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23 February 1998

[EXCERPT]: STATE DEPARTMENT NOON BRIEFING, FEBRUARY 23, 1998

(Iraq) (8050)
State Department Spokesman James Rubin briefed.
IRAQ -- As of noon February 23, U.S. officials were still assessing
the agreement brokered by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan with Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein, Rubin said.
Secretary of State Albright has made clear that the United States does
not want "a phony solution," he said.
"What we're interested in is substance, and the substance is based on
UNSCOM's access," Rubin said. "We're not going to agree to anything
that doesn't meet our goals."
The current crisis with Iraq, Rubin said, is about Iraq's failure to
allow U.N. inspectors under the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) full and unfettered access to suspected chemical and
biological weapon storage sites as required under U.N. resolutions.
"It's critically important that the agreement lead to access," Rubin
said. Citing the success of the U.N. inspectors in finding and
destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, Rubin said "a peaceful
resolution (of the crisis) is preferable...because that's the surest
way to see UNSCOM gets back to doing its job."
Rubin said he did not foresee any immediate drawdown of U.S. forces
sent to the Persian Gulf region for a possible strike against Iraq
should Iraq fail to comply with U.N. demands. Those forces, he said,
will remain "commensurate with the threat as judged by the Secretary
of Defense and his recommendations to the President."
Following is the State Department transcript:
(begin transcript)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX
Monday, February 23, 1998
Briefer:  James P. Rubin
ANNOUNCEMENTS
1   Secretary's Appearances on the Hill This Week
IRAQ
1 Secretary: Briefing by Amb Richardson/Consultations With Foreign
Policy Team
1-3, Agreement: Transmitted to New York/US
Discussions/Details/Acceptance/ Next
8-9 Steps/Reversing Course, Not Negotiating/Russian Rpt of New UN
Resolution
10-12, Relevant UN Resolutions/Secretary's Talks with Russian FM
Primakov
14,16
2-4, UNSCOM: Aims/Access to Sites/Name Change/Relevant UN Resolutions/
6-7,  Experts/US Position on UNSCOM's Work
11,16
4-5,8, Oil-for-Food: New Resolution/Linkage to Agreement/Provision of
Medicine &
12-13 Food/Increase in Oil Production/Distribution of Food/Secretary
General's Report
5-7, US Military Forces: Remain in Place/Acting Alone/Sharing
Costs/Additional
9-10,14  UN Resolution to Act
5-6,13 Sanctions:  US Policy on Lifting
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 24
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1998  12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing. Let me start by
saying that Secretary Albright will be testifying this week three
times before Congress the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with
Secretary Cohen tomorrow; the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice and State, on Wednesday at 2:00 p.m.; and on
Thursday at the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State, at 10:00 a.m. Of course, this is part of the budget
process, which we expect at this time of year. But I suspect it will
be an opportunity to continue discussions with members of Congress on
the situation in Iraq, which, obviously, people are very focused on.
With regard to that situation, Secretary Albright has been receiving a
briefing over the last several --- the last 45 minutes, from
Ambassador Richardson as a result of the receipt of the agreement by
the permanent members of the Security Council in New York. She's
receiving a briefing; it may be completed right now. I expect her to
be consulting with the other members of the foreign policy team during
the course of the day. It's my understanding/expectation that the
White House will have more to say about rendering more complete
assessment of this agreement. So I am not going to be in a position to
do so, but I welcome your questions.
Q: So they're not going to know for roughly two and a half hours. So
you look like the point person, so I hope you'll indulge us. To begin
with, are all the details in? You know, the usual question are there
any handshakes or not-on-paper aspects to this accord that you'd want
to know about; or are you confident you have what is that was agreed
to?
MR. RUBIN: Well, first off on that, the document was transmitted to
Ambassador Richardson at the meeting in New York. And as would be
appropriate, Ambassador Richardson would be asking some questions
about it and trying to understand any parts that aren't immediately
obvious.
But to the extent that I were to declare ambiguities or lack of
ambiguities or clarity, that would be part of what we expect to see as
a result of discussions. This is a say this that Secretary Albright
made clear that we do not want a phony solution; we want a real
solution. So the President's advisors, Secretary Albright, are taking
the time to go through this, discuss it so that we will see whether,
indeed, it is a real solution. That requires some time, so we're going
to be very reluctant to make pronouncements prior to that consultation
process, which is ongoing right now.
