Support for the Democratic Opposition of Iraq
Executive Summary
This report is submitted in accordance with Section 10008 of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Recissions Act (P.L. 105-174) (hereinafter, "the Act"). The Act requires the Secretary of State to submit a detailed report to the appropriate Committees of Congress on plans to establish a program to support the democratic opposition in Iraq. The detailed plan provided in this report reflects our current planning and should not be misinterpreted to be a fixed blueprint. It represents our best current estimate of how a unique--in some ways unprecedented--program will likely proceed. The Department of State will provide frequent updates to Congress as changes and refinements inevitably occur.
Iraqi opposition groups reflect the diverse nature of the Iraq people. They represent the popular struggle by the people against a brutal, repressive regime that has been under way ever since Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti seized power. Many groups have been formed to represent the Shi'a and Sunni Arabs, the Kurds and Turkomen of northern Iraq, and Assyrian, and other Christian minorities. Politically, their ideologies range from constitutional monarchy to communism, from Islamic activism to nonpartisan support for the restoration of the rule of law and human rights.
Most of today's Iraqi opposition groups espouse a pluralistic society and a democratic political system. However, achieving consensus among groups has been difficult even though all are faced with the repressive dictatorship of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime. From 1992-95, most of the major political groups were active in the Iraqi National Congress (INC) umbrella organization. Since then, political infighting has reached extreme levels, with some groups even engaged in armed conflict with each other. Many INC members have formally withdrawn or "frozen" their membership. Remaining members are generally inactive; the INC has continued to carry on its work, but has not held a plenary session since 1992.
The central goal of US support for the democratic opposition of Iraq is to encourage a unity of purpose through which these groups can present a credible alternative to dictatorship and repression. We seek to encourage a united opposition to the present regime with the shared goals of fostering a pluralistic, post-dictatorship Iraq on behalf of the Iraqi people, that is secure and unified within present borders, at peace with itself and its neighbors, and in voluntary compliance with UN resolutions.
To achieve these goals, the Department of State will fluid programs to support the opposition, implemented by established non-governmental organizations (NGOs) US federal institutions (FIs) and independent contractors. The Secretary of State intends to create the position of Special Representative to the Iraqi Opposition (SRIO) principal manager for all Iraqi opposition Economic Support Funds (ESF). The position would be filled by an appropriately senior Foreign Service Officer. The SRIO will report to the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), coordinating with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy Human Rights and Labor ([DRL) and the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (S/WCI).
The Act grants the US government the authority to provide support to the Iraqi opposition "notwithstanding any other provision of law." This key clause--which should be retained in any future appropriations for the Iraqi opposition and Iraq war crimes efforts--would make it possible to create a flexible program, avoiding the severe limitations originally put in place to restrict dealings with the Government of Iraq. The level of detail provided here is meant to illustrate to Congress the manner in which the administration will use this extraordinary authority.
The SRIO will encourage NGO/FI and independent contractor program implementors to take a flexible and innovative approach in implementing these programs. The detailed plan outlined here is meant to make the direction and goals of the new programs clear, not to preclude changes, additions or new NGO/FI initiatives as circumstances and experience indicate.
We will encourage participation in these programs by all INC constituent groups and leadership, as well as political and nonpartisan Iraqi opposition groups outside the INC. Participating groups will be required to state their support for the principals of pluralism and representative government and to engage constructively in program activities. The Secretary expects that a significant portion of the support will go towards groups now or formerly active in the INC; most major opposition groups, although no longer active in the organization, are still members. Details of specific levels of support provided to various groups will be made available after grants are awarded and the groups actually participate in the programs
Based on consultations with numerous opposition groups, five major interlocking program categories have been established. To work effectively, they must be conducted as a comprehensive whole. The first two programs--organization building and coalition building--address the opposition's structural and organizational needs. The final three--implementing UN resolutions, a pluralistic Iraq, and Iraqi war crimes--are thematic programs which will help unify the opposition.
*Organization Building: Developing management skills and building membership; training the rank-and-file in word processing, fund raising, media relations, etc. Support to conduct membership drives and provide computers, fax machines, etc., with an emphasis on using these new skills and equipment in conjunction with the three thematic programs. $1,150,000
*Coalition Building: Support for a new opposition-wide newsletter and a London "Iraq Center" to present reports and conferences related to the three thematic programs. This will lead to grass-roots confidence building and dialogue groups and senior leadership meetings, which may, in turn, lead to a general opposition congress. $630,000
*Theme: Implementing UN Resolutions: Support for opposition leaders to focus on Iraqi government compliance (or lack thereof) with relevant UNSC resolutions. Two areas in which they have already expressed strong interest are violations of the human rights provisions of UNSCR 688, and the UN's "oil-for-food" program. The opposition will have the ability to express and publicize their views via delegations to the UN and to Security Council and other capitals $375,000.
*Theme: A Pluralistic Iraq: Support for conferences/monographs to discuss restoring the rule of law, rebuilding the economy, etc. In conjunction with the Coalition Building effort, this will lead to opposition committee meetings and an opposition-wide plenary on Iraq's future to identify the benefits of a pluralistic Iraq. $675,000
*Theme: War Crimes/Crimes Against Humanity: Support for the more than five million war crimes documents already in the public domain to be collected, analyzed and translated for use in international education and media efforts, to draw up model legal briefs, and in opposition governmental liaison. Video evidence will be digitized and indexed. $2,170,000.
Budgetary notes:
1) The Act earmarks $5 million in ESF in support for the Iraqi democratic opposition as an emergency earmark. The Administration sees this as the start of a renewed effort to work with the opposition which will very probably require significant additional funding in FY99 and beyond.
2) The mix of expenditures on different aspects of this plan may vary considerably from these initial estimates, in order to ensure flexibility and to encourage the opposition to seize opportunities as they arise. The Department of State will inform the Congress when changes and refinements to the plan are made.
3) This plan does not include the $5 million appropriated for Radio Free Iraq, which will be created and administered by Radio Free Iraq/Radio Liberty.
4) Implementation, evaluation and independent contractor costs will be covered from within amounts allocated for each program. In exceptional instances, evaluation costs have been listed as a separate line-item.
