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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

USIS Washington File

25 February 1998

TRANSCRIPT: STATE DEPARTMENT NOON BRIEFING, FEBRUARY 25

(Iraq/Annan agreement)  (6660)
State Department Spokesman James Rubin briefed.
IRAQ/ANNAN AGREEMENT -- Rubin called the agreement recently brokered
between Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan a "win-win" arrangement for the United States.
If Saddam Hussein cooperates with UN demands for full and unfettered
inspections of all suspected chemical and biological weapons sites, he
said, "the best way to combat the clear and present danger of weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of this dictator will be achieved."
If, however, Saddam Hussein reneges on this agreement, said Rubin, "we
have very firm assurances from our friends and allies, key members of
the (UN) Security Council, that they will be more supportive for the
use of military force."
So far, Iraq has shown no indication whether or not it will honor its
commitments, Rubin said. He added that the United States is hoping the
pact will be tested as soon as possible.
"What we're focusing on is the testing of this agreement. We're
focusing on substance. It's not about the words of an agreement,"
Rubin said. "Our efforts are now on clarifying the agreement, on
getting the ambiguities resolved."
In discussions since February 24 involving Secretary of State
Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richardson and the UN
Secretary General, the United States has received assurances on some
major points, Rubin said.
These assurances include:
-- That Richard Butler, chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) which has been conducting the weapons inspections, will
maintain operational control of all inspections in Iraq.
-- That Butler will continue to report directly to the United Nations
Security Council, not to a new political advisor in the UN Secretary
General's office as reported in the media.
-- That an UNSCOM commissioner reporting to Butler will head the
special inspection group which will be created to inspect so-called
"sensitive Presidential sites" in Iraq.
-- That the team leader of the special inspection group will be one of
the UNSCOM inspectors, all of whom are technical experts regarding
weapons of mass destruction.
-- That diplomats will be included in the special inspection group as
observers, but the inspectors will be in charge of each inspection
mission.
Rubin said a number of details remain to be worked out, such as how to
map "sensitive sites" and how the diplomatic observers will be chosen.
Following is the State Department transcript:
(begin transcript)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX
Wednesday, February 25, 1998
Briefer:  James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1    KUWAIT: National Day; Anniversary of Liberation
1    JAPAN:  Consultative Committee on Fisheries Concludes
1    MIGRATION:  International Conference, Feb 24-27
IRAQ
1-2 Agreement: Focus on Weapons of Mass Destruction / Sen Lott
Criticism / Iraqi
5,9-10  Implementation / Details to Address
2-4 Compliance: Reversal of Course / Accounting for Kuwaiti Prisoners
3-4, UNSCOM: Inspectors / Teams / Diplomats / Commissioner / Executive
Director /
6-10,13 Role of Chairman Butler / Responsibilities for Certification
5-6 Military Force: Costs for US Military Operations / Support from
Other Countries / Additional UNSC Resolution
7-8   Sites:  Access / Off-Limits Areas
12-13 Secretary: Feb 15 Mtg with UN Secretary General / Discussion of
Diplomatic Solution / Rationale for US Policy
IRAN
10-11   EU Decision on Visits / Exchanges with US
TERRORISM
11 Calls for Terrorist Acts Against Americans / Public Announcements
re Travel
KOREA
11-12  Inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea
12   US Support for North-South Dialogue
CHINA
14 Chinese Citizens Arrested in US for Selling Body Parts for
Transplant Purposes
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 25
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1998  12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I have
one statement that I'm going to read this morning. Today is Kuwait's
National Day, and tomorrow will mark the seventh anniversary of the
liberation of Kuwait. We celebrate the success of the international
coalition in expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and re-emphasize our
commitment to Kuwait's independence.
At the same time, we note the continuing legacy of Saddam's unprovoked
invasion and brutal occupation. In a tragic reminder of Saddam's
aggression, the fate of the more than 600 Kuwaiti prisoners of war and
missing remains unknown. Together with Saddam Hussein's obligation to
provide free and unfettered access to the United Nations' Special
Commission, his obligation to provide a complete accounting of the
POW/Missing, as mandated in Security Council resolutions, remains
unfulfilled.