Q: However much you may know about the agreement, the long experience
with Saddam Hussein suggests, doesn't it, that you have to see what
happens on the ground; correct? It could be the most reassuring
agreement, but would you be satisfied until you see monitors appearing
at sites and see how they're received?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say this it's important what an agreement
says, and what it indicates in terms of Iraq's willingness to give
unfettered access to the UN inspectors; if, indeed, that is what it
makes clear.
But it's at the end of day, it's also critical that Iraq provide
access. That's what this crisis has been about failure on Iraq's part
to allow UNSCOM, the UN inspectors, the access they need to do their
job. So what we're looking for is Iraq to reverse course and agree to
allow access to UN inspectors, in the first instance, through an
agreement. And if that agreement does make clear that there will be
unfettered access, then at the end of the day, we'll be looking for
that access to be demonstrated through the implementation of the
agreement. That is what UNSCOM is about.
Let's bear in mind how we got to this crisis. UNSCOM has done a
terrific job; UNSCOM has destroyed weapons of mass destruction; UNSCOM
has uncovered things the Iraqis didn't want it to uncover. So if
UNSCOM can now go where it needs to go, that will continue to work
confronting directly in the best possible way, the threat of weapons
of mass destruction from Iraq.
I think Secretary Albright and the other officials have made clear
from the beginning that the best way to deal with this problem is to
have UNSCOM continue its work. So for UNSCOM to continue its work, we
need words in an agreement; that's important. But at the end of the
day, we need the implementation through the actual inspections.
Q: Jamie, maybe you can help on one facet of this. As I understand it,
this agreement refers to eight presidential sites. All last week you
stressed that there are a lot more sites beyond that upwards of over
60 presidential sites and hundreds, if not thousands, of other sites
that UNSCOM needs unfettered access to. What happens to all the others
in this agreement?
MR. RUBIN: Again, I'm not going to be making statements on an
agreement that has just been orally briefed to Secretary Albright by
Ambassador Richardson. But I can say this the crisis is not about
eight presidential sites; the crisis is about UNSCOM, the UN
inspectors, getting access to all the sites they need -- not just any
eight sites designated as so-called presidential sites, but UNSCOM
getting access to all the places in Iraq it needs to go in such a way
that they can do their job, track down material if it's there, and
know that they've been unable to track it down not because they were
blocked, but because it's not there. That's what the crisis is about;
it's not just about eight sites.
Q: So you need this document to indicate that before the US would sign
off on it.
MR. RUBIN: Again, I hesitate to refer everything to any document. I
know there's a tendency to do that. What this crisis has been about is
access by UNSCOM to do its work. This crisis will be taking a step
towards resolution when UNSCOM's access is made clear, and then it
will be further when UNSCOM gets that access. The access is across the
board.
Q: Do you anticipate the United States possibly making changes in
whatever agreement Annan has come forward with? Is that a possibility?
MR. RUBIN: Again, what our expectation is is that this agreement will
be examined; the President will be in a position later today to talk
about my understanding is to talk about it on behalf of the
Administration. So I don't want to do that, other than to say what our
principles are: the principle of access; the principle that it's
important what it says, but at the end of the day, it's critically
important that the agreement lead to access, if indeed it allows that
access.
So the process by which this agreement is examined, and if it's
sufficient, implemented, is a lengthy one. Secretary General Annan, I
believe, already referred to the fact that Chairman Butler was
scheduled to go to Baghdad. Obviously that's part of the process. So
it's not this isn't a treaty-making process, where you make a treaty
and then you make an amendment and then you implement the amendment to
another document. This is a process based on actions that we would
expect UNSCOM to take.
Q: Jamie, I just had a follow-up on that. The French are saying that
they feel that they've been vindicated because Annan has been able to
reach an agreement. Do you have any reaction to that?
MR. RUBIN: If indeed the agreement meets the principles we set out,
and if indeed the agreement yields access at the end of the day, then
I think all the countries in the world that said they wanted to put
pressure on Saddam Hussein through the use of force and through the
threat of the use of force will make clear that peaceful resolution
was permitted because this leader was faced with the prospect of
military force.
I think we would agree with all countries that a peaceful resolution
is preferable for the reasons I stated; because that's the surest way
to see that UNSCOM gets back to doing its job. But I'm not in a
position to make a judgment about something that others were obviously
more quick to make a judgment about.
Q: -- and if you're not willing to make that judgment now. I mean, can
you at least say that the United States is optimistic that the
situation is resolved; or is that going too far?
