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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

Briefer: James P. Rubin

....................

QUESTION: Jamie, everybody - State, Richardson, White House - are putting down this Iraqi proposal, which sounds like old stew. But is there anything there that suggests that there is some thinking in Baghdad about proffering something that might be acceptable?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as explained in the media, the proposal by Tariq Aziz falls short - significantly short - of compliance with UN resolutions. What it really is it's another attempt by Iraq to come up with a procedural gimmick, rather than agreeing to accept the terms of UN inspections. That is because it explicitly precludes UNSCOM from conducting the inspections.

UNSCOM is the expert body charged by the Security Council with conducting this job. It is no easy task; it is a task that requires great expertise and great experience. It's not something one can learn overnight.

Tariq Aziz also called the UNCOM Iraq's adversary. UNSCOM is nobody's adversary. UNSCOM is the body charged by the international community with getting to the bottom of what Iraq has in the area of weapons of mass destruction .

Secondly, this so-called proposal seeks to limit inspections to a one-time, finite duration exercise. And it does not commit Iraq to access over time, and continuous access, full access for inspections or monitoring, as provided by UN Security Council resolutions.

If we were to allow UNSCOM to be adjusted procedurally in the way that Iraq suggests, we would be heading down a slippery slope to more obfuscation, more confusion and more attempts by Iraq to prevent the international community - and the United Nations, in particular - from finding out what it has in this area. And for example, I note that Tariq Aziz whipped out some piece of paper, suggesting that UNSCOM is not accurately describing the presidential sites that exist in Baghdad. And I would point out that Iraq has refused to provide UNSCOM with information about those sites.

So if there's a problem here with what Iraq deems to be the proper description of these so-called presidential sites, then Iraq can solve the problem by coming clean, describing what these sites are and allowing the experts to get back to business.

To directly answer your question, Barry, to the extent that this and other proposals in recent days indicate that Iraq has realized that its position is untenable, that might be a step in the right direction. But since this proposal is so clearly a procedural gimmick to get around the requirements of the Security Council, we're skeptical that there is a diplomatic resolution. That continues to be our position.

QUESTION: One quick follow, please. There have been reports of a Russian ultimatum, or an ultimatum conveyed by Russia and/or a date that if we don't hear something acceptable by February 16, there's going to be some sort of a grave situation. Is the US part of that? Is this a credible report? Are the Russians, on their own, beginning to get tired of these warmed-over proposals?

MR. RUBIN: Again, you'd have to ask the Russians whether they're getting tired of Iraqi stonewalling. I can say this -- that I'm not aware of any effort by the United States to signal to the Russians a timeline. We've been very clear in public to all of you that we're not going to get into timelines; other than to say, as Secretary Albright said over the weekend, that it's not months and it's not days, it's weeks. But I'm not aware of any effort of that kind.

QUESTION: Follow up -- there was an al-Ahram report that suggested that the US had sent a message to Iraq, giving it a deadline, a specific date.

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of anything like that.

QUESTION: The Brits are saying, in New York, that they want action on the oil-for-food resolution as soon as possible. Where does the US stand at this moment on timing of any action? And have you made a decision about whether you'll support the actual number that Kofi Annan has put forward?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say that, in general, we support the idea of expanding the oil-for-food program for one simple reason: that unlike Saddam Hussein, we do have concerns about the Iraqi people. We want to see oil be sold to allow people to eat and medicines to be provided.

He could have done that all along. Food and medicine can be purchased under the sanctions, but he has refused to spend his scarce resources on that objective. Instead, he's spent his scarce resources on building luxurious palaces and trying to rebuild his military, and other actions that support him.

So we support the idea of expansion. We believe that it is important that the supplies of critical food and medicine be increased, and we strongly support the Secretary General's recommendations, in general. We're continuing to study the details. We want to be sure that whatever system is put in place ensures that there is an adequate mechanism so that projects are prioritized and that the Iraqi people, not Saddam Hussein, benefit.

As far as the specific timing of any action in the Security Council, I would have to refer you to New York for that. But in general, we are supportive of an expansion. We want to see food and medicine go to the Iraqi people.

QUESTION: You said something there that was a little different. I want to make sure I understand. Are you signing on to that Kofi Annan five point whatever -- $2 billion figure?

