I. UNSCOM REPORT TO UNSC ON JUNE 11-15 MISSION TO BAGHDAD
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION
The Executive Chairman
16 June 1998
His Excellency
Sr. Antonio Monteiro
President of the Security Council
United Nations
Excellency,
Following the technical presentation to the Security Council on 3 and
4 June, I visited Baghdad from 11 June to 15 June 1998, in order to
discuss with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, the priority
issues in the various disarmament areas which remain to be resolved. As
suggested by severa1 members of the Council, I offered to engage the
Iraqi side in a technical, scientific and objective dialogue with the
Commission in order to work together on the outstanding disarmament
issues.
The discussions were held in a cordial and professional manner, which
reflected the new spirit of cooperation between both sides following the
signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary-
General and the Government of Iraq on 23 February 1998.
As a resu1t of the talks the Deputy Prime Minister and I agreed on a
schedule for work, to be carried out by both sides during the next two
months in order to try to resolve most of the priority disarmament
issues.
I believe that if the Government of Iraq provides the full
cooperation it undertook to provide in the Memorandum of Understanding
between the United Nations and Iraq, it should be possible for the
Commission to resolve remaining issues and begin to formulate reports on
its work pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).
A report on the outcome of this visit to Baghdad is attached. I
would be most grateful if you could bring this letter and the attached
report to the attention of the members of the Security Council in
document form.
I stand ready to brief you and the Council, at your convenience,
following my return to New York.
Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.
Richard Butler
[signed]
Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established
by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (I) of Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991) of his mission to Baghdad 11- 15 June 1998
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Executive Chairman of the Special Commission visited Baghdad from
11 to 15 June 1998. He was accompanied by the Deputy Executive
Chairman, Mr. Charles Duelfer, and four Commissioners: Prof. Benson Agu
(Nigeria), Mr. Gennady Gatilov (Russian Federation), Dr. Roberto Sanchez
(Venezuela) and Dr. Emile Vanden Bemden (Belgium), as well as a team of
senior technical and policy officers of the Commission's Executive
Office in New York.
2. Four plenary meetings, and two expert level ta1ks, comprising some 14
hours, took place on 13 and 14 June. These talks followed a day of
consultations with the resident staff of the Commission's Baghdad
Monitoring and Verification Center (BMVC). The Iraqi delegation was led
throughout by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz. He was
supported by a large delegation that inc1uded Mr. Muhammad Saeed
Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gen. Amir Rashid, Minister of
Oil, Gen. Amer Al Saadi, Counsellor to the Presidency, Mr. Abdel Daif
Taiwiesh, Director of the Military Industrialisation Corporation (MIC),
Gen. Hossam Amir, Director of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate
(NMD), as well as those officials responsible for various activities
related to Iraq's proscribed programmes.
II. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE VISIT
3. The Executive Chairman's visit to Baghdad followed the Commission's
technical presentation to the Security Council on 3 and 4 June 1998.
After making a similar presentation to the Iraqi side, the Commission
sought Iraq's cooperation to fulfill what the Commission assesses to be
the necessary requirements if it is to be able to submit credible
reports to the Council on the verification and adequacy of Iraq's
declarations on its proscribed weapons programmes.
4. For that purpose, the Executive Chairman proposed to the Deputy Prime
Minister that the two sides concentrate the discussions on the list set
out in the informal paper presented to the Council on 4 June, entitled
"Disarmament Issues" (see annex I).
5. The Executive Chairman made it clear to the Iraqi delegation that
the Commission's list of priority issues contained in that paper
included the major outstanding issues relevant to the conclusion of the
disarmament work and that no other "hidden agenda" existed.
6. While not accepting the Commission's document, the so-called "road
map," the Deputy Prime Minister allowed the discussions in Baghdad to
concentrate on the priority disarmament issues identified by the
Commission, in that document, but disagreed that all of them were issues
of disarmament.
III. TOPICS COVERED
7. In the course of the meetings, the senior experts from the
Commission made presentations on the status of the verification of the
priority disarmament issues. The experts outlined to the Iraqi side the
various problems encountered by the Commission in establishing a
material balance of proscribed weapons, and in their clarification of
these issues. This was due, in particular, to the unilateral
destruction carried out by Iraq. The Iraqi side presented its own
assessment on the status of the verification of most of these issues.
