Iraq and the UNSC on its Nuclear Program
Iraq NewsSUN, MAY 17, 1998
By Laurie MylroieThe central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. UNSC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON IRAQ, MAY 14
II. UN MAY SCALE BACK NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ, CNN, MAY 14
III. IRAQI CABINET PROTESTS UNSC STATEMENT, XINHUA, MAY 17
IV. NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE, LETTER TO BILL RICHARDSON, MAY 12
V. D. ALBRIGHT & K. O'NEILL, "IRAQ: RESETTLE THE SCIENTISTS," BULLETIN
OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, JAN-FEB 1998
VI. NEWS FROM THE FREE IRAQ CAMPAIGN, MAY 14
One reader, responding to the WSJ May 13, on US plans to reduce
forces in the Gulf and shift toward "a less confrontational posture,"
remarked, "Unbelievable. Orwellian. Are we living in some kind of
parallel universe?" No, they are living in a world of spin; in fact,
they may be lost in it.
On Thurs, May 14, the UNSC issued a presidential statement.
Essentially, it marked a US compromise with Russia, which had wanted to
use the IAEA's controversial April report, to "close" the nuclear file,
while the US had wanted to wait until Oct. The IAEA will make a
previously unscheduled report in July.
The Orwellian world of spin and parallel universes is not limited to
Wash DC. Thus, as the UNSC stated Thursday, "The Council welcomes the
improved access provided to the Special Commission and the IAEA by the
Government of Iraq following the signature of the Memorandum of
Understanding by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary
General on 23 February 1998 . . .
"The Security Council expresses the hope that the agreement by the
Government of Iraq to fulfill its obligation to provide immediate,
unconditional, and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the
IAEA will reflect a new Iraqi spirit with regard to providing accurate
and detailed information in all areas of concern . . .
"The Security Council notes that the investigations by the IAEA over
the past several years have yielded a technically coherent picture of
Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, although Iraq has not supplied
full responses to all of the questions and concerns of the IAEA . . .
"The Council affirms its intention, given the progress of the IAEA . .
. to agree in a resolution that the IAEA dedicate its resources to
implement the ongoing monitoring and verification activities of the IAEA
. . . upon receipt of a report from the Director General of the IAEA
stating that the necessary technical and substantive clarifications have
been made, including provision by Iraq of the necessary responses to all
IAEA questions and concerns . . . The Council requests the Director
General of the IAEA to provide this information in his report due on 11
October 1998 and to submit a status report by the end of July 1998 for
possible action at that time."
Nonetheless, Iraq's UN ambassador responded, as CNN reported later
that day, "Iraq thinks at this moment that all the files have to be
closed" and the UNSC action was "too little, too late." Too little, too
late for what?
Today, as Xinhua reported, the Iraqi cabinet issued a statement
saying that the UNSC "statement does not respond to Iraq's minimal
rights in view of the great sacrifices of its people," while "Iraq is
awaiting a positive response from the council as demanded" in its May 1
open letter to the UNSC.
There are enormous problems with Iraq's nuclear program [see "Iraq
News," Sept 25 97; Apr 16 98]. It is the expert opinion that all Iraq
lacks for a nuclear bomb is the fissile material, although that only
became known after the Aug 95 defection of Hussein Kamil. Indeed, in
Dec 95, then Israeli Foreign Minister, Ehud Barak, raised the danger of
a potential Iraqi nuclear breakthrough in exceptionally strong terms
with then US Sec Def, William Perry. But nothing was done. The US
view was that it could take care of the problem by overthrowing Saddam,
particularly as Saddam looked especially weak after Kamil's defection.
But the administration hoped to overthrow Saddam quietly, in a coup,
and otherwise sought to keep Iraq off the agenda in an election year.
In Jun 96, Saddam arrested the conspirators associated with the Iraqi
National Accord, whom the CIA expected to carry out the coup, while in
Aug 96, Iraqi tanks assaulted the Iraqi National Congress in Irbil. And
the administration lost all its options for overthrowing Saddam. How it
now intends to address the problem of Iraq's proscribed unconventional
programs--including the nuclear program--is anyone's guess.
Most recently, on May 12, Paul Leventhal and Steven Dolley of the
Nuclear Control Institute wrote the US ambassador to the UN, detailing
known problems in Iraq's nuclear declarations. They include material
related to weapons-design; centrifuge R&D; and missing components and
equipment for a bomb.