The Iraqi regime has resorted to obstructionism and blatant denials to
frustrate international diplomatic efforts to resolve the fate of the
POW/Missing. These tactics must not allow Saddam Hussein to evade his
regime's legal and humanitarian responsibilities to the families of
his victims and to the community of nations.
We also have a statement on the US-Japan consultative committee on
fisheries, as well as a statement on the international migration
conference that will be issued after the briefing. But let me go right
to your questions.
Q: Jamie, do you happen to know if the 600 missing were part of Kofi
Annan's brief?
MR. RUBIN: I believe the focus of his efforts was the weapons of mass
destruction, but in the course of which the relevant resolutions of
the Security Council, which do include this, I suspect came up in one
form or another. But I think his objective was, again, to do what
we've said, which is to get the best possible way to combat the threat
of weapons of mass destruction implemented; and that best possible way
is to get the inspectors back to work.
Q:  Can I ask you one late-breaking, as we say?
MR. RUBIN:  Yes.
Q: Senate Majority Leader Lott has really opened fire on the
agreement. He says that Kofi Annan has put trust in somebody, meaning
Saddam, of course, who can't be trusted calls the agreement folly, et
cetera. You've had criticism like that before. I don't know if you've
seen the Senator's remarks, but is there a response to that?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm familiar with the gist of what the Senator said.
It's much like what some of the other Senators said yesterday.
Let me say this. Let's bear in mind why we believe that this agreement
was a step in the right direction. This is a win-win situation for the
U.S. Administration. If, as a result of Kofi Annan's efforts, Saddam
Hussein changes course, proceeds from a pattern of stonewalling and
non- cooperation to a pattern of cooperation, if he reverses course,
the best way to combat the clear and present danger of weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of this dictator will be achieved; and that
is the inspectors doing their jobs -- the inspectors who have been
able to uncover tens of thousands of chemical weapons, missile systems
and precursor chemicals and biologicals. This is the best way to
combat the threat, if he reverses course and moves from stonewalling
to cooperation.
If he reneges on this agreement as it is implemented, if he refuses to
allow inspectors access, if he continues the pattern of stonewalling
that was so evident over the last several years, we have very firm
assurances from our friends and allies -- key members of the Security
Council -- that they will be more supportive for the use of military
force.
So we are in a win-win situation. If Saddam Hussein reverses course in
practice, we will be combating the threat in the most direct possible
way. If he fails to comply, if he reneges in front of the whole world,
we believe we will have greater support for much stronger measures, as
the President has indicated he would be prepared to take.
Q: A couple of questions. Do you agree with Kofi Annan's assessment
that UN inspectors have been cowboying in their duties? I believe he's
reported to have said that to the Security Council in recent days. And
secondly, can we gather from your opening statement that under no
conditions will sanctions be lifted from Iraq until they account for
the 600 missing prisoners of war?
MR. RUBIN: Let me make clear our position on both points. On the
second point, we have said that he needs to comply with the relevant
resolutions, one of the relevant provisions of which is the accounting
for Kuwaiti prisoners. So yes, that is a part of the requirement that
would yield a position by the United States that we could move towards
sanctions relief if the relevant resolutions, including provisions on
this, were acted upon.
But that's a long way off. That's a truly hypothetical question. We
have seen no indication that Iraq is going to do this, nor have we
seen any indication yet, until this agreement is tested, that Iraq is
going to change its behavior.
On the first question, let me say this. A lot of people can focus on
the words of the agreement. They could focus on the words that the
Secretary General may or may not have said behind closed doors, after
three and a half days of a long, long trip to Iraq. But what we're
focusing on is the testing of this agreement. We're focusing on
substance. It's not about the words of an agreement; it's not about
the words of the Secretary General in characterizing Iraqi views about
UNSCOM. What we are focused -- our efforts are now on clarifying the
agreement, on getting the ambiguities resolved.