8. Much discussion took place over the importance of certain of the
matters under investigation. The Deputy Prime Minister stated that the
Commission pursued many trivial matters not related to disarmament that
only delayed lifting the embargo under paragraph 22 of resolution 687
(1991). Iraq had destroyed its proscribed weapons, and the details were
unimportant in view of the level of suffering in Iraq as a consequence
of sanctions. The Executive Chairman pointed out that the Commission's
work had been both prolonged and greatly complicated ever since 1991
because of Iraq's incorrect declarations; unilateral destruction and
policies and actions of concealment. There was often a lack of direct
material or documentary evidence. Consequently, in order to fulfill its
obligation to verify Iraq's declarations, the Commission had to use less
direct methods.
9. The Commission's experts stressed that, of particular importance,
were measures to try to verify the total quantities which had been
produced. In a number of instances, it has been found necessary to
investigate details in order to develop confidence that the total
picture was understood. As briefed to the Council on 3 and 4 June, the
Commission had found elements of the Iraqi declarations to be incorrect.
10. In the missile area, the discussions concentrated on: the accounting
of missile warheads, in particular the results of the excavation and
laboratory analysis of missile warhead remnants; the indigenous
production of missile components; and the accounting for missile
propellants. The Commission stressed the importance of documents to
help resolve the issues in the missile area.
11. The Commission's concerns on the verification of those issues were
discussed. On the issue of propellants, the Deputy Prime Minister said
that: the issue was not essential for the disarmament process; it could
be addressed under ongoing monitoring by the Commission; and, Iraq would
not agree to its inclusion in any current schedule for work.
12. On the accounting for Iraq's indigenous production of missiles, and
for major components, Iraq reiterated its position that it had not
achieved full capability to produce indigenously, engines and gyroscopes
for proscribed missiles. Therefore, accounting fully for such
components was unnecessary. The Commission countered that such
accounting was necessary due to the significant uncertainty surrounding
that programme, including the lack of physical and verifiable evidence
of the destruction of the components.
13.In the chemical weapons area, the discussions focused on the
accounting for special chemical munitions and the material balance of
equipment for the production of chemical warfare agents. The
Commission's experts outlined some practical means to address the
issues, including the provision of additional information and
documentation by Iraq. Both sides agreed that quick progress should be
made on these issues.
14. During the discussions, the Commission presented the preliminary
results of the chemical analysis of certain excavated remnants of
special missile warheads. The Iraqi side rejected these results. Both
sides agreed to conduct further discussions on this issue.
15. While informed of the Commission's concerns, Iraq refused to
undertake additional steps to clarify the extent of its attempts to
produce the chemical warfare agent VX. Iraq stated that this matter was
closed and that it was only ready to discuss the evidence available to
the Commission of incorrect declarations on VX. The Commission stressed
that this important disarmament issue needed to be fully clarified and
further verification undertaken.
16. In the biological weapons area, the Commission's experts presented
a status report on the verification of Iraq's declarations. Particular
emphasis was given to the problems derived from the lack of physical or
verifiable evidence in most aspects of the biological weapons programme.
Iraq stated that it had already presented all the evidence available to
it and that no additional information; or documentation would be
provided to the Commission.
17. Iraq once again declared that the bio1ogical weapons program had
been obliterated. It stated that it would not revise its declaration of
full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD). The Commission proposed a
shift in methodology to focus on the munitions end of the programme.
Iraq requested a meeting in Baghdad with the Commission's experts and
additional internationally recruited experts to again review the entire
declaration. Iraq further requested that this meeting should continue
until it settled the outstanding problems. The Commission agreed to a
meeting, including international experts drawing from those present at
the biological weapons Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) in Vienna. The
duration of the meeting wou1d be at the discretion of the leader of the
meeting.
18. The Executive Chairman also raised a number of additional matters of
importance. It informed the Deputy Prime Minister that additional
aerial surveillance was being initiated by France. Further capability
was under discussion, with the Russian Federation for the provision of
an aircraft, if appropriate basing were to be agreed by Iraq. The
Commission proposed that the Russian aircraft and its crew be based at
the Rasheed Airbase, outside Baghdad, where the Commission's Chilean
helicopter unit was currently located. This would facilitate
coordination and logistics for the Commission's various aviation assets.
