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23 February 1998

FACT SHEET: IRAQ PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: FACTS ABOUT SANCTIONS

(Facts about UN sanctions and the oil-for-food program) (1610)
(Following are facts and figures about U.N. sanctions on Iraq and the
oil-for-food program.)
-- The United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Iraq on August 6,
1990, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The maintenance of
sanctions makes it impossible for the Iraqi regime to gear up its
weapons programs to full strength. Saddam Hussein desperately wants to
resume the unrestricted development and production of weapons of mass
destruction -- chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. He has used
chemical weapons on the Iranian and Iraqi people, and threatened to
use them during the invasion and liberation of Kuwait.
-- UN sanctions cannot be lifted until Iraq complies with its
obligations under all relevant UNSC resolutions.
-- UN sanctions on Iraq have never prohibited the import of food,
medicine or other essential humanitarian supplies. The sanctions on
Iraq were carefully structured to ensure that the Iraqi people need
not be harmed. There have always been "humanitarian" exceptions to the
UN sanctions regime.
-- Even at the height of the Gulf War, Security Council resolution 661
(adopted August 6, 1990) allowed Iraq to purchase food, medicine and
other humanitarian goods. The government of Iraq has never taken full
advantage of this exception, preferring instead to spend scarce
resources on its military and security services, as well as building
luxurious palaces for its leadership.
-- In order to reduce the unintended impact of sanctions on the Iraqi
people, in 1991 the UN proposed, and the US strongly supported, an
"oil-for-food" program that was firmly under the control of the United
Nations (Security Council resolutions 706/712). Iraq rejected this
approach.
-- In a 1995 UN report, Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the
United Nations Commission on human rights, noted Iraq's responsibility
for the suffering of the Iraqi people. The report states: "there
exists no embargo upon the import by Iraq of medicaments or foodstuffs
for humanitarian purposes... In addition, the government of Iraq is
under specific obligation to take advantage of available resources to
secure the rights to food and health care of its citizens. ... The
government of Iraq is wholly responsible for discriminatory policies
in the distribution of such resources as do exist."
-- Iraq refused to accept a modified version of 706/712, resolution
986 (the oil-for-food program) for more than a year after it was
adopted in April 1995. Only after protracted negotiations between the
SYG and the government of Iraq did the oil-for-food program finally
become a reality in December 1996.
-- The oil-for-food program currently allows Iraq to sell USD four
billion of oil each year to help buy food, medicine and other
humanitarian supplies for its people and to compensate those it harmed
during the Gulf war.
-- The amount of food actually available for distribution to the Iraqi
people under the oil-for-food program is substantial. According to the
UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, over three million metric
tons of food purchased with money from legalized oil sales arrived in
Iraq in 1997.
-- The oil-for-food program was intended to supplement, not substitute
for, Iraq's other resources. However, Iraq reduced its own purchases
of humanitarian goods, in response to the "oil-for-food" program and
has portrayed the "oil-for-food" program as its sole source of food
and medicine. There is also evidence that Iraq may have diverted
critical food and medical supplies from its own stocks for use by its
military rather than distribute it to civilians.
-- The Iraqi regime has obstructed and manipulated the oil-for-food
plan since its inception. It has resisted un procedures and
initiatives, mismanaged the contracting process, and failed to put
proper priority on important humanitarian needs.
-- Baghdad deliberately and unnecessarily pumped oil for two months in
June and July 1997, and again for over one month in December 1997 and
January 1998. These delays held up humanitarian purchases and have led
to significant disruptions in the provision of humanitarian supplies
into Iraq.
-- It has reduced the food ration for each person, even as more food
was flowing into the country.
-- It has placed its own stock of non-986 food in warehouses -- even
though the people need it now.
-- Under phase one (beginning December 1996), Iraq ordered many of its
medical purchases from small, inefficient pharmaceutical companies.
These companies had flawed paperwork, used unknown brand and product
names, and had difficulties meeting delivery schedules.