Also, David Albright and Kevin O'Neill of the Institute for Science
and International Security, wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
Jan/Feb 98, warning that even at the present level of highly intrusive
monitoring and inspections, "Under some scenarios, Iraq might be able to
construct a nuclear explosive before it was detected." They advised
resettling Iraq's nuclear scientists in countries like the US.
And the present level of inspections and monitoring will not last.
One problem in the IAEA approach is that it is willing to "close the
file" on inspections and deal with unanswered problems in what was
envisaged as a follow-on monitoring phase, provided for in UNSCR 715
[Oct 11 91]. Not only is the IAEA approach highly questionable in
itself, it threatens to set a precedent for UNSCOM, which is under
relentless political pressure from Iraq's friends on the UNSC. And once
the weapons "files" are "closed" and the sanctions ended, neither the
IAEA nor UNSCOM will last long in Iraq, if they last that long.
Congress has been AWOL on the subject of Iraq's retention of
proscribed weapons and its treatment of UNSCOM. Since Hussein Kamil's
defection, when the problem became known, it has not held one hearing on
the issue. Only once was the UNSCOM chairman asked to testify, and then
it was a hearing related to the Nunn-Lugar legislation on enhancing the
US ability to cope with unconventional terrorism. Why doesn't Congress
speak out and otherwise take some action to stop the Clinton backsliding
on UNSCOM and Iraq's proscribed weapons? If India was alarming, what
about the day Saddam has a nuke?
Finally, the Free Iraq Campaign will start May 23, with its first
rally in San Jose, CA, making its way to Wash DC.
I. UNSC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON IRAQ, MAY 14
S/PRST/1998/11
14 May 1998
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
At the 3880th meeting of the Security Council, held on 14 May 1998,
in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The
situation between Iraq and Kuwait", the President of the Security
Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:
"The Security Council has reviewed the report of 16 April 1998 from
the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission
(S/1998/332) and the report of 9 April 1998 from the Director General of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (S/1998/312). The Council
welcomes the improved access provided to the Special Commission and the
IAEA by the Government of Iraq following the signature of the Memorandum
of Understanding by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the
Secretary-General on 23 February 1998 (S/1998/166) and the adoption of
its resolution 1154 (1998) of 2 March 1998. The Council calls for
continued implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding.
"The Security Council expresses the hope that the agreement by the
Government of Iraq to fulfil its obligation to provide immediate,
unconditional, and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the
IAEA will reflect a new Iraqi spirit with regard to providing accurate
and detailed information in all areas of concern to the Special
Commission and the IAEA as required by the relevant resolutions.
"The Security Council expresses its concern that the most recent
reports of the Special Commission, including the reports of the
technical evaluation meetings (S/1998/176 and S/1998/308), indicate that
Iraq has not provided full disclosure in a number of critical areas, in
spite of repeated requests from the Special Commission, and calls upon
Iraq to do so. The Council encourages the Special Commission to continue
its efforts to improve its effectiveness and efficiency and looks
forward to a technical meeting of the members of the Council with the
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission as a follow-up to the
review of sanctions held by the Council on 27 April 1998.
"The Security Council notes that the Special Commission and the IAEA
must discharge their mandates as defined under resolutions 687 (1991) of
3 April 1991 and 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991 with full Iraqi
cooperation in all areas, including fulfilment by Iraq of its obligation
to provide full, final and complete declarations of all aspects of its
prohibited programmes for weapons of mass destruction and missiles.
"The Security Council notes that the investigations by the IAEA over
the past several years have yielded a technically coherent picture of
Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, although Iraq has not supplied
full responses to all of the questions and concerns of the IAEA,
including those specified in paragraphs 24 and 27 of the report of the
Director General of 9 April 1998.
"The Council affirms its intention, given the progress of the IAEA,
and in line with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), to agree
in a resolution that the IAEA dedicate its resources to implement the
ongoing monitoring and verification activities of the IAEA under
resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, upon receipt of a report from
the Director General of the IAEA stating that the necessary technical
and substantive clarifications have been made, including provision by
Iraq of the necessary responses to all IAEA questions and concerns, in
order to permit full implementation of the ongoing monitoring and
verification plan approved by resolution 715 (1991). In this regard, the
Council requests the Director General of the IAEA to provide this
information in his report due on 11 October 1998 and to submit a status
report by the end of July 1998 for possible action at that time.
"The Security Council acknowledges that the IAEA is focusing most of
its resources on the implementation and strengthening of its activities
under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan. The Council notes
that, within the framework of its ongoing monitoring and verification
responsibilities, the IAEA will continue to exercise its right to
investigate any aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, in
particular through the follow-up of any new information developed by the
IAEA or provided by Member States and to destroy, remove or render
harmless any prohibited items discovered through such investigations
falling under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991) in conformity with
the IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by
resolution 715 (1991)."
