23 February 1998
EXPERTS SUSPICIOUS OF IRAQI VX WEAPONS PLANS
(Technical evaluation determines VX picture still incomplete) (1080) By Judy Aita USIA United Nations Correspondent United Nations -- Iraq was able to produce between 50 and 100 tonnes of the deadly chemical warfare agent VX before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and currently has the know-how, equipment and possibly the chemicals to manufacture as much as 200 tonnes of VX, a group of international chemical weapons experts has concluded. The experts, who were called together by the U.N. Special Commission overseeing the destruction of Iraqi weapons (UNSCOM), said that "it is clear that the capability to produce VX was regarded as being of the utmost importance to Iraq in 1987 and beyond." "Iraq's unilateral destruction of VX essential components and materials, coupled with the denial until 1995 of attempts to produce VX on an industrial scale can only reinforce that view," they said in a new report to the Security Council. "Therefore, the retention of a VX capability by Iraq cannot be excluded." Iraq had great expectation for the so-called technical evaluation meeting -- which was held February 2 - 6, 1998, -- between experts assembled by UNSCOM and Iraqi officials. Baghdad saw the meeting as a means of closing the U.N. files on its chemical weapons programs and bringing the end of the wide-ranging economic sanctions that much closer. However, the team concluded that while the technical evaluation meeting was "not without merit" it was "premature." Another team of missile experts also concluded that more work is needed to account for all of Iraq's long-range missile warheads that are also banned by the Gulf War cease-fire agreement. The Security Council, which received copies of the two reports February 19, will be briefed by UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler on the technical evaluations later in the month after Secretary General Kofi Annan returns from his diplomatic mission to persuade Baghdad to open all sites in Iraq to UNSCOM inspections or face military strikes. UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in October 1997 that Iraq had not revealed the full extent of the chemical warfare agent VX. That assessment was upheld by an emergency session of the Special Commission in November 1997 at the beginning of the current crisis over weapons inspections. The chemical weapons team was headed by UNSCOM staff member Horst Reeps of Germany. It included 15 chemical weapons experts from the United States, Switzerland, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, Sweden, and The Netherlands. The team attempted to balance Iraq's declarations on the amount of precursor chemicals and VX produced with UNSCOM's independent investigations and data. UNSCOM used a variety of sources to verify Iraq's declarations, including field inspections, interviews with Iraqis involved in VX activities, information from documents found at a farm in Iraq after the defection of the late General Hussein Kamal who was in charge of hiding information from the U.N., and data provided by other governments. "The team does not feel that the level of verification achieved so far is satisfactory," the report said. "There continues to be too much reliance placed by the Iraqi side on unsupported individual statements." "There has been a long history of misrepresentation of the VX program and as of this (technical evaluation meeting), vital information remains to be revealed," the experts said. The experts also found fault with Baghdad's claims that it had a successful research effort on VX but never was able to produce the weapon in quantities large enough to use in war. "There is no credible technical reason why Iraq should fail in the production of VX," the experts said. Iraqi scientists have "demonstrated their understanding of four major synthesis routes, yet have no credible technical justification for not successfully scaling up two of these routes," the U.N. team said. It pointed out that since 1984 the Muthanna State Establishment had industrial production of a chemical process (organophosphorous synthesis) that is more difficult than the processes involved in VX production. The report pointed out that VX and its precursors were completely omitted from Iraq's first declarations to the U.N. in 1991 and until 1995 Iraq sought to portray its VX activities as being much smaller in ambition and scope than in fact they were. Yet, the experts said, VX research started as early as the mid or late 1970s. And by the Spring of 1988 successful industrial scale production trials were made at Muthanna. After 1995, Iraq acknowledged attempts to produce VX on an industrial scale and said it had modified facilities for VX and VX precursor production. In 1996 Iraq admitted that it had filled three aerial bombs and one 122 mm artillery rocket with VX for storage and corrosion tests. To verify fully the extent of the VX program, the experts said, Iraq must give UNSCOM production records and research and development reports, including munitions trials, for the entire period of VX activities. "To this end Iraq has provided only fragmentary evidence in related documentation. No evidence to support Iraq's declarations on its VX activities in 1989 to 1991 has been provided," the report said. Although Iraq made available personnel involved in VX research and development, UNSCOM said that the head of the Iraqi delegation repeatedly overrode efforts made by Iraqi experts to answer questions so that the experts did not get clear answers. Iraq also failed to provide interpreters for Russian, French and Chinese experts working for the U.N., it reported. The panel on warheads said that excavated warhead remnants have provided valuable data for overall analysis and evaluation but the level of verification is not satisfactory and more work is required. "Less progress has been achieved in the accounting of Iraq's declared special warheads for chemical and biological weapons," the panel reported. UNSCOM "still needs to obtain a full picture of Iraq's warhead production," including warhead design and testing, the experts said. In the report on the technical evaluation meeting, the experts said that "on several occasions, the Iraqi side vehemently objected to the introduction of all relevant facts and information. ... In many cases, the Iraqi side would withdraw or change its explanations if they were not satisfactory to the team." The warheads group was made up of 13 experts from the United Kingdom, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. It met in Baghdad with Iraqi officials from February 1 to 6.
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