President Clinton, Secretary Albright and Ambassador Richardson have
all been in contact with the Secretary General in the last 24 hours,
as well as the UN Mission in New York being in discussions with the
experts. As a result of those conversations, we have received
assurances on some major points.
First of all, that Chairman Butler is in charge of this operation.
Chairman Butler will be in operational control of this mission.
Secondly, that Chairman Butler will not be reporting to some new
political advisor in the Secretary General's operation. The
relationship between Chairman Butler and the United Nations Security
Council will remain unchanged. Thirdly, diplomats will accompany the
inspectors, but they're not going to be the inspectors. The team
leader and this is the fourth point, and this is critical for those of
you who want to know how this agreement is going to play out in
practice if the Iraqis cooperate -- the team leaders for this special
group in these special locations will be UNSCOM inspectors, reporting
to the UNSCOM chairman, who will then be in a position to report to
the Security Council. So the experts are in charge.
Fifthly, the commissioner for this special group will be one of the
UNSCOM commissioners. This group will be within the construct called
the UN Special Commission, UNSCOM. The executive chairman of that
commission, with all its members, is kind of like the chairman of the
board of a corporation with a lot of board members. So as the
executive chairman of this commission, he is in charge. So all the
assurances we've gotten are that the issue is not going to be so much
what this agreement says, but the issue is going to be a lot more on
whether Iraq changes course and moves from a pattern of
non-cooperation to a pattern of cooperation.
The proof of this agreement will not come in the words or the
clarifications. Ultimately, the proof of this agreement will come in
its testing and its implementation.
Q: Can I follow up here? Just this commission I'm a little unclear on
this.
MR. RUBIN:  I'll do my best.
Q: This is going to be another layer, another can you just explain
what --?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, let me try that again. One of the things that we felt
strongly about was that this special group for this special purpose
inspecting sites that UNSCOM has never been to before, no UN
inspectors have ever been was within the UNSCOM system. The assurances
we've received is that the UNSCOM commissioner, the person who will be
selected to be the commissioner of this special group will be an
UNSCOM commissioner, but not Butler. But Butler is the executive
chairman of that commission.
Q:  So he'll be above he'll still be above --
MR. RUBIN: He will be I'm trying to give you the best analogy I can,
which is there's a board called UNSCOM, there are board members and
there's a chairman of the board. The executive chairman of the
commission is Butler. There are 21 or so commissioners, one of which
will be the commissioner for this special group within the UNSCOM
system.
Q: What's a long way off and hypothetical that Iraq will satisfy all
the resolutions, or that the sanctions will be lifted because Iraq has
satisfied it's practically the same thing? But I want to be clear what
you think is a long way off.
MR. RUBIN: I would start with what's genuinely hypothetical. We're
from Missouri on whether Saddam Hussein is going to comply with this
agreement. And before we can even begin to discuss whether it's this
accord, this area of weapons of mass destruction or all the other
areas, we need to see a pattern of continuous cooperation from Iraq a
pattern that has been sadly missing from their behavior in the past.
Until we see a pattern of cooperation and the UNSCOM inspectors can do
their work, we're not going to be in a position for the experts to
make any judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction: have they
destroyed them; have they destroyed all the precursor chemicals that
Iraq apparently had imported prior to the war?
These are the kind of expert judgments that are a long way off because
of the Iraqi behavior. If their pattern of behavior changes, they'll
be less long way off. But we don't have any reason to know at this
point that he indeed will change from non-cooperation to cooperation.
Q:  But the other resolutions are still in play?
MR. RUBIN:  Absolutely.
Q:  Kuwait has to be satisfied, et cetera.
MR. RUBIN:  Right.
Q: And that obviously is a long way off if you have this pattern plus
other things.
MR. RUBIN:  Correct, yes.
Q: You've just said over and over again, as well as others, and the
Secretary has said this that Saddam doesn't have the proclivity for
cooperation.