MR. RUBIN: Again, we're just getting the briefing now or Secretary
Albright is. We're running through this. This is a serious matter, and
it's not a time for high fives; it's not a time for down faces. It's a
time for looking through the details, making sure that the principles
that we've set out are upheld; and then making sure that at the end of
the day, whatever agreement is reached, if it's sufficient, is
implemented.
Q: -- the UN has suggested that one of the items in the agreement that
Annan was able to broker would be that UNSCOM's name is changed to
something to represent the diplomats that are going to escort the
inspectors into the sites. Is that something that the US would find
acceptable, or you would say is maintaining the integrity of UNSCOM?
MR. RUBIN: Without getting into the name game, let me say this we have
made clear that UNSCOM is the unit that has performed so well over the
years, and it is UNSCOM that needs to be in a position to go to these
places because it's only UNSCOM that can make effective, technical
judgments about this. If a few diplomats were to accompany UNSCOM in
that work, that's a detail; that's a flourish, a bell, a whistle
whatever you want to call it. What matters is that UNSCOM gets the
access.
As far as the name issue, I just don't have anything for you on that.
Q: But changing the name, would that be something that you UNSCOM plus
something else; is that something that represents UNSCOM?
MR. RUBIN: Our principle is simple. Our principle is the expert group,
UNSCOM, that has been the one that has done the work so hard, going to
be able to go to the places it needs to go. I'm not going to be
getting into name issues. That's a big thing in New York for figuring
out what you name something.
What we're interested in is substance; and the substance is based on
UNSCOM's access
Q: Jamie, on Friday, as you know, the United States approved a
Security Council resolution that basically allows Iraq to more than
double the amount of oil it can sell on the international market for
humanitarian reasons. I had two questions for you on this. One is, why
did the United States agree to this just as Kofi Annan was going to
Baghdad? And two, do you think this creates the appearance of linkage?
MR. RUBIN: I have some experience on the appearance of linkage with
regard to the oil- for-food program. What's important here is that we
make clear through actions that we care about the Iraqi people; and
this program doubles the amount of food that would be available as a
result of oil sales for the Iraqi people.
It is the United States that has cared time and time again about what
happens in Iraq. It is Saddam Hussein who doesn't care. So even in the
face of the odd questioner who might ask about linkage, we are
pursuing our policy; and that policy is to try to do what we can to
help the Iraqi people by providing billions of dollars worth of food
and medicine to limit the damage that Saddam Hussein has done. He has
plenty of money to spend on weapons and palaces, and he doesn't spend
any of it on his people. So we are trying to do what we can to direct
food and medicine towards those people, under strict controls to make
sure that whatever oil is sold is only sold for this purpose.
And if some people might decide to get the wrong idea, we can't help
that. What we can do is do what we can to help the Iraqi people.
Q: Jamie, do you realistically think that the military build-up which
has happened in the Gulf area can now be reversed?
MR. RUBIN: I think we've made quite clear that the forces are there,
and there are no plans, to my knowledge, to adjust those forces. As
far as I know, the expectation is that they would stay there
commensurate with the threat, as judged by the Secretary of Defense in
his recommendations to the President.
But I haven't heard of any stand-down. We aren't even at a point where
we've decided that this agreement is sufficient to not use military
force. When we've made that decision, it's my understanding that that
doesn't mean that the next day or the day after that changes our force
posture. The agreement, even it is -- meets our principle, has to be
tested through implementation.
Q: Jamie, one technical question. Does the Secretary not have the
actual document that was signed?
MR. RUBIN:  I think she would have it now, yes.
Q: She does. Secondly, though, let me go to another question that's
been raised by the British and French foreign ministers in the last 24
hours; and that is the issue of sanctions relief. Both of them have
called for should the Iraqis comply with this signed agreement, and
assuming that this agreement is satisfactory to everybody the prospect
of lifting sanctions. What is the US policy on relief of sanctions for
Iraq at this time?
MR. RUBIN: I think the answer was contained in your question. There's
a lot of "ifs" that have to go before one could begin to talk about
sanctions relief. If this agreement meets the test of access; if the
inspectors actually are able to do their job; if after being able to
do their job, the Iraqis actually cooperate and allow them to come to
some conclusions about weapons of mass destruction I've counted four
"ifs" already. So that is what we call, in this business, a
hypothetical question.