Support for the Democratic Opposition of Iraq
Organization Building
Background:
During its many years in exile, the Iraqi opposition has presented a tenacious resistance to one of the world's most repressive regimes. In these difficult circumstances, creating and sustaining opposition groups has been a major achievement in itself. In many cases, the groups have had to operate on a shoestring, with little or no organizational infrastructure. Organizational building seeks to help the opposition help itself by developing greater institutional strength. Enlarging group memberships and improving group administration are the two primary objectives of the organization building program
Program Objectives:
*To get more expatriate Iraqis to become actively involved in opposition groups and to ensure that they have an effective voice in establishing opposition programs and policies
*To help improve the managerial and administrative skills of the opposition groups' leadership.
Program Activities:
Organizational Skills
Group leaders will be invited to a series of seminars conducted by organizational management consultants. The seminars will emphasize membership outreach and best-practices for administering activist and political organizations.
At the same time, training sessions will be held for working-level members on office administration, fund- raising, grant proposal writing, accounting, data processing, intra- and inter-group communications, desktop publishing, web/internet usage, media relations, and related topics.
To supplement these formal seminar and training activities, groups with strong expertise in a particular area (e.g., the INC secretariat's Internet skill) will be encouraged to share expertise and undertake cooperative efforts with other groups. For all of the sessions, formal or informal, the practical application of new skills will be emphasized. This will naturally center on the unifying themes of war crimes documentation and research, ways to publicize the Iraqi government's poor record on implementing the UN's "oil-for-food" program, etc., described below. In this way, the opposition will be encouraged from the outset to use its new organizational skills for cooperation rather than competition.
For both leadership and rank-and-file, the sessions will be open to INC and non-INC members, and to nonpartisan as well as political opposition groups. To maximize attendance and minimize travel and per diem costs, the sessions will be conducted in communities where opposition groups have established themselves: London, Amman, Jordan, and Washington, DC. In London, the Iraq Center--part of the coalition building program described below--will be a focus for this training activity. At least initially, some opposition groups may prefer not to participate in training with other opposition groups. If necessary, the NGO/FI program administrators may arrange for multiple, parallel sessions.
Most of the seminar and training sessions described above will take place during the early stages of the overall opposition program, but NGO/FI program administrators will keep in reserve some funds for refresher training, to address needs which initially may not have been identified, and to allow groups which initially did not participate to do so.
Organizational Development
So that groups can take advantage of the new organizational skills they have acquired, limited in-kind support will be provided for projects they decide to undertake. The support will be disbursed on a competitive grant basis, with a preference for proposals from groups which have taken part in organizational skills programs or which demonstrate such competence. Preference will also be given to proposals submitted cooperatively by INC-member groups or by ad hoc consortia of more than one group. This start-up support is intended to help groups build towards an independent, cooperative, active existence. It is not meant to provide a continuing subsidy for group operations.
Two areas will receive special emphasis in awarding grants: a) activities designed to increase the number and participation of rank-and-file organization members; and b) the purchase of startup office equipment (including fax machines, personal computer equipment and software, and the establishment of Internet accounts) to encourage greater communication among groups and help them make their presence felt worldwide.
Membership development grants may be used for any of the activities associated with building a political movement, such as conducting local rallies, printing fliers and posters, mass mailings, telephone canvassing, television and radio advertising (on Arabic-, Kurdish-, and Assyrian-language media), and setting up and maintaining Internet list servers and web sites. Wherever possible, grant proposals should describe ways in which group members will be encouraged to volunteer their time to help make membership programs a success.. And, where possible, membership initiatives should be linked to volunteer efforts on such unifying thematic initiatives as war crimes and "oil-for-food."
Computer hardware and software purchased under this program should address a wide variety of organizational needs and outreach goals, among them: word processing, membership lists, desktop publishing, Internet access and websites. All equipment and software should be Y2K compliant and interoperable with equipment used by other groups. An effort will be made to ensure that the equipment provided to each group can form the basis of an opposition-wide computer network; trainers, program administrators, and Department of State personnel will encourage the opposition to develop such a network. Each grant proposal for computer hardware or software must explain how the equipment will be used on unifying projects (such as the war crimes, "oil-for-food," or pluralistic Iraq initiatives), describe how electronic security will be ensured (e.g., the purchase or lease of legally exportable encryption software), and provide follow-up verification that the equipment is being used as intended.
Program Evaluation:
Because the level of organizational sophistication varies significantly from group to group, a pre-evaluation of the groups' capacities and needs will be conducted. This will enable NGO/FI program administrators to prioritize their efforts, in consultation with Department of State personnel.
Contract seminar leaders and trainers conducting organizational skills programs will assess the progress made by individuals and groups in their sessions, reporting their findings to the NGO/FI program implementors. The implementors will audit the growth in membership and assess the extent to which new capabilities are being applied to unifying opposition-wide projects (e.g., war crimes, "oil-for-food", etc.)
Groups participating in these programs will file quarterly financial and narrative reports. Program implementors will visit organization offices to review the effectiveness of the program, to explore new ways in which the US can be of assistance, and to help ensure that word processing and other equipment provided by the program is used for authorized purposes only.
Organizations will be encouraged to provide descriptions and samples of newsletters, website pages, press packages, media advertising etc. developed or improved as a result of the management and organizational sessions. Organizations will also be encouraged to invite program administrators and USO personnel to rallies, rank-and-file meetings, etc., to promote an active dialogue in building organizations and their membership.
Estimated Budget:
Pre-evaluation: $ 20,000
Management Seminars: 80,000
Organizational Skills Training: 250,000
Membership Development Programs: 350,000
Computer/Internet Development Programs: 450,000
Total: $ 1,150,000
Support for the Democratic Opposition of Iraq
Coalition Building
Background:
Iraq's diverse ethnic, religious, linguistic and ideological mix is reflected in its varied civil society and political culture. While the Baathist dictatorship has suppressed these healthy differences inside Iraq, in exile, the opposition has maintained them. The regime's intense efforts to divide and destroy the opposition, moreover, has added to historic divisiveness among opposition groups. The geographic dispersal of Iraqi expatriates has added to the problem. The coalition building program seeks to overcome these differences, encourage communication among opposition groups and among Iraqi expatriate communities, and help the opposition develop working coalitions leading to the re-creation of a permanent cooperative structure.
Program Objectives:
* To encourage more open dialogue among various elements of the democratic opposition and among the expatriate Iraqi community.
* To foster cohesion and a unity of purpose among Iraqi organizations both within and outside the INC structure, and to encourage groups to build coalitions to work together towards common goals.
* To help resolve conflicts, where they exist, between Iraqi opposition groups.