MR. RUBIN:  Right.
Q: What makes you confident and I have a second question that this
time around, this agreement and this promise is any different from the
behavior we've seen from him seven years throughout the seven years?
What makes you all --
MR. RUBIN: I don't think anybody has expressed confidence that he's
going to implement this agreement. We've expressed confidence that, as
we've sought additional assurances from the United Nations, we've
received clarifications that are moving in the right direction; that
make clear that the UN Special Commission Chairman Butler will be in
charge; that the experts will be doing their work; that the team
leader of the inspections will be from the UN Special Commission.
Those are the items we're increasingly confident about, but I don't
think anyone has expressed confidence that Saddam Hussein is going to
reverse his behavior.
What we've expressed confidence about is that we are in a situation
where, either way, we're better off. If Saddam Hussein does change his
behavior -- and that's a huge if, as the President said -- we will be
able to combat the threat of weapons of mass destruction through the
best means, which is the inspectors doing their work. If Saddam
Hussein doesn't change his behavior, the whole world will watch him
renege on an agreement signed with the Secretary General and the
support of many nations in the world. And we've received concrete
assurances from key countries that in that event, the severest
consequences will ensue and that we will receive support for the
military action the President has spoken of.
Q: Just to follow up about --there are reports now that it's costing
to keep troops over there about $600 million, and those costs could
increase the longer troops are over there. Is the United States
prepared to keep the troops over there indefinitely and ratchet up
these kind of costs?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think you know that costs for military operations
are better directed at my colleague Ken Bacon at the Pentagon. But as
far as the overall posture is concerned, the President has made clear
we will keep our forces at this high state of preparation for some
time. Until the President changes that decision, that is the plan.
Q: Jamie, do these five clarifications that you went through, does
that clear up all the ambiguities?
MR. RUBIN: No, there are still details to be worked out with regard to
the mapping of the sites and how that exactly will be worked, how the
diplomats will be chosen. There are ambiguities that still need to be
clarified, and we want to continue to do that work.
But as far as some of the key principles that have undergirded our
position on this from the beginning -- namely, that the experts are in
charge, that the agreement will be tested very quickly -- we've
received assurances -- I would say this is a sixth assurance -- that
the agreement will be tested very quickly. We expect that to happen as
soon as possible. Thirdly, that the integrity of the process is
protected because the team leaders will be from UNSCOM, will report to
the UNSCOM chairman, and the relationship between this chairman of the
UN inspectors and the Security Council will not change; and lastly,
that the access is total.
I think, if anyone looks at this agreement, I would urge you to read
it carefully, from the leaked copies I've seen in some of the news
account. And I would point you to the fact what I've been saying to
you for some time here this is not about presidential sites; this is
about a whole slew of sites across Iraq, a whole pattern of
cooperation. In that case, the agreement is very explicit with regard
to information, materials, means of transportation, all the other
locations in Iraq. Iraq has to comply with the UN Security Council
resolutions and provide full and complete access.
Q: You talked about key countries indicating support if he reneges. Do
you want to say which ones they are? Do you want to say how many there
are?
MR. RUBIN: What we try to do here is give you as best an indication as
we can about the views of other countries. But until those other
countries have made their views public, we're reluctant to do that for
them. But what I can say is this: when it comes to the key members of
the Security Council, the ones whose votes count the most, we have
assurances that they will be increasingly supportive of the prospect
of military force if Saddam Hussein reneges on this agreement.
Q: Jamie, will you all seek another resolution in the Security Council
to try and lay out parameters for non-compliance that could lead to
military actions, or would you prefer to keep this vague?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we certainly don't want to keep anything vague,
Betsy. The memorandum of understanding is between the UN Secretary
General and Iraq. It consolidates commitments made by Iraq concerning
the ability of the UN Special Commission inspectors to pursue their
mandate.