But as far as our policy is concerned, our policy is if the Iraqi
regime complies with Security Council resolutions in this area, then
we would be in a position to look at sanctions relief. But that means
compliance; it doesn't mean hope for compliance; it doesn't mean
optimism about compliance. It means actual compliance. That means
letting the UN do what it needs to do; following all the resolutions
that are appropriate. And the past practice doesn't yield a lot of
optimism that that is going to happen soon. But we, again our position
is clear, and has been from the beginning.
The ball for sanctions is in Saddam Hussein's court. If he were to
allow the UN to do its job, if he were to implement the relevant
resolutions, then one could begin to imagine sanctions relief. But we
haven't seen that for seven years. We're waiting to see it; we'd like
to see it. But it hasn't happened yet.
Q: Jamie, can I follow up on this point because you talk about the
relevant resolutions, the appropriate resolutions, the resolutions in
this area.
MR. RUBIN:  Right.
Q: What specifically is relevant here? Is it just the resolutions
dealing with weapons of mass destruction, or is it every resolution
that's been -
MR. RUBIN: Well, our position on that has been that it's the relevant
resolution. I'll have to get a legal analysis for you of what our
lawyers believe are the relevant resolutions and all the provisions.
But one can't even begin to address this question, unless we see
cooperation with UNSCOM that we haven't seen before.
Q: Before Albright got a partial account, and certainly before the
document surfaced, she said on public television on television
publicly, that the US would act on its own, if need be. Is that still
accurate?
MR. RUBIN: Absolutely, that's why we're taking our time to examine
this document. This is a serious matter. We don't want a phony
solution, and we're not going to agree to anything that doesn't meet
our goals.
Q:  -- the right to take unilateral --
MR. RUBIN: And if it doesn't meet our goals, we reserve the right to
disagree, yes.
Q: A couple of very quick ones. When you talked about the commission,
you're still upholding the principle of the commission's expertise.
MR. RUBIN:  Right.
Q: Let's break that down a little bit. Is the US position still that
only UNSCOM is to decide, irrespective of nationality, who relevant
experts are to go look at a site?
MR. RUBIN: I don't believe we've ever stated it that way. Let me
remind you --
Q: Well, when they tried to bar Americans, you said the judgment is
their expertise, not their nationality.
MR. RUBIN:  Certainly this is based on expertise.
Q:  This doesn't erode this does it?
MR. RUBIN: But you have to be very careful here, and that's why I'm
going to be fairly elusive in response to your question.
UNSCOM has never gone to these places before. Nobody's ever gone to
these places. So this is new territory in how access will be allowed.
And frankly, it's not so much about these new places, these places,
but --
Q:  But the principle.
MR. RUBIN: -- but it's about all the places in Iraq that they've been
blocked time and time again from going to. So it's a very complex
issue that requires the experts, the can-do inspectors who've worked
so hard on this issue to judge whether their integrity and their
ability to operate has been impaired in any way. Our position is the
experts have to be able to do the job; the experts have to be able to
render the judgments on whether the job is half-done or is complete.
Q: Fine, I understand. But this latest impasse began over the barring
of an American, and the degradation of him as spy. The question is
whether experts are to be chosen in any way, based on the nationality.
Has Kofi Annan agreed to limit the American presence on these
monitoring groups?
MR. RUBIN: I think I'd rather wait until we've talked about the
agreement to talk about a technicality that look, I'm not disputing
I'm sure anything that looks like something that's wrong is a big
thing for you all. But for us, what's important is that UNSCOM experts
are behind the process of finding out what goes on in Iraq. How it
would work in a place where UNSCOM has never gone to and I've already
said that if a few diplomats need to go along, that's not a problem
for us.
So as far as the expertise and who are the experts within UNSCOM, I've
heard nothing to suggest that any part of any arrangement will be to
challenge UNSCOM's judgment about who UNSCOM's experts are.
Q: Two questions first, did any of the American diplomatic contacts in
the region, apart from those with the British, has the idea been
broached of sharing the cost of the American deployment; and has there
been any positive response to that?
MR. RUBIN: This is primarily a Pentagon question, but I would say that
in principle, we have a burden-sharing practice that we've adopted in
this area, and that burden-sharing will continue. But I haven't heard
of anything specifically, the way you described it.
Let me remind you that many countries in the world over 20 were
prepared to offer either direct military support, over-flight rights,
basing rights or other military cooperation. So I think there is the
burden being shared. At the same time, I think we all recognize that
even during the Gulf War, the heavy lifting was done primarily by the
United States, the British and the French.
