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17 February 1998

TEXT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON IRAQ CRISIS

(Crisis with Iraq: The Threat, The Facts) (3170)
(The following questions and answers on the crisis with Iraq were
prepared by the U.S. Information Agency.)
I. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RECORD ON BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS Q. How
many people has Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, already killed through use
of chemical and biological weapons?
A: In 1984 Iraq became the first nation to use a nerve agent on the
battlefield when it deployed Tabun-filled aerial bombs during the
Iran-Iraq war. Some 5,500 Iranians were killed by the nerve agent
between March 1984 and March 1985. Tabun kills within minutes. In
addition, some 16,000 Iranians were reported killed by the toxic
blister agent mustard gas between August 1983 and February 1986.
In one horrific case, Saddam Hussein's forces reportedly killed
hundreds of Iraqi Kurds with chemical agents in the Kurdish town of
Halabja in March 1988. Saddam Hussein ordered the attack after he
accused the Kurds of supporting Iranian troops. Q. How does Saddam
Hussein continue his efforts to deceive the world community about
Iraq's weapons capability?
A: In October 1997, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
monitoring the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
concluded that Iraq was still trying to conceal the full scale and
scope of its biological weapons program. Iraq acknowledged in 1995
that, prior to the Gulf War, it had produced large quantities of
anthrax spores, inserted them into at least 166 aerial bombs and Scud
missile warheads, and stockpiled them for use. Although Iraq claimed
to have destroyed its biological arsenal after the war, U.N.
inspectors believe that Iraq is hiding a cache of anthrax spores and
germ-filled warheads.
Iraq has medical, veterinary, and university facilities where
biotechnical research and development can be carried out. Some of
these facilities likely are staffed by former members of Iraq's
biological warfare program. Much of the laboratory equipment is
dual-use and could be used for biological agent development. Q: How
does Saddam Hussein thwart the efforts of the UNSCOM inspectors?
A: In November 1997, Iraq barred U.S. experts from participating in
UNSCOM weapons inspection teams. While the on-site inspections were on
hold, the Iraqis moved equipment and tampered with U.N. surveillance
cameras at ostensibly civilian facilities, such as vaccine plants,
that could also produce biological warfare agents. There is a concern
that without effective monitoring, the Iraqis could easily adapt
laboratory or industrial equipment in "a matter of hours" to produce
stocks of biological warfare agents.
Iraq has barred the United Nations from eight so-called presidential
complexes. The U.N. also says inspectors have been told at least 63
times that various sites they wanted to enter were "sensitive," and
have been required to wait for a high-level escort. These sensitive
sites have included Republican Guard facilities. And in January 1998,
Iraq declared all sensitive sites off-limits at least until April. II.
THE THREAT FROM IRAQI WEAPONS Q: How do Iraqi biological and chemical
weapons threaten the Gulf region?
A: Operational missiles armed with chemical or biological warheads
would pose a serious threat to nations neighboring Iraq. UNSCOM
believes Iraq continues to conceal chemical agents, munitions and
production equipment.
During the 1980s, Iraq developed the largest, most advanced biological
warfare program in the Middle East and claimed to have mounted
anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin on weapon delivery systems.
Iraq possessed a number of chemical warfare agents prior to the Gulf
war including blister (Mustard) and nerve (Tabun and Sarin) agents and
delivery mechanisms, including artillery rockets, mortars, spray
tanks, aerial bombs and SCUD-type missiles. Although Iraq's weapons
programs were severely damaged during the Gulf war, the U.S. Defense
Department believes Iraq retains the ability to reconstitute them.
In fact, following the defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and
former head of Iraqi military industries Hussein Kamel in 1995, it
became clear that even intrusive UNSCOM inspections had failed to
discover Iraq's efforts to develop the nerve agent VX from May 1985
until December 1990. Iraq had also successfully hidden its testing of
a type of SCUD missile equipped with a chemical warhead with a range
of between 600 and 650 kilometers.
Iraq has rebuilt key chemical weapons facilities since 1991. While
they are subject to United Nations scrutiny, some could be converted
from industrial and commercial use fairly quickly, allowing Iraq to
restart limited production of chemical weapons agents.