MR. RUBIN: Well, in general we support the proposal he's put together, but we need to see the details. Contained in the proposal are ideas about large-scale projects that we want to take a good, hard look at. So I can't sign off on the whole package; but in principle, we support the expansion that Secretary General Annan's proposal envisages.

QUESTION: But would you acknowledge that action is unlikely to be swift?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: Given all your concerns.

MR. RUBIN: No, I wouldn't acknowledge that at all. I think this is an elaborate program that we have to put very careful safeguards on, so that the food and medicine goes to the people, and money doesn't go to the leadership. I wouldn't rule out quick action on the general goal and other steps to be taken later to ensure that the procedures were in place so that the projects were prioritized and the goods went to the right people, that that can conceivably be done through the sanctions committee. So we're studying the proposal. There's no timing yet established, as I understand it, for action in the council, other than that they're beginning to talk about it this week.

QUESTION: Jamie, is there concern that Iraq still has a dozen or more Scud missiles, either with conventional or chemical or biological warheads; and that these missiles threaten the United States forces or US allies? And if there is such concern, what is to be done about that?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - we don't know exactly what Iraq has in the area of chemical and biological weapons. We have grave concerns about what they might have.

The purpose of the UN inspections is to figure out, once and for all, what they built, what they hid and what they still have, and to make sure that what they do have is destroyed. I can say that on December 18, 1996, the president of the UN Security Council briefed the press that then-UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus had informed the Council that he thought significant numbers of Scud missiles still existed in Iraq. We agreed with former Chairman Ekeus, and that is because Iraq has consistently hid what it has and threatened UNSCOM inspectors for so long.

As far as our policy on this, in light of the potential for military action, Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen have made quite clear that if Iraq were to make the serious mistake of using chemical or biological weapons against any of its neighbors - any of them - that our response would be swift and forceful.

QUESTION: Could you just expand on something the Secretary said yesterday about reserving the right for additional strikes?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: Is the Administration's position that it will keep bombing Iraq until all the sites are opened?

MR. RUBIN: No, there's been a lot of confusion on this. Let me see if I can try to clarify, but I know all of you have to write a different story every day. But our position has been quite clear from the beginning. The best way to uncover the weapons of mass destruction and then destroy them is to do what UNSCOM has been doing for the last six years, where they've uncovered the thousands of tons of material that we've gone through with you in some detail.

That is the best way to protect ourselves against this threat. So the best way to combat the threat is to convince, through diplomacy and the threat of force, Saddam Hussein to reverse course and come back into compliance. If diplomacy fails and it is necessary to take another decision, we're in a different situation; and then we're in a military situation. What we have said very clearly is that in that situation, our military objectives would be to diminish substantially Saddam Hussein's ability to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, as well as threaten his neighbors. Those would be military objectives, in furtherance of our desire to combat this inherent threat of weapons of mass destruction .

If after that military action - which has not been decided upon - were to take place, and the United States believed that Saddam Hussein were in a position again to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction, Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Berger have made clear that we would reserve the right to strike again. But I'm not going to be in a position to get beyond the principles involved here, and talk to you about how many days or at what point we would make that decision.

But the principle is clear: if we believe that weapons of mass destruction are being reconstituted, we would reserve the right to use military force again.

QUESTION: Just a follow-up, so I'm clear. It appears as if you're now prepared for the outcome that, if there is military action, that the inspectors will not be allowed to go back, and that in - so the American bombers will in fact take the place of the weapons inspectors, and they will strike Iraq when they thing there's evidence of weapons production. Is that --

MR. RUBIN: Well, those are your words. I try to choose mine much more carefully than that. My words are the ones I'm going to have to stick with, which is that the preferred way to combat this threat is to have the inspectors in there doing their job, finding out what Iraq has and destroying it through their procedures. If diplomacy and the threat of force does not convince Saddam Hussein to allow that preferred course to occur, we have set the military objectives as I have indicated.

If after the use of force, there is a belief that they are reconstituting their weapons of mass destruction, we would reserve the right to act again. That is because it is a possibility that in the aftermath of military force, that UNSCOM's inspectors will not be able to do their job in the best way that we believe to get at this problem.

QUESTION: But Jamie --

QUESTION: Jamie --

QUESTION: Can I follow up?

MR. RUBIN: Excuse me. Let's go over here.

QUESTION: Is the US Government confident that it would know if Saddam were reconstituting those weapons, through other means than the weapons inspectors?