II. UN MAY SCALE BACK NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ
U.N. may scale back nuclear inspections in Iraq
May 14, 1998; Web posted at: 6:34 p.m. EDT (2234 GMT)
UNITED NATIONS (CNN) -- The U.N. Security Council agreed Thursday to
consider scaling back inspections of suspected nuclear sites in Iraq --
which would mark the first significant reduction in the inspections
regime imposed on Iraq in the wake of the Persian Gulf War.
In a statement drawn up by U.S. and Russian diplomats after lengthy
negotiations, the Security Council agreed to decide whether the
International Atomic Energy Agency should shift from its current program
of inspections of suspected nuclear sites to less-frequent verification
visits. The decision will be based on a report from the IAEA due July
31.
The change would mean IAEA inspectors would no longer look for
evidence of Iraq's past efforts to build nuclear weapons but would watch
for attempts to revive a nuclear program or import materials needed to
restart it.
Supporters of the reduction in inspections wanted to reward Iraq for
its cooperation with U.N. monitoring of its nuclear weapons capability.
But Iraq's U.N. ambassador, Nizar Hamdoon, termed the council's action
"too little, too late," calling for an immediate end to U.N.
inspections.
"Iraq thinks at this moment that all the files have to be closed," he
said.
Change could come as soon as July
If the IAEA recommends a reduction in inspections, the Security
Council could give the go-ahead by the end of July, although American
diplomats say they don't expect any decision will be taken until
October.
The change would not apply to other U.N. weapons inspection programs
in Iraq that are looking for evidence of biological or chemical weapons.
Thursday's decision was a compromise between two factions among the
permanent members of the Security Council. Russia, France and China
wanted to reduce the regime of inspections now, based on a recent
evaluation by the IAEA that Iraq had complied with U.N. requirements in
dismantling its nuclear weapons program.
But the United States opposed an immediate reduction in inspections,
saying Iraq had not answered all of the questions about its program.
"There is some progress in the nuclear field. We've acknowledged
that," said Bill Richardson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.
"But we are not closing the nuclear file."
Some independent experts back the U.S. position, warning that any
reduction in monitoring would give Iraq more room to hide any
bomb-building plans it may have.
The Nuclear Control Institute sent a letter of support to Richardson,
saying there are still too many questions about Iraq's nuclear
capacities and missing bomb components, equipment and nuclear fuel.
Correspondent Brian Jenkins and Reuters contributed to this report.
III. IRAQI CABINET PROTESTS UNSC STATEMENT, XINHUA, MAY 17
Iraq Dissatisfied with U.N. Statement on Nuclear
BAGHDAD (May 17) XINHUA - The Iraqi Cabinet expressed dissatisfaction on
Sunday with the United Nations Security Council's presidential statement
on its nuclear file, the Iraqi News Agency reported.
At a session chaired by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the cabinet
maintained that to transfer International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
activities in Iraq to permanent monitoring phase by July as stipulated
in the statement does not respond to Iraq's minimal rights in view of
the great sacrifices of its people.
The U.N. statement issued three days ago urged Iraq to continue
cooperation with IAEA so that the council can close Iraq's nuclear file
by July.
The Iraqi cabinet said Iraq is awaiting positive response from the
council as demanded in an open letter the country presented to it on May
1.
In the letter, Iraq demanded the U.N. Security Council to implement
Article 22 of the U.N. Resolution 687, which provides the lifting of
trade embargo against Iraq. . . .
IV. NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE, LETTER TO BILL RICHARDSON
May 12, 1998
Ambassador Bill Richardson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
Dear Ambassador Richardson:
We are writing to convey the Nuclear Control Institute's summary of
unresolved issues regarding Iraq's nuclear weapons program. These issues
were raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its
October 1997 consolidated inspection report, but were never resolved in
subsequent IAEA reports.
Important questions remain to be answered in the areas of weapons
design; centrifuge research and development; missing weapon components
and equipment; remaining uranium stocks; the EMIS ("calutron")
enrichment program; Iraq's reporting to the IAEA and its efforts to
conceal elements of its weapons program from the Agency; and post-war
nuclear program activities.
In spite of these important outstanding questions, the IAEA
proposes in its April 1998 report a shift from inspections to less-
intrusive monitoring. As you are aware, this report is fueling efforts
by certain Security Council members to "close the nuclear file" as a
first step toward lifting sanctions. We understand that the Security
Council will soon consider formal affirmation of the IAEA's findings,
possibly sometime this week.