Although Iraq is prohibited from possessing missiles with a range
greater than 150 kilometers, Baghdad is believed to be concealing a
small number of mobile missile launchers and several dozen long-range
missiles that survived the Gulf war. It is also thought that Iraq
retains a broad array of chemical-weapons-related items such as
precursor chemicals, production equipment, filled munitions, and
program documentation, as well as requisite technical expertise. Q:
How many people would die in a biological weapons attack?
A: A biological attack could create an almost unimaginable
catastrophe. According to an estimate by the U.S. Congress's Office of
Technology Assessment, 100 kilograms of anthrax, released from a
low-flying aircraft over a large city on a clear, calm night, could
kill one to three million people. This figure is comparable to the
casualties from a one-megaton hydrogen bomb. Q: What do nerve agents
and other chemical and biological weapons do?
A: Nerve agents are a group of very toxic chemical weapons agents.
Other toxic CW agents are blood, blister, and choking agents. They
will, in sufficient dosage, induce lethal poisoning in the absence of
immediate medical treatment.
The chemical and biological weapons Iraq has produced or may have the
capacity to develop include: VX: An odorless nerve agent which enters
the body through the eyes, lungs, mouth or skin and can kill its
victim in 15 minutes. Initial symptoms include vision problems,
stomach cramps, convulsions and coma. Iraq has admitted producing 3.9
tons of VX. Because of the agent's persistent nature it could be used
to contaminate territory for long periods of time. Sarin, Tabun, and
mustard gas: Chemical agents that vary in speed of action and
lethality. The nerve agents, Tabun and Sarin kill in 15 minutes if the
victim is not treated.The colorless blister agent mustard gas affects
the eyes, skin, lungs, and mouth, with the onset of symptoms delayed
from four to 12 hours or longer. Severe exposure can cause blindness
and severe respiratory difficulty. Anthrax: A bacterial agent,
manifested as spores, which causes illness in two to four days. A
lethal dose of anthrax is considered to be 10,000 spores; 80 percent
of a population that inhaled such a dose would die. Less than one
millionth of a gram is invariably fatal within five days to a week
after exposure. Typical symptoms are fatigue, a low-grade fever and a
cough.
Iraq declared it had produced almost 8,500 liters of concentrated
anthrax and admitted to weaponizing anthrax on five SCUD missiles.
UNSCOM has estimated that the production of the agent may have been
twice as high. The Iraqis also admitted to modifying some of their
aircraft with a spraying device as an alternative means of delivering
anthrax. Botulinum: A lethal biological agent that takes several hours
to days to cause symptoms such as blurred vision, difficulty in
swallowing and flaccid paralysis. Iraq admits to having produced
19,400 liters of botulinum toxin and loaded some of it on board 16
SCUD missiles. UNSCOM believes the amount produced may have been twice
that. Aflatoxin: A biological agent that causes headaches, jaundice,
gastrointestinal distress; if the victim is untreated, it may cause
cancer of the liver and internal bleeding, which may be lethal. Iraqi
officials admit that they produced 2,400 liters of the agent and
filled four SCUD missiles with it. Clostridium botulinum: The
causative agent of botulism, it is an example of a microorganism that
can be grown to produce a toxin. Ricin, for example, is a plant toxin
which can be derived from the castor bean which is grown in Iraq. A
lethal dose is estimated at 500 micrograms. Exposure can cause the
failure of multiple organs in one or two days.
In 1995, Iraqi officials admitted conducting weapons testing using
Ricin. They have estimated producing 10 liters of the agent.
Clostridium perfingens: A substance that can cause gas gangrene upon
entering open wounds on the battlefield. Iraq reportedly produced
hundreds of litres of this substance at its al Hakum facility, which
was later destroyed by the United Nations. III. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
CORRUPT AND INHUMANE POLICIES Q: How is Saddam Hussein personally
benefiting despite the plight of Iraqi civilians?
A: The most visible example of how the Iraqi regime is drawing
resources away from the civilian population has been the construction
of numerous "palaces" since the end of the Gulf war. Iraq has built 48
palaces and VIP residences since the end of the Gulf war, increasing
the total number of such facilities at the disposal of Saddam and his
inner circle to at least 78. The Iraqi leader has spent $1.5 billion
to $2 billion building new palaces or renovating existing ones since
1990.