Program Activities:
Iraq Center
To provide a neutral meeting place for all Iraqi opposition groups and a forum for the open exchange of ideas, an Iraq Center will be created in a suburban London location. Among other programs, the Center will host regular opposition-group meetings, open to all elements of the opposition, including both INC and non-INC affiliated groups. The Center itself will not take positions on matters of politics or policy. It will serve as a forum for activities involving themes such as war crimes and human rights in Iraq, Iraqi refugees worldwide, a pluralistic Iraqi civil society, conflict resolution between opposition groups, and institution building, but it will not directly fund or sponsor such activities.
The center will be composed of rented office space with easy access to public transportation. It will include conference and meeting rooms, a small research library, computer facilities (offering internet access and a common internet server for groups too small to obtain one for themselves), small offices and/or office cubicles for opposition groups wishing to maintain a presence at the Center, and administrative offices.
Administrative staff will be limited to a Director and an Administrative Assistant Librarian. Data processing support, custodial and security services will be provided, contractually. NCO/FI program administrators will determine how the positions will be filled and if there is a need for a non-partisan board of directors. In making these decisions they should consult with existing Iraqi community groups and HMG. This process is important, because it will help ensure that the Center remains a neutral, apolitical forum serving the opposition, rather than a new political entity within the opposition.
Ideally, the applicants for the two administrative positions should be Iraqi nationals or dual nationals, fluent in English and Arabic, and not affiliated with an opposition group. The director will be responsible for scheduling Center events, encouraging opposition groups to utilize the Center's facilities, and ensuring that the Center is used only for activities of the Iraqi democratic opposition and not for other purposes. The Administrative Assistant Librarian will serve as receptionist, maintain the research library and computer facilities, and assist the director as required.
To encourage the full utilization of the Center, the director will encourage the voluntary participation of Iraqi opposition groups, expatriate Iraqi individuals, and academic and journalistic researchers interested in Iraq. Monetary and in-kind contributions from opposition groups, Iraqi expatriates and others may be accepted to furnish the Center, provide library materials, etc. USG funding will only provide a bare minimum of facilities; the Center will necessarily also have to rely on non-USG funding.
London is the natural location for such a Center because most opposition groups maintain their headquarters or significant branch offices there. The suburban location is designed to minimize costs and to underscore that the Center is a non-profit, nonpartisan institution promoting Iraqi opposition unity, and not a forum for UK-resident Iraqi expatriates in their dealings with HMG. Before proceeding, the USG will confer with HMG on the best ways to implement this program.
Leadership Meetings
While the senior leaders of Iraqi opposition groups share many positive goals for their nation, they have been divided on strategy and programs. In several instances, their rivalry has deepened into rhetorical infighting and even armed conflict.
To help resolve these differences, opposition leaders will be encouraged to meet at a senior level. The meetings might be bilateral or multilateral, possibly involving the mediation of other opposition groups, but more likely involving only the groups in question and mediators in a private setting. The thematic programs described below (particularly the enforcement of UN resolutions and war crimes) might be the primary agenda for the initial sessions to maintain a focus on practical, confidence-building steps which can be taken now--rather than to attempt to address immediately all of the political differences between parties. Significant preparatory diplomacy may be necessary before these meetings can be arranged. Traditional Iraqi mechanisms for conflict resolution and coalition building will be used whenever possible.
Opposition Digest
With so many different groups, there is no single, reliable source of information on Iraqi opposition activities. To aid in the dissemination of information both between groups and to outside parties interested in the Iraqi opposition, a nonpartisan opposition group will be provided with the resources with which to publish a monthly digest drawn from the public newsletters, press releases, and web sites of all other groups and wire service and newspaper reports. Particular emphasis will be given to the unifying themes of war crimes, equitable implementation of UN resolutions, etc. The digest should avoid editorial positions regarding issues internal to the opposition, submitted by writers from two or more opposition groups, will be encouraged.
The grant for this project will be awarded competitively by the program administrators. The recipient organization must be able to gather and edit significant opposition information into a 30-40 page monthly Arabic-language digest; arrange for the accurate translation of this publication into Kurdish, English and French; print and disseminate via the mail 2,000-3,000 copies each month; and post a multi-language electronic version onto the group's website.
Grass-Roots Confidence Building
An estimated two to three million Iraqis now live in self-imposed exile in refugee communities worldwide. Unfortunately, in many of these communities, contacts between Iraqis from different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups are limited.
As a counterpart to encouraging senior leaders to work together, local community leaders will be asked to reach out across the dividing lines to establish community-wide programs and initiatives. Facilitators will conduct a series of meetings with community leaders to help initiate this cooperation. The first step is an evaluation of communities where cooperation is most needed and most possible. Because of the limited initial funding, it is likely that the initial grant will only permit work in the most promising expatriate population centers.
Next, the facilitators will establish direct contact with community leaders in selected communities. The facilitators will arrange dialogue sessions among community leaders to establish areas of common interest and to encourage them to initiate programs benefiting the entire local Iraqi community. In consideration of the vital role which Iraqi women have often played in their communities, the facilitators should not overlook the contribution they might make to this process. Besides issues of purely local concern, this dialogue should include a discussion of unifying political themes, such as the war crimes initiative, etc. Finally, NOOIFI program implementors will report on the results of the community-wide programs and describe any increase in communication across internal community boundaries.
General Opposition Congress
The democratic opposition of Iraq has not met in a general session since the last INC conference in Salahedin in 1992. The USG must be prepared to make available sufficient resources to cover a substantial proportion of the costs for such a conference when the INC or an ad hoc consortium of opposition groups generates significant support for one. As many as 400-500 delegates might attend this high-visibility session. Most of the delegates will have been long active in Iraqi opposition politics, but it is to be hoped that a significant number will be drawn from newly active members and from grass-roots confidence building.
Properly conducted, such a large-scale conference would cost an estimated $800,000 to $1 million. Setting aside such a large sum for an event which may not take place during the time-frame of this plan would force cuts in other important projects. The Administration will request the required finds through the reprogramming of other ESF funds or from other sources when the opposition program progresses to the point that a large-scale conference is possible.
A general conference would discuss common ideals of the opposition on unity, territorial integrity, pluralism and power sharing, democracy, human fights,. civil society and other principals. It would build on the thematic programs of a pluralistic Iraq, enforcing UN resolutions and war crimes, described below. It would be inappropriate, however, for the USG to convene or organize such a conference. This initiative must develop as a natural outgrowth of the work of the Iraqi opposition and the needs of the Iraqi people. By engaging in the thematic programs, conducting senior leadership meetings and rebuilding a committee system, the opposition can build consensus on which to base a productive general conference.
