06 March 1998
TEXT: DEFENSE SECRETARY COHEN ON IRAQ, BOSNIA SUPPLEMENTAL
(Says Iraq's commitment must be tested and verified) (2100) Washington -- Defense Secretary Cohen told members of the Senate Appropriations Committee March 6 that the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) "must robustly test and verify" Iraq's latest memorandum of understanding. In the meantime, U.S. military forces in the Gulf will remain "at high states of preparedness while we see if Iraq lives up to its commitments." If Iraq fails to cooperate and "we need to take action, we are in a stronger position internationally than ever before," he said. The United States is determined to secure Iraq's full compliance with its commitment to destroy its weapons of mass destruction "by whatever means necessary," Cohen told the committee. Regarding Bosnia, the secretary said even though NATO has not finalized the precise follow-on force structure needed for that country, the United States is expected to contribute approximately 6,900 troops there after June 1998 and maintain about 3,100 support personnel in Croatia, Hungary and Italy. Following is the text of Cohen's remarks as prepared for delivery: (begin text) Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for scheduling so promptly a hearing on President Clinton's request for emergency supplemental appropriations for fiscal year (FY) 1998 and for a budget amendment for FY 1999. This statement will highlight the content of our funding requests, the President's proposals regarding financing of these appropriations, and the importance of timely action on our FY 1998 package. The President's funding request for the Department of Defense (DOD) has three major components: Bosnia. To support the vital U.S. role in maintaining a peaceful environment in Bosnia, the FY 1998 Supplemental requests $487 million related to the planned extension of operations beyond June 1998. The FY 1999 amendment seeks $1.839 billion ($1,839 million) to continue Bosnia operations through the next fiscal year. Although NATO has not yet finalized the exact structure required for the follow-on-force in Bosnia, our cost estimates assume that the United States will contribute approximately 6,900 troops to the operation in Bosnia while maintaining about 3,100 support personnel in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy. This reduced force will allow for the continuation of currently assigned missions with the support of other NATO countries while providing for adequate force protection. We have learned in this turbulent century that America's security and Europe's stability are intimately linked. The Bosnia war saw the worst fighting and the most profound humanitarian disaster on that continent since the end of World War Two. Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords is changing the conditions that made Bosnia a fuse in a regional powder keg. American leadership remains essential to sustain the current rate of progress. U.S. and NATO operations in Bosnia have already achieved remarkable success. A stable military environment has been created, over 300,000 soldiers have returned to civilian life, and 6,900 weapons have been destroyed. Public security is improving through restructuring, retraining, and reintegrating local police. Democratic elections have been held at all levels of government, and hard-line nationalists are increasingly marginalized. Independent media and political pluralism are expanding. Over 400,000 refugees and displaced persons have returned home. One third of the publicly-indicted war criminals have been taken into custody. Economically, substantial progress has been made in the Bosnian Federation, whose economy grew 30 percent in 1996 and 35 percent in 1997. Political progress in the Serb portion of Bosnia has been notable, with a pro-Dayton government gaining power and which is helping to create conditions necessary for economic progress there, as well. Continued U.S. participation in support of the Dayton Peace Accords is crucial because America has important national interests in ensuring that war does not resume in Bosnia, from which it could spread to elsewhere in the region. Stability in Europe and an international environment favorable to our future requires, as much as ever, resolute American leadership. Southwest Asia (SWA). In response to Saddam Hussein's unwillingness to permit unrestricted access to UNSCOM inspection teams, the United States has deployed additional forces that are prepared to take appropriate action against Iraq, should the President determine that to be necessary. The fundamental U.S. goal has been to assure that UNSCOM has unconditional and unfettered access to all suspect sites, as called for by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Diplomacy, backed by the threat of force, has moved us forward toward achieving that goal. Iraq precipitated a crisis by trying to avoid its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. It tried to dictate to the international community where UNSCOM could hold inspections, the manner in which inspections could be conducted, and the length of time they would continue. Iraq's effort failed. Last week, Iraq made a written commitment to provide immediate, unrestricted, unconditional access for the UNSCOM inspectors to all suspect sites. If fully implemented, this commitment will allow UNSCOM to fulfill its mission of finding and destroying Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver these weapons and instituting a system of long-term monitoring to make sure Iraq does not build more. This commitment applies to all sites anywhere in the country -- not only to the eight so-called "presidential sites," but also to all sensitive sites, which up to now Iraq had tried to claim were off limits to UNSCOM. Any and all of these sites are subject to repeat visits. There are no deadlines for UNSCOM to complete its work. In short, for the first time, Iran explicitly has committed to open every site throughout the country to the weapons inspectors. The Secretary General has provided assurances that UNSCOM Chairman Butler remains in charge of UNSCOM and all weapons inspections. The Special Team for the "presidential sites" will be part of UNSCOM, will report to Chairman Butler, and will operate under procedures developed by UNSCOM and the Secretary General, not Iraq. The Secretary General has made this clear to the Iraqis, as well. There are issues that still need clarification, notably with respect to the inspection procedures for the "presidential sites." The U.S. has made clear that it expects all aspects of this agreement to reinforce the fundamental requirement that UNSCOM be permitted to carry out its inspections in a rigorous and