• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

.....................

QUESTION: Do you want to talk about how the efforts to get a UN Security Council resolution are going?

MR. FOLEY: Well, it's a work in progress. I understand the Security Council did meet this morning for I think what they call a "tour de table." They had - all the members had an opportunity to comment initially on the draft of the resolution. I think that they're not likely to be voting on a resolution for a few days. It may be as late as early next week. But we look forward to supporting a resolution that acknowledges the good work of the Secretary General and that puts Iraq on notice that it must now fully fulfill its commitments this time.

QUESTION: And is there strong language about the consequences that you would like to put in?

MR. FOLEY: I Obviously can't give you the text of the resolution because it's still under discussion in New York. But I can repeat what I just implied -- that we expect that this resolution will put Saddam Hussein on notice of the serious consequences that would ensue, without doubt, in the event that he fails this time to comply, after having put his signature, his government's signature on paper to comply fully with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

QUESTION: As I understand it, it's your position - the US Government's position that such a resolution would not be necessary.

MR. FOLEY: That remains the case. We believe we have the authority, under existing resolutions, to undertake action, if that proves necessary.

QUESTION: Jim, as the Secretary and the spokesman both said publicly, you feel that - or you've gotten commitments from key countries to support you in the Use of force if Saddam breaks this agreement, as most people feel he will. Why can this not be in the resolution? Why is there a sort of shyness to sort of step forward, if, in fact, as the U.S. is claiming, there is this support for that kind of action in the future?

MR. FOLEY: Well, you're making assumptions which may not be founded. I think --

QUESTION: What are the assumptions --

MR. FOLEY: Your assumption that the resolution will not address the issue of consequences, in the event of a failure on the part of Iraq to comply. They just had an initial discussion today in the Security Council. Certainly, the United States is pushing for language that would make clear the serious consequences, in the event of a failure to comply. We look forward to a resolution that reflects that.

QUESTION: But even if it says "serious consequences," my understanding is that this would not be seen by other members of the Council as an automatic -- sort of an endorsement of military action. Why is that?

MR. FOLEY: I would say two things. First of all, you know very well that the United States was prepared to act, up until the visit of Secretary General Annan and his return with an agreement that looks like, if implemented, can achieve the objective of bringing Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction under control. So we were prepared to act, and that is unchanged. I think all members of the international community, including the Security Council, know that. So with or without a resolution, we remain vigilant and prepared to act. A resolution would certainly be helpful in conveying to Saddam Hussein that the other members of the Security Council recognize that serious consequences would ensue. I think that speaks very eloquently for itself.

QUESTION: Do you regard the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed in Baghdad as having the force of law already, or not?

MR. FOLEY: Well, what we believe has the force of law are the relevant Security Council resolutions, which set up UNSCOM in the first place. The Memorandum of Understanding covers the inspections that will take place on these so-called eight presidential sites. And if the Security Council, in its resolution, provides some acknowledgment of those arrangements, then you can consider that the international community is supporting their implementation.

I would hasten to add that we had questions, as you know, about the nature of the agreement. We've received some very firm and positive reassurances on that score, and we simply emphasize that really the testing is what's necessary; that these agreements are good agreements if they are implemented faithfully by the Iraqi regime.

QUESTION: You're probably right in assuming that a resolution will be passed next week that endorses the deal among other things. But I'm just wondering whether you know whether as a matter of law, that Memorandum of Understanding is already a binding document on the United Nations, or whether it is not.

MR. FOLEY: I think only the Security Council can produce binding directives, if you will. So I think the answer to your question is, not yet.

QUESTION: Is the United States currently drawing up plans for a new program that would seek to undermine Saddam?

MR. FOLEY: I can't comment on that. As you know, there was a newspaper article that made certain allegations of an intelligence nature, and it's not possible in a public forum to comment on such allegations.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up to this? I mean, not all programs of that nature would necessarily be covert. I mean, you could choose to have an overt program. So --

MR. FOLEY: Well, I have nothing to announce in that regard today. What we have said is that we look forward to working with a post-Saddam regime in Iraq; that we've worked with the opposition groups before, and we will do so and we will look for more effective ways of doing so. I have nothing to announce in that regard today.

QUESTION: Were there any meetings here this week with Chalabi and U.S. officials?

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: Who did he see, and when did that happen?

MR. FOLEY: They - well, I don't remember the exact date; it was several days ago. I can't remember if it was late last week or early this week. I believe it was late last week they met at the National Security Council. They met with David Welch, the Deputy Assistant Secretary here in the Department. I have no details for you on those meetings, though.

QUESTION: Jim, the reaction of the Israeli Government to this whole peace agreement has been less than enthusiastic. I was wondering if the U.S. Administration were concerned that the Netanyahu Government might strike out on his own or do something preemptively. They don't always play ball. The Netanyahu Government has had differences with the Clinton Administration over policy in the area. Are you concerned that you might be dealing with a loose cannon here, or have you had any agreements with the government that they would go along with the agreements that were signed?

