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18 February 1998

TRANSCRIPT: INDYK 2/17 WORLDNET INTERVIEW ON IRAQ

(Annan's visit to Iraq is "last chance" for diplomatic solution)
(7260)
Washington -- A visit to Baghdad by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
will be the "last chance" for a diplomatic solution to the Iraq
crisis, according to Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
"I think there is a general sense -- not just in the United States,
but in other capitals -- that if Kofi Annan goes to Baghdad that this
will be as it were the last chance" for a diplomatic solution. "It's
difficult for us to see if that visit fails -- we hope it won't fail
-- what else could be achieved through diplomacy," Indyk said February
17.
"There are two basic principles that have to be observed and will have
to be a part of any diplomatic solution" during Annan's visit, Indyk
said in a Worldnet interview with participants in Paris, Cairo, Riyadh
and Ankara:
"The first is, as we said all along, and as is provided for by the
Security Council resolutions, free and unfettered access for UNSCOM to
be able to do its job. And the second is that whatever arrangement is
worked out the integrity of UNSCOM must be preserved."
Indyk also made the following points:
-- The United States seeks a "genuine, peaceful solution. We would
prefer not to have to resort to force. And we are making clear that we
will do what we can to ensure that a peaceful solution is achieved.
But it is not just up to us. If Saddam Hussein does not comply with
the Security Council resolutions, then force may be necessary. If it
becomes necessary, then our objective will be to significantly
diminish the threat that he can pose with his weapons of mass
destruction and to reduce his military capability to threaten his
neighbors. Those are the clear objectives."
-- "The heart of the problem" on lifing sanctions is Saddam Hussein's
refusal to comply fully with the U.N. Security Council resolutions,
which "make very clear the circumstances under which sanctions would
be lifted." Until Saddam complies "... we can't even get into that
kind of discussion."
-- The U.S. is very concerned about the plight of the Iraqi people and
supports the U.N.'s proposal for expanding the oil-for-food plan,
allowing Iraq to sell more than double the amount of oil, "so as to
ensure that the Iraqi people do not suffer as a result of Saddam
Hussein's refusal to comply with the Security Council resolutions."
-- "There are a lot of countries around the world that have weapons of
mass destruction. The difference in the case of Saddam Hussein is that
he has used his weapons of mass destruction, and he has shown a
pattern of aggressive behavior that is unparalleled anywhere else in
the world. ... He has used his weapons of mass destruction not only in
the war with Iran but also against his own people. He used gas against
Iraqi Kurds in the north. So there is a clear record of behavior here
that is unacceptable. And that is why there are specific Security
Council resolutions that mandate that Iraq will not have weapons of
mass destruction."
Following is the transcript of the Worldnet program:
(Begin transcript)
MR. BERTEL: Welcome to Worldnet's "Dialogue," I'm Jim Bertel. After
weeks of intense efforts by U.S. and international mediators, Iraq
remains steadfast in refusing access to the United Nations inspection
teams. The United States has not given up on finding a peaceful
resolution, and is continuing to pursue efforts to find a diplomatic
solution to the crisis.
(Begin videotape.)
Diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis with Iraq
over U.N. arms inspections continue today, even as the international
coalition prepares for possible military strikes to destroy Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. But compromise proposals
delivered to the U.N. by Iraq this week, offering U.N. arms inspectors
limited access to suspected weapon sites, were dismissed by the U.S.
ambassador to the U.N., Bill Richardson, who says they are unworkable:
AMB. RICHARDSON: Let me say that I have been traveling, as you know,
around three continents. And I found support for our policy of
diplomacy backed by force. I believe there is a strong body of
countries around the world that support America's position. We are not
going to be abiding by deadlines or timelines. We believe very
strongly that compliance is in Saddam Hussein's hands.
MR. BERTEL: U.S. military commanders in the Persian Gulf say within
days they will have more than enough firepower to handle any
contingency. On their way to the region are 3,000 additional soldiers
from the United States, and the helicopter carrier USS Guam, with more
than 2,000 combat-ready Marines. The troops join three aircraft
carriers and hundreds of warplanes already in the region.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says the U.S. is prepared to
strike:
SEC. ALBRIGHT: It will be substantial, and it will be long enough to
do the job.