professional manner. Earlier this week the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a new resolution that backs up this memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iraq by warning Baghdad that it will face the severest consequences if it fails to fulfill its commitments. The President has made clear that, in the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM must robustly test and verify this commitment. If Iraq implements the agreement, the weapons inspectors will for the rust time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites in Iraq, with no limits on the number of visits or deadlines to complete their work. If Iraq does not cooperate and we need to take action, we are in a stronger position internationally than ever before. The U.S. will keep military forces in the Gulf at high states of preparedness while we see if Iraq lives up to its commitments. The U.S. remains resolved to secure by whatever means necessary Iraq's full compliance with its commitment to destroy its weapons of mass destruction. For the purposes of the FY 1998 Supplemental, we are requesting $1.361 billion ($1,361 million) to cover the added costs associated with sustaining our enhanced level of forces in the SWA region this fiscal year. These costs do not include any estimate for increased OPTEMPO (Operations Tempo) levels that would occur during an actual campaign of armed hostilities, nor the related costs for expended munitions and cruise missiles, nor the costs for attrition losses. No additional SWA funds have been requested for FY 1999. However, if these higher forces levels are needed beyond next September, the administration will need to seek added FY 1999 funding. Natural Disasters. To recover from damage to U.S. military facilities and assets due to natural disasters, $123 million in emergency FY 1998 supplemental appropriations is requested. This would provide $121 million for damage in Guam from Typhoon Paka and $2 million for damage in the U.S. from ice storms. Most of these currently identified costs are for repair of facilities and replacement of damaged equipment, but some military construction and family housing expenditures are needed as well. An additional $50 million for the Department is also requested, to be made available contingent upon the Administration's submission of a later request. Financing Requested Appropriations Regarding the financing of this additional funding, President Clinton is requesting that DOD's FY 1998 unfunded requirements be met by non-offset emergency supplemental appropriations. Similarly, the President is proposing a non-offset emergency FY 1999 budget amendment to fund the unanticipated costs of extending the U.S. mission in Bosnia through the fiscal year. The administration included an allowance in the President's FY 1999 budget of $3.2 billion ($3,200 million) to cover the costs of contingencies like Bosnia, SWA, and natural disasters. The administration's plan to finance these unanticipated contingency operations is the only way to ensure support for our forces deployed to Bosnia and Southwest Asia and avoid damage to military readiness. Thus, I strongly urge the Congress to support the administration's request. If FY 1998 supplemental appropriations were required to be offset from funds currently available to the Department of Defense, the damage would be broad and deep. Non-deployed units would likely be forced to drastically curtail training. Troop inductions and civilian personnel hiring would be curtailed or halted. Research and production programs would be reduced substantially, driving up costs and delaying needed modernization. Civilian personnel might have to be furloughed. Requiring DOD budget cuts this far into the fiscal year would multiply the severity of the actions that would have to be taken to fulfill America's commitments in Bosnia and SWA. The President's FY 1998 budget request and subsequent appropriations enacted by Congress did not accommodate nor anticipate these DOD funding requirements. The decision to maintain a significant presence in Bosnia and to confront Iraqi efforts to build and maintain a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction emerged after FY 1998 appropriations were completed. Moreover, the Defense topline set in the bipartisan budget agreement did not anticipate these added costs. The Department used the Quadrennial Defense Review to carefully construct a balanced Defense program that sustains the necessary high levels of readiness, but still funds modernization at levels that will ensure that future readiness is also protected. To now unravel this program by requiring funding offsets will undermine this balance and hurt readiness both now and in the future. Timely Approval of FY 1998 Supplemental Appropriations I cannot stress enough the need for House and Senate action on our requested FY 1998 non-offset emergency supplemental appropriations by early April. Without timely action, the significant costs of continuing our presence in Bosnia and responding to the crisis in Southwest Asia will begin to hurt force readiness. The risk to readiness will be especially acute because so many of our forces are deployed in major operations. Beginning in April, the Military Services must decide on the funding to allocate to their programs for the remainder of the fiscal year. Without assurances on supplemental funding, major expenditures could be curtailed or deferred. The Services could begin curtailing deferrable activities -- consisting primarily of training, depot maintenance, and maintenance of real property. (Fixed costs such as salaries, utilities, and base support contracts are difficult to curtail in the short term.) Were that to happen, important training opportunities would be lost, and the readiness of our nondeployed forces reduced. While depot maintenance and real property maintenance programs are deferrable, late funding of them potentially disrupts activities and can result in the idling of certain functions, thus creating a logjam of backlogged work that cannot be accomplished expeditiously or efficiently. Closing In closing, let me join with the President to urge Congress to consider this FY 1998 Emergency Supplemental as part of a comprehensive package together with requests for supplemental appropriations included in the FY 1999 Budget, including additional funding for veterans compensation and pensions; requests transmitted on February 2, 1998 for the Department of State to pay U.S. arrears to the United Nations and other international organizations and for the International Monetary Fund; and requests for other important needs that were transmitted on February 20, 1998. (end text)
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