We agree with the Administration's position that it would be
premature to close the nuclear file. We urge that the United States call
for the continuation of complete, meaningful inspections until all
outstanding questions about the Iraqi nuclear program can be resolved.
Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter. We would
welcome the opportunity to brief you and your staff further on these
issues.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Paul Leventhal, President
Steven Dolley, Research Director
Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Unresolved Issues
Steven Dolley
Nuclear Control Institute
May 12, 1998
To view documentation from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspection reports, please click on the active link at the top of
each issue category.
Weapons Design
Many important weapons-design drawings and reports are still
missing. The status of R&D on advanced weapons designs (boosted,
thermonuclear) remains unclear.
Documentation of research on explosive lenses remains incomplete.
Some key design drawings are still missing.
The extent of outside assistance offered to or received by Iraq,
including a reported offer of an actual nuclear weapon design, remains
unresolved.
Centrifuge R&D
Almost all centrifuge design documents and drawings are missing.
Information is incomplete and drawings are missing related to
Iraq's super-critical centrifuge R&D program.
Significant inconsistencies exist between Iraqi and foreign
testimony on the amount of foreign assistance and components provided to
the centrifuge program.
Missing Components and Equipment
Not all "Group 4" nuclear weaponization equipment has been located
or accounted for.
Some uranium-conversion components remain unaccounted for.
A plutonium-beryllium neutron source, potentially useful as a
neutron initiator for a nuclear bomb, is still missing.
Uranium Stocks and Enrichment Program
Large stockpiles of natural uranium remain in Iraq.
Historical uranium MUF's for Iraq's uranium conversion and
enrichment are large. Over three tons of uranium remains unaccounted
for.
The credibility of low (20%) historical capacity for EMIS
(calutron) uranium enrichment reported by Iraq is open to question.
Iraqi Reporting to the IAEA
The completeness of Iraq's FFCD (Full, Final and Complete
Declaration) is questionable. No information is publicly available on
this report.
The completeness of Iraq's report on the technical achievements
of its weaponization program is unknown. No information is publicly
available on this report.
Many documents seized by Iraq during the "parking lot stand-off"
in September 1991 were never returned to the IAEA and remain unaccounted
for, including key centrifuge documents.
It is not publicly known whether all the documents from the
Haider House cache have been translated and fully analyzed.
Iraqi Concealment Activities
Iraq now officially denies that a governmental committee to
minimize impact of NPT violations ever existed, even though Iraq itself
first revealed the committee to the IAEA.
Reports on Iraqi nuclear team's interactions with IAEA
inspectors are incomplete.
It is not publicly known whether Iraq's report on their
post-war concealment activities has been completed and reviewed.
Iraq has not enacted a criminal law to punish violations of UN
resolutions.
Post-war Nuclear Program Activities
Conversion of former weapons program facilities has not been
fully documented.
Documentation of ongoing activities at former weapons
facilities remains incomplete.
Information is inconsistent on the date of termination of
weapons activity at the Al Atheer weapons facility.
No evidence of any Iraqi decree to halt the nuclear weapons
program.
Extent of Iraq's post-war foreign procurement network has not
been documented.
NCI's report, "Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues," is
available on the web at http://www.nci.org/nci/sadb.htm Documentation
from IAEA reports on unresolved issues may be found at
http://www.nci.org/nci/iraq511.htm
V. D ALBRIGHT & K O'NEILL, "IRAQ: RESETTLE THE SCIENTISTS"
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jan-Feb 1998
Iraq: Resettle the Scientists
By David Albright & Kevin O'Neill
Last November, almost seven years after the end of the Persian Gulf
War, Saddam Hussein demonstrated yet again that he cannot be trusted to
honor Iraq's commitment to abandon weapons of mass destruction.
The harsh economic sanctions and other punitive measures imposed by
the U.N. Security Council after the war have failed to change the nature
of the regime despite the suffering they caused the Iraqi people. Saddam
Hussein is likely to restart his nuclear weapons program as soon as
sanctions are lifted and his agents could more easily obtain banned
items for a new more secretive nuclear program.
The Security Council has constructed a powerful set of measures
including economic sanctions, the destruction of Iraq s nuclear weapons
assets and capabilities, and the world s most intrusive monitoring and
inspection system, which is operated by the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the U..N. Special Commission. With years of valuable
experience before the war, however, Iraq's nuclear weapons experts are
another valuable and necessary asset.