MR. BERTEL: U.S. officials say the chances for a diplomatic solution
are fading. And while none claim to want a military solution, they say
allowing Saddam Hussein to hold weapons of mass destruction is an
unacceptable alternative.
(End videotape.)
MR. BERTEL: Here to discuss this important matter is Ambassador Martin
Indyk, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs. Ambassador Indyk, welcome to our program.
AMB. INDYK:  Thank you.
MR. BERTEL: Before we join our international audience, I'd like to ask
a question. The president will be speaking to the nation in about an
hour, updating us on the standoff with Iraq. Where do things stand
diplomatically right now?
AMB. INDYK: Well, there is a lot of intense activity going on in New
York today in preparation for what Secretary General Kofi Annan would
like to do when he goes to Baghdad. He has made clear, and we agree
with him on this, that he shouldn't go unless he has a clear mandate
from at least the permanent members of the Security Council. And there
has been a lot of engagement to try to reach some understandings about
the mandate that he would proceed to Baghdad with. Those discussions
are ongoing.
But as far as we are concerned, there are two basic principles that
have to be observed here, and will have to be any part of a diplomatic
solution. The first is, as we said all along, and as is provided for
by the Security Council resolutions, free and unfettered access for
UNSCOM to be able to do its job. And the second is that whatever
arrangement is worked out the integrity of UNSCOM must be preserved.
Those are the points that the permanent five are discussing at the
moment. It's what that means in practice. And they'll be meeting again
with Kofi Annan this afternoon, and we'll see where it goes from
there.
MR. BERTEL: Well, I know our international panelists are eager to ask
questions of you. So I'd like to welcome them to our program at this
time. In Paris, Cairo, Ankara and Riyadh we have many journalists
standing by. Let's begin our program in Paris. Go ahead with your
first question.
Q: Hello, my name is Agnes -- (inaudible) -- and I work for the French
newspaper -- (inaudible) -- in Paris. My first question is about the
visit of the foreign minister of Iraq in Paris. And what I want to
know is you know that France has its own proposal on the condition of
inspection of the presidential sites. If an agreement comes out from
the discussions with President Chirac and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Iraq, will the United States consider this proposal?
AMB. INDYK: Well, we have been engaged in intensive discussions with
the French over -- throughout this crisis. The secretary of state has
met with Foreign Minister Vedrine several times. I was in London over
the weekend meeting with my British and French counterparts. And I
think that we all are fairly close in terms of what needs to be done
for special inspections for the presidential palaces -- we're not
talking about the compounds here; we are talking about the particular
buildings which may be residences for Saddam Hussein, or other
high-level officials. Those would have to be designated. There is a
U.N. Security Council -- I'm sorry, there is U.N. team there, under
the auspices of the secretary general, that is trying to map out these
particular buildings. And then we would have to see what special
requirements then will apply to that. But I think it's very important
to distinguish between those and everywhere else in Iraq where UNSCOM
must have free, unfettered access. UNSCOM must also be able to inspect
those sites that are designated as presidential residences.
I don't know what will come out of President Chirac's meeting, and
therefore it's impossible for me to make a judgment about that. But,
as I've said before, I think the focus for diplomatic solution is with
Kofi Annan and the question of the terms for his visit to Baghdad.
MR. BERTEL: Paris, thank you for getting us started. Let's welcome
Cairo to our program now. Go ahead with your question.
Q: Ambassador Indyk, Secretary of the Defense William Cohen raised the
prospect that if Iraq complies with U.N. resolutions there will be
lifting of sanctions. On the other hand, we hear Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright saying in Georgetown that so long as President
Saddam Hussein is in power there will be no lifting of those
sanctions. Don't you think that this inconsistency in the U.S.
position is rather disturbing? I mean, there is this feeling among the
Iraqis that no matter what they do it won't be satisfactory for the
United States. So why should they comply in the first place? Thank
you.