19. The Deputy Prime Minister agreed that Iraq would meet with experts
from the Russian Federation and the Commission to consider this matter
further. While he welcomed aircraft from Russia and France, the Deputy
Prime Minister demanded that the Commission stop using the U-2 aerial
surveillance aircraft due to the hostile policy towards Iraq of the
Government supplying the aircraft, the United States. The Executive
Chairman reminded the Deputy Prime Minister that the emergency session
of the Special Commission, held on 21 November 1997, had noted that
additional aerial surveillance, with additional aircraft, could enhance
UNSCOM's effectiveness. Thus, the Russian and French aircraft were
supplemental to the U-2. He said he would study the Deputy Prime
Minister's request, but that his decision would be based on UNSCOM's
operational requirements for disarmament and monitoring.
20. In relation to missile monitoring, the Executive Chairman reiterated
the Commission's serious concern over the use by Iraq of certain key
components taken from a surface-to-air missile system (VOLGA) and in
modifying them for use in a short-range missile system. These
modifications could in turn enable Iraq to modify the VOLGA missiles
into a proscribed surface-to-surface mode.
21. The Deputy Prime Minister stressed that, due to the sanctions, it
needed to make the best use of its limited resources for its national
defence, and that all the missile systems in Iraq were under the
Commission's monitoring, which would allow the Commission to detect any
proscribed modification of a missile.
22. The Executive Chairman took note of this position, but reiterated
that, under the ongoing monitoring plan adopted by Council resolution
715 (1991), the Commission would not permit the use or modification of
certain components in non-proscribed missile development. The Deputy
Prime Minister did not accept the Commission's position.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
23. As a result of the discussions, the Deputy Prime Minister and the
Executive Chairman agreed on a schedule for work on certain outstanding
disarmament issues for the next two months (see annex II). Several
meetings were planned to be held in Baghdad between experts from Iraq
and the Commission in order to address some of the issues. Iraq made a
particular demand that select experts from China, France and the Russian
Federation should be included as well as the Commission's experts and
other international experts for a review of the biological weapons
declaration and a review of the chemical analysis of special warheads.
Additional laboratory analyses, excavations and physical accounting of
proscribed weapons would be undertaken by both sides.
24. The results achieved under the schedule for work would be assessed
by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman during the next
round of discussions, to be held in Baghdad during the second week of
August 1998. Depending on the results of these discussions, further
work could be agreed upon by both sides, before the presentation of the
next bi-annual report by the Commission to the Council, in October 1998.
25. The Executive Chairman stressed to the Deputy Prime Minister that
concrete progress on the priority disarmament issues would have a direct
impact on the Commission's ability to report favourably to the Security
Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). The Executive
Chairman emphasized to the Deputy Prime Minister that fundamental to
this end would be the provision by Iraq of documents sought by the
Commission on the priority issues. This has been deemed essential by
the Commission, given Iraq's claim that it no longer possesses any other
physical or verifiable evidence to support its declarations that it does
not retain any proscribed weapons, components, or equipment.
26. In virtually all instances, Iraq remained firm in its position that
no relevant documents were available. However, in limited cases, Iraq
would look again for documents. In one instance, Iraq refused to
provide documents it acknowledged having in its possession--documents
previously shown to the Commission on one occasion--on the ground that
Iraq had itself determined the materials contained in those documents
were unrelated to the Commission's work.
27. While the schedule for work includes most of the priority issues
identified by the Commission in its briefing to the Council and its
April 1998 report to the Council, Iraq refused to include some of the
priority issues which had been identified by the Commission. These
included the extent of the VX production, the accounting for proscribed
missile propellants, and the clarification of the concealment actions
and policies by Iraq. On the accounting for propellants for proscribed
scud-type missiles, the Commission indicated that it did not accept
Iraq's contention and that it would continue its investigation of this
issue in parallel with the implementation of the agreed schedule for
work. This was also the case in respect of the verification of the VX
issues.
28. During the discussions, the Executive Chairman raised the matter of
Iraqi concealment actions and policies, and their impact on verification
and monitoring. He stressed that the Commission considers a full
investigation of this issue to be fundamental if it were to report to
the Council, with a great degree of confidence, that all Iraq's
proscribed weapons programmes had been destroyed, removed, or rendered
harmless.
29. The Executive Chairman proposed to the Deputy Prime Minister that a
special meeting be held to discuss in particular those events that gave
rise to the Commission's concern on possible concealment activities by
Iraq. The Deputy Prime Minister declined, preferring to focus on the
schedule for work on the other outstanding disarmament issues, and then,
after that, to discuss the matter of concealment. The Executive Chairman
stated that the Commission needed to continue investigating Iraq's
actions and decisions to retain proscribed materials and associated
documents in order to verify that they had, indeed, ended.
