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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Great Seal

U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

INDEX
MONDAY, JANUARY 26, 1998
Briefer: JAMES P. RUBIN

IRAQ
1-4Weekend Mtg to Review Options / US Consultations With Key Allies and UNSC Members / Military Strike Option and Authority for Use of Force / Inability of UNSCOM to Carry Out Mission / Decision Made Under Chapter VII of Charter / Concern for Biological Weapons Capability / No Decision on Unilateral Actions
2-6Russian Amb at State Dept / Visit to Baghdad by Russian Envoy / Shared Concerns About Compliance with UN Resolutions / Secretary's Contacts / "One More Attempt" to Persuade Iraq to Comply
6Secretary's Travel re Iraq Issue


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB # 12
MONDAY,JANUARY 26, 1998, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)


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QUESTION: When we left the Iraq story, there had been two White House meetings, and reporters were free to report that the US was edging closer to action, and it looked like unilateral action. And then there was that old word about consulting. I don't suppose that consulting means taking the advice of others. Doesn't that consulting - and if it's going on, please tell us about it - might more necessarily be what the US has concluded.

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me make a few comments on Iraq, and then address directly your question. Over the weekend, the President and senior national security advisors reviewed the situation with respect to Iraq. The advisors agreed with the conclusion of Chairman Butler that under the present circumstances, UNSCOM, the UN mission, cannot carry out its mandate. This is a very serious matter.

The purpose of the meeting with the President was to review options, not to make a decision. The President and his advisors reaffirmed that all options remain on the table. The United States Government is now in the process of intensive consultations with key allies and members of the Security Council. For example, Secretary Albright spoke yesterday with Foreign Minister Cook of the United Kingdom. She intends to stay in very close contact with him in the coming days. She also reviewed with him issues of concern in his role as president of the European Union, particularly the Middle East peace process.

The Secretary will continue to be in close touch with leaders in Europe and the Gulf. It's my understanding the President will be in touch with leaders as well.

As far as what will be said to these people and whether consultations are consultations, at this point they are consultations. All I can say to you with respect to the unilateral question that you asked is that we have made clear that we believe that we already have the authority for a military strike, should such an option be chosen. As for the position of other members, you will have to ask them. But that is our view. Whether or not that option is chosen, again, is a decision that hasn't yet been made. But that is our view.

QUESTION: The we is the United States?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: So far, you've had really only one steadfast supporter, and that was Britain. You're talking to Cook, and indeed, he has a double role. But are you talking to the British particularly in light of their steadfast support and their lack of nervousness about using force to enforce the Security Council resolutions? And I really would like to ask you if these other folks, when you get down the list to China and France and Russia and all, can they talk the United States out of its conclusion? I don't mean out of its action, out of its conclusion.

MR. RUBIN: Whatever - certainly we have reached the conclusion, as has Chairman Butler, that under current circumstances the UN cannot do its job in Iraq. This is a very serious matter.

Our objective for some time has been to do whatever is necessary, including not ruling out the use of force, to achieve our objective. Our objective is to be sure that Iraq's ability to make weapons of mass destruction and missiles is steadily diminished. This is an objective stated by the United Nations Security Council. It's one that the United Nations Security Council has signed up to in resolution after resolution.

So to other members of the Council that may have differences as to how to achieve that objective, our view - our firmly held view - is under current circumstances, if something doesn't give in Iraq, if excuses continue, there is no possibility that UNSCOM can do the job that the UN itself - including the permanent members, Britain, France, the United States, Russia, China, as well as the non-permanent members - have said is their objective, under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter.

All countries of the world should bear in mind that the international system looks to the United Nations to protect its international peace and security; and that if the United Nations Security Council makes a decision under Chapter 7 of the Charter, that is a binding decision and one where the use of force is implied if not explicitly stated. So it is our view that those countries that have a different view as to what is required for Iraq to meet those requirements, they should think long and hard about the fact that Iraq is flouting those very countries' positions.

QUESTION: Jamie, the Russian Ambassador Vorontsov, just left the building. I was wondering if he was here as part of those consultations about Iraq - whether specifically or tangentially -- and if so, if he gave you any information about what their deputy, I think it's foreign minister, is going to be doing on his mission to Baghdad.

MR. RUBIN: It would not surprise me if the ambassador from Russia talked to our senior officials here about this issue. In fact, it would greatly surprise me on a day like today if they didn't discuss that issue.

Let me say this about the Russian envoy's travel to Baghdad. We do not object to efforts by other countries to get Saddam Hussein to stop making excuses and start complying with the United Nations. The issue is not who the messenger is; the issue is the message. The message has to be clear: compliance, compliance, compliance; no more excuses.

If as a result of any such discussion, Iraq reverses course and will comply, that will be a good thing. I can't say we're particularly optimistic at this point, given the number of weeks that have gone by and the way in which Iraq has disrespected the United Nations special commissioner in making clear that they do not intend to meet his legitimate requirements. But again, it's not the messenger, it's the message. And the message that we support, and the message that every country that cares about the resolutions of the Security Council should support is compliance, compliance and compliance.

QUESTION: Jamie, could I go back to your statement that the United States has the necessary authority for the use of military force. You're referring to past Security Council resolutions?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: And which one specifically --

MR. RUBIN: I'll get you a legal analysis of what we think the relevant authority is. I think I've done that on several occasions in this room, and will be happy to take that question for the record.

QUESTION: Jamie, you brought up Chapter 7 resolutions. Is that something the US will be going for now at the Security Council --

MR. RUBIN: No, no, what I'm merely pointing out is the facts; and the facts are that Resolution 687, the cease fire resolution that set up the UN special commission, and subsequent resolutions regarding Iraq are all operating under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. So all the operative resolutions are already under Chapter 7.