AMB. INDYK: Thank you. I think the inconsistency is in Saddam
Hussein's position, not in ours. The standard has always been full
compliance. I think that there is out there an almost universal
coalition of nations who insist that Saddam Hussein comply fully with
the U.N. Security Council resolutions. He has repeatedly refused to do
so. The fact that we are in this situation seven years from the time
of the end of the Gulf War is because of his refusal to comply. That
is the focus of the international community, and that is what needs to
be done. He doesn't accept that, and he seeks every way possible to
avoid complying with the Security Council resolutions, whether it's
deception or concealment or fabrication or obstruction. And that's the
heart of the problem. People say, Oh, there needs to be a light at the
end of the tunnel. He is the one who is turning off the light by
refusing to comply. He is the one that's inflicting continued hardship
on the Iraqi people because of his refusal to comply. So I think
rather than asking us what we will do, the Security Council
resolutions make very clear the circumstances under which sanctions
would be lifted. What matters is that he will not comply. And until he
does so we can't even get into that kind of discussion.
MR. BERTEL:  Let's move on to Ankara for our next question.
Q: Hello, my name is -- (inaudible) -- from Interstar (sp) Television.
Sir, have you had any discussions or exchange of opinions about a
possible exodus from Northern Iraq to the Turkish border, namely the
Kurds? Because this is one of the big concerns that Turkey has. And
will America give support if anything like this happens -- not only
verbally, but also financially or in other words? What kind of
assistance should Turkey expect from the United States? Thank you.
AMB. INDYK: Thank you. You know, there are a lot of worst-case
scenarios that everybody is now focused on and concerned about, and
refugee flight is one of the issues -- not just for Turkey, but also
for Jordan, Kuwait -- because we have seen those circumstances before.
Obviously we are concerned about those kinds of contingencies. We are
consulting with friendly governments, including the Turkish
government, about those kinds of situations. And I hope that we won't
have to deal with it. But if we do have to deal with it, we will be
prepared to do so.
MR. BERTEL: We're discussing the crisis in Iraq. Let's return now to
Paris for more of our discussion.
Q: This is -- (inaudible). I would like to know, sir, what you think
about the difficulties congressmen in Washington and some opinion
polls feel about the difficulty to define (proper aims ?) of war for
your eventual strikes on Iraq. What do you think about that? And are
you politically obliged to ask approval of the Congress next week
before beginning those strikes? Thank you.
AMB. INDYK: Thank you. The President has made clear -- Secretary
Albright and Secretary Cohen -- what the objectives are here. The
President will speak again very soon today about the objectives. And I
would just repeat those basic points, which is that first of all we
seek a genuine peaceful solution. We would prefer not to have to
resort to force. And we are making clear that we will do what we can
to ensure that a peaceful solution is achieved. But it is not just up
to us. If Saddam Hussein does not comply with the Security Council
resolutions, then force may be necessary. If it becomes necessary,
then our objective will be to significantly diminish the threat that
he can pose with his weapons of mass destruction and to reduce the
capability, his military capability, to threaten his neighbors. Those
are the clear objectives.
Now, people say, Well, you can't destroy all of these weapons of mass
destruction; therefore you shouldn't use force. We just simply cannot
accept that proposition. Obviously it would be better if UNSCOM could
do its job, and UNSCOM were able to go anywhere at any time of its
choosing and be able to finish this effort to take away from Saddam
Hussein his weapons of mass destruction and his capability to
reconstitute it. They've made great strides in that regard over the
last seven years, but now we are coming up to the most sensitive
points, the core of is WMD capability, and he doesn't want to get rid
of it.
If UNSCOM is unable to inspect these sites -- and we're not just
talking about presidential residences; we're talking about huge
compounds with hundreds of buildings which UNSCOM has never been able
to inspect over the last seven years -- if UNSCOM is not able to do
that, then it can't do its job. And if he succeeds in preventing
UNSCOM from doing its job, then UNSCOM over time will become what we
call a Potemkin UNSCOM, an ersatz UNSCOM. And that will become very
dangerous. So if we are looking at the choice between an UNSCOM that
can't operate and the use of force to try to do what UNSCOM is unable
to do, then we are prepared to make that choice. And if he tries to
reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction after our use of force,
and if it becomes clear that UNSCOM is not able to operate after use
of force, then we will have to impose a different kind of regime in
which we will use our capabilities to detect any effort on his part to
reconstitute or deploy his weapons of mass destruction, and we will
then act preemptively to take care of that problem.