MR. RUBIN: We have our means to determine what we think our threats are. We think the best course is to have people on the ground working the problem, inspecting sites, proving what the Iraqis say is true or not true -- that the combination of our national technical means with those types of on-site inspections is a better way to keep track of and destroy.

But in the event that UNSCOM is not able to now do its job -- in other words, those inspections are not able to operate -- we need to face the question of whether military force will be necessary. That has not been answered yet. And in that event, be prepared to deal with a situation where there were not inspectors. In that case, we will use whatever means we need to determine what's going on there. And if it reaches a threshold that we believe constitutes the reconstitution of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, we will reserve the right to act.

QUESTION: I'm not asking you what those methods are; I realize you can't talk about that. But are they adequate, is the question I was asking? Are you confident that they would be adequate?

MR. RUBIN: Again, we believe we will be in a position to act on that right we're reserving for ourselves.

QUESTION: Jamie, how do you take Senator Kerry's assessment yesterday that Saddam can reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction in as little as six months - and he says everybody agrees on this; I'm not sure if they do - if you --

MR. RUBIN: Do you agree, Roy?

QUESTION: I'm not an expert.

MR. RUBIN: Oh, okay.

QUESTION: Perhaps you have access to experts.

MR. RUBIN: I think - I'm sure everyone doesn't agree on a number like that.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, if it is six months, or maybe it's 12 months, isn't there the possibility, if you go down the track now of the military course, that you're going to wind up having to go to war every six to 12 months?

MR. RUBIN: Well, you're taking the presumption of a particular time period that I'm not going to accept. I will agree that the preferred course is diplomacy. The best way to deal with the problem of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses is to have inspectors finding out what occurs, getting the access they need, uncovering the weapons and destroying them.

But if that can't happen - as it now can't happen - and there is no access or not full access for UNSCOM, then we're in a different situation, and the President will have to decide whether the use of force is the next step. What the objectives of that next step would be are the ones I specified. And precisely to deal with the possibility of reconstitution, we are reserving the right to act again. But it would be folly to presume to know at this point, one, whether inspectors would be able to go back; and two, how often one would have to exercise that right. But we are prepared to answer the question of why, in the absence of UNSCOM working now, the use of force is better than doing nothing.

QUESTION: Back to your point on diplomacy, you say that diplomacy is the preferred outcome. But --

MR. RUBIN: Again, because that will mean that the UNSCOM inspectors will be able to do their job.

QUESTION: But there's two questions on diplomacy that I have. One is that there's no sign of any American diplomacy -- not even a meeting with Tariq Aziz, as occurred before the Gulf War several times. And the Secretary yesterday repeated her position of a year ago that she looks very much forward to negotiating with Saddam Hussein's successor - implying that she really has no intention of --

MR. RUBIN: I don't remember her saying those words, but I think I understand your point.

QUESTION: And the person - if you have diplomacy, it's got to be with the man who's in power now, obviously, and not with his successor.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: But the one point - the second is, I'm wondering whether the limitation now of American and British goals in whatever military strike might have to be undertaken almost cramps the diplomacy; because you now are - it seems to be restricting --

MR. RUBIN: You just switched sides, haven't you?

QUESTION: I don't take sides. I'm just - the position --

MR. RUBIN: It's nice to be able to come at it from both angles, right?

QUESTION: That's right.

(Laughter.)

The fact is you've limited - the public statements now limit the goals as destroying the weapons of mass destruction, and not the military infrastructure, not the Republican Guard, not the man himself. They're much more restricted. Well, if you want to have diplomacy work, if you want to have coercive diplomacy work, you have to - ordinarily, the logic is you have to threaten the man and his power base, otherwise there's no incentive.

MR. RUBIN: Are we getting to the question mark soon?

QUESTION: Well, the question is --

QUESTION: I've got a follow.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: The question is how you are supporting diplomacy either through the United States itself, or through the other countries, by the policies you're pursuing.

MR. RUBIN: All right. Let me answer the first part of your multipart question. The Iraqis have no illusions on what they need to do. Secretary Albright has met with many of the countries who are talking to the Iraqis. We are fully comfortable with the work that Ambassador Butler has done in explaining to the Iraqis what they need to do.