30. The Executive Chairman reminded the Deputy Prime Minister that,
while carrying out the schedule for work, the Commission would be
engaging in its other activities and would pursue all the matters it
deemed necessary to accomplish its mandate. The Deputy Prime Minister
stated that Iraq would cooperate with the Commission.
DISARMAMENT ISSUES
Given below is a statement of specific tasks and information the
completion and verification of which are necessary to the formulation by
UNSCOM of a report, pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991), that, in its view, Iraq has completed the
disarmament actions contemplated in that resolution. The achievement of
this outcome will require Iraq to meet, fully, its obligation to provide
access to all necessary materials, documents and information.
The preparation of such a report would also require the Commission
to be able to conclude that concealment of proscribed programmes, by
Iraq, had ceased.
Missiles
Warheads
Completion of the warhead material balance
Implementation of the missile warhead TEM recommendations
Provision of the documentation requested in the Commission's letters
of 4 November 1996 and 1 August 1997
Propellants
Provision of the record of the unilateral destruction of propellants
Full disclosure on propellant unilateral destruction activities
Indigenous production
Establishment of material balance of major components
Provision of supporting documentary evidence, in particular monthly
production status reports
Verification and assessment by UNSCOM of the foregoing
Chemical weapons
Accounting for special missile warheads
Provision of documents and clarifications on the production, filling
and deployment of warheads
Material balance of special munitions
Provision of verifiable evidence of the disposition of unaccounted
munitions, including 155-mm mustard shells and R-400 chemical/biological
aerial bombs
Extent of Iraq's efforts to produce chemical warfare agent VX
Implementation of the recommendations of the Technical Evaluation
Meeting (TEM)
Provision of documents and verifiable evidence to support its
declarations
Material balance of chemical weapons production equipment
Provision of information on the use and status of the equipment
evacuated from chemical weapons facilities prior to the adoption of
Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
Verification and assessment by UNSCOM of the foregoing
Biological weapons
Material balance of:
Acquisition and production of:
Materials and equipment
Agents
Munitions
Destruction of:
Materials and equipment
Agents
Munitions
Additional action required
Provision of information and materials identified by the TEM
Verification and assessment by UNSCOM of the foregoing
SCHEDULE FOR WORK ON OUTSTANDING DISARMAMENT ISSUES UNTIL 9 AUGUST 1998
Missiles
Warheads
1. Completion of the verification of the warhead material balance:
(a) Completion of the warhead survey and excavation work at the
destruction sites in Iraq by 18 or 21 June
(b) Classification of warhead remnants and collection of data
by the UNSCOM assessment team in Iraq, 18 to 24 June;
(c) Completion of the UNSCOM analysis of the 44 warhead
samples removed from Iraq by 19 June and provision of the results to
Iraq by 22 June.
2. Review of the implementation of any remaining recommendations
of the missile warhead TEM between 18 and 24 June, and agreement on any
further steps needed from Iraq within two weeks.
3. A meeting between Iraq and UNSCOM on the warhead issues, if
required, end of July (Baghdad).
Indigenous production
An expert meeting to be held in mid-July in Baghdad between the
two sides to review the status of indigenous production (engines,
gyroscopes, warheads), the material balance and the unilateral
destruction thereof.
Chemical Weapons
1. Taking additional samples by UNSCOM from soil and warhead remnants
from the destruction sites as soon as possible.
2. Expert meeting to be held during the first week of July in Baghdad
on:
the availab1e results of the chemical analysis of the warhead
remnant samples;
the results of the chemical analysis of the samples from the MSE
VX dump site, including stabilizers.
The results of the analysis will be provided to Iraq by 23 June.
3. Material balance of special munitions
l55mm mustard shells
(1) Clarification to be submitted by Iraq by 21 July on sites
where 155mm mustard shells were lost during the war. Iraq will give
UNSCOM two weeks advance notice in case it would request deployment by
UNSCOM of survey and verification equipment.
(2) Expert meeting on the accounting of 155 mm shells last week
of July (Baghdad)
R-400 aerial bombs
Presentation by Iraq of documents on the accounting of
conventional aerial bombs BRIP 400 (tail section)-first week of July.
4. Material balance of chemical weapons production equipment
Clarifications to be submitted by Iraq on the movement of the
glassware shipping containers which contained chemical production
equipment within 2 to 3 weeks.
Biological Weapons
Iraq-UNSCOM expert meeting on the BW file beginning 11 July in
Baghdad.
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