MR. FOLEY: I just can't share in any way the numbers - premises in your question. I would refer you to the comments of the Prime Minister and the Israeli Government at the time when Kofi Annan was returning from Baghdad.

As I recall - and you can correct that, it's not a State Department pronouncement but just a recollection of what was in the press -- I think the Prime Minister recognized, as we do, that if this agreement is implemented by the Iraqis, it's a good step. I think the entire world - and that would include the United States, it would also include Israel - wished for a peaceful settlement, a peaceful resolution to this crisis, but one which met the objectives of dismantling, ultimately, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.

So I think that everyone is skeptical, and rightly so, as Secretary Albright indicated in testimony yesterday. No one, especially the United States, is naïve about Saddam Hussein, but he signed on the dotted line; his government signed on the dotted line. They're the ones who have put themselves in the toughest position now, because what they've indicated on paper is that they're going to reverse course. Now they have to do it. They're the ones who are really facing the question of what happens next.

In terms of the attitude of the government of Israel, as I recall it, there were questions raised in this briefing room and other public fora about what might happen in the event of military action. And I believe the Israeli Government made clear they were not looking to participate in any military action, but they stood vigilant in the case that they needed to take defensive action. So I see no merit or foundation to the question.

QUESTION: Are you happy with --

MR. FOLEY: I'll be with you in a second.

Yes, Howard.

QUESTION: Different subject. Libya is claiming victory as a result of the World Court decision. I wonder what the U.S. reaction to that might be.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I think that's an exaggerated claim. Let me first tell you that in 1995 the United States and the United Kingdom filed separate motions, asking the International Court of Justice to make preliminary rulings dismissing Libya's claims against them in the Lockerbie cases. What the court announced today is that it was not prepared to make such a preliminary ruling dismissing Libya's claims. Instead, the court decided to have further briefings and hearings before making a final decision. So no decision on substance has been made, to this point.

The court will now ask the United States and the United Kingdom to file detailed answers to Libya's legal claims. There will then be another round of oral hearings. These further proceedings may, in fact, take several years. So this was a procedural matter. But on the matter of substance, Libya's challenge to the UN Security Council resolution which placed Libya under sanctions and required Libya to turn over the two suspects to UK or U.S. legal authorities remains fully in effect.

QUESTION: Aren't you dismayed that this could drag out for years to come?

MR. FOLEY: Actually, no, because, as I said, the Security Council resolutions -- there are two of them -- remain in effect. The sanctions, pending Libyan compliance with the resolutions, remain in effect. So the status quo remains unchanged.

QUESTION: But is the status quo something to be content with? It doesn't bring the suspects any closer to justice.

MR. FOLEY: That depends on Libya, whether they're willing to surrender the two indictees for trial in the UK or in the U.S. or in Scotland. We think it's something that Libya ought to do. They are under legal obligation, under Security Council resolutions. We believe they're under a moral obligation, given the horrendous crime that occurred and the seriousness of the charges that have been filed against the two indictees. If they believe that the two are innocent, then they ought to put them before a court of law where they'll get a fair trial to attempt to prove their innocence.

I'm sorry. I'll come to you in a second, Sid.

QUESTION: Are you happy with the appointment of a Sri Lankan diplomat?

MR. FOLEY: Is this on the court case, the Libya --

QUESTION: No, it's on Iraq.

MR. FOLEY: I'll come to you next.

Sure.

QUESTION: Technical point. You might not have the answer. If you could ask the lawyers.

MR. FOLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Which has ultimate authority, the Security Council or the court?

MR. FOLEY: On --

QUESTION: Which would be above the other?

MR. FOLEY: I don't -- I think that's a question for the legal experts. I could ask - this is a matter before the International Court of Justice. They're the body that's determining this case, both on procedure and substance. But I'd be happy to check with the lawyers.

QUESTION: Right, but if they don't rule in a way that the United States and Britain like, the ruling could always be challenged on the basis that the Security Council is above the court.

MR. FOLEY: It's a good question. It's a hypothetical question in the sense that probably a judgment or a ruling in this case, as I indicated, is perhaps several years away. But I'd be glad to look into it for you.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. FOLEY: I'll come back to you.

QUESTION: Sorry. I wonder, is it completely too late now for the United States to have any role in this trial? And also, I want to ask what can the State Department say to the families of these crash victims who - I mean, they want to know, why isn't the United States Government going to punish anybody responsible for killing their family members?

MR. FOLEY: Well, first of all, this is a matter that's under the purview of the Security Council, which has acted. Libya is a pariah state, is isolated, is subject to severe Security Council sanctions - mandated sanctions. Libya cannot hope to rejoin the family of civilized nations until it complies with those resolutions. So we think that very firm action has been taken. Obviously, though, the decision to render the two suspects to justice in the United Kingdom or in the United States is a matter that Libya has to - a decision that Libya has to take.