This isn't about messages being confused and the need to have a face-to-face meeting so that those messages can't be garbled. The message is clear: Ambassador Butler needs to be able to do his job with full and unfettered access. So the issue of a face-to-face meeting is different than it was at that time, when perhaps Iraq didn't believe the United States was prepared to use military force in 1991 and a decision was made that they needed to hear it directly from the United States. That's not the case here; we've used military force many times with regard to Iraq.

Now, switching to the other side of the question, I'm not going to get into targeting for you, but I will point you, with some emphasis in my words, to perhaps the answer to your question. The objectives, if military force is to be used, are, first, to diminish substantially his ability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction; and second, his ability to threaten his neighbors. Those are military objectives that entail actions the Pentagon would take that I think make clear that this would be a substantial use of force.

To the extent that Iraq may be understanding that its position is untenable and beginning to come up with new ways in which it wants to show that access is possible -- even if it falls well short of full access -- I suspect the problem here is not that Iraq doesn't believe the threat is real and the threat is substantial.

QUESTION: The question really is whether diplomacy can conceivably work without the use of credible threat to his survival as a leader or to the survival of his regime or of his power structure.

MR. RUBIN: All right. Let me try to -- I think I really came as close as I can to answering your question, Roy, in this setting. But let me try another way, and that is that we've seen in repeated occasions, over the last several years, that Saddam Hussein has responded to the threat of force. On several occasions, material breach resolutions -- which are implicit threats that the cease fire is over and therefore force might be used -- have led to him changing his position and allowing UNSCOM to do its job.

So the issue is not whether Saddam Hussein believes that there will be a substantial use of force going at those things he holds dear. This crisis is about his refusal to let the inspectors get at the weapons of mass destruction. So he obviously cares a great deal about that. And there's no question he cares about the Republican Guard units that make up part of what his capability to threaten his neighbors are.

So I would disagree with the premise of your question that our objectives are so limited as to not pose a substantial threat, and thereby undermine our diplomacy. I would think, on the contrary, that this is a serious - the use of force contemplated is substantial, and that is not the problem. The problem is Saddam Hussein has not reversed course.

QUESTION: This is going to sound like a think-tank luncheon without the rich dessert.

MR. RUBIN: Well, we've been think-tanking for a while here.

QUESTION: Well, but you know what's getting remote here - and maybe - I don't know what you want to do about it - but the UN connection. I mean, isn't Iraq a special case? All this isn't in - isn't all this in the context of the US having authority to act, the US says, under a UN resolution that's very specific and tailored for Iraq? Otherwise, the Secretary of State and Berger and you are laying out a doctrine, almost, that the US has the right to attack --

MR. RUBIN: In the case of proliferation of --

QUESTION: -- countries, because Iraq is not the only member of this club. There are others. There's Libya, there's North Korea --

MR. RUBIN: Thank you for that helpful question.

QUESTION: No, I'm not trying to steer you, but it's getting to be --

MR. RUBIN: I'm steerable.

QUESTION: You're beginning - the Administration is beginning to get to be the cop, the international cop. And maybe you want to be, and maybe you should be. But this -- isn't Iraq a special situation?

MR. RUBIN: Let me try to answer that directly. Iraq is a special situation. Iraq is under Chapter 7 sanctions by the Security Council. Iraq has invaded another neighbor, and the cease-fire resolution - the decision to stop using force -- was premised upon his giving up his weapons of mass destruction. At the time, some hoped that might occur in as quick as 60 to 90 days. Well, here we are almost seven years later, and he's still playing hide-and-seek, still playing procedural gimmicks to try to stop what has been the ultimate decision of the Security Council on behalf of the world, because of the threat his regime poses.

Our view that we have the right to use force, pursuant to international law, as well as pursuant to the President's constitutional authorities, is at least partially premised on the Security Council resolutions; and therefore, to that extent, this is a special case.

QUESTION: And that resolution authorizes continual strikes?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I don't want to misstate the legal case here, because the lawyers can really work themselves into a frenzy over this issue. But we do believe we have the authority, and that authority is based at least in part on the fact that Iraq has fundamentally violated the cease-fire resolution.

QUESTION: What's the reaction of this government to the landing in Baghdad of Vladmir Zhirinovsky? And I believe 30 Russians went with him. And secondly, is there a fear that these Russians might become human shields, get in the way of any air campaign that might come? Just finally, is Mr. Butler's UNSCOM people going to get out before anything happens?