Program Evaluation:
The Director of the Iraq Center will coordinate with the NOO/FI program implementors on progress towards establishing the center, its utilization by the opposition and Iraqi expatriates working on opposition causes, and the programs and meetings held there.
Program implementors and Department of State personnel will report on their efforts to help arrange senior leadership meetings, and the contribution of these meetings in encouraging opposition unity. They will also report on progress towards a general opposition conference.
The director of the Iraq Center and groups participating in the programs outlined above will file quarterly financial and narrative reports.
Program implementors and the Department of State will receive copies of the opposition digest in each of the published languages.
Program implementors will conduct a preliminary survey of Iraqi expatriate communities worldwide to assess where grassroots confidence building programs would have the greatest potential for success. They will report on their subsequent visits to these communities and on community-based projects and work on unifying themes resulting from this effort which help foster a sense of pan-Iraqi unity across previously divided expatriate sub-communities.
Estimated Budget:
Iraq Center: $ 225,000
Rent and Utilities: 100,000
Administrative Salaries: 45,000
Computer Equipment: 45,000
Contractual Services: 30,000
Supplies/Communications/Misc.: 5,000
Leadership Meetings: 25,000
Opposition Digest: 275,000
Salaries: 70,000
Rent and utilities: 20,000
Translation: 120,000
Printing: 25,000
Distribution/Mailing 15,000
Equipment (e.g., PC's, scanners) 10,000
Supplies/miscellaneous 5,000
Grass-Roots Confidence Building 105,000
Preliminary Evaluation 10,000
Facilitator Travel/Accommodations 60,000
Facilitator per diem 20,000
Meeting Space Rental 5,000
Administrative/Miscellaneous 5,000
Final Evaluations 5,000
Grand Total $630,000
Support for the Democratic Opposition of Iraq
Theme: Implementing UN Resolutions
Background: C)
In the past, Iraqi. Opposition delegations traveled to New York for UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions reviews and other major decisions on Iraq. Their engagement helped ensure that the views of the Iraqi people were represented in UN decision-making. Unfortunately, this activity has languished in recent years as opposition groups ran short of funds. As a result, the Government of Iraq (GOI) went unchallenged when it misleadingly claimed to represent the Iraqi people's interests.
The opposition's absence from New York has had a particularly telling effect in two areas. First, they had been very effective in their insistence the Baathist regime strictly abide by the terms of UNSC resolution 688--which calls on Baghdad to respect the human rights of the Iraqi people--but now they are not adequately being heard. For example, in recent months, the. Special Rapporteur for Iraq has publicized credible reports that the regime has carried out the summary execution of thousands of political prisoners. The US and a few other nations have denounced these atrocities. But, without the presence of representatives of the victims, UN deliberations on Iraq have often moved forward as if nothing out of the ordinary were happening in Iraq.
Second, in UN deliberations on the "oil-for-food" program (UNSC Resolutions 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153), the opposition's support for UN successes in meeting the needs of the people--and their criticism of GOI inequities in administering the program--have largely gone unheeded. The Government of Iraq has cut off oil sales, added non-humanitarian items to the distribution plan, given preferential treatment to regime supporters, denied rations to perceived opponents, arbitrarily reduced the nutritional content of the "food basket," redirected previously-purchased pharmaceuticals to the black market for profit as UN-program pharmaceuticals became available, forced Iraqi citizens to pay for humanitarian supplies, and used other techniques to undermine a successful UN program for propaganda purposes.
The Iraqi opposition clearly desires to be able to convey its views on these issues to the UN. The US should assist the opposition in making its voice heard in New York once again.
Program Objectives:
To enable opposition leaders to reestablish direct contact with senior officials of the UN Secretariat, members of UN national delegations and key decision makers in delegation capitols.
*To ensure that opposition views on Baghdad's continuing, severe abuses of human rights, in violation of UNSC resolution 688, are adequately heard.
*To enable the opposition to help ensure that food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies are equitably distributed to the Iraqi population under the UN "oil-for-food" program, by informing UN decision-makers of GOI obstruction of the "oil-for-food" program in order to strengthen the efforts of the UN Secretariat to obtain a reasonable distribution plan from the GOI and help ensure equitable UNSCR 1153 implementation.
* To quickly reestablish solidarity between Iraqi opposition groups which have seldom worked together over the past several years.
Program Activities:
UN Delegations
Opposition delegations from both INC and non-INC-affiliated groups will be provided with support to allow them to travel to New York for consultations with UN officials and Security Council missions, accompanied by support staff and opposition economic/development experts. Discussions will center on UNSC resolutions concerning Iraq, such as 688 and 986/1153. The visits might coincide with reviews of the "oil-for-food" program, with each sanctions review, and with new incidents of regime human rights abuses. Delegations might be comprised of 5-10 individuals, selected by the consensus of all interested opposition groups.
Analyzing the Iraqi "Oil-For-Food" Implementation
As noted above, implementation of UNSCR 986 and subsequent resolutions has consistently failed to address the needs of the most vulnerable portions of Iraqi society. Sufficient food, medical and other supplies are clearly reaching Iraq to meet the needs of all of the people, but Baghdad's implementation creates disparities. The Secretary General has just concluded another intensive effort to obtain a better distribution plan for the expanded "oil-for-food" program (UNSCR 1153), but reports indicate that the GOI may again attempt to hobble the UN effort. The new plan went into effect in May 1998.
Opposition leaders and opposition economic/development experts who wish to be heard on this issue will be encouraged to undertake an in-depth analysis of the new distribution plan and its implementation. They may choose to prepare a critique of the existing plan, examine the manner in which the plan is being implemented or even draft a new model distribution plan. when the review is complete, opposition leaders may choose to convene a small conference to discuss and publicize these issues. They may present their final report and recommendations to the UN and to Security Council members.
Briefings in Capitals
To supplement activities at the UN in New York opposition delegations of 3-4 individuals, selected by the consensus of interested opposition groups, will be provided with support to allow them to travel to UNSC and other capitals. Program implementors will authorize reimbursement for this travel on a case-by-case basis, with particular emphasis placed on nations which receive senior GOI leaders. Local US Embassies might meet with the delegations, though all logistical arrangements and requests for meetings will be made by the delegation's support staff.