-- After the oil-for-food program was renewed for the first time in
June 1997 (UNSC resolution 1111), Iraq unilaterally decided not to
begin selling oil. This necessitated a delay in the processing of
applications for goods. The Security Council clearly identified Iraq
as being responsible for the delay in implementing 1111 when it passed
UNSCR 1129. That resolution modified the deadline for filling the
first one billion USD of the oil quota to insure that the maximum
amount of money would be available for purchase of humanitarian goods.
-- Iraq has sent several letters to the un sanctions committee
requesting that contracts under the oil-for-food program for food and
medicine that exceed the program's distribution list amounts not be
approved. In effect, Iraq is saying that other (non-food/medicine)
items -- such as machine tools and spare parts for power plants -- are
a higher priority than increasing the supply of food to its people.
Iraq has canceled contracts for food and medicine worth tens of
millions of dollars even after they were approved by the sanctions
committee.
-- While the Iraqi people are suffering, the Iraqi leadership has
continued to spend substantial amounts on the maintenance of its armed
forces and internal security services, as well as on the construction
of at least 48 lavish palaces for Saddam Hussein and his family. We
estimate the cost of the palaces alone at the equivalent of USD 1.5-2
billion.
-- In February, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted a proposal
recommending an expansion of the oil-for-food program which would
permit Iraq to sell USD 5.2 billion dollars every six months. Iraqi
officials declined to cooperate in the preparation of the report, and
have rejected virtually all aspects of the proposal. Objections from
Baghdad are likely to delay the implementation of any expansion
effort.
Frequently asked questions:
Q:  Is there a limit on the amount of food that Iraq can purchase?
A: No. Sanctions have never limited the importation of food and
medicine.
Q:  Do sanctions prevent Iraqis from getting medical treatment?
A: No. Sanctions do not prevent Iraqis from receiving medical
treatment either inside or outside of Iraq. In fact, some Iraqis have
even traveled to the U.S. for treatment.
Q: What causes delays in approvals of contracts to sell humanitarian
goods?
A: Most delays are the result of normal commercial issues --
production, shipping schedules, transfer of payment, etc. Iraq chooses
the companies with which it deals, and the shippers that bring the
goods to Iraq, and is free to change companies if its dissatisfied
with their performance.
There are strict deadlines for the contract review/approval process.
Ninety-two percent of contracts have been approved within the
deadlines (i.e., within two days for food and medicine contracts, and
within five days for other goods). Virtually all those contracts not
approved within the deadlines are non-food, non-medicine items which
have been put on hold in order to obtain additional information on
end-user/uses before approval. Final decisions on these applications
are made as soon as the requested information has been provided. More
than 95 percent of all contracts are eventually approved.
-- Of the small percentage of contracts which are blocked, the vast
majority fall into three categories:
A) Dual use items -- that is, items which could be used for military
purposes (e.g., fermenters and spray nozzles that could be used for
making and using chemical/biological weapons)
B) Non-humanitarian, commercial or industrial items -- (e.g., spare
parts for factories)
C) Problem companies -- history of sanctions violations or Iraqi-owned
firms.
Q:  Are there many applications on hold?
A: No. The sanctions committee has considered more than 2000
applications for humanitarian goods since the program began. Nearly 95
percent of these applications have been approved, and others have been
withdrawn by Iraq.
Of those few applications that remain on hold, most are awaiting
additional information from Iraq or the supplier to confirm that the
items requested really are destined for humanitarian use rather than
for industry or the military. These are not food or medicine
contracts. The committee could resolve most of these holds immediately
if the necessary information were provided.
Q: Why did the United States put holds on the purchase of ambulances?
A: Iraq drafted a "distribution list" which was approved by the UN's
Department of Humanitarian Affairs. This list called for the purchase
of 100 ambulances. The UN sanctions committee, of which the U.S. is a
member, approved the contract as soon as it was submitted. Iraq later
submitted a request for another 100 ambulances, which the U.S. blocked
since it exceeded the distribution list amount. The distribution list
for Phase II (beginning June 1997) called for purchase of another 100
ambulances. Again, the sanctions committee approved the application as
soon as it came in. In the meantime, the first distribution list was
amended to allow for an additional 100 ambulances. Based on that
amendment, the U.S. allowed approval of the earlier application that
had been blocked.