As far as the congressional issue, we have support from the Congress
at the time. Obviously if the nation is going to go to war or use
force against Iraq, the president would welcome congressional support,
and I think the senatorial leadership has made it clear that if it
comes to that there will be strong support for the president's
actions.
Q: The Gulf War ended leaving Saddam Hussein in power. Seven years
after, do you think it was a mistake? And do you think the U.S. should
have gone up to Baghdad to overthrow the Iraqi leader?
AMB. INDYK: Well, seven years ago, with 500,000 troops on the ground
and the Iraqi army surrounded, there was I think a better -- much
better opportunity than there is today to demand Saddam Hussein's
removal and to support those who would have done the job. But that was
then. We face a different situation today. And it would have been
better I think for the whole world, but particularly it would have
been much better for the people of Iraq if Saddam Hussein were no
longer imposing his will on them. And no doubt, as we've said all
along, the Iraqi people would be better off with a different kind of
leadership, and we would welcome that date. But what we have to face
today is the reality that he is still there -- he is weaker than he
was before, he has less support than he had before, but he is still
there, and he is still up to his old tricks. And we have to insist
that this is not acceptable. And in that regard we have the support of
just about the whole international community for him to cease and
desist these kind of games and to comply with the U.N. Security
Council resolution.
Q: My name is Agnes -- (inaudible) -- daily newspaper. In case of a
military action, what would be the real target of bombing? Since it's
not clear what you --
AMB. INDYK: I think I tried to make it clear, so I'll try again to
make it as clear as possible. The purpose of our use of force, if it
comes to that, if diplomacy fails to achieve a solution -- the purpose
of our use of force is to significantly diminish the threat that
Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction pose. And we also would
intend to reduce the threat that he would pose to his neighbors from
his military capability. I think that to go beyond that and to specify
what the actual targets would be would be foolish, and I hope you can
understand why I am not prepared to do that.
MR. BERTEL: At this point I would like to welcome Riyadh to our
discussion. Please go ahead with your first question.
Q: Good evening -- (inaudible) -- Riyadh newspaper. First --
(inaudible) -- crisis will have -- (inaudible) -- a military buildup
in the Gulf region. Beside that, we have (heard ?) about the
diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis peacefully. How long will the
United States give for our diplomatic efforts to succeed or to fail?
AMB. INDYK: The secretary of state has I think answered that question
when she said that it's not days and it's not months. And one can
conclude therefore that it's weeks. She said that a few weeks ago. And
I think that there is a feeling that we are really getting to the end
of the diplomatic rope. I think there is a general sense -- not just
in the United States, but in other capitals -- that if Kofi Annan goes
to Baghdad that this will be as it were the last chance. We'll have to
see what happens there, but I think that the Russians have tried, the
Arab League secretary general has tried, the French have tried. And
all of this is coming together in terms of the U.N. secretary
general's visit. It's difficult for us to see if that visit fails --
we hope it won't fail -- but if it does fail, it's difficult for us to
see what else could be achieved through diplomacy.
MR. BERTEL: Riyadh, thank you for that question. Let's return to Cairo
now for more of our discussion with Ambassador Martin Indyk.
Q: Hello, Mr. Ambassador, this is -- (inaudible) -- newspaper. Iraq's
public opinion has many fears regarding the dangerous consequences if
a military strike happens, considering stability and security all over
the area. Is the American administration aware of that? Thank you.
AMB. INDYK: Thank you. We are very sensitive to all public opinion,
whether it's in this country or in the Arab world. But I think that
it's important to distinguish between what the people in the Arab
world think about Saddam and what they think about the Iraqi people. I
think that seven years after the Gulf War there is very little
sympathy for Saddam Hussein, and that the sympathy is for the Iraqi
people who have been suffering under his rule. If he had complied with
the U.N. Security Council resolutions there was never any expectation
that the sanctions would have gone on for so long -- but they have
because of his refusal to comply. In that context, the sanctions never
denied Iraq the ability to import food and medicines.
Yet the people suffered because the regime was not prepared to spend
money for that purpose, to feed the Iraqi people. So we introduced
Resolution 986, and some of its precursor resolutions, to set up an
arrangement whereby Iraq would be allowed to sell oil to pay for the
food and medicine to provide for the basic needs of the Iraqi people.