Program Evaluation:
While it is not possible to measure directly the effects of opposition delegations on UNSC decision making, a number of objective measures can help gauge whether the opposition is making itself heard. Delegation support staff will be asked to report on the number and level of delegation meetings in New York and in capitals. Delegation staff and participating opposition groups will also be encouraged to keep a record of press reports of these meetings.
Program implementors will confirm and report on the opposition analysis of the UNSCR 1153 distribution plan and interventions on 688 issues. Groups participating in these programs will file quarterly financial and narrative reports.
Estimated Budget:
UN Delegations: $ 175,000
Travel 75,000
Accommodation 85,000
Per Diem 15,000
Briefings in Capitals 175,000
Travel 100,000
Accommodation 65,000
Per Diem 10,000
"Oil-for-Food" Analysis 25,000
Total $ 375,000
Support for the Democratic Opposition of Iraq
Theme: A Pluralistic Iraq
Background:
Every Iraqi opposition organization describes in general terms its vision for the future of the Iraqi state. The INC (among opposition political organizations) and the Free Iraq Foundation (among nonpartisan opposition groups) have probably done the most to encourage a cross-group dialogue on Iraq's future, but this work is far from complete. There are significant areas for discussion on Iraq's political structure, re-establishing the rule of law, the role of the Iraqi military, Iraq's economic development, the transition from dictatorship to pluralism, the legal and political implications of a government in exile, and a host of other subjects.
Encouraging this dialogue serves two concrete purposes, going far beyond an academic exploration of Iraq's future potential. First, by bringing together Iraqis of all political orientations with Iraqi expatriate and western professionals from the fields under discussion, it will encourage the formation of unifying opposition and expatriate networks across group lines. Second, by establishing a consensus on the transition from dictatorship to pluralism and the nature of Iraqi society after that transition, it helps ensure that a post-dictatorship Iraq will itself be unified, peaceful and secure within its existing territorial boundaries.
Program Objectives:
* Help build a consensus among the Iraqi opposition on the transition from dictatorship to pluralism.
* Help build a consensus among the opposition on the nature of Iraqi civil arid political society in a pluralistic state.
* Build on the dialogue, seminars, etc. to create a core committee structure covering a full spectrum of future governmental activities.
Program Activities:
Research Monographs
NGO/FI program implementors will award research grants on subjects related to Iraq's transition from dictatorship to pluralism and Iraq's potential after the dictatorship ends. In awarding grants, the program administrators will give preference to Iraqi nationals or dual nationals who oppose the existing regime, who are conducting graduate or post graduate research, and whose work relates to upcoming thematic conferences, where their results can be presented. Joint monographs from researchers with diverse professional backgrounds or different political perspectives will be encouraged. 6-10 research grants would be awarded each year. Research grant recipients will report every six months to program implementors to describe the progress in their research.
Thematic Conferences
NGO/FI program implementors will facilitate a continuing series of small conferences (as many as 10-15 each year) bringing together members of the Iraqi opposition, opposition leaders, Iraqi- expatriate and western professionals from the field being discussed, as well as representatives from other current or past external opposition movements. Additionally, the Department of State will host 3-4 conferences each fiscal year. The conferences will be held in a variety of locations, to make it easy for a wide variety of participants to attend. Ideally, there might be a half dozen conferences in the US, in London at the Iraq Center, and at other locations (including in the Middle East region and possibly including cities active in the grass-roots confidence building program). Naturally the size and venue for each conference will be for the program implementors and opposition participants to decide, but we would expect that normally about 5-10 panelists and 20-40 participants would be invited. Ideally, conference subjects will be apportioned among the three geographical sectors to minimize topical overlap at any one location during any one fiscal year.
A special effort will be made to invite members of the INC's former committee most closely related to the conference topic. Some conferences will be open to press coverage and to members of the general public (at the discretion of and by prior arrangement with the conference organizers), while others will be closed to the press and the public.
Conference topics might include, but would not be limited to: Iraq's future political structure; maintaining Iraq's unity and territorial integrity; re-establishing the rule of law; restoring Iraqi civil society; human, civil and minority rights in Iraq; women in Iraqi society; federalism vs. centralism in Iraq; the role of the Iraqi military; war crimes prosecutions, amnesty and truth commissions; Iraq's economic potential; reintegrating Iraq into the global financial system; the redevelopment of Iraq's petroleum sector; the role of the UN in Iraq's economic development; rebuilding the middle class; the transition from dictatorship to pluralism; the legal and political implications of a government in exile; Iraq's frozen assets under international and national law; the future constitution of Iraq; reforming and rebuilding Iraq's educational system; restoring Iraq's public health sector; establishing a market economy; and Iraq's future international relations.
Within the overall program budget of $5 million, we anticipate that approximately $490,000 will be set aside for conference purposes. This would cover at most 8-12 conferences by the end of FY99. If this initial conference series is successful particularly, if it leads to greater unity within the opposition, as outlined below, the Administration may consider reprogramming an additional $0.25 to $0.5 million in FY99 for 3-6 additional conferences and will make it a regular part of our opposition program in future years.
Proceedings and Media/Internet Outreach
Iraqi groups active in the conferences will publish conference proceedings and serve as the clearinghouse for follow-up media and internet outreach on the covered topics.
Committee Meetings
As noted above, the organizers of thematic conferences will make a special effort to invite members of the former INC committee most closely related to the conference topic. When practical, they will encourage committee members and/or group representatives with a strong interest in a former committee's work to hold follow-up sessions to discuss opposition programs based on conference findings. These committee sessions might also cover aspects of the conference topic which the committee members preferred to not discuss in a public forum. Grants for travel and related expenses associated with committee meetings may be awarded to committee members on a case-by-case basis.
Plenary on Iraq's Future
Building on the work of the conferences and committees, and preliminary to a general opposition congress, opposition groups may decide to hold a plenary session on Iraq's future. If they do, USG involvement would follow the same ground rules described for a general congress in the Coalition Building program above.
As with the General Opposition Congress (see section on Coalition Building), this initiative must spring organically from the work of the Iraqi opposition and the needs of the Iraqi people. The opposition must be fully agreed on the agenda, venue, participation and procedural rules before USG funding is provided. As many as 250 participants might attend this high-visibility session. It is unlikely that the opposition will reach a consensus on a plenary session during FY98, but such a meeting may be possible in FY99. USG funding must be available whenever the opposition is ready. As with the General Congress, this activity, with a total cost of perhaps $400,000-$500,000 should be funded as part of FY99 ESF, rather than held aside from the 1998 Supplemental appropriation.