Q: And on the oil-for-food deal, it's my understanding that it
actually allows for a higher volume of oil than Iraq can currently
have the capacity to pump. Is the United States prepared for Iraq to
increase its oil pumping capacity by importing the equipment necessary
to redevelop its oil fields?
MR. RUBIN: Well, this is one of the issues that will be discussed in
the implementation of this resolution.
Q:  Is it implanted in the resolution?
MR. RUBIN: There are some questions out there about how much oil they
can now pump. There are bigger questions about how much food they're
buying, and whether they're distributing it. So it's a balance of
issues, including how do you sell the oil; how do you get the oil to
the right places; also including how do you get the food and the
medicine to the right places?
We do not know whether Iraq will accept this new resolution. As you
can see, they still have yet to stand up and say they want to be able
to feed their people. They've still yet to say they're happy to sell
oil to provide food for their people. They have to be bludgeoned into
this process through diplomatic pressure. What we're waiting for is
more information from Kofi Annan on how this expanded program is going
to work. And the issue you raise is one of the issues that will be
discussed in the implementation process. The Secretary General will
prepare an independent report on Iraqi production and transportation
capacity, and make recommendations on what is necessary in order for
Iraq to be able to export this oil.
In short, this is an issue that has to be worked out. The Secretary
General is going to make some judgments. You hear oil experts throw
around numbers rather casually; and what's important is that the
Secretary General decide what additional enhancements are needed, if
any, to meet this higher threshold. We need to await that report, and
then be in a position to make that judgment.
Q:  Jamie, procedurally can you --
MR. RUBIN:  Hold on, let's let him finish.
Q: In principle, is the United States willing to let Iraq import
equipment to --
MR. RUBIN: In principle, the United States is waiting for the report
from the Secretary General on what's necessary.
Q: Going back to the UNSCOM and the agreement which is just arriving,
procedurally what happens now? Does the Security Council have to
approve it formally?
MR. RUBIN: That is a judgment that will have to be made based on what
the agreement says and what one thinks the agreement says. I mean,
Secretary General Annan has made clear that it's this is a matter that
rests in the hands of the Security Council. UNSCOM was created
pursuant to a Security Council resolution. This sanctions issue is in
the hands of the Security Council. He can make recommendations, but
it's up to the members of the Security Council to decide whether Iraq
is in compliance with Security Council resolutions or not.
So I would expect some way for the Security Council to take into
account this agreement if the agreement meets the test. So it's hard
to say exactly what will happen, since we haven't made that first
point.
Q: And if the is it the US Government position that it would like to
see another very specific, explicit resolution passed by the Security
Council?
MR. RUBIN: Prior to this agreement's parent conclusion, we made clear
that we would be happy to have a strong message sent to Iraq. We also
made clear that we didn't think we needed a Security Council
resolution if the President decided to use force. So it's hard for me
to answer your question until we've first made a judgment about
whether this agreement, as its absorbed and given careful scrutiny,
examination by the Administration, what it does to the prospect of the
use of force. At that point, it's possible to then decide what steps
the Security Council ought to take.
Q: Jamie, I'd like to clarify something I think you said. I want to
check. You're saying that if this agreement is accepted, and the
UNSCOM inspectors go back to work, that the US would keep military
assets in the region until we are sure that the inspectors are able to
do their work?
MR. RUBIN: I specifically did not say that parsed sentence, as you put
it together. What I said was, we will keep our the Secretary of
Defense, I believe, said and Sandy Berger said yesterday that we
intend to keep our forces in the region, even if Kofi Annan achieves
an apparent success, because the forces are there commensurate with
the threat we think exists.
At such time as the Secretary of Defense deems the threat situation to
be different, pursuant to either success in the implementation of this
agreement or not, I would presume he would then make recommendations
to the President of the United States.
So all I'm saying is that I haven't heard anybody say that in the
immediate aftermath of an agreement there will be a drawn-down. But
how long the forces stay there and whether they wait for which
benchmarks in this area or other indicators of the threat is something
I specifically did not say.
Q: Okay. Can I get one more question? Given that, as one of Barry's
first questions indicated, Saddam Hussein's word is not something
which seems to be kept very frequently, given that we can't trust his
word, do you think that the US would keep military assets there on a
more stepped-up basis?
MR. RUBIN: I think I did the best I could with that question, Betsy,
which is that both Secretary of Defense Cohen and Sandy Berger have
made clear that even if there were an agreement struck that met our
test, there wouldn't be an immediate draw-down of our forces. They
said that yesterday. I can repeat that today.