QUESTION: The US position has been for weeks that you've tried diplomacy and it's not getting anyplace. Without attacking or questioning the Russian Government's motives, if their mission, as last time we went round this, is to delay action; if their mission is to buy Saddam more time - and there's great suspicion that he is using the lack of inspection to hide biological weapons or weapons ingredients. How is this helpful to you in any way to have a Russian diplomat down there, chatting with Saddam Hussein with what's been gone over again and again and again? Do you owe this to Russia somehow? Because you don't owe Saddam Hussein anything, do you?

MR. RUBIN: Barry, I don't really understand the question, but let me try to respond to it.

QUESTION: Well, it's going to delay things. If the effect is to delay things, do you live with it?

MR. RUBIN: I don't understand why a meeting today or tomorrow in Baghdad delays anything.

QUESTION: Well, because --

MR. RUBIN: Let me try to address the points you've made. First of all, in the area of biological weapons, UNSCOM has said for several years that Iraq has not supplied a complete accounting of its biological weapons program, and has so informed the Security Council.

We share the UN's concern over Iraq's biological weapons program. There are more unanswered questions with regard to biological weapons than any other area that the UN is working on. It cannot be ruled out that Iraq has an operational biological weapons facility. This situation illustrates the need to maintain the strongest possible international pressure on Iraq to provide a complete verifiable accounting of its past activities, as it is obliged to do.

So, yes, we are concerned about this area - very concerned. The question is the speed with which we are going to move in ramping up the pressure. I can say two things to you. Number one, the diplomatic string, the string for diplomacy is rapidly running out. I can say secondly that the Administration intends to proceed with deliberate speed here. We're not going to be rushed, nor are we going to be slowed down. The fact that there's a meeting in Baghdad is an irrelevant consideration when it comes to the timing for our decision-making.

We have not made decisions. I've been very clear that we haven't made decisions. When we make those decisions, they will not be affected by someone having a meeting at that level in Iraq. What I've said to you is that we're now beginning consultations. This is a very serious matter. When decisions are made, we can be more clear with you; but they have not yet been made.

QUESTION: Would the Secretary of State have to be airborne to have the kind of consultations that you --

MR. RUBIN: I don't think it's an absolute prerequisite, no.

QUESTION: Jamie, did you all talk to the Russians about the visit by the deputy foreign minister before he left? And do you know what their message is?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to what diplomatic contacts went on. It is our understanding that the Russian position and ours is identical on the question of compliance. That is the discussions that Secretary Albright has had with Foreign Minister Primakov have made clear they do not have a different view; that it's up to Iraq to comply with Chairman Butler's requirements. It is not up to Iraq to come up with excuses for why it can't comply with Chairman Butler's requirements. We are therefore confident that that is the message.

At the same time, I'm not going to sugarcoat this. We've had differences with the Russians as to what tactics to pursue in order to achieve our joint objectives. All I can say to that is that the Russians, like other countries in the world, in the Security Council, have signed and voted for these very resolutions that it's clear Iraq is flouting. So they have the same interests as we do in seeing that this non-compliance comes to a halt.

QUESTION: Has the Secretary spoken to Primakov; and has she also spoken to the French foreign minister?

MR. RUBIN: At this point, the only call that I can report is Foreign Minister Cook. I suspect that she has not spoken to Foreign Minister Primakov.

QUESTION: Do you know if she plans to?

MR. RUBIN: When we have more to tell you about consultations, we will.

QUESTION: Jamie, Iraqi ministers talking to reporters in Baghdad -- and in fact one or two columnists here in this country - have argued that the use of military force from the air against Iraq will not achieve very much. They've argued that the regime can survive such bombing; that a program of producing weapons of mass destruction, if it exists, would probably survive such bombing as well. Why is military force or aerial bombing an option? What would it achieve?

MR. RUBIN: First of all, it would be very difficult in this setting for me to get into any details about military options. But let me simply say this - under current circumstances, Iraq is failing to comply with the United Nations. Diplomatic missions have gone to Baghdad. Chairman Butler has had a series of meetings, and it's clear that under the present circumstances, there is no prospect that Iraq will comply with the UN requirements.

Therefore, those who argued that somehow other options to get them to comply will put us in a worse situation, it's hard for me to fathom. How can it be worse than Iraq failing to comply with the United Nations?

QUESTION: Well, it could be worse in the tense that you bomb Iraq, Iraq throws out UNSCOM, and you have no more UNSCOM.

MR. RUBIN: UNSCOM, under its current circumstances is not in a position to do its job.

QUESTION: Jamie, the reporting over the weekend said that there would be one more attempt diplomatically to persuade the Iraqis to do something. Is that correct? And is the Russian mission that attempt, or will there be some other way of doing this?

MR. RUBIN: All I can say on that is we're undertaking intensive consultations with allies. I wouldn't presume everything you read in the newspapers this weekend is accurate. I wouldn't -- nor would I be in a position to comment on any one thing or another.

QUESTION: Can you say anything about possible travel by the Secretary along these lines?

MR. RUBIN: Well, those of you who have made it a practice to try to sign up for the Secretary's travel list, I would say that in the coming days you might want to have your pens ready. But I don't have any specific information on that. There have been no decisions. I wouldn't rule it out, but exactly the form in which these consultations take is something that's still to be determined.

QUESTION: As long as you've gone that far --

MR. RUBIN: I just said to have them ready.

QUESTION: Yes, yes. How about heavy winter coats and --

MR. RUBIN: Well, again --

QUESTION: Or should it be more like short sleeves?

QUESTION: Parkas.

QUESTION: Well, I think, on Secretary Albright's trips, we've all come - gotten very used to the idea that we could be anywhere. So pack well wherever we go, because you never know.

QUESTION: Different subject?

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