This mandate and the UN Special Commission itself were established by
the Security Council. It is therefore appropriate for the Council to
take action to codify developments that affect the implementation of
that mandate. As far as what such a resolution should or should not
include, all I can say is we're consulting on this. We do think it's
important to make abundantly clear to Iraq that they must provide the
unfettered access, and the Iraqis should understand that we will go
back to a situation if they fail to comply in which the United States
has made clear there will be serious consequences if he fails to
implement this agreement.
This is a very serious matter, and there will be serious consequence
if Iraq reneges on this agreement.
Q: Jamie, one point I think you have made clear that the person who is
head of this diplomatic component for these teams is a commissioner
that will report to Butler; correct?
MR. RUBIN: In the sense that a chairman of the board sits on a board
and the board members look to the chairman of the board to be their
leader. Again, UN bureaucrats --
Q:  That puts him above Butler.
MR. RUBIN: No, no, on the contrary, Betsy. What I'm trying to explain
reporting to is a term of art for bureaucrats, even for journalists
who have to report to producers and executive editors. And I want to
be very clear on this: when it comes to the meat and potatoes of the
work of inspectors, the team leader -- even for these sensitive sites,
these so-called presidential sites will be from UNSCOM, will provide
his report directly to the executive chairman. The executive chairman
will make his report to the Security Council. So there is a direct
line between the experts doing the inspecting and the Security Council
evaluating the process.
As far as who will be the titular head of this special group within
the UN Special Commission, UNSCOM, process, it's complicated. The
simple way to analogize is the titular head of that special group
within the UNSCOM process is equivalent to a board member; the
chairman of that board, being executive chairman, Richard Butler.
Q:  Will this person make a separate report, separate from --
MR. RUBIN: No, Butler does the reporting. There's no question about
that.
Q: So is this person there just to give face or allow the Iraqis to
save face? Is that the point of this?
MR. RUBIN: Look, I'm not going to psychoanalyze the reasons the Iraqis
might have decided to reverse course on paper. They've clearly
reversed course on paper. They're now prepared to say that they're
going to give the access they've refused to give. Whether they reverse
course in practice remains to be seen. We want this process to be
tested; we want it to be tested as soon as possible.
Q: Well, I ask the question because the Iraqis are saying Butler is
not in charge --
MR. RUBIN:  We've received firm assurances that Butler is in charge.
Q: Jamie, is the U.S. understanding that the special group will search
the entire boundaries of the presidential sites? And is that
acceptable to you, as opposed to just the presidential palaces, which
was the position at one point?
MR. RUBIN: My understanding is that there will be total access. The
precise way in which that will be accomplished is one of the details
that needs to be clarified within these compounds, but the access is
total.
Q: In other words, they will have responsibility for certifying the
special group, that is certifying compliance within those boundaries;
is that right?
MR. RUBIN: That's not the way it works. An inspection team doesn't
certify compliance of anything. An inspection team sets out a
decision: I want to go somewhere. They then ask for access to those
locations. Then they go and they evaluate the information they a
factual report -- to the executive chairman. And he is then analyzing
that information on the basis of all the information he has.
Let me remind you, one of the reasons why these presidential sites
were important is because we can't have a sanctuary. Not so much that
people thought that there were weapons of mass destruction hidden
there, but people knew that if you had a sanctuary, a place that was
off- limits to the inspectors, then the Iraqis could take material,
evidence, documentation, or in the extreme, weapons of mass
destruction, move them from places you were inspecting into places you
couldn't go.
So what you need is a closed circle by which hard-nosed, trained
inspectors can do their job, report to the UN Special Commission
chairman, Richard Butler, and then he can report to the Security
Council for the Security Council to make judgments.
Q: Jamie, you have used the phrase "we've gotten assurances the
agreement will be tested very quickly," things like that. Can you put
that into, as best you can, a time frame? Are we talking about days?
Are we talking about weeks? Butler is supposed to go next week.
MR. RUBIN: That decision will be up to UNSCOM to make. But what we
wanted to see, and we're pleased that we received assurances
regarding, is that this will be tested quickly, because our view is
the proof of this agreement is not in the wording or the nit-picking,
but in the testing.