Program Evaluation:
Program implementors will survey published research monographs, reviews of the monographs, conference records, press accounts of the conferences, and the number of internet hits of sites providing information on these activities. This will aid them in assessing the effectiveness and public impact of the research and conference activities.
Program administrators will report on efforts to arrange committee meetings as a follow-up to conference activity, and the contribution of these committees to opposition programs and unity. The Department of State will report on progress towards convening an opposition plenary session on Iraq's future.
Groups participating in these programs will file quarterly financial and narrative reports.
Estimated Budget:
Research Monographs: $ 110,000
Thematic Conferences: 490,000
US Conferences: 120,000
London Conferences: 70,000
Conferences in other locations: 160,000
Selected participant/panelist travel: 70,000
Selected partic./panel. accommodations: 50,060
Selected partic./panel. per diem: 20,000
Proceedings and Media/internet Outreach: 40,000
Committee Meetings: 35,000
Grand Total: $ 675,000
Support for the Democratic Opposition of Iraq
Theme: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
Background:
The Iraqi regime's record of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law is notorious and well-documented. Human rights groups and the UN Special Rapporteur for Iraq have described the regime's use of chemical weapons against Iran during the 1981-88 Iran-Iraq War; the "Anfal" campaign against the Kurds in 1988-89 from which 100,000-200,000 persons are still missing, the use of chemical weapons against civilians at Halabja and at other sites during the Anfal, war crimes and crimes against humanity directed against Kuwaiti civilians and Coalition forces during the 1990-91 Gulf War, and possible genocide in military operations against Marsh Arab civilians that have destroyed most of Iraq's southern marshes.
War crimes are without question the single greatest unifying issue for the Iraqi opposition. Opposition groups are, by and large, made up of individuals who have suffered at the hands of the regime. War crimes initiatives link opposition groups together and help link all the groups to nations in the Gulf region and beyond (e.g., Kuwait, Iran and the United States) which were also subjected to war crimes in the course of military conflicts with the GOI.
A wealth of material on possible Iraqi war crimes is already available to researchers and jurists investigating the Anfal campaign and the 1990-91 Gulf War. Over five million documents captured by the Kurds in 1991 were safeguarded outside Iraq by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and preserved on 176 CD-ROM diskettes. Millions of Iraqi documents seized by allied forces after the liberation of Kuwait City are maintained by the Government of Kuwait. To be usable, however, this mass of documents requires a large-scale program of indexing, translation and document analysis, informed by the requirements of possible future legal proceedings.
For other war crimes incidents, only limited information is presently available. This is particularly true for the use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops during the 1981-88 Iran-Iraq war, and the destruction of the southern marshes.
Program Objectives:
· To raise international awareness of the Iraqi regime's record of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
· To insure that past Iraqi war crimes are not left behind in the push for a permanent international criminal court to prosecute future war crimes.
· To help develop working-level war-crimes affairs contacts among Iraqi opposition groups and between these groups and international human rights and legal organizations.
* To collect, analyze and disseminate evidentiary material of the type which could be used by a Commission of Experts, an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, or by a successor government to indict and prosecute Saddam Hussein and key members of his regime.
· To help reestablish solidarity between Iraqi opposition groups that have not worked together over the past several years
Program Activities:
Each functional activity described below will play an important role in the opposition effort on Iraqi war crimes. Most, if not all, opposition political and human rights groups will be able to participate in the extensive effort outlined here, with the activities of any one group spread across several functional areas. Each group will be encouraged to create a customized human rights/war crimes program and to submit an overall grant request to. program implementors, who will review applications to ensure coordination of efforts among groups.
The programs outlined here include the USG share of funding only. It is important to note that this will not be sufficient to cover all of the projected costs of a vigorous war crimes initiative. Other donors, both public and private, will be encouraged to join this effort and provide substantial additional finding.
Nonpartisan opposition groups with a special focus on human rights and Iraqi war crimes will likely receive the majority of the USG grants; they will be encouraged to create specialized programs and branch offices to fill specific needs. General opposition political groups will likely create smaller programs in which a single individual may perform several of the functions described here.
Documentation
This program will necessarily be large because of the large number of documents already available and the likelihood that additional information will come to light. It will include indexing and abstracting documents that are or will soon be available in the public domain; flagging key documents for translation; noting the importance of documents for legal, education and media programs; comparing documents to find similar command and control patterns, particularly in different theaters of operation; creating bibliographies; and writing research summaries on particular incidents, type of activity, etc.
Priorities for documentary analysis will include the chemical attack at Halabja in which 5000 civilians were killed, the killing of Kuwaiti civilians during the Gulf War, the Anfal campaign against civilians, the southern marshes campaign against civilians, the use of chemical weapons against Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war, the killing of civilians in Iraq and the identification of mass graves sites, allegations that Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programs may have used humans as experimental subjects, the ongoing ethnic cleansing of non-Arabs from Kirkuk and other northern cities, and the oil fires intentionally set prior to the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Audio/Video Evidence Digitization and Indexing
Videotape evidence of Iraqi war crimes provides the most persuasive evidence of the criminal nature of the present Iraqi regime. As a result of allied efforts to document Iraqi atrocities during the 1990-91 Gulf War, Iranian efforts to document Iraqi atrocities during the 1981-88 Iran-Iraq War, and the extensive international media coverage of Iraq throughout the past two decades, a large quantity of video imagery related to Iraqi war crimes exists. At present, however, it is scattered in various video archives throughout the world. State-of-the-art technology makes it possible to digitize and index these images, so that jurists, researchers and journalists can instantly access the imagery they are seeking.
Like many other opposition movements, Iraqi opposition groups do not possess the technology or expertise required for this effort. In similar circumstances in Bosnia and Rwanda, human rights organizations specializing in this sort of work carried out the Audio/Video projects. Opposition groups participating in war crimes coordination activities will be supported by specialized A/V organizations. For the remaining months of FY98, $80,000 is allotted to this effort in order to begin the process. For FY99, significant additional finding (as much as $700,000-800,000) drawn from International Organization Activities and Programs (IO), other USG sources, or from other contributors, should be provided.
Collection
Opposition groups regularly receive word from sources in Iraq about ongoing human rights violations there. In addition to the support provided to set up special human rights/war crimes centers within opposition groups, additional in-kind support will be available to help these groups disseminate their reports to a wider audience.
