25 June 1998
TRANSCRIPT: PBS INTV WITH UNSCOM CHIEF RICHARD BUTLER ON IRAQ
(Lab analysis confirms nerve gas in some Iraqi warheads) (2210) (Permission has been granted covering republication/translation of the text by USIS/local press outside the U.S. On title page, carry: From the NEWSHOUR with Jim Lehrer, June 24, 1998, co-produced by MACNEIL/LEHRER PRODUCTIONS AND WETA, in association with WNET. Copyright (c) 1998 by MacNeil-Lehrer Productions.) New York -- The chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq, Richard Butler of UNSCOM, says independent laboratory analysis of remnants of special Iraqi long-range missile warheads excavated in the desert northwest of Baghdad has confirmed that "some of those warheads had contained the chemical nerve agent VX. "Now, what's really interesting about this is that Iraq has always robustly denied that they ever put VX into weapons; in other words, weaponized it," Butler said during an interview the evening of January 24 on the PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. "Even as recently as a week ago," Butler said, "when we mentioned these lab findings to the Iraqis, when I was in Baghdad, they still said they never did it. Now, that's a problem because this lab analysis is utterly unambiguous. It couldn't have been anything else. The remains that we found in these remnants could only have come from VX. So there is a problem." Butler said the nerve agent VX is "about the most toxic that there is. The one that that guy used in the subway in Japan, called sarin, is a nerve agent. This one is 10 times more powerful than that. It's a very serious substance." Asked if the remnants excavated recently were from "warheads that they had before the Gulf War," Butler said, "At about that time they -- as far as we can see -- they filled these warheads with VX. We don't know the exact number. We want to know more detail from Iraq about what is exactly the truth, how many did they fuel, and then going back from that how much of this substance did they make. We want to investigate this further. We are going to send some more of these missile parts to other labs in France and Switzerland. We want to get to the bottom of this." Following is the transcript of the PBS interview: (begin transcript) THE NEWSHOUR WITH JIM LEHRER INTERVIEW WITH: AMBASSADOR RICHARD BUTLER, CHIEF U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1998 MARGARET WARNER: The chief U.N. weapons inspector, Richard Butler, briefed the Security Council this morning on the latest findings of the U.N. Special Commission he heads, known as UNSCOM. UNSCOM has been investigating Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities for the past seven years. I spoke with him late this afternoon: Welcome, Ambassador Butler. AMB. BUTLER: It's a pleasure. MS. WARNER: Tell us in some detail what it is you found, and when and where you found it. AMB. BUTLER: We've been excavating in the desert northwest of Baghdad for the remnants of special missile warheads that Iraq said it destroyed there by explosion. Now, these were special warheads to be carried on long-range prohibited missiles which they had filled with either biological or chemical agents. We took some pieces of those remnants that we dug up out to a laboratory for analysis -- we did this with Iraqi agreement. And what that analysis found was that some of those warheads had contained the chemical nerve agent VX. Now, what's really interesting about this is that Iraq has always robustly denied that they ever put VX into weapons; in other words, weaponized it. Even as recently as a week ago, when we mentioned these lab findings to the Iraqis, when I was in Baghdad, they still said they never did it. Now, that's a problem because this lab analysis is utterly unambiguous. It couldn't have been anything else. The remains that we found in these remnants could only have come from VX. So there is a problem. MS. WARNER: And, very briefly, what is VX? AMB. BUTLER: VX is a nerve agent -- about the most toxic that there is. The one that that guy used in the subway in Japan, called sarin, is a nerve agent. This one is 10 times more powerful than that. It's a very serious substance. MS. WARNER: All right, and these were warheads that they had before the Gulf War, is that right? AMB. BUTLER: At about that time they -- as far as we can see -- they filled these warheads with VX. We don't know the exact number. We want to know more detail from Iraq about what is exactly the truth, how many did they fuel, and then going back from that how much of this substance did they make. We want to investigate this further. We are going to send some more of these missile parts to other labs in France and Switzerland. We want to get to the bottom of this. MS. WARNER: All right. And, as you know, Iraq complained about the methodology you used in collecting them, that you didn't give them equivalent samples, that you didn't take soil samples, that you didn't send them to a lab in a neutral country. I mean, were any of those concerns raised by other Council members today? And what's your response on those various concerns Iraq raised? AMB. BUTLER: In the Council today I believe my assurance and that of our chief chemist that this was unambiguously VX, was accepted. Now, the sorts of things that Iraq has said -- what shall I say -- they are interesting. I mean, I had already authorized that we take some more samples and do some more checking into other labs. But quite frankly, talking about the nationality of this first lab, soil samples, other things -- I mean, these don't alter the central fact. We had in our hand these remnants. We tested them by an absolutely professional and objective laboratory, using three different means, all independent. Each of the means that were employed came up with the same outcome. They can make these sorts of noises if they wish, but it won't alter the rigorous technical fact that in these remnants that's what we found. And, by the way, they also took samples. We never impeded that -- and they're at liberty to take more, which I am sure they will. They were to