MR. RUBIN: Let me first say we have very little reaction to that flight, other than to say that the sanctions committee approved the flight, subject to the following conditions. Russia provided assurances that the flight was purely humanitarian in nature. The number of passengers - originally over 200 - would be greatly reduced, and would include primarily people who are necessary for distribution of the humanitarian items on the plane; which may mean that some of your colleagues may no longer be on the plane, I really don't know. The plane would spend only the time on the ground in Baghdad necessary to carry out its humanitarian purpose. The UN would inspect the flight upon arrival and departure to ensure that only humanitarian items are on board.

The point here is, we can't rule out that Saddam Hussein would break all the laws of civilized behavior and put women and children and even humanitarian workers and even journalists in the way of - at risk, in the case of the use of force. That is something that we're very cognizant of, but I wouldn't be able to comment further.

QUESTION: Okay, but the UN is going to monitor who gets off the plane, who gets back on the plane. Is that the part of it?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: Oh, okay.

QUESTION: Follow-up --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll go here, and then we'll go over there.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: I can't imagine I have much more to say, but I'll give it a whirl.

QUESTION: Well, one of the people who are overseeing the distribution is Zhirinovsky, who's been there before, the parliamentarian. But my question is, are you at all concerned that this aid and this food and medicine aid is going to not go to the people of Iraq, but will actually go to the military or official --

MR. RUBIN: Well, what we're - the reason why we've imposed some restrictions in the sanctions committee was precisely to combat that possibility, and we understand that the UN would inspect the flights on arrival and departure to ensure that only humanitarian items are on board and that they went to the right places.

QUESTION: What kind of consultations is the United States in now with Russia over Iraq?

MR. RUBIN: That's a different question. Let's go over here. I'll come back to you.

QUESTION: Just to revisit this question - the follow-on strikes, have the members of the core alliance that have agreed to participate in the military action -- what I guess some observers are now calling the Anglo-Saxon alliance - have they agreed to this?

MR. RUBIN: All these anonymous observers always come up with this great stuff.

QUESTION: Have they agreed to this approach of follow-on strikes? And also, have the Arab states - Kuwait, Bahrain, et cetera - also agreed to provide whatever support they've agreed to provide, under that scenario - under the continuing strike scenario?

MR. RUBIN: Let me get at the question this way - first by saying that we're particularly grateful for the unequivocal and firm support of the United Kingdom for the United States in the ongoing crisis. The best indication of this support is Her Majesty's decision to send combat aircraft to be based in Kuwait for possible use in a military operation.

Canada and Australia have also expressed willingness to participate in a military operation to enforce UN Security Council resolutions. Portugal and Germany have stated publicly that facilities in their territories - there goes Anglo-Saxon - would be available for use in a military operation. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have expressed support for the US position. Poland has offered forces trained in countering the effects of chemical weapons. Hungary and the Czech Republic are examining what help they can give.

The GCC has just issued a very strong statement, placing the entire responsibility - there was a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council today -- for the crisis on the Iraqi regime. The GCC also states repeatedly that any dangerous consequences resulting from Iraqi intransigence would be the responsibility of the regime alone. They ask Saddam Hussein to yield to international efforts. And I would point out that Jordan and Egypt have also emphasized the need for Saddam to comply.

Directly on point to your question, I can assure you that Secretary Albright and Sandy Berger -- National Security Advisor Berger's public comments have been something that we have said privately to those we have talked to about the use of force in recent days, and I don't think it came as a surprise to them.

But again, it's not - we don't expect to have the same level of support for this situation as we had during the Gulf War. That was a situation where Saddam Hussein had invaded another country. What we expect to have is a range of views, including full and complete support; including the support of joining us militarily; including the access to military facilities that we need; including public support for the use of force; including private support for the use of force, and public blame on Saddam Hussein for the consequences.

So there will be a range of views, including, obviously, the possibility that Russia would oppose us, if it came to that. We've expected that, and that's not surprising, considering the differences in this situation. As I've indicated to all of you in the past, I don't think it is an equivalent standard, and therefore each of the countries are going to have different ways of expressing their support.

But Secretary Albright was feeling that, in her discussions with Gulf states, that privately they were quite supportive; and each of them has their own constituencies that require them to say words differently in public. But overall, as she indicated, they did not urge her to come back and try to tell the President that this would be a disaster that he needed to not follow through on.

QUESTION: Can you plug in France and Saudi Arabia in that fairly comprehensive wrap-up?