Although inspections have been improved, they are unlikely to be
adequate to successfully monitor the activities of those scientists
involved in the pre-Gulf war nuclear program. In particular, monitoring
is not sufficient to learn if these scientists are putting together a
new, more secretive program that is explicitly designed to exploit the
Action Team's weaknesses. Under some scenarios, Iraq might be able to
construct a nuclear explosive before it was detected.
If the Security Council forced Saddam to allow his cadre of
knowledgeable nuclear weapons scientists and their families to leave the
country, if they so wanted, Iraq would be unable to reconstitute its
nuclear program. To enforce such a move, the Security Council would
have to punish Iraq if it retaliated against its experts, their
immediate families, or relatives that remained in Iraq. Possible UN
reactions would include a refusal to remove sanctions or to reimpose any
sanctions that might have been lifted.
Would any nuclear scientists leave Iraq voluntarily? Probably.
There is growing recognition that many of Iraq's nuclear experts are
essentially prisoners. Most were arbitrarily assigned to the nuclear
weapons program after returning from school abroad. After suffering
years of hardships created by the sanctions, many scientists and their
families may be eager to leave.
The vast majority of these exports have been identified through
captured Iraqi documents and Action Team inspections. And the
resettlement of even a few dozen devastate Saddam's ability to rebuild
his nuclear weapons program.
A key to success would be the protection of the scientists and their
families. The United States might be a possible resettlement site
because it could provide adequate protection against Iraqi agents. The
Security Council would also the need to mandate the Action Team and the
Special Commission with the task of investigating any suspected
retaliation against family members remaining in Iraq.
Resettled scientists would need to be provided with economic support
until they found employment. But the costs of resettlement could be
collected from Iraq, just as the costs of the Action Team and the
Special Commission are taken from the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales.
For their part, the resettled scientists would have to agree to have
their activities monitored by the host government or the Action Team, to
insure that they were not secretly helping Saddam rebuild his military
programs.
Time is running out. But a resettlement initiative could nip any
future Iraqi nuclear program in the bud. Such an initiative is a
reasonable price for Iraq to pay to have sanctions eased. The
alternative is letting the nuclear cadre, intimidated by Saddam, remain
in Iraq, awaiting the inevitable order to reconstitute the nuclear
warpons program or to train the next generation of nuclear weapons
experts.
David Albright, a physicist, is the president of the Institute for
Science and International Security (ISIS), in Washington DC. Kevin
O'Neill is deputy director of ISIS.
VI. NEWS FROM THE FREE IRAQ CAMPAIGN
May 14th 1998 Los Angeles, California,
USA
***** FREE IRAQ CAMPAIGN PRESS RELEASE *****
Our Iraqi-American grass roots effort has build up an enormous momentum
over the last several weeks. Today, over 75 Iraqi-Americans are
involved daily in organizing one aspect of this campaign or another.
This nation-wide activity has won endorsements from an array of seasoned
Iraqi-American organizations, listed alphabetically below:
Assyrian National Alliance, Chicago, IL
Canadian Iraqi Community Relief Fund, ONT
Independent Iraqi Group of North America, Toronto, ONT
Iraqi American Committee, Los Angeles, CA
Iraqi Democratic Union, CA, AZ, MI
Iraqi Forum for Democracy, Nashville, TN
Iraq Foundation, Washington, DC
Iraqi Turkoman Association of Toronto, ONT
Kurdish National Congress of North America
Muslim Public Affairs Council, Los Angeles, CA
The "bus tour", as its dubbed inside our community, is on schedule to
hold the first rally in San Jose, California on Saturday, May 23rd.
Attendance at these rallies varies from as little as 50 in some
locations to as high as 300 in San Diego, 400 in Phoenix, 700 in Detroit
and over 1,000 in Lafayette Park (across from the White House). Convoys
of cars will be following the bus from Detroit, Boston, Cleveland and
New York all the way to Washington, DC.
During these rallies, Iraqi refugees who participated in the
short-lived March 1991 popular revolt will be giving witness accounts of
the atrocities committed inside Iraq as directed by Saddam Hussein.
Members of the press may be scheduled to Be on the bus for short
periods of this 3,500 mile journey. The locations for these rallies
have been selected and can be found on the Free Iraq Campaign web site
at:
http://www.iraq.net/Editorials/FreeIraq.html which is maintaIned daily.
For more information, please contact: Mr. Nibras Kazimi at
nibrask@mediaone.net
Tel. (508) 641-0443; Fax. (617) 876-0839
Yours Truly,
Mazin Yousif,
Free Iraq Campaign Manager
marka@broadcom.com
Tel. (714) 725-9719; Fax (714) 725-0440
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