As far as what would be required for this crisis to be resolved and
what level of force would be necessary throughout, that is not
something I'm prepared to speak to from this podium. That is a matter
for the Secretary of Defense to make recommendations to the President
about.
Q: Over the last couple of months you've said even from this podium
that you weren't interested in negotiating, or the UN was not going to
negotiate with Saddam Hussein; this wasn't about negotiations; this
was about access and letting UNSCOM do its job. Well, today all the
appearances are that the UN did negotiate with Saddam and he got his
way and came out ahead and almost
MR. RUBIN:  Is that your conclusion?
Q:  No, I'm just I'm giving you the impression that
MR. RUBIN:  I thought you said that was your conclusion.
Q:  The appearance and what some observers are saying, is that
MR. RUBIN:  Oh, those observers.  Those famous observers.
Q: -- that Saddam almost has the UN eating out of his hand. He got the
Secretary General to come all the way to Baghdad to have a
face-to-face meeting with him. And what happened with no negotiating?
MR. RUBIN: There hasn't been, from our standpoint, any negotiating in
the sense that we are going to change our principles. Does that mean
one can't have a meeting -- that the Secretary General shouldn't try
to get Saddam Hussein to reverse course and allow access he's never
allowed before? No. If Saddam Hussein allows access, if he reverses
course, if he permits access, that's not negotiating, that's reversing
course. And a meeting does not a negotiation make.
Q: You're saying if the meeting got the end result, which is
diplomacy, then that was a good thing, even if some are calling it
negotiating?
MR. RUBIN: Well, some will criticize whatever we do. We understand
that, because people need to make a living.
(Laughter.)
But as far as the question of negotiation is concerned, what we're
saying is the message is what counts, not the messenger. We don't have
an objection to people meeting. What we have an objection to is anyone
purporting to change the principles that underlie Security Council
resolutions. And if, as a result of a meeting with Saddam Hussein, the
Secretary General was able to get him change his position and give
UNSCOM unfettered access to places it's never gone before and start to
let it to go to places it has been blocking UNSCOM from going, then
that is a step forward and that's the kind of meeting that is not a
negotiation that we can support.
Q: How will the US decide whether UNSCOM has sufficient authority? I
mean, you've said in the past that Butler has the right to sort of
define that. But you're also saying the US reserves the right to take
military action. Is there a contradiction there?
MR. RUBIN: No, I don't see it. I think what I've tried to indicate in
the past, that since our UNSCOM contrary to the impression some
critics are suggesting that UNSCOM is some weak organization, that
it's bad to allow the UN to be involved in something these are can-do
guys and they do a hell of a job and they've uncovered more weapons of
mass destruction over the last several years than has been destroyed
-- or was destroyed by the Gulf War. They are the ones who can make
judgments about whether they have the access they need to do their
job, because they're the experts. Our principle is that UNSCOM have
access. And so they are going to have to make a judgment as to
whether, indeed, they can do what they need to do.
With regard to the unilateral question, your second point, we have
said we would prefer the United Nations being able to get access so
that they can find these weapons of mass destruction and confront this
threat directly. If we don't believe that that is going to be allowed,
because Saddam Hussein is not going to allow that, then we would be in
a position to have to decide whether to act to protect our vital
national interests. And one of those vital national interests is to
protect against his inherent threat from these weapons of mass
destruction in a situation where he's not allowing UNSCOM to operate.
Q: Just to follow up on that, so it's conceivable that UNSCOM and even
the Security Council could find this arrangement acceptable, but that
the US would act regardless?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think I said that. What I said was that we reserve
the right to act based on our national interests, and our national
interests are to contain and confront the threat from Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction. UNSCOM, the UN inspectors, have done a hell of a
job in confronting that threat, destroying weapons of mass
destruction, and we want them to continue to do their work. If they're
unable to continue to do their work, which is a judgment that they and
others will have to make based on a variety of criteria, we reserve
the right to disagree with any arrangement that has been made.
.
But it's hard to get heavily into those details until we've had a
chance to assess this arrangement and then be in a position to see
whether it yields a new position, a reversed position by Saddam
Hussein namely, unfettered access.
Judd, you sound like you've just been handed a note..
Q: This just in so you probably won't have anything on this, but let
me ask anyhow. According to Interfax, the Russians are saying that
Russia and the United States are going to jointly introduce a
resolution in the UN Security Council on the agreement.