MR. RUBIN: The Saudi Government has stated -- as part of the GCC statement and separately -- that the consequences would fall on Saddam Hussein. And we believe we will have the necessary Saudi cooperation and support to perform the mission, as things have evolved over the last two weeks.

QUESTION: Do you think that the --

QUESTION: And France?

MR. RUBIN: France, at this point - sorry. We'll get right over there. The Secretary was heartened at the time when the French Government made clear that all options were open. I think I pointed out to you that that was a different view than existed prior to October, when this issue first came to a head of access to sensitive sites. The French are now engaged in an effort to try to convince Saddam Hussein to reverse course. We're supportive of that effort, and that may require them to say things differently because of their efforts to be an interlocutor.

QUESTION: Do you feel that the Turkish action, attacks against Northern Iraq right now, are complicating this scenario?

MR. RUBIN: The short answer is no, because I don't have any firm information on this. We've seen press reports claiming that this is the case. We still have no information confirming - independent confirmation of such troop movements. A Turkish Government spokesman has repeated that no such operation is taking place. I would have to refer you to the Turkish Government.

But I can say this -- Turkish forces have entered Northern Iraq for limited periods in the past to destroy bases and arms caches of the terrorist PKK. We have consistently supported the right of the Turkish Government to defend itself against terrorism, as long as any incursions are limited in scope and duration, and fully respect the rights of the civilian inhabitants in the region.

QUESTION: But even though the Turks have gone in and come out, they've often been there for a long time - months at a time, in fact. I wonder if you were convinced that in fact this was going on, whether you would find it a complication at this time.

MR. RUBIN: The United States recognized Turkey's very real security concerns and its desire to avoid a repeat of the massive influx of refugees seen in 1991. We want to work constructively with the government of Turkey on these issues.

I wouldn't use the word complication, but we certainly recognize what the potential contingencies are.

QUESTION: The large number of the Turkish officials, which include the Prime Minister and President of Turkey, they are complaining about the level of the dialogue between the US and Turkey on the Iraqi situation. They said that they don't have several events before the actions and the build-up on the Iraqi borders. Can we describe this complaint as a change or differences of US-Turkish relations in the near future?

MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright spoke to Prime Minister Yilmaz during the course of her trip. She authorized Assistant Secretary Grossman and the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go to Turkey to discuss these issues. Our ambassador is in regular contact with the Turkish Government, and we will continue to consult as closely as possible as we can with the Turkish Government during the course of this crisis.

The Secretary herself was heartened that following her call, the Turkish Government made clear who was responsible for this crisis, and made clear that it supported our efforts to get Saddam Hussein to comply with UN resolutions on this point.

QUESTION: It seems to me you were just now expressing support for the Turkish aims in dealing with the refugees, which are reported to be the aims of an operation that you say doesn't exist.

MR. RUBIN: Well, I always hesitate to answer questions when it seems to you, Roy. I stated words --

QUESTION: Your words.

MR. RUBIN: Right, I stated the words; I'll be happy to repeat them. The United States recognizes Turkey's very real security concerns and its desire to avoid a repeat of the massive influx of refugees seen in 1991. We want to work constructively with the government of Turkey on these issues. We have no information on such an operation or a refugee movement of that kind. Should the question arise, we will consult with the government of Turkey regarding a proper response.

I don't know how to be more clear than that.

QUESTION: The point is, those are the stated aims, at least in the news reports, of the Turkish operation - and you're expressing sympathy for them, but you can't even confirm that the operation is going on right now. And there's another report --

MR. RUBIN: I don't see why those two are inconsistent -- that we can't confirm an operation that's going --

QUESTION: But how can the United States --

MR. RUBIN: Let me try to answer your question.

QUESTION: How can you not know that something is going on?

MR. RUBIN: Let me try to answer your question, Roy, OK? I can't always confirm an operation that you all see press reports about. I can say that we have no independent confirmation of that. With regard to the specific question of refugees, I've stated what the U.S. Government's position is. I don't know how to play - answer your question any more concretely than that.

QUESTION: There's independent confirmation that - it's coming in news reports. Are you disputing the news reports?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer your question any further.

QUESTION: Second point --

MR. RUBIN: Yes. Over here, please.

QUESTION: Just to follow up - can I follow up, please? Because there's another report on the very same subject, which is that -

MR. RUBIN: That I also can't confirm?