Now the secretary general of the United Nations has recommended that
that process be expanded and that Iraq be allowed to sell more than
double the amount of oil -- some $11 billion a year of oil, which is
about two thirds of what Iraq used to sell before its invasion of
Kuwait -- and that be sold under special U.N. monitoring arrangements
so that the United Nations can ensure that the money is used to meet
the needs of the Iraqi people. If Saddam Hussein won't do it, then the
United Nations is taking on that responsibility. And we support that
expansion, that very large expansion, so as to ensure that the Iraqi
people do not suffer as a result of Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply
with the Security Council resolutions. So I use that as an example to
answer your question that concern on the humanitarian side of this
issue is very high in our minds, and it's something that we want to
assure listeners and viewers in the Arab world it's something that we
consider very seriously when it comes to the question of use of force.
Q: Ambassador Indyk, over the past few weeks the U.S. has been talking
about exhausting the diplomatic channels before carrying out a
military strike against Iraq. But so far it's been the Russians, the
French, the Arabs and even the Turkish who have been pursuing that
path. We haven't seen any U.S. officials for instance meeting with
their Iraqi counterparts. So, Ambassador Indyk, don't you think that
adversaries should meet before one can determine that the diplomatic
channels have been exhausted?
AMB. INDYK: Well, this is not a dispute between Iraq and the United
States as much as Baghdad would try to make it so. Remember they
claimed that the problem was American inspectors on the UNSCOM team.
This is a conflict between Iraq and the United Nations. And we think
it's very important that the focus be kept there. We have not placed
any obstacles in the way of those who would go to Baghdad and try to
get some kind of reasonable response from Saddam Hussein. They have
been unable to do so so far. And we are very intensively engaged with
our P5 partners from the very beginning of this crisis back in
October. The secretary is on the phone with her counterparts, the
secretary of state, just about every day, to try to work this
diplomatic effort. So there is no lack of intense involvement on our
part. But we don't see the need or the worth of our directly engaging
with Baghdad.
Q: Ambassador Indyk, in case of the failure of the expected military
strike to achieve its goal, what will the United States do? Thank you.
AMB. INDYK: Thank you. As I said before -- let me try to explain it
again -- the purpose is to go after Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass
destruction capabilities. We do not put out there as an objective the
complete destruction of these weapons of mass destruction
capabilities, because part of the problem is we don't know where all
of them are. So what we say is those sites where we know he has the
capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, those become
legitimate targets. Where it becomes impossible to destroy all of
them, we will either have a situation where after the use of force
UNSCOM is allowed back in to operate, which would be the best outcome
-- but if Saddam Hussein continues to refuse that then, as I said
before, we would set up an alternative regime, one in which we would
independently monitor his efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, to reconstitute his capability to build them, or to
deploy them. And if we detect that we would reserve the right to
strike it and to destroy it. In other words, one way or the other the
Security Council resolutions will be implemented. He will not be
allowed to have weapons of mass destruction.
Q: Ambassador Indyk, you just mentioned that the standoff with Iraq is
not between the United States and Iraq, but rather between Iraq and
the United Nations. So my question is: Shouldn't the United Nations be
the forum in which such a dispute be resolved? I'm referring to the
U.S. repetitive statements that with or without international backing
the U.S. will be making a military strike if necessary against Iraq.
AMB. INDYK: Well, we have been engaged some months now through the
U.N. Security Council with the five permanent members of the Security
Council. Now with the secretary general to try to get the U.N.
Security Council resolutions implemented. And that has been the focus
of the diplomatic activity. It has been very much a U.N.-centered
effort. But the issue of use of force is -- comes up in relation to
the implementation of Security Council resolutions when they cannot be
achieved by other means. We prefer them to be achieved by other means.
But if they are not achieved by other means then there is so much at
stake for the international system, for the credibility of the
Security Council, for the credibility of the Security Council
resolutions, that if it comes to that then we will act -- and if
necessary we will act unilaterally to impose the will of the
international community.
MR. BERTEL: Cairo, thank you for those questions. Our discussion
continues now with more questions from Ankara. Please go ahead.