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I would be hard pressed to respond to
Interfax, which has mostly, I guess well, let me not characterize
their accuracy.
(Laughter.)
Q:  It's (inaudible) -- but that's okay.
MR. RUBIN: It would be a bad practice to respond to Interfax reports
from Moscow, other than to say that we haven't made a judgment and are
in the process of making that judgment. I can say this -- Secretary
Albright spoke to Foreign Minister Primakov this morning. She spoke
also to Foreign Minister Cook, to Foreign Minister Axworthy, and I
suspect she'll continue her discussions during the course of the day
to talk about, compare notes, try to decide what the best course of
action will be.
But in order for us to decide whether a resolution is necessary,
whether no resolution is necessary because the agreement isn't good
enough, we need to go through the process of deciding what we think
about this agreement. And as I've tried to say, that's still a few
hours off.
Q: I'd like to go back to the issue of negotiating and you're sort of
MR. RUBIN:  Are you sure?
Q: Yes, I do disputing the notion of negotiating and asserting that
only a reversal by Saddam is acceptable. I mean, in fact, what is
increasingly apparent -- all the elements of a deal are out there. The
United States went and signed on to this vast increase in the
oil-for-food program. You've got the element of the diplomats going
with UNSCOM to the sites. You have some sort of paper apparently
agreed to by Annan and Saddam in Baghdad. How can you say there's been
no negotiating going on?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I know it's hard to resist the effort to link issues,
but I can tell you that I never heard any discussion that because we
do oil-for-food, we're going to get some better cooperation from Iraq
on UNSCOM. At the core of your argument is that somehow because we're
going to provide the Iraqi people food and medicine, Saddam Hussein is
going to allow more access for UNSCOM. And there's no evidence over
the last seven years that he cares one whit about his people, and that
he would do anything more or less based on them eating more or less.
Q:  I don't think
MR. RUBIN:  You brought up oil-for-food
Q: Right, I know. But I think that's an element that the French and
the Russians and the British wanted, not
MR. RUBIN: No, it's something we started. The United States was the
country that put forward the resolution a couple of years ago that
created the oil-for-food program. It was a US initiative others
supported it. So I think you're incorrectly analyzing the lay of the
land.
Q: Jamie, could I get issue of sanctions. The Secretary spoke about
this in her speech at Georgetown one year ago March. Do her remarks at
that point still stand?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
Q: Well, her remarks at that point were that she said, we do not agree
with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations
concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted.
Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful
intentions, it can only do so by complying with all the Security
Council resolutions to which it is subject. Now, does that still
stand?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. I think I just said that, Roy. But if you go to the
next quote which is what I would have quoted if I were you and then
that analytical point as to whether Saddam Hussein can do this, which
she expressed her doubts about. But that is different from asking, as
you like and are want to ask, what is the policy of the US Government?
The policy of the US Government is if he complies with the relevant
resolutions then it is possible that sanctions can be lifted.
It is a different question over whether we think he will comply with
the resolutions. And many people have misquoted that paragraph.
Q: But this says, all the resolutions, all the Security Council
resolutions.
MR. RUBIN: I think I used the phrase, all relevant resolutions right
here.
Q:  No, but this does not say, all relevant it says, all.
MR. RUBIN: Roy, I can't imagine we would distinguish between all
non-relevant resolutions. Obviously, they have to be relevant.
Q:  Okay.  Secondly, does the United States see eye-to-eye
MR. RUBIN: Is it going to be a question more likely to yield an
answer?
Q: I don't know. I mean, does the United States see completely
eye-to-eye with its allies, Britain and France, on this issue?
MR. RUBIN:  They'll have to speak for themselves.
Q: Can I go back to the question of forces in the Gulf? Can the United
States maintain that posture and not compromise its ability to respond
to a regional conflict elsewhere in the world?
MR. RUBIN: I believe that the view is that Saddam Hussein's weapons of
mass destruction pose a threat to our national interests; and on that
basis, forces were deployed. It is up to the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs to make judgments over how to operate in the context
of multiple threats to US national interests and where to put forces
at a given time. But I think the fact that Iraq is a threat is not
going to go away.
Q: -- follow up on that, and this may not be something you can
address. Can you discuss this delay in a rotation of troops into
Korea?
MR. RUBIN: No. That would be something that would be appropriately
directed at the Pentagon.
Q: Two questions -- the first, a follow up on Roy's. What about
Paragraph XXII? Does the United States believe that that can be
responded to, absent compliance with all the other resolutions?