An important international effort complementing these opposition efforts should also be mentioned here. Because of its concern over the human rights situation in Iraq, the UN has, since 1991, conducted its own, independent effort to gather information. As part of this effort, the UN Special Rapporteur for Iraq has for many years asked the GOI to permit UN monitors to enter Iraq to collect information on current and past human rights abuses, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The GOI has persistently refused to grant this access, and has even denied the Special Rapporteur entry to Iraq on all but one occasion. As a fallback, the Special Rapporteur has asked the UN to fund Human Rights Monitors stationed in countries around Iraq in order to interview Iraqi refugees, but financial support has not been forthcoming.
While the Special Rapporteur's reports are unconnected to opposition efforts on this same subject, the two tracks work side by side on precisely the same problems. Rather than fund a new opposition effort on human rights monitors, monitor activity should remain under the supervision of the Special Rapporteur to ensure objectivity, to enhance safety, and to deflect spurious GOI claims that human rights reports from opposition groups are biased. The USG should fund half a dozen full-time UN monitors as part of FY99 International Organization and Programs (IO) funds, and should encourage other UN members to take similar steps. The estimated cost to the US would be $400,000-$500,000.
Human Rights/War Crimes Centers
As noted above, every Iraqi opposition group has suffered some form of human rights abuse at the hands of the Iraq regime, including possible war crimes. Many opposition political groups have in-house collections of documents and eye-witness accounts. The holdings of the Shi'a opposition groups are of particular interest because they may help document events during the Iran-Iraq war and in the regime's campaign to drain the southern marshes. To systematize these important holdings and to make them available to Iraqi war crimes researchers, in-kind support will be provided for about half a dozen major groups to create a small, 2-3 person, human rights/war crimes centers. Personnel will receive initial training at the coordination center described below.
Copies of the 176 CD-ROM diskettes on the Anfal campaign were provided recently to the two major Iraqi Kurdish factions. They are now stored at the Universities of Irbil and Suleymaniyah. In-kind support will be provided to establish Human Rights Centers at each university--under the auspices of major Kurdish, Assyrian and Turkoman political organizations--to take advantage of these unique resources. The two centers would be headed by full professors, supported by 4-5 assistant lecturers and staff. As with other war crimes efforts, additional finding to round out the USG effort might be sought by the universities, once the programs are established.
Translation/Interpretation
Two separate translation initiatives are required as part of the overall war crimes effort. First, raw documents selected from the millions captured from the Iraqi military will be translated from Arabic to English and French to prepare for the possible prosecution of Iraqi war criminals. Second, key documents already translated into English, as well as Arabic- and English-language media programs and studies on Iraqi war crimes will be translated and dubbed into major world languages for use in the education and media outreach programs.
All told, as many as 30-40 fill-time translators may ultimately be needed for this extensive effort. They would work at the war crimes coordination center and branch offices, and at opposition-group or north-Iraq university human rights centers. Since a large portion of the translation effort will, of necessity, flow from the work of document researchers, legal analysts, etc., additional finding for this effort will likely be required in a surge effort during the later half of FY99. For this reason, in addition to $375,000 for translation as part of the FY98 ESF Supplemental Appropriation, $300,000-$400,000 more might be required in USG finding in FY99, with substantial additional contributions coming from other sources.
Education
Educating the public and opinion leaders worldwide on the extensive record of GOI human rights and war crimes violations will require a concerted effort. Many nations have paid less attention to this record than the United States because these nations have not been directly party to the repeated international confrontations staged by the Iraqi regime.
In total, 10-15 persons may be involved in the education effort, working at the war crimes coordination center and branch offices and with other opposition initiatives on war crimes education. They will prepare written and audio/visual educational materials, develop internet applications, make captured Iraqi documents available over the Internet, give presentations to groups interested in Iraqi war crimes and contact opinion leaders to discuss the war crimes record.
Media/press Outreach
Working in tandem with the education effort, media/press outreach will involve liaison with the press, and creating audio and video programs related to war crimes incidents. Particular emphasis will be placed on providing media services in as many major languages as possible and providing a platform for war crimes victims to describe their personal experiences.
Legal Analysis
Expert legal analysis will support the opposition's war crimes initiative in two ways. First, it will help direct archiving, research and translation efforts to focus on the highest priority documents and incidents. A proper understanding of what is, and what is not, prosecutable is essential to educating the public on war crimes issues. Second, it will enable the opposition to produce model legal briefs for use in education, media outreach and government liaison to demonstrate that a prima facia case exists for the indictment and prosecution of Saddam Hussein and key members of his regime. As far as possible, the opposition will be encouraged to draw on the pro bono services of experienced international attorneys and jurists, reimbursing their expenses.
Government Liaison
Liaison with governments will be an important element of the overall campaign. Opposition groups will share the results of war crimes research based on information already available in the public domain. Based on this information, governments--including the USG--may examine their own archives with an eye to filling any gaps in the record established by opposition investigators. If governments uncover any significant information based on these searches, they may choose either to declassify and release the information immediately into the public domain, or to hold and safeguard the information to support the future activities of a possible Commission of Experts, an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal on Iraq, or a successor Iraqi government.
War Crimes Activities Coordination
The Iraq war crimes initiative will necessarily involve dozens of opposition and human rights organizations and scores of individuals. Coordinating their activities will be essential. The opposition will need to agree on a central office to help direct these activities, to prevent duplication of effort and to serve as a clearinghouse for information. Program implementors should encourage groups already been active in this effort to meet early on to discuss and resolve this coordination question.
A likely location for a human rights clearinghouse would be in or near London, where most Iraqi opposition groups are based. Many activities in the operational categories described above, such as documentary archiving, legal analysis and research, could also be performed at the clearinghouse center, perhaps with the assistance of volunteers and interns drawn from the extensive Iraqi expatriate community.
Coordination does not necessarily mean centralization, however. Several of the activities in operational categories described above would be more efficiently conducted by smaller, regional offices than by one big central one. These activities include developing and implementing public education and media outreach programs, government liaison efforts, and translating source documents into relevant languages. Regional centers of at least 3-6 individuals might be established in the US (both Washington (USG) and New York (UN)), at the Hague (for proximity to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); in an EU capital accessible to EU offices in Brussels, the EU parliament in Strasburg, and Red Cross and UN Human Rights Commission headquarters in Geneva; in Scandinavia (whose governments have traditionally supported human rights causes); in eastern Europe; in the Far East; in the Middle East (in a country with a large expatriate Iraqi community); and in Kuwait (a major repository for documents relating to Iraqi war crimes in the 1990-91 Gulf War). The affiliation of these regional offices to the coordinating center could be direct or indirect.