Q: Good evening, this is -- (inaudible) -- TV. Mr. Ambassador, in
Ankara we expect an extremely cold situation after a possible U.S.
military strike. In this context, do you expect some new countries,
independent countries, in the south and north of Iraq? And let me make
a follow-up. If Saddam Hussein dies during the major strike, who can
be the alterative to the Iraqi president? Thank you.
AMB. INDYK: I'm sorry, I didn't understand the first part of the
question. Could you repeat that?
Q: Do you expect new countries in the north and south of Iraq, because
most probably the Baghdad administration will lose the central
authority. So, do you expect new states in the north and south of
Iraq?
AMB. INDYK: No, we don't, and we wouldn't support that. We have always
been clear and on the record about supporting the territorial
integrity of Iraq, and I don't believe that that's a real danger that
separate states are going to be created. We've seen the Iraqi
situation over a prolonged period of time face a good deal of stress
-- not just as part of the Gulf War, but for the 10 years before it,
during the Iraq-Iran War. And I think that the fear of the break-up of
Iraq is much exaggerated. But we would not support that. We wouldn't
countenance that kind of break-up.
As far as what might happen if Saddam dies and who might replace him,
you know, I think that that's a hypothetical question that doesn't
bear going into at this moment.
Q: I'm -- (inaudible) -- from Channel D Television. Mr. Indyk, the
Turkish government complains that there is not enough information
about the developments of the Gulf crisis. What's the reason to your
opinion?
AMB. INDYK: Well, I'm not sure what the basis of the complaint is. We
have consulted very closely with the Turkish government. General
Ralston paid a visit there recently. We're in daily contact with the
government. And I believe they are fully informed of our diplomacy and
of our thinking about how the crisis should be resolved.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, as you know Iraq is not the only country in the
area which has amassed restrictive weapons. Iran and Syria have
similar weapons. So what are your plans for those countries?
AMB. INDYK: That's a good question -- I think an important one -- to
address. There are a lot of countries around the world that have
weapons of mass destruction. The difference in the case of Saddam
Hussein is that he has used his weapons of mass destruction, and he
has shown a pattern of aggressive behavior that is unparalleled
anywhere else in the world. He himself has initiated two wars in the
past 20 years -- the Iraq-Iran War which went on for 10 years, and
then the invasion of Kuwait hot on the heels at the end of that first
war. So we know his aggressive nature and we know that he has used his
weapons of mass destruction not only in the war with Iran but also
against his own people. He used gas against Iraqi Kurds in the north.
So there is a clear record of behavior here that is unacceptable. And
that is why there are specific Security Council resolutions that
mandate that Iraq will not have weapons of mass destruction. And then
UNSCOM was established as the special mission to implement this will
of the international community. So such a regime doesn't exist
anywhere else in the world. It was set up specifically because of
Saddam Hussein's behavior.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, after the Gulf War in 1991, Turkey and some other
countries in the area had tremendous economic damage. So a second
military strike will create a similar situation for Turkey and for the
other countries in the area. So what kind of plans do you have to
support those countries, including Turkey, financially after the
strike? Thank you.
AMB. INDYK: Again this is another area where we have tried to be as
sensitive and as supportive as possible over the last seven years,
with special arrangements for Turkey and other special arrangements
for Jordan as the countries who are most affected by the continuation
of the sanctions. And I think that for instance the oil-for-food
arrangements under the 986 resolution specifically mandate -- I think
it's something like 50 percent of the oil -- should be exported
through Turkey as a way of taking into account Turkey's special
situation. So the principle is there.
As to what kind of arrangements would have to be made in the wake of a
military strike I think it's a situation we have to see and deal with
when we get there. I say that because before the Gulf War there were a
lot of alarmist predictions about what would happen if we used force.
I remember in this country they said that 20,000 Americans would die
if we used force. Well, that obviously wasn't the case. And although
we can all go through -- and I can understand why people go through
worst-case scenarios in terms of drawing up plans for what might
happen -- until we actually see what happens I think it's premature to
discuss those kinds of plans.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, in the south of Turkey you have a huge base and up
until now in Turkey it was a big concern if you will ask to use this
base during the operation to Iraq. So at this stage what are the
expectations of the U.S. government from Turkey? Thank you.