Defense Secretary Cohen describes one of the palace complexes as being
the size of Washington, D.C., the U.S. capital. "We believe that these
sites should not be off limits" to UNSCOM weapons inspectors, he said.
Although often described as "people's palaces," the level of security
and opulence suggests they are destined for use by the elites of Iraq.
Foreign visitors report a huge domed palace is being built in Baghdad
for Saddam Hussein and archaeological reconstruction sites bear
inscriptions to him. At the same time, the U.N. reports that electric
power production is inadequate, the agriculture industry is hurting
from lack of spare parts and supplies, public sanitation is suffering,
clean water is lacking, and the educational system is poor.
In addition, the Iraqi leadership has benefited from the black market
that has developed since the imposition of sanctions. Supplies of
certain commodities have become even scarcer, and, by all accounts,
the president's own family has benefited financially, as have other
representatives of the top Iraqi leadership. Q: How has Saddam Hussein
hampered international relief operations inside Iraq?
A: The provision and delivery of food and medicine has been permitted
under the U.N. resolutions since 1991. But the single biggest obstacle
to the successful implementation of these relief programs consistently
has been Saddam Hussein. For political reasons, Saddam Hussein could
not prohibit relief agencies from establishing a presence in Iraq. His
regime's tactic has been to thwart the ability of these organizations
to operate effectively. A comprehensive campaign of harassment has
been aimed at every relief group trying to help the people of Iraq.
The Iraqi government routinely has interfered with the international
community's provision of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people
by placing a higher priority on importing industrial items than on
food and medicine, diverting goods to benefit the regime, and
restricting the work of U.N. personnel and relief workers.
Because the importing of food and medicine was never prohibited under
U.N. sanctions, Iraq could purchase and distribute all the
humanitarian supplies it wanted. However, it became evident that Iraqi
civilians were not receiving the supplies needed for a minimum
standard of living. The adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution
986 allowed the sale of Iraqi oil to pay for the purchase and
distribution of humanitarian goods - under U.N. supervision to ensure
that they went to civilians in need. The U.N. checks food markets
throughout Iraq, spot checks individual homes, and undertakes sample
surveys. U.N. personnel watch the movement of medical supplies and
equipment and visit hospitals, clinics, and medical and pharmaceutical
facilities.
Saddam Hussein refused to accept the oil-for-food scheme for more than
three years after it was first proposed, finally agreeing to go along
with the plan in January 1996. However, after the program was
operating, Iraq refused to sell oil in June and July 1997. Acting to
prevent unnecessary hardship for Iraqi civilians that would have been
caused by the interruption of oil sales in mid-1997, the Security
Council adjusted the time limits so that the full amount of oil could
be sold. Q: How have Saddam Hussein's policies created hardship and
suffering among innocent Iraqi civilians?
A: In central and southern Iraq, the regime diverted humanitarian
supplies to its security forces, the military, and other supporters.
For most of 1996, the Iraqi government maintained an internal embargo
against Iraq's northern governorates, blocking the shipment of food,
medicine, and other goods from government-controlled territory to the
Kurdish-controlled areas. Even after the government announced the
lifting of the internal embargo, reports indicated that the regime
still exercised tight control over the flow of goods and services into
and out of northern areas.
In 1997, Iraqi military operations continued to target Shi'a Arabs
living in the southern marshes. The government maintained a partial
internal embargo against Iraq's northern provinces, blocking shipments
of food, medicine, and other goods, except those provided by the U.N.
"oil-for-food" program.
Reports of attacks on Kurdish villages as well as attacks on aid
workers after the Gulf war prompted the United States and its Gulf
allies to press the U.N. to undertake the distribution of food and
medicine in the north and provide security for aid workers. Under the
oil-for-food scheme, $15 million every six months goes directly to the
U.N. program for the northern governorates. Q: How has Saddam Hussein
abused human rights in Iraq?
A: The government of Iraq has persistently refused to permit visits by
human rights monitors and continued restrictions designed to prevent
dissent.However there are credible reports that summary executions of
perceived political opponents increased significantly during 1997;
more than 2,000 such killings were reported. Several dozen of these
reported executions followed specific allegations of coup attempts in
February and August. Reports suggest that far more people were
executed merely because of their association with an opposition group
or in an effort to clear out of the prisons anyone with a sentence of
15 to 20 years or more. The government continued to kill and torture
persons for alleged economic crimes, military desertion, and on a
variety of other charges. Q: How else does Saddam Hussein imperil the
lives of Iraqi civilians?
