AMB. RICHARD BUTLER'S PRESENTATION TO THE UNSC, JUN 3
Iraq News, JUNE 11, 1998
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. UNILATERAL DESTRUCTION II. MISSILE RELATED ISSUES III. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IV. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RELATED ISSUES V. DOCUMENTS VI. CONCEALMENT Amb. Butler arrived in Baghdad today, for what looks to be rough talks. AFP, Jun 9, quoted an unnamed Iraqi official, "This will be the last round in the negotiations between Butler and the Iraqis within the framework of the struggle to lift the sanctions." On Jun 3 and 4, Butler presented to the UNSC a review of Iraq's proscribed programs. "Iraq News" has excerpted the bulk of that presentation and an informal, unofficial version follows. It was UNSCOM's most comprehensive statement and detailed, in layman's language, the threat Iraq now poses, and the even more serious threat it will pose in the future, if/when sanctions are lifted. Asked in an interview with the French paper, Liberation, Jun 8, about what degree of approximation regarding the destruction of Iraq's weapons might be acceptable to break the deadlock, given Iraq's position that it has no proscribed material, Butler replied, "It is true that in some cases 100 percent accounting could be impossible. We told the Council this for the first time this week, and-which seems to me interesting- nobody demurred." That is truly something, as the problem is not just some uncertainties on peripheral matters. It is the knowledge that Iraq is holding on to vast quantities of the most dangerous substances known to man, or at least retains the capability to produce them quickly. UNILATERAL DESTRUCTION/CONCEALMENT As Butler explained to the UNSC, UNSCOM's fundamental problem is Iraq's claim to have unilaterally destroyed most of its proscribed weapons. That, in fact, was Iraq's response to an early UNSCOM achievement. Following the Gulf war, Iraq claimed to have had no nuclear program. But on Jun 28, 1991, an UNSCOM/IAEA team discovered equipment from its nuclear program. Two days later, as Iraq acknowledged in 1996, a special High Level Committee, chaired by Tariq Aziz, was formed. On Jul 7, it decided on a program of unilateral destruction to hide the material Iraq wanted to retained. The destruction was carried out that month, while UNSCOM was informed of it in Mar 92. The program of unilateral destruction was a vast complicated shell game, in which some material was destroyed and some was not, making it difficult to prove that any given material Iraq claims to have destroyed was not destroyed. And as Butler told the UNSC, "It is important to note the order of magnitude of the weapons retained by Iraq: 2/3 of the operational missile force; more than half of the chemical weapons and all of the biological weapons. . . . This unilateral destruction, in violation of resolution 687, has created a major problem . . . The unilateral destruction was conducted by Iraq in such a manner as to hide the existence of these weapons and to some extent to cover the level of achievement of its weapons programmes. Iraq recognized this in a letter to the Security Council on 17 November 1997, which reads: 'The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely unrecorded, no written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction to anybody.'" MISSILES As Butler explained, Iraq is able to indigenously produce special [CBW] warheads. It claims the unilateral destruction of 45 declared special warheads, even as some accounts of the purported destruction are contradicted by satellite imagery. Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed SCUD missile propellant. The claim is undocumented and internally contradictory. Iraq is capable of indigenously producing all components of a SCUD missile, save for gyroscopes, which Iraq imported and which remain unaccounted for. Until Hussein Kamil's Aug 95 defection, Iraq "undertook efforts to conceal the extent of its success in the indigenous production of missiles. This is another example of Iraq's attempt to protect its most advanced capabilities in the proscribed areas. For these purposes, Iraq falsified declarations of its manufacture and testing of indigenously manufactured engines, misrepresented the purpose and use of production machinery in order to spare it from destruction, and under reported the quantities of imported components. Additionally, Iraq stated that it chose the method of unilateral destruction to conceal specifically both the acquisition or manufacture of certain components and success that the programme had achieved. Iraq has declared that additional efforts were taken, even after its declaration of the unilateral destruction in March of 1992, to secretly excavate and further destroy components to conceal these programmes. Many critical components, tools and documents were diverted from the unilateral destruction and retained." CHEMICAL WEAPONS--VX Until Aug 95, Iraq denied any VX production. Afterwards, it acknowledged having producing 3.9 tons of VX, but claimed unilateral destruction. This is so, even as Iraq imported precursors sufficient for the production of 200 tons of VX. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS This is the "black hole" of which Butler has spoken. "From 1991 to 1995, Iraq categorically denied it had a biological weapons programme ... Only in 1995 after pressed by UNSCOM with evidence that demonstrated that Iraq had a BW programme did Iraq reveal its offensive BW programme. Subsequently, after acknowledging this program, Iraq provided only the minimum amount of information required. It continues to downplay and trivialize the programme. Even since August 1995, Iraq has provided altered documents and taken other measures to mislead the Commission." Like its VX production, Iraq has understated its BW production. Iraq has provided no coherent account of the growth media it imported; microorganisms involved in the program; the production of bulk BW agents; the production of munitions; the union of bulk biological agents with munitions to make BW weapons; the destruction of unused bulk agents and munitions; and ultimately the use or destruction of the weapons. Also "production of other munitions, including drop tanks, aerosol disseminating devices developed for helicopters, pilotless aircraft (drones), or slow moving fixed wing aircraft are not adequately documented. The information on the development and testing of the aerosol disseminating device was excluded from the September FFCD. Iraq has recently stated that the activity related to this aerosol disseminating device was not mentioned in the 1997 declaration because the effort was primitive and inconsequential and that nothing has turned up to change that and no added credibility is gained by keeping the text in the 1997 FFCD. These explanations provided by Iraq are not supported by documents. The modified drop tanks and the aerosol disseminating devices are judged by the experts to be the most serious development of BW munitions by Iraq... The significance of the modified drop tank, a device to spray weapons-grade biological warfare agent from fighter aircraft, is greatly underplayed, taking into account that the assessment of the TEM is that this weapon appears to be the most efficient for the delivery of biological warfare agents produced by Iraq." DOCUMENTS "Iraq has undertaken systematic efforts to move around, reclassify, destroy or retain documents related to its past proscribed weapons programs. Iraq has admitted such. Iraq has declared to the Commission a program from April 1991 until February 1993 to hide documents from the Commission, destroy duplicate sets of documents, and microfiche documents. Iraq claims that this effort was ordered by one man, Hussein Kamal, and that it was done in secret from the rest of the Iraqi leadership. The Iraqis claim that the Chicken Farm cache is the products of this secret effort. However, the Iraqi story does not stand up to close scrutiny. . . "The first slide shows an image of the Haidar farm, commonly known as the chicken farm. You see on the picture, taken on 26 July 1995, that containers have been brought to this farm, which belongs to Hussein Kamal. . . These containers can be seen there, between two sheds. There are about ten of them. Iraq has since claimed that these containers were used to transport the annual potato harvest. However, an examination of imagery for previous years, as well as the years since 1995, revealed no indication that such containers or for that matter any like them, were present for this purpose at the Haidar farm. "On 8 August 1995, Hussein Kamal left the country. On 9 August, as seen on the next slide, there are no more containers in front of the farms. A lot of trucks were coming in and out. Boxes and crates are stacked up in this location, near where the Commission eventually discovered boxes and crates of similar dimensions containing documents relating to Iraq's past proscribed weapons programs. "On the third slide, you see a picture taken on 19 August, a day before the arrival on the spot of the Executive Chairman and his team. You can see that there are no more trucks or containers. In one of those containers present when UNSCOM inspected the site, documents on the biological program were found, along with documents pertaining to all areas of Iraq's proscribed weapons programs. We have some concern that the Chicken farm might have been cleansed before the arrival of the team. The Farm manager himself stated that he was taken into custody by the Special Security organization on 9 August, the same day that we see considerable activities on the farm. . . . The reality of the matter might be, as reported by the Farm manager, that the Farm was seized by Special Security on 9 August, and that material was brought to the site at that time. The Farm had been used to store material earlier. This material was probably contained in the containers observed in July 1995. Special Security, concerned about the revelations of data expected to be made by Hussein Kamal brought material back to the farm for the purpose of discovery by the Commission. However, this material was not at the Haidar Farm on 8 August 1995. High-level defectors have informed the Commission that this material was, on 8 August, stored at a number of locations through the Baghdad area to include residences associated with several high-ranking Iraqi Government officials. The Special Security organization might have quickly acted to consolidate those caches, and from 9 August until 18 August, worked to sort the material into two categories: what was to be turned over to the Commission, and what was to be retained. . . . "An analysis of documents which could have been present in the Chicken Farm include: Integration drawings for the SCUD missile. Of all technical drawings, this is the one needed if Iraq is to be able to resume production of the SCUD missile. 'Cookbooks' for chemical agent. These are the detailed recipes and manuals for producing the chemical precursors and agents. None were found. Any meaningful documentation concerning the biological weaponization programs."
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