AMB. INDYK: Thank you. We are very grateful to the Turkish government
to be able to use their facilities to fly the Northern Watch, to
operate the no-fly zone in the north which helps to deter Saddam
Hussein from sending his army north into Kurdish areas, which could
provoke a refugee situation, which would be potentially destabilizing
for Turkey. So I think we and the Turkish government have a common
interest in continuing to operate that Northern Watch.
Beyond that we are not seeking additional assistance from Turkey, and
so that the question really doesn't arise. I want to repeat again that
we are very grateful for the Turkish government for cooperating with
us in being able to help protect the north from Saddam Hussein's army.
MR. BERTEL: We are discussing the crisis in Iraq with Ambassador
Martin Indyk, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South
Asian affairs. We continue now with more questions from Riyadh.
Q: (Inaudible) -- from Al Sharq Al Awsat (sp) newspaper. Mr.
Ambassador, there is a question in the Arab world, why you don't have
the same hard position for Israel. You said Iraq has threatened its
neighbors. Also, Israel not only threatens its neighbors, but also
bombed Lebanon everyday, and also had nuclear weapons. And Israel also
occupies its neighbors' territories in south Lebanon and in Golan
Heights. Thank you.
MR. INDYK: Thank you, and I appreciate this question, because I know
that there are a lot of people in the Arab world who feel that there
is some double standard being applied here, and I welcome the
opportunity to address that point.
As I've said before, the Security Council resolutions in the case of
Iraq are mandatory. They demand that Iraq comply. And that is because
Iraq, in an act of completely unprovoked aggressive, invaded Kuwait
and plundered the country. And I think everybody can remember the
horrific sites of what Iraq did in Kuwait. And it was a result of that
conflict that those resolutions were passed. And, as I said, they are
mandatory, and sanctions are applied in order to get Saddam Hussein to
comply with the Security Council resolutions.
In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there are Security Council
resolutions that govern the settlement of that conflict. Those are 242
and 338. And those resolutions, the first one, 242, which was agreed
upon after the end of the 1967 Six Day War, and 338, which was a
follow-up resolution after the 1973 war, both those resolutions
provide for negotiations. They are not mandatory, they are not
self-implementing. They lay out the principles that should govern
peace negotiations -- direct negotiations between Israel and its
neighbors. We have since 1967, and especially since 1973, we the
United States have acted vigorously and unrelentingly to have those
resolutions implemented. They form the basis of the Madrid conference.
They form the basis of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. They form the
basis of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty and of the Oslo Accords
between Israel and the Palestinians.
Fundamental to the resolutions and the agreements that have been
struck between Israel and its neighbors is the trade of territory for
peace -- that is the basic principle. And in the case of Egypt, when
Israel withdrew from all of Sinai, in the case of Jordan where it
withdrew from some small areas of territory that it occupied, in the
case of the Palestinians, where Israel has already withdrawn from Gaza
and all of the main population centers, Palestinian population centers
in the West Bank, there was and continues to be a trade of territories
for peace. We are engaged at the moment in a vigorous effort with the
Israelis and the Palestinians to see the implementation of the interim
agreement, which would provide for further redeployment or withdrawal
of Israeli forces from territory in the West Bank.
So there is no double standard here. There is a requirement under the
U.N. Security Council resolutions for Iraq to comply with the will of
the international community. And there is a requirement for Israel and
those Arab countries neighboring it, and the Palestinians, to engage
in direct negotiations based on territory for peace. Both of these
sets of resolutions need to be implemented, and we are actively
engaged in an effort to have them both implemented.
Q: (Inaudible) -- UPI. Mr. Ambassador, there are some reports that
Iraq moved some of its weapons to some countries in the region, like
Libya and Sudan had been mentioned. A, are you concerned about this
report? And, B, what is your administration going to do toward them if
it comes to be true? Thank you.
AMB. INDYK: Thank you. I cannot confirm those reports. We've seen
those reports. We are disturbed by them and we are certainly looking
into them. But we don't have confirmation of that. But this kind of
report underscores the point that we have been trying to make all
along, which is that the resolutions make clear that Saddam Hussein
should not have weapons of mass destruction, and the mechanisms have
been set up to prevent him from maintaining those weapons of mass
destruction. That's why we need an effective UNSCOM, to be able to
track down these kinds of reports, to be able to trace what happens.