A: Environmental terrorism is another tactic that has been employed by
Baghdad on more than one occasion. This practice has grave
consequences for those in Iraq's immediate vicinity as well as those
outside Saddam Hussein's area of operations. The destruction of Iraq's
southern marshes has been called the environmental crime of the
century. The draining of the marshes was part of an effort to isolate
and eliminate groups of Iraqi civilians living in the south. The
regime sacrificed an entire ecosystem in order to strengthen its
political hold on an impoverished region. IV. UNINSPECTED SITES IN
IRAQ Q: Why must UNSCOM inspectors inspect Saddam Hussein's palaces
and other private residences?
A: Inspections must take place to verify whether these sites are being
used to mask materials that could be employed to develop biological or
chemical agents.
The UNSCOM inspectors need to search for hidden documents or other
materials linked to Iraq's banned chemical, biological, nuclear and/or
ballistic weapons programs. UNSCOM has collected evidence which shows
that Iraq has tried to retain certain weapons and prohibited items
that may include computer discs, clandestine purchase orders for
pesticides, and parts of missile guidance systems.
Although Iraq has said that its efforts to hide documents from the
U.N. ended in 1995, UNSCOM continues to see a pattern of efforts to
move and/or remove documents that could be related to Iraq's banned
weapons programs. Weapons inspectors have seen suspicious activity and
surveillance photos taken at inspection sites have shown such
activity.
Defense Secretary Cohen says Saddam Hussein has been engaged in "a cat
and mouse game" with UNSCOM inspectors for years. "He has engaged in a
lot of deceit and manipulation in order to prevent the UNSCOM
inspectors from doing their job," Cohen said. The Iraqi leader has had
two goals throughout: to get rid of the inspectors or limit them to
such a degree that they can't fulfill their duties "with any kind of
validity." Q: What has been UNSCOM's experience in Iraq?
A: Since 1996 UNSCOM has planned inspections and investigations
specifically to analyze and understand Iraq's concealment plans.
Between March 1996 and November 1997 UNSCOM mounted eight inspections.
Of the 63 sites UNSCOM attempted to visit, there were delays gaining
entrance at 38 sites and UNSCOM was denied entry outright at 14. Q: At
what sites have UNSCOM inspectors been refused entry?
A: The government of Iraq has said that absolutely no access would be
granted to U.N. weapons inspectors at sites designated "presidential
and sovereign." These include eight presidential sites in four
provinces and the headquarters buildings of all ministries. Iraq has
said that the presidential sites or compounds include multiple
buildings and surrounding areas inside perimeter walls at those sites.
The Baghdad regime will give UNSCOM only general descriptions of their
size and locations, but will not provide UNSCOM maps of the sites. Q:
Why must the monitoring and surveillance of Iraq's weapons activity
continue?
A: "The best way to stop Saddam from having nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons," President Clinton declared February 4, "is simply
to get the international inspectors back to work with no restraints.
Keep in mind they have done a marvelous job. They have uncovered more
weapons potential and weapons storage than were destroyed in the
entire Gulf War."
Iraq currently has 41 sites with equipment that could be converted to
produce chemical weapons agents and their precursors and four
facilities that produced chemical munitions until 1991 and could do so
again. At least 30 facilities have infrastructure that could be
reconfigured for weapons production.
Iraq also has the experience and know-how in large-scale production of
chemical weapons agents and sufficient qualified personnel with
practical experience in research and development on, and the
industrial production of, CW agents.
UNSCOM estimated that, under current circumstances, Iraq would be able
to organize the production of chemical agents through reconfiguration
or relocation of available dual-use material within several days or
weeks.
In 1997, a panel of international experts concluded that Iraq's
account of the filing, storage, and dispersal of its filled biological
weapons munitions was incomplete, undocumented, and unsupported by the
information Iraq had provided to UNSCOM.
Iraq has the equipment, raw materials, and know-how for bulk
production of biological agents for weaponization and the means of
delivering the agents. With the equipment Iraq is known to possess,
350 liters of weapons-grade anthrax could be produced each week,
according to Iraq's own production figures. February 1998