12 February 1998
FACT SHEET: IRAQ PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: IRAQ'S RECORD WITH UNSCOM
(Details Iraq's history of blocking UNSCOM inspectors) (2100) Washington -- Following is a summary of Iraq's dealings with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). It contains basic facts about UNSCOM -- its mandate and its findings. The summary also details, in chronological order from February 1997 to January 1998, Iraq's history of blocking UNSCOM inspectors and concealing, destroying or removing evidence of its WMD program -- at times under the eyes of UNSCOM inspectors. UNSCOM FACTS -- UNSCOM's Mandate: Under UN Security Council Resolution 687 (April 1991), which set out the cease-fire terms for ending the Gulf war, Iraq is obliged to accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all its: (a) Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles with a range over 150 km; and (b) Research, development and manufacturing facilities associated with the above; and (c) Undertake not to develop such weapons in the future. The Secretary-General was instructed to establish a special commission (UNSCOM) to oversee these processes. Iraq must give full cooperation and, in particular, immediate, unrestricted access to any site UNSCOM needs to inspect. -- UNSCOM ACHIEVEMENTS: (a) Despite constant Iraqi deceit, concealment, harassment and obstruction, UNSCOM has succeeded in destroying: 38,000 chemical weapons, 690 tons of live chemical weapon agents, 48 operational missiles, 60 fixed scud launch pads, 30 special missile warheads for chemical and biological weapons, and hundreds of CW production equipment items. (b) UNSCOM discovered that, although Iraq claimed that its VX nerve agent project was a failure, it actually had the capability to produce VX on an industrial scale, and had produced four tons. Iraq had a large-scale program to produce numerous other agents including sarin, tabun and mustard gas. (c) UNSCOM discovered a custom-built biological weapons factory that was able to produce 500,000 liters of anthrax and botulinum. (Iraq had claimed it was for animal feed.) (d) Iraq has admitted producing 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin and clostridum. Iraq has admitted filling ballistic missile warheads and bombs with the first three of these agents. Iraq claims -- but has not yet shown clear evidence -- that these weapons were subsequently destroyed. Iraq denied the existence of all of these biological weapons until August 1995. (e) UNSCOM has a systematic monitoring system to watch facilities known to be capable of producing WMD. -- Continuing UNSCOM Concerns: (a) UNSCOM has evidence of deliberate government-controlled concealment efforts designed to allow Iraq to continue developing WMD and to procure materials. Given the chance, Iraq would undoubtedly resume WMD production. (b) Iraq has four plants which have been used to produce cw materials. It has numerous personnel with the required expertise. While UNSCOM has destroyed Iraqi equipment procured to produce chemical weapons, Iraq retains dual-use equipment which has legitimate alternative civilian uses. UNSCOM closely monitors such equipment which Iraq has declared. (c) Iraq's CW program was on an enormous scale. Thousands of tons of CW precursors and tens of thousands of CW munitions are not accounted for. (d) Iraq has continued trying to acquire banned WMD technology. (e) Iraq may still have in operation a small number of scud-type missiles with chemical and biological warheads. (f) UNSCOM strongly suspects that admitted Iraqi figures for production of BW agent are still way too low. CHRONOLOGY: FEBRUARY 1997-JANUARY 1998 -- February 23, 1997. The Government of Iraq agrees to stop blocking removal from Iraq of remnants of some 134 scud long-range missile motors (with key components stripped by Iraq and still unaccounted for). This removal had been blocked since November 18, 1996, which reinforced UNSCOM concerns that "Iraq still possesses a force of operational missiles proscribed by Security Council Resolution 687." A December 30, 1996, UNSC presidential statement said, "the council deplores the refusal by Iraq" to let UNSCOM remove these remnants for analysis at laboratories of its choice. -- March 7-20, 1997. An UNSCOM team is delayed for up to 3 hours at sites labeled "presidential" by Iraqis, who then allow inspectors only limited access. After these delays and limitations, the team finds nothing of concern, but does not claim blockage. -- June 1997. On June 4, Iraqis manhandle an UNSCOM photographer while airborne in an UNSCOM helicopter, and grab at the fuel control. On June 5, an Iraqi grabs at an UNSCOM helicopter control stick. On June 7, an Iraqi puts a foot on the UNSCOM helicopter collective control, and Iraqi helicopters fly in front of UNSCOM helicopters to block them -- including overlapping of rotors within a few feet. -- On June 10, an UNSCOM team is prohibited entry to a suspected prohibited weapons-procurement facility for seven hours, and finds it to be completely cleared out following wholesale movement of documents in front of the inspectors. -- On June 12, an UNSCOM team is blocked on a road and simply told it may go no further toward what Iraq claims to be a "presidential" site, even though the chief inspector says his team has no interest in any palaces. Later that day, another team is denied access to a previously inspected Republican Guard site. -- On June 13, the Security Council adopts a presidential statement that "deplores" the incidents of June 4, 5 and 7, for "endangering the helicopters and their crews," calling on Iraq to "put an end to all such actions." -- On June 18, Rolf Ekeus briefs the Council that UNSCOM has witnessed Iraqis burning, shredding, and fleeing with stacks of documents while inspectors were blocked. -- On June 21, the UNSC unanimously adopts resolution 1115: (1) condemning Iraq's refusal of access as "clear and flagrant violation" of relevant resolutions, (2) suspending sanctions reviews until after UNSCOM's October six-month report to the Council, and (3) expressing the "firm intention to impose additional measures" if Iraq does not comply. -- July 1, 1997. Richard Butler (of Australia) replaces Rolf Ekeus as Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. -- September 17, 1997. Security Council press statement says the Council views "in the gravest terms" (1) incidents on September 13 outside a large military base, including vehicle movements inside the site while an UNSCOM team was blocked outside, in-flight manhandling of an UNSCOM photographer, and interfering with safety of flight -- thus invalidating the inspection; and (2) incidents on September 15 outside another large