QUESTION: -- that F-16 aircraft, U.S.-provided aircraft, are being used in this operation?

MR. RUBIN: I have no comment on the operational details of any military plans.

QUESTION: Let me try --

QUESTION: You have no - don't you have a position on what - if US --

MR. RUBIN: I'm not sure we're making progress here.

QUESTION: Has the United States asked Turkey, straight out, if an operation is underway?

MR. RUBIN: Sorry?

QUESTION: Has the United States asked Turkey if an operation was underway; and if so, what was the response?

MR. RUBIN: I will try to get an answer to what our contact has been, but I've been given the information that I've provided you.

QUESTION: Jamie, can I ask you about the assurances from Baghdad - if that's the right word - that no outside - no other country is threatened. I mean, if you're an Israeli or a Saudi or a Kuwaiti, would you relax over the latest Baghdad assurance that they would only target - if that's the word - their foes within Iraq?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't want to get into a position of unnecessarily alarming people, but certainly the fact that we have stated what our response would be to such a serious mistake indicates that we take - how we take the threat.

QUESTION: Jamie, there are people on the Hill who are saying that - and elsewhere - who are saying that they feel that the objectives of this operation are unclear --

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: -- and that they, in fact, have changed from the beginning of this conflict several months ago. How - would you agree with them, and how would you assess their remarks?

MR. RUBIN: The short answer is no. There is a tendency to take a snapshot of a given situation and look at what we're trying to achieve, and then graft onto that the assumption that military force is designed to achieve that.

As I responded to Sid, I can say this: The military goals for this operation have been clear from the beginning. And they are: If diplomacy fails, to substantially diminish Iraq's capability to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, or to threaten its neighbors. That is a very clear military objective -- the kind of military objective that members of Congress have quite rightly said ought to be clearly stated in advance of the use of force, so that the American people clearly understand what the goals are and know whether they can be achieved, and whether they can be achieved at a reasonable cost.

That is different than the desire that we have to use the best way to combat the weapons of mass destruction threat -- and that is UNSCOM inspectors going in and doing their job. To the extent that diplomacy and the threat of force can coerce or convince Iraq to do that, that would be all to the good. But if that fails, we need to state very clearly to the American people what our objectives are. Other than a different verb here or there, or maybe a missing adjective, or at most, a missing adverb, I think we've been quite clear on our military objectives; and those are the ones I just specified.

QUESTION: So our sense and thrust of - this government's sense and thrust of this crisis has not altered, even in discussions with other countries, taking in their views. I mean, Arab countries have a different view of this crisis and how it's constructed.

MR. RUBIN: No. What hasn't changed is the military objectives we would set for a military operation, should that become necessary, that would be conducted primarily by the United States. So we've made clear what an appropriate military objective would be, and we've done that for a very simple reason, because members of Congress, quite rightly, want to know what it is we're seeking to achieve; that that is a clear objective; and that it's an achievable objective at acceptable cost and risk. That is the kind of discussion we've had in this country regarding the use of force for many years, and it's appropriate that we set forth those objectives.

That is different, however, from the desire we've had all along to see Saddam Hussein reverse course in the face of the threat of the use of force, or as a result of diplomatic efforts, and allow UNSCOM to do its job, which would be a better way to get weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of Saddam Hussein.

QUESTION: Can we switch to another subject?

MR. RUBIN: Let's go over there, please. One more on this subject, and then we'll change.

QUESTION: Just to repeat my question about any contact with the Russian Government or consultations on Iraq.

MR. RUBIN: Yes, Secretary Albright is in regular contact with Foreign Minister Primakov. I'm not going to be able to share with you every phone call or every letter; but she's in regular contact with him.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - this week?

MR. RUBIN: She's been in contact with him this week, yes.

QUESTION: Could we try something else?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I think we're doing that.

QUESTION: One more.

MR. RUBIN: One more. Is it an answerable question?

QUESTION: I bet it is. Do you have anything on something called - a chemical agent called Agent 15?

MR. RUBIN: I would have to get you information for the record for that.

QUESTION: Do you know what the question is about?

MR. RUBIN: It sounds like I'm not going to have an answer.

QUESTION: Well, the British Defense Secretary --

MR. RUBIN: I'm aware of that report, and I will try to get you some details about it. I don't have anything, OK? I don't have anything here, but I'd be happy to get it for you.

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