02 March 1998
IRAQ: SECURING AMERICA'S INTERESTS
By Samuel R. Berger (1240) (This article by President Clinton's National Security Advisor is in the public domain. It first appeared in the Washington Post.) Although it may fail to satisfy those who want to use force against Iraq regardless of the context, Saddam Hussein's agreement to open all Iraqi sites to international weapons inspectors advances our strategic objectives, either in the event he complies with it -- or if he doesn't. If Iraq follows through on its commitment, the inspectors will for the first time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites -- including sites the Iraqi government previously had declared off limits. If Iraq reneges, we will respond powerfully, from a position of maximum strength internationally. From the beginning of this crisis, the President has made clear that the best outcome for the international community was for UNSCOM inspectors to be given access to all locations in the country, including presidential sites and other security-related installations from which they had been blocked in the past. The reason was simple: Despite continual harassment and deception by the Iraqi regime over the years, UNSCOM has been remarkably effective in locating and destroying Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological, chemical and missile capabilities and establishing a long-term monitoring system that makes it far more difficult for the Iraqi regime to rebuild that capacity. The President also made crystal clear that if Saddam Hussein failed to let UNSCOM do its work, he would use overwhelming force to seriously diminish Iraq's weapons of mass destruction threat and its ability to strike its neighbors. He sent Secretaries Albright and Cohen and Ambassador Richardson around the world, not to seek approval but to explain to others our position in unmistakable terms. As a result, Saddam Hussein knew that he would be hit, and hit hard, if he didn't comply. Backed by two American and two British aircraft carriers in the gulf, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan went to Baghdad. We had made clear to him our two bottom lines: total, unfettered access for UNSCOM and the ability of UNSCOM to do its work in a professional and expert manner. Saddam unequivocally committed to the first. If he complies -- and I offer no odds -- it will be a significant step in the long process of disarming Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability. As for the second, clarifications provided in discussions between Annan and the determined chairman of UNSCOM, Ambassador Richard Butler, have led Butler to conclude that UNSCOM will have operational control over all inspections and that the arrangements are "entirely satisfactory to the organization I lead." The Special Group for the eight presidential sites will answer to Butler; UNSCOM procedures will apply; the inspection team leader will come from UNSCOM; the diplomats who accompany the inspection will be observers only; and for all other sites, including those previously blocked, existing UNSCOM practices will apply. Ultimately, however, as the President also made clear, "the proof is in the testing." In the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM will test Iraq's commitment. We will keep our forces in the region at a high state of readiness. Failure to allow the inspectors to go where they want, when they want will result in the use of serious force. After two crises provoked by Iraq in four months, the time for diplomacy will be over. The consternation of some that the guns are silent for now in part reflects an important debate about our strategic objectives in Iraq. Since 1991, the Bush and Clinton administrations have pursued a policy of containing Saddam Hussein -- stopping him from threatening a region of strategic importance to the United States. This policy has been successful. For example, when Saddam Hussein moved toward Kuwait again in 1994, we immediately deployed forces to the region, and warned him to move back. He did. So long as we have the national will to sustain that policy, it serves our national interests. It is strategically sound, even if aesthetically displeasing. Saddam's threat is blocked, even if he still blights the landscape. Two alternative approaches have been suggested. Some countries want to pursue essentially a narrow disarmament strategy -- "inspect and lift." Let UNSCOM finish its work (and hurry up while you're at it), then lift sanctions (which deprive Saddam and his military machine of $15 billion a year) and reintegrate him into the international community. But given Saddam's track record since the Gulf War, there is good reason to believe that this approach -- which fails to require Saddam to demonstrate his "peaceful intentions" by complying with all U.N. resolutions -- would simply allow him to refinance his territorial ambitions. Some here in the United States argue that our strategic objective should be to remove Saddam Hussein from power. There is no doubt that the Iraqi people would be better for it. We would gladly work with a successor regime that respects its neighbors and returns Iraq to its rightful place in the family of nations. But this also is a course with substantial risks and costs. A military campaign to remove Saddam would require a major commitment of ground troops, risk large numbers of casualties and cost tens of billions of dollars. We would pursue it alone. Once we fought our way to Baghdad, it is unlikely that Saddam would be waiting for us at the airport. I am convinced the costs -- in blood, treasure and political isolation -- are not justified. Alternatively, we could seek to achieve that result by proxy -- through support of Iraqi opposition groups. We have worked with the Iraqi opposition in the past and we can do so more effectively in the future. But before we embrace lofty goals, we must be sure this time that we are prepared for the ride. From the Bay of Pigs in 1961 to Budapest in 1956 to post-war Iraq in 1991, we have learned the dangers of starting something we were not prepared to finish. This discussion about strategic objectives is healthy. It forces all of us to challenge our thinking and assumptions. But unless we are prepared either to invade under current circumstances or to dismiss the threat Saddam Hussein poses -- two options I reject -- Saddam will be with us for some time. In the meantime, we must maintain the resolve, alone if necessary, to prevent him from threatening the region -- in other words, to contain him. There are four pillars to this policy. Maintain sanctions. Continue to enforce a no-fly zone over the north and south of his country to reduce the threat Saddam Hussein poses to his neighbors and his people. Insist that UNSCOM be permitted to do its work without conditions. Be prepared to reinforce each of these undertakings with military force if necessary. It also means permitting the Iraqi government to sell some of its oil to buy food and medicine for the Iraqi people under strict U.N. supervision. Starvation is not a card we wish to play, nor permit Saddam to play against us. That is the policy we are pursuing. For seven years, it has held in check the Persian Gulf's most disruptive and dangerous threat and helped maintain stability in a region vital to our national interest. But, as the President said last week, whether that continues to be our strategy will be affected in no small measure by whether this agreement is honored. (The writer is national security advisor to the President.)
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