Effective coordination also implies avoiding the creation of new, unproven, centralized structures which would duplicate the efforts of existing, proven war crimes organizations in noncentral locations.
Program Evaluation:
Program managers will document the number and quality of document translations, finished reports, media programs, press placement, legal analyses, etc. resulting from the overall war crimes program. More particularly, they will assess the interaction of different elements of the investigative process, focusing on the extent to which basic activities, such as information gathering and document abstracting support and are informed by the needs of legal, education and media staffs. They must also ensure that support provided for the war crimes effort are used in the most efficient manner possible and for authorized purposes only.
The ultimate indicator that the program has been a success will be a growing international consensus on the need to establish a Commission of Experts and/or an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to indict and prosecute Saddam Hussein and key members of the Iraqi regime.
Where applicable, Human Rights officers at American Embassies will report on opposition activities related to Iraq war crimes.
Groups participating in these programs will file quarterly financial and narrative reports.
Estimated Budget:
Documentation: $ 475,000
Audio/Video Digitization Indexing: 80,000
Collection Efforts: 40,000
Human Rights/War Crimes Centers: 325,000
Political Party Centers: 225,000
N. Iraq University Centers: 100,000
Translation: 375,000
Source Documents: 250,000
Finished Reports: 125,000
Education: 210,000
Media Program Development: 250,000
Legal Analysis: 40,000
Government Liaison: 200,000
War Crimes Activities Coordination: 125,000
Evaluation: 50,000
Grand Total: $ 2,170,000
Support for the Democratic Opposition of Iraq
Appendix: Program Administration
The Secretary intends to create the position of Special Representative to the Iraqi Opposition (SRIO) as the principal policy manager for all Iraqi democratic opposition Economic Support Funds (ESF). The position would be by a senior Foreign Service Officer, preferably one who had served previously in the region as an ambassador. The SRIO will report to the Secretary through the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs (NEA). A/S NEA will provide the SRIO with guidance on the relationship of the opposition effort with overall USG policy towards Iraq and the Middle East.
The SRIO will coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy Human Rights and Labor (DRL) on coalition building efforts; rule-of-law, human rights and related issues; and program development and implementation by NGO's and Fl's. He or she will also draw on DRL's experience from other USG efforts to work with exile opposition movements.
The SRIO will coordinate with the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (S/WCI), who has overall coordinating responsibility for the USG interagency effort to gather information on Iraqi war crimes, to facilitate democratic opposition work on Iraqi war crimes. S/WCI will coordinate with the SRIO its substantive work on information-gathering and USG consultations with other governments about diplomatic, investigatory and prosecutorial strategies, and its contacts with the Iraqi opposition, in this regard.
The SRIO will consult with opposition groups and other government agencies involved in Iraq policy. Based on these consultations, the SRIO will identify priority candidates from among opposition groups for the organization and coalition building programs. To the degree scheduling or other aspects of the program are affected by the political climate in the Middle East, the SRIO will propose program alterations. In coordination with DRL and S/WCI, he or she will provide NCO/FI/independent contractor program implementors with frequent updates on US policy, DOS contacts with the Iraqi opposition, and international activities of the GOI to ensure that USC support for the opposition is consistent with overall US policy towards Iraq.
A collaborative, three-member Joint Management Committee (JMC) comprised of representatives from NEA's Office of Northern Gulf Affairs (NEA/NGA), DRL's Programs Office (DRL/P), and S/WCI will advise the SRIO on program administration.
After preparing an operating year budget notification, USAID will direct Iraqi opposition ESF to the Department of State's Bureau of Finance and Management Policy (FMP) as a section 632(a) allocation. FMP will release finds to DRL's Program Office (DRLIP) for subsequent grant and interagency transfer, as directed by the JMC, to NGO's, Federal Institutions and independent contractor program implementors. The Department of State will be responsible and accountable for the management, audit and use of the funds allocated and must ensure that these finds are obligated and expended in accordance with applicable law. None of the funds may be used for military or paramilitary purposes.
The Department of State and the US Agency for International Development will conclude a Memorandum of Agreement for allocation of funds pursuant to Section 632(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The MOA will specify that funds allocated will be used to encourage a unity of purpose among the democratic opposition of Iraq, through which these groups can present a credible alternative to dictatorship and repression. DOS will file monthly and quarterly reports on obligations and budget execution to the USAID Office of Financial Management, Central Accounting and Reporting Division USAID/M/FM/CAR). DOS shall also provide an annual report of program performance, describing activities undertaken and achievements in terms of progress toward the program objective.
NGO/Fl and other program implementors will obtain funds to carry out program activities by competitive and sole-source grants, interagency transfer, and contract (as awards as recommended by DRL/P in accordance with applicable law and regulation). The grant, transfer and contract recipients will file financial activity reports with DRL. DRL/P will convey these reports to the SRIO, NEA/NGA, S/WCI and USAID.
Opposition groups participating in these programs will file reports, at a minimum, at least quarterly with the program implementors and grantors (note: individuals receiving research grant will report on their progress to program implementors semi-annually). Each organization may arrange for an annual independent audit of the in-kind support it receives under these programs, providing a copy of the audit to program implementors. The quarterly reports, as well as annual audits.
The system described above is meant to encourage dialogue and cooperation among program offices, NGO's, Fl's, independent contractors and the Department of State. The unique nature of ESF programs for the Iraqi opposition underscores the need for this sort of coordination. It is important to note that the Iraqi opposition effort is not a "democracy building" program per se, since the majority of Iraqi opposition groups are already democratic in nature and the program will in no case involve the present dictatorial Government of Iraq. In addition:
· The Government of Iraq (GOI) is very likely to oppose the program. In fact, it may actively attempt to subvert it. Should groups in opposition be lured into open or surreptitious cooperation with the regime, rapid program changes will be necessary.
· The GOI's international relations are volatile and highly unpredictable. Reflecting this, the implementation of US policy towards Iraq must sometimes change dramatically on short notice Program administrators may find it necessary to make immediate changes in the opposition program in tandem with policy changes.
· For reasons of safety, almost all of these activities will be carried out outside Iraq, at least in the program's initial stages
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