Republican Guard base, including vehicle movements while a team was delayed for 3 hours. -- September 27 & 29, and October 1, 1997. An UNSCOM team is blocked at three sites termed by Iraq as "presidential." Limited access is gained to sites declared "sensitive" by Iraq but the team finds clear evidence of recent sanitizing. -- October 6, 1997. UNSCOM six-month report to the Security Council notes large gaps in Iraq's declarations for its long-range missile, chemical and biological weapons programs. (a) In the missile area, specific concern is expressed over "Iraq's actions to retain launchers ... accounting for special warheads (and) propellants ... major engine components ... guidance instruments ... and proscribed modification, testing and acquisition activities after the adoption of resolution 687." (b) In the chemical weapons area, large quantities of CW agents, munitions, special warheads, and especially VX nerve agent mass-production capabilities and product denied by Iraq. (c) In the biological weapons area, UNSCOM reports that a panel of experts from 13 member states unanimously found that "the outstanding problems are numerous and grave." (d) As for concealment, "the Commission strongly believes that relevant materials and documents remain in Iraq, and that there have been highly coordinated actions designed to mislead the Commission." -- October 23, 1997. UNSCR 1134 is adopted (10-0-5, with abstentions by China, Egypt, France, Kenya, Russia). It expresses "grave concern at the report of additional incidents since the adoption of resolution 1115," reaffirms "its determination to ensure full compliance by Iraq with all its obligations under all previous relevant resolutions ... condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities ... to allow access to sites designated by the special commission ... decides that such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions. ... Expresses the firm intention (if Iraq does not comply) to adopt measures which would oblige all states to prevent without delay the entry into or transit through their territories of all Iraqi officials and members of the Iraqi armed forces who are responsible. ... (and) decides further, to begin to designate ... individuals whose entry or transit would be prevented. ... (as well as) decides not to conduct the day sanctions reviews) until after ... 11 April 1998." -- October 29, 1997. On October 29, the Government of Iraq informs the president of the Security Council that beginning on October 30 Iraq will not deal with Americans working with the Special Commission, and demands that all UNSCOM Americans leave Iraq within seven days. In following days, Iraq in fact refuses to allow UNSCOM inspectors of American nationality to either inspect or arrive in Iraq on UNSCOM aircraft, then delays the expulsion order while a 3-member UN delegation sent by the Secretary-General visits Baghdad for talks. The Americans are then forced by Iraq, during the night of November 12, to drive overland to Amman, after which UNSCOM and the IAEA immediately draw down to caretaker status. -- November 12, 1997. UNSCR 1137, "taking note with grave concern of the letter of 29 October 1997, from the deputy prime minister of Iraq, conveying the unacceptable decision of the government of Iraq to seek to impose conditions on its cooperation with the Special Commission.... condemns the continued violations by Iraq of its obligations. Its denial of entry ... to sites designated by the Special Commission for inspection to Special Commission inspectors on the grounds of their nationality, its implicit threat to the safety of the reconnaissance aircraft operating on behalf of the Special Commission.... decides ... to designate ... a list of individuals whose entry or transit will be prevented under the provisions of (UNSCR 1134).... (and) expresses the firm intention to take further measures as may be required for the implementation of this resolution." In a presidential statement of November 13, the Council again condemns the Iraqi decision. -- November 19, 1997. Butler and his experts brief the Security Council on Iraq's noncompliance. -- November 20, 1997. Iraq announces that UNSCOM may return to resume its ordinary work. P-5 foreign ministers, meeting in Geneva, issue a statement calling for "unconditional and complete fulfillment by Iraq of all relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council," and note that on the following Friday a meeting of the UN Special Commission will discuss "ways to make UNSCOM's work more effective." -- November 21, 1997. Emergency meeting of the commissioners of the UN Special Commission. The report of this meeting is given by Executive Chairman Butler to the Security Council on November 22, noting among other things "the systematic concealment activities conducted by Iraq." -- December 16-24, 1997. An UNSCOM team inspects various sites declared "sensitive" by Iraq. Limited access is given by Iraq, but with clear evidence of computer materials having been removed during entry delays. Iraq accuses the chief inspector (an American) of being a spy, and blocks an UNSCOM photographer from taking photos over one site. -- December 22, 1997. Following talks in Baghdad December 12-16, Butler briefs the Council December 18, and on December 22 a Council presidential statement "stresses that failure by the government of Iraq to provide the Special Commission with immediate, unconditional access to any site or category of sites is unacceptable and a clear violation of the relevant resolutions." -- January 12, 1998. Iraq announces that, following a day of successful inspections including "sensitive" sites, it will bar further work by an UNSCOM team because of a claimed imbalance of U.S. and UK inspectors on the team. On January 13, Butler reports to the Council that this January 12 team "consisted of 44 persons drawn from 17 nations." -- January 14, 1998. Security Council presidential statement "deplores" the Iraqi refusal to let UNSCOM do its work, declaring "that this failure is unacceptable and a clear violation of the relevant resolutions." Butler removes the blocked UNSCOM team from Iraq on January 16. -- January 23, 1998. Butler briefs the Council on his January 19-21 Baghdad talks, citing continuing across-the-board lack of Iraqi cooperation in providing either information requested by UNSCOM or access for inspections to seek out the information Iraq refuses to provide. Questioned by a member of the Council, Butler says that, under the current circumstances, UNSCOM cannot fulfill its mandate of disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and preventing Iraqi development of such weapons. (End text)
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