But in terms of the court case itself, at the International Court of Justice, again, that's separate from the Security Council action. Libya is challenging the Security Council's resolutions in this case. We're going to present our case, as will the United Kingdom, in that court; and I can tell you we are very confident that the decisions of the Security Council will be upheld. But in the meantime, the sanctions remain, the resolutions are in effect.

QUESTION: And as for the families?

MR. FOLEY: Well, we feel very strongly that the perpetrators of this crime have to be brought to justice. We are in contact with the families on a regular basis, consulting with them on steps that we take to try to persuade Libya to surrender the two indictees.

The case at The Hague, at the International Court, though, as I said, it's a separate matter. It's an attempt by Libya to try to get out from under the sanctions, to negate the effect of international law, which we think, at the end of the day, will not succeed. But in the meantime, the situation remains - Libya is an isolated pariah state under UN sanctions.

QUESTION: Are there any similarities between this case in which Libya is claiming victory and the Iraqi case?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure I understand the question. First of all --

QUESTION: Regarding the American position.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I can tell you - maybe I can give one kind of an answer to it. In both cases, the nations have declared victory in recent days. In the Libyan case, it was a procedural issue. Libya got no satisfaction at the court, except that the case will continue, which we expect to win.

In the Iraqi case, victory was declared by - as Secretary Albright indicated yesterday in her testimony - by the controlled press of a police-state regime. I mentioned a few minutes ago, I think that the agreement reached by Kofi Annan in Baghdad actually puts Saddam Hussein in the most difficult position of anyone involved in this; because until now, for seven years, he has refused to fully cooperate with the UN inspectors, apparently -- and I would say obviously -- because his programs of mass destruction are dear to him. He wants to keep them and have sanctions lifted at the same time.

Now he has made bold as to affix his government's signature to a full commitment to allow the UN inspectors to do their job everywhere in Iraq, wherever they need to go, whenever they need to go, until they're fully satisfied that the disarmament process is complete. The ball is very much in his court, and he's got a very tough decision to make now; because, as Secretary Albright has said, in the event that he does not abide by this agreement, the entire world will have been witness to his having reneged on his solemn promise. And we expect to have significant international support for the kind of tough action that would be necessary in the event that he repudiates this commitment.

Can I get to you now?

QUESTION: Are you happy with the appointment of a Sri Lankan diplomat by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to oversee these inspections in Iraq? And also, how much time more are you going to give to Saddam Hussein this time, because it's been dragging and dragging on and on and on?

MR. FOLEY: In answer to your second question - it's a very good question, and I can't give you a day or a date, but we would like to see this agreement implemented and tested very soon. That's going to be up to Chairman Butler as to when he believes the time is right -- and some of these new procedures have to be ironed out-- but to begin anew the inspection process and to test these procedures, to test Iraqi compliance. So the sooner the better, as far as the United States is concerned.

Now, in terms of Ambassador Dhanapala, he earned international respect for his leadership of the 1995 NPT Review Extension Committee. He has excellent credentials as an international diplomat and as a diplomat representing Sri Lanka. He has considerable experience with nonproliferation and arms control issues. We would expect Ambassador Dhanapala to be very aware of the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. FOLEY: I'm sorry.

QUESTION: Can we get a copy of --

MR. FOLEY: A copy of what?

QUESTION: Of this Ambassador Dhanapala -- the statement you're reading. Can we get a copy of --

MR. FOLEY: Well, there will be a transcript that you can probably access after the briefing.

QUESTION: Just to follow, the ambassador and other diplomats that will be joining the UNSCOM team: Weren't they asked for in the negotiations between Annan and Hussein? Were they not a concession to the Iraqis? And do they not slow down the process of UNSCOM getting back in to test?

MR. FOLEY: It would have been a concession had diplomats been accorded some independent, autonomous status as inspectors, with an ability to interfere with or second-guess or prejudge, or post-judge the work of the inspectors. And that is not the case. We've received solid assurances on that score that these will continue to be UNSCOM inspections, UNSCOM judgments, passed by Chairman Butler himself to the Secretary General and the Security Council.

Was there a second part to your question?

QUESTION: Well, yes. We're in the first part. Maybe there were three parts. I'll go back a second. How did it come about - how did it come about that diplomats were added to the inspection teams? That was a concession to Iraq, no.

MR. FOLEY: I would urge you to ask the UN whether they consider that a concession. We don't insofar as the diplomats will have no role in the inspections themselves.

We, I think from this podium, indicated that we regarded the presence of diplomats as observers -- before Mr. Annan went to Baghdad we said this - as a detail, and not as a matter of substance.

.....................

[end of document]