Q: Thank you, Mr. Rubin. Is there going to be any place in Iraq that
is off-limits where the inspectors cannot go, or is this access to the
total totality of Saddam's territory?
MR. RUBIN:  Our understanding is it's total access.
Q: Can you go back to this board member who's going to head up the
special sites. It just sounds a little odd to me.
MR. RUBIN: I think you haven't spent enough time in the private
sector, Sid.
Q:  Clearly, looking at my bank account.
Q:  Or in international relations.
Q:  Thanks, Charlie.
Q:  This person is a member of UNSCOM?
MR. RUBIN:  Yes, is an UNSCOM commissioner.
Q:  He's an UNSCOM commissioner?
MR. RUBIN:  Right.
Q:  Someone who an existing UNSCOM commissioner?
MR. RUBIN: Maybe one there are vacancies. He might be from a vacancy.
Q:  Okay.  This person will decide how -- where to inspect?
MR. RUBIN:  No.
Q:  No?
MR. RUBIN: This person will be in charge of developing and overseeing
the special group. The special group's procedures will be based on the
key point and this is what I would focus you to that in the case of
how this special group will operate, the team leader for an inspection
will be an UNSCOM inspector. Diplomats will accompany; diplomats will
observe; diplomats will not inspect. Professionals will inspect.
Furthermore, we've been assured by the Secretary General that his
selection of this commissioner will be a professional arms control
expert. Again, the importance here is that even when the Iraqis wanted
an outside evaluation of the work that UNSCOM had done -- the so-
called technical evaluation teams that I reported on to you last week
it was clear to this outside evaluation team that Iraq was doing all
the things that UNSCOM said. They were non- cooperating in
documentation; they were challenging the facts; they were not
providing information. And there were these gaps in the areas of
chemical weapons, biological weapons and missiles.
So the point is, when experts who understand the parameters of these
issues, examine the issues, there are no alternative facts possible.
What we've seen time and time again is every time someone evaluates
Iraq's cooperation, they conclude they're not cooperating, and every
time someone evaluates Iraq's behavior, they conclude there are still
huge gaps between what they say they have and what UNSCOM can prove
they've destroyed.
Q: And one last one has the Clinton Administration now accepted the
Secretary General's the product of his talks in Baghdad?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we think this agreement is a step forward, but we
think it will be a real step forward if its implemented properly.
Q:  You've now accepted what has been presented to you.
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, those are your words. My words are the ones
that I can use, which is the agreement is a step forward and if it's
implemented rigorously, tested rigorously, over time, it could be a
major step forward. But we've seen agreements in the past. What we've
never seen is a pattern of cooperation on the part of Iraq.
Q: Jamie, just going back to the special group again, initially I
know, it's beating --
MR. RUBIN:  I thought we beat this special group to a dead horse.
Q: I guess we're going to beat it until it dies again and is
reincarnated. But initially, Iraq had said that they felt as though
UNSCOM was not doing their job. You mentioned the gaps, and then they
called for an outside not an outside group, but they called for
another group, independent --
MR. RUBIN:  Additional evaluation, yes.
Q: -- to have some kind of expert opinion. So it would seem to the
average person, perhaps, listening to you today, that this is the
special group was a concession made to appease Iraq and their
grievances and make them happy with UNSCOM.
MR. RUBIN: I am confident that an average listener would have trouble
understanding half of the things I said, let alone concluding what you
concluded.
There are no concessions. Iraq has reversed course on paper. The
question is, will they reverse course in practice?
Q: There was no this it would be impossible to perceive this creation
of a special group as somehow meeting Iraq halfway.
MR. RUBIN: I said yesterday that critics will criticize, and I'm sure
somebody can conceive of it that way, but a fair-minded person needs
to focus on two points. We demanded total access; they agreed to total
access. We demanded that UNSCOM will be in charge; UNSCOM will be in
charge. The question for this agreement is not what it says on the
piece of paper; the question for this agreement is what will happen in
practice.
Q:  Iran?