conduct their own analysis. We're not in the business of trying to prove them liars, or trying to trick them in some way. We are in the business of trying to find the truth. And the truth that we found with these remnants is unalterable. MS. WARNER: All right, what does the fact that you found VX in these remnants tell you, if anything, about the possibility that Iraq still possesses -- currently possesses VX, and in a form that can be stored or used for weapons? AMB. BUTLER: We don't know. But that's one of the things we must now get to the bottom of. VX for its longevity needs to be stabilized. And we found remnants of the stabilizer there as well. And if it is properly stabilized it can last for 30 years. Now, the background here is that Iraq never told us the truth in the beginning about how much VX it made. It had enough basic material to make 200 tons. It started out by saying that it had only made some 250 kilograms. Now, when confronted with our evidence over a few years, they revised and revised again their declaration, and now we're up to four tons. But, you know, there are a number of questions that this raises. Just bear that in mind. They said we never did this thing. We have scientific evidence that they did do this thing. So that opens up now the need to know -- well, how much of it did they do? How many weapons did they make? How much bulk agent did they create in order to put it into weapons? Again -- these are the questions to which we now need to have clear and honest answers. MS. WARNER: And how did the Iraqis respond when you presented these findings to them at your meetings in Baghdad -- I think it was eight or ten days ago? AMB. BUTLER: That's right. Well, I tried to do it as discreetly as possible. I didn't just slap it on the table in front of Mr. Tariq Aziz. In the first instance, I carefully prepared our experts to go into another room and talk quietly with their experts and say, "Look, we do seem to have a problem here -- can you give us some answers?," and so on. And straight away, before hearing from them in reply I already started to put en train arrangements to have more testing done in other laboratories, because I felt certain they would ask for that. And so we tried to be fair and decent about this, but when it did come to the table at the highest level, between Mr. Tariq Aziz and me, that's when they slapped down their absolute denial, and said, "This is rubbish -- we never did it." Well, that doesn't sit with the technical facts, and we'll have to do better than that as we look into this further. MS. WARNER: All right, and what specifically do you want from the Iraqis now to get to the bottom of this, as you said? AMB. BUTLER: The truth. It's as simple as that. We want the truth, and it must be verifiable truth. I've told them that we are not going to caterwaul or make trouble about how the story in the past wasn't true. We want to get this disarmament job done as soon as possible. We want to look to the future. And for us to do that we now need the whole truth in terms of production, weaponization and the ultimate fate of both the substance and whatever weapons they made. If they tell us the truth, we'll verify it and move on. MS. WARNER: What impact does this finding have on your ability -- on UNSCOM's ability to certify that Iraq has complied with the whole weapons inspection regime, which is of course what may open the door to lifting the sanctions? AMB. BUTLER: Right. Well, I'm very disappointed at the Iraqi reaction to these scientific results. We've done a really good agreement with them 10 days ago to accelerate our work in the missile, chemical and biological field, in order to try to get to the end of the disarmament phase of our work, and that might lead to the lifting of at least some of the sanctions. Now, a result like this particular sets that back. I don't want it to, but it will unless they accept this fact -- tell us the truth. Now, they may not do that until we get the other lab analysis done in France and Switzerland. I certainly don't want to give up hope that they might internalize what this really means and see that instead of throwing bricks at it and saying, "This is a bad deal, it was done in an American laboratory," et cetera, et cetera -- you know, those things that are just a distraction; I hope that they realize the seriousness of this and decide that the best way ahead is to come clean and to help us work out the whole VX issue as part of our overall accounting for their weapons of mass destruction -- and getting to the end of this disarmament business. MS. WARNER: Now, the wires are reporting that Baghdad issued a statement today demanding that once again sanctions be lifted immediately, and threatening to -- I think they said "reconsider" their relationship with your team, if they weren't. Do you take that as a threat? How do you read that? AMB. BUTLER: Forgive me, but I prefer not to get into that sort of political exchange in public with Iraq. I'd much rather focus on the fact that we did do an agreement a week ago, 10 days ago, on a very good work program, which if followed honestly by them could get us through the last remaining disarmament issues. MS. WARNER: So when you said at the end of those meetings 10 days ago that you saw that the -- I think you said the light at the end of the tunnel is more visible today than it is for a long time -- AMB. BUTLER: Absolutely. MS. WARNER: Absolutely. And those are the terms in which I briefed the Security Council today. I am very happy to tell you that the Council was content, and they urged me to get on with it in practical terms, follow our work program that we agreed with the Iraqis, and get this job done as soon as possible. In other words, they said, "Great -- Godspeed -- get on with it." And that's what I would rather do. But this VX issue must now be taken very seriously, and be a part of what we get worked out, I hope, in the next few months. MS. WARNER: All right, well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. AMB. BUTLER: Thank you. (end transcript)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