But if UNSCOM isn't able to do its job then we are going to have to
use other means to make sure that Iraq does not have weapons of mass
destruction. So obviously we need to pursue these kinds of stories.
They are disturbing. But what it means overall is that we will have to
remain vigilant and active, even aggressive, in our efforts to prevent
Saddam Hussein from retaining this kind of capability, regardless of
whether he does it in country or out of country, and to make sure that
he is not able to threaten his people or his neighbors with these
weapons ever again.
Q: Mr. Indyk, Ahmed Anwar (ph) from El Medina (sp) Arab daily
newspaper. Let's suppose that you reach the point that an interaction
has to be taken against Iraq. I am really interested to know such a
military action, the financial cost to such a military action would be
paid by the American or Britain's taxpayer, or will be paid by the
Gulf region governments, and we know that the Congress is willing to
support such a military action if it will go to the end to get rid of
Saddam Hussein, which is different than the objectives Mr. Clinton and
you just mentioned. So how will you be able to find the solution with
the Congress about this? And the first part of the question please.
AMB. INDYK: As far as the Congress is concerned, I think there are a
lot of different views being expressed in Congress. There are
certainly some who, as you say, are very determined that our objective
should be the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. That of course was easy to
achieve, as I said before, when we had large numbers of ground forces
on the ground, and his army was surrounded by those forces. That was
when we had maximum leverage. We don't have that kind of force on the
ground there now, and Congress has not yet shown a willingness to
support that kind of deployment for that kind of objective. We are
looking into other things that can be done to make the opposition more
effective and to make it clear that we would be prepared to welcome a
new government in Iraq that was pursuing a different policy. But I
don't think there's a significant difference between the Congress and
the administration on this issue. And, as I said before, the president
is confident that as a result of statements made by the leadership in
the Congress that if it becomes necessary to use force the Congress
will give the backing to the president for that effort.
As far as who pays, you will remember the kind of tin-cup exercise
that was undertaken before the Gulf War. But we are not looking at
that exercise at the moment, and I can't project as to whether that
would be necessary in the future. But we are not looking at that at
the moment.
MR. BERTEL: Riyadh, thank you for those questions. We're running short
of time. Let's return to Paris now for another quick question.
(Technical difficulties.) Paris, are you there? All right, we are
having some technical problems with Paris. Let's return to Cairo for
our next question.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, it seems that this -- or everybody agrees that this
is a very dangerous situation. But isn't the United States concerned
with the humanitarian aspects of a military strike; that is, the
civilian casualties that are going to result from such a strike?
AMB. INDYK: Yes, as I said before we are concerned about that
situation. We would be particularly appalled if Saddam Hussein were to
use human shields, which would be a war crime under the laws of war.
But I think that we will obviously do whatever we can to avoid
civilian casualties. And I think that is an important priority, just
as feeding -- taking care of the needs of the Iraqi people is an
important priority.
We have to understand that we wouldn't be in this kind of situation if
Saddam Hussein did not use his people as propaganda weapons, as human
shields, to try -- he will resort to anything in order to avoid
implementing the Security Council resolutions and complying with the
will of the international community. And in those circumstances he
leaves us all with a very difficult choice. That's his purpose -- is
to precisely do that, to try to back us down. I will repeat again that
we are very concerned about the plight of the Iraqi people. We will do
what we can to ensure that they -- that their suffering is limited,
alleviated, as best we can. But when it comes to the need for Saddam
Hussein to comply, when it comes to the question of whether he will
succeed in retaining weapons of mass destruction, which we know he
will use to cause and inflict much more misery -- not just on his own
people but on his neighbors as well -- that is unacceptable to us, and
I believe it is unacceptable to the international community.
MR. BERTEL: I'm afraid we'll have to end our discussion there. My
thanks to Ambassador Indyk, assistant secretary of state for Near
Eastern and South Asian affairs. Thank you for joining us for this
informative and important discussion.
AMB. INDYK:  Thanks for having me.
MR. BERTEL: And I'd also like to thank all the participants who joined
us today. Before we go, we quickly have a Web site for you to take a
look at. You can get more information and point of views from the U.S.
Information Agency's Web site. And that is www.usia.gov/iraq. I'm Jim
Bertel, thank you for joining us. Have a good day.
(End transcript)