MR. RUBIN:  Sure.
Q: Russia and Iran today vowed to strengthen their economic and
political ties. After the EU established high-level contacts with
Iran, I believe, Sunday, foreign minister of Italy, Dini, is traveling
to Tehran. I was wondering, what's the US evaluation of these
developments?
MR. RUBIN: As we understand it, EU foreign ministers decided to resume
official bilateral ministerial visits to and from Iran. We view this
decision as the EU's to make, but have urged that contacts with
Iranian officials be used to register concern over Iran's
objectionable policies. In this regard, we note that the EU decision
stipulates that enhanced political contacts between the EU and Iran
should lead to a dialogue on areas of concern, including on weapons of
mass destruction, terrorism, human rights, including the fatwa against
Salman Rushdi*, and Iran's attitude toward the Middle East peace
process.
So we have had differences in tactics with many countries about how to
deal with Iran. Let me just say this -- that with respect to the
visitors that are in Iran, the academics that are there, we welcome
the apparent Iranian decision to encourage these kinds of visits as a
way of expanding contacts with the US, in line with President
Khatemi's call for people-to-people contacts.
We have said we are ready for official talks with the Iranian
Government to discuss issues of concern to both governments. Iran has
said that it is not yet ready for an official dialogue.
People-to-people exchanges, however, which appear to be starting up,
are valuable and can help prepare the ground for
government-to-government talks. We encourage those who wish to
participate in such contacts to do so. When Iranians wish to come to
the US, we will work to facilitate visa issuance on a case-by-case
basis.
Q: Following up -- on the issue of fatwas do you have any comment on
the report yesterday out of London of a group of unnamed religious
leaders issuing fatwas against American citizens?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We understand that there was a published fatwa that
was attributed to Saudi financier Osama Bin Ladin. It is an open
invitation for terrorists to attack American civilians. We strongly,
strongly condemn this and all such exhortations to violence. There is
no basis in Islam, or any other religion for inviting such cowardly
terrorist attacks. The United States takes this and all such threats
seriously. We are studying it carefully and evaluating its
implications. However, there is no specific threat contained in the
fatwa. The Department does, however, remind Americans that several
recent public announcements relating to travel in Europe and the
Middle East remain in effect.
Q: South Korea has a new president. Do you have some words of welcome
for him?
MR. RUBIN: We do congratulate President Kim Dae-jung and the people of
Korea on the inauguration of Korea's new president. The smooth
transfer of power was an impressive demonstration of the Republic of
Korea's commitment to the democratic process.
President Kim takes office after the third free presidential election
since the end of military rule, the first to involve a transfer of
power from the ruling party to an opposition party. President Kim is
well known as a supporter of strong relations between the United
States and Korea. In his inaugural address, he cited US support for
Korea in its time of economic crisis, and pledged to strengthen US-ROK
security ties.
President Kim has many friends here, and we look forward to working
closely and cooperatively with him in the future.
Q: You didn't mention North Korea. Do you have any words there on his
views on North Korea?
MR. RUBIN: I don't always have to have words to make up words; but I
will answer your question as follows.
We do support meaningful dialogue between North and South Korea. We
have said that for some time. We think this complements very well the
idea of the four-party talks. We have long supported the
implementation of the 1991 basic agreement. We support this meaningful
dialogue, including the implementation of that agreement's specifics.
It fits well with the four- party talks. President Kim has stated his
support for the four-party process, and preparation for the March
meetings in Geneva are moving forward.
Q: Do you have any comment on Mr. Kim's proposal to the North Korean
authority, especially on exchange of envoys?
MR. RUBIN: Again, within the context of the 1991 basic agreement
between North and South Korea, we do support meaningful dialogue
between North and South Korea on trying to implement that agreement as
a key to lessening of tensions on the Peninsula.
Q: Jamie, to go back to the Annan-Iraqi agreement, did the Secretary
meet with the Secretary General two Sundays ago to talk specifically
about the package that he would carry with him, or the negotiating
position that he would not the negotiating position, you'll knock that
one down straight away.