MR. RUBIN: We're now entering what I call a hypothetical world. I have
been very happy to talk about our policy on relevant Security Council
resolutions. But in order to get to the point that you are asking me,
one has to posit, one, the agreement constitutes one that can move the
inspection process forward; two, that Iraq actually cooperates with
that agreement and sees it implemented; three, that UNSCOM is able to
complete its work, which it has not been able to do for six long
years. If all of those three "ifs" were answered in a positive way,
one would have a problem about that Paragraph XXII.
But in the meantime, we've seen steps backwards in the last several
months from Iraq, in terms of complying with Security Council
resolutions on weapons of mass destruction. So we've been farther away
from addressing that issue.
Q:  Can I change the subject?
MR. RUBIN:  Yes, go ahead.
Q: We haven't talked about in the last couple of days, but apparently
Russia has said, I believe it was Mikhailov, their atomic guy, said
they're going to complete the reactor in Bushehr; that he thinks Iran
is, in fact, secretly trying to develop a nuclear weapon, but that
they're so far off it doesn't make any difference.
MR. RUBIN: Okay. Let me try to address this question as best I can.
Our position on the subject of nuclear cooperation with Iran is clear:
we are opposed to any form of nuclear cooperation with Tehran, given
its demonstrated interest in requiring a nuclear weapons capability.
That's our assessment. Our position extends to the Bushehr plant.
Reports that the Russians intend to expand their role at the plant, to
take charge of some of the construction that was to be handled by
Iran, does not alter our view of the project. Moscow has given us some
helpful assurances on the nuclear issue in the past, including
President Yeltsin's assurance that Russia would not provide Iran with
any militarily useful nuclear technologies, including a gas centrifuge
facility and a heavy water moderated reactor. Those are the equipment
that could have the most danger because of their potential application
to a nuclear weapons program.
Given this inherent proliferation risk, they've given us those
assurances. And while we appreciate those assurances, we've made clear
to them time and again, and will continue to do so, that we oppose any
form of nuclear cooperation with Iran.
Q: What is the affect on the Total sanctions decision as a result
well, first of all, have the Russians confirmed to you that they are,
in fact, going to finish the Bushehr plant?
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think his comments were on the record and so
there's no reason to dispute that this is their intention. What I'm
saying is that we will continue to discuss this matter with them.
We've made clear that we oppose any cooperation at all. But in the
areas that it could have been the most danger in terms of
proliferation, we've seen the Russians agree not to move forward.
Q: Secondarily, does this have any impact on Total sanctions decision?
MR. RUBIN: I don't see the direct linkage, but I can go to the Total
guys and see if this has changed their view of whether another project
affects the Iranians ability to gain money, which is what that
judgment is based on.
Q: I don't know if you have anything on this, but a Lebanese-born US
citizen by the name of Bashar Saidi is currently in an Israeli jail
accused of --
Q:  Can we stay on Iraq, please, Jamie?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I'm not sure we're going to make much more progress,
but happy to give it one more question, Charlie, yes.
Q: In Judd's earlier question talking about the Russians and a
possible resolution putting aside the hypothetical of what
MR. RUBIN:  I never do that.
Q: Well, I'm putting that aside. My question is specifically, did the
Secretary in her discussions today with any of the foreign ministers,
and especially Primakov, talk about the possibility of a joint
resolution?
MR. RUBIN: What I would say to you is that I'm not going to repeat
what was said in a private communication with the Russians. I will say
that they obviously talked about the different scenarios if the
agreement does pass muster or if it doesn't pass muster.
Mark, let's give it one more shot; but I'm not sure we're going to
make much progress.
Q: The Secretary General said on a CNN interview this morning, in
discussing the impasse between UNSCOM and Iraq that some of the fault
lay on both sides.
MR. RUBIN: I didn't hear that quote. I know where you're going on the
question do we agree with that some of the fault lays on UNSCOM? All I
can say is when you're in somebody else's country -- and it's often
polite to try to blame problems on some misunderstandings. That's a
diplomatic trick to say that people didn't understand each other. We
think UNSCOM has done a great job. We think UNSCOM is a can-do
organization. And we think they have destroyed more weapons of mass
destruction after the Gulf War than were destroyed during it. So
UNSCOM has done the world, the entire world a great service.
Q: -- those words future misunderstandings the Secretary might have
overseas?
MR. RUBIN: No, no. I was saying the Secretaries General often used
that word.
Q:  Oh.
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