The position he would take --
MR. RUBIN:  You've got my number, Steve.
Q: The position he would take with him if/when he went to Iraq? And
was the broad framework of the agreement we see today something that
was already worked out in consultation between the Secretary and the
Secretary General and perhaps others, before this mission began last
week?
MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright did meet with Secretary General Annan in
New York on Sunday, February 16 or is the 15th? They had a luncheon
meeting, one-on-one; and Secretary Albright laid out the rationale for
our support for a diplomatic, peaceful solution.
The rationale she laid out was that if, as a result of Kofi Annan
going to Baghdad, the Iraqis were to reverse course and begin to
comply and cooperate with the UN Security Council, the best way of
combating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction would be developed. And
that was our preferred course, and the President made that very clear.
Equally important, she explained that if this agreement failed to
yield Iraqi compliance or if his mission failed to yield an agreement,
the whole world would see that Iraq was refusing to comply with the
United Nations, and the prospect of support for military action would
be increased. During the course of those discussions, the Secretary
did state America's position on the matter, which included a
description very much like the descriptions that I had been giving you
publicly about our red-lines, in terms of what any discussion could
entail -- namely, that UNSCOM would be in charge of the process and
that access would be permitted to all sites in Iraq. And we do believe
that the outlines of the agreement fit within those parameters, but
there are some important details to be clarified.
Q:  Was the concept of chaperones talked about in that meeting?
MR. RUBIN: The idea -- I think -- I believe soon after that meeting we
all made the point that we had no problem with diplomatic chaperones
accompanying technical experts; and so I suspect that that did come up
in such a meeting. But beyond these broad points, I'm going to be very
cautious not to get into the substance of a private discussion like
that.
Q:  What are the chaperones going to do, Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: These are one of the issues to be talked about, but the
assurances we've received during the course of the last 24 hours,
through the conversation the President had with Kofi Annan, through
her discussions, through Ambassador Richardson's work in New York, are
that they are to tag along rather than conduct the inspections.
Q:  Will the head of the team have authority over the chaperones?
MR. RUBIN: Well, if this system is not worked out in such a way that
will prevent any diplomat from interfering with the integrity of an
inspection, then this process won't work. But those are the kinds of
implementation details that need to be discussed by the experts.
Q:  Who will be the chaperones?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, the way the agreement spells it out and these
are some of the questions we need to work on is that the commissioner
of this special group, who operates within UNSCOM, will select
diplomats. But again, the team leaders and the core of that group will
be from the UN Special Commission.
Q:  Jamie, different subject?
MR. RUBIN:  Please.
Q: There is a story that there are several Chinese who have been
trying to sell organs from political prisoners who were killed in
China. Do you have anything on that? Are we in touch with the Chinese?
MR. RUBIN: We can confirm that two Chinese citizens were arrested on
February 20 for alleged violations of US laws prohibiting the purchase
of human organs. The Chinese Government was notified of these arrests
on February 23, in accordance with our consular obligations. We are
continuing our efforts to ascertain additional facts in the case.
Let me say this -- we find the idea of trade in human body parts to be
abhorrent. The State Department's 1997 China human rights report
states that there have been credible reports in recent years, that
body parts from executed prisoners were removed, sold and transplanted
in China. Chinese officials have confirmed that executed prisoners are
among the sources of organs for transplant, but maintain that consent
is required.
We have raised this issue with China time and time again. We expect
China to enforce applicable laws and regulations. These are very
serious allegations. This is abhorrent behavior, if true. We have
repeatedly raised this issue in meetings with senior Chinese
officials, asked for results of investigations into this matter and
will continue to do so.
Q: Is this the first time that you're aware of this sort of open
market in this country?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I would refer you to the human rights report from
1997. I'll have to check on what information we may have had about
various reports in the United States prior to this.
Q:  Have the Chinese responded at all?
MR. RUBIN:  I don't have any information on their response.
(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)
(end transcript)




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