DoD News Briefing
Thursday, October 9, 1997 - 1:30 p.m.
Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD PA
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Q: Iraq. Can you bring us up-to-date on whether there've been any violations in the last 24 hours?
A: I don't believe there have been any in the last 24 hours.
Q: This morning Secretary Cohen said that enforcement had been tightened. Can you describe how enforcement has been tightened?
A: Yes, it's been tightened in three ways. I'm talking primarily about the southern no-fly zone which is the no-fly zone that principally contains Iraq from either from attacking its neighbors or positioning itself to attack its neighbors.
First of all, the... And I'm not going to get into numerical detail here, but just to give you a sense. The Operation SOUTHERN WATCH flights are flying farther north than they were before. In other words, they're going deeper into the no-fly zone or the box as it's called -- closer to the 33rd Parallel than they were before.
Second, the packages of planes, the numbers of planes, flying are larger than they were before. They're now at what they call in the theater, surge levels.
Three, we are in the process of building up our forces in the area. You know that the NIMITZ battle group will be on station and ready to fly in the area sometime this weekend. That's a group that includes the NIMITZ: two cruisers, the USS PORT ROYAL and the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN; a destroyer, the USS KINCAID; a guided missile frigate, the USS FORD; an attack submarine, the USS OLYMPIA; and a fast combat support ship, the USS SACRAMENTO.
In the mean time we still have there the Air Expeditionary Force -- 22 Air Force planes in Bahrain supplemented by two B-1 bombers who will stay on for awhile. They're supported by tankers, two KC-135s which will also remain in theater until mid-October or later, if necessary. Additionally, two Tomahawk capable cruisers -- the STETHAM and the DR RAY -- that were conducting maritime intercept operations in the Arabian Gulf, were extended until arrival of the NIMITZ to provide additional naval power in the area, the NIMITZ battle group.
So that's what we've done, the three things. They're flying further north, there are bigger packages, and we've enhanced both supporting naval and air power.
Q: Just to clarify a couple of points, although they're flying further north, am I understanding you right, they're still staying south of the 33rd? They're not flying beyond the 33rd, is that correct?
A: The no-fly zone extends to the 33rd, and we have not flown over, beyond the declared no-fly zone.
Q: It's further into the existing zone. There's been no extension...
A: Right. It's not an extension of the existing zone.
You know last year we extended the no-fly zone up to the 33rd. We extended it by about 60 miles.
Q: Can you give us any current status of Iraqi air defenses around the 33rd or slightly north thereof? What have you seen in terms of activity?
A: Nothing particularly unusual, but there are some... First of all, Baghdad, which is about 30-40 miles north of the 33rd, is very, very heavily defended. It's ringed by air defense sites. There are a couple of other heavily defended areas that are within the no-fly zone, and our planes work hard to avoid getting into the range of those SAM sites. But there have not been unusual developments in the Iraqi air defense system recently.
Q: There are active SAM sites inside the no-fly, but as long as they don't paint us it's okay?
A: We have not been... We can respond to being painted and there have not been reasons to respond.
Q: But they're active within the southern no-fly zone.
A: There are SAM sites there. They have not been acquiring our planes.
Q: What do the B-1 bombers have to do with enforcing the no-fly zone?
A: What do they have to do with enforcing the no-fly zone? They're part of a package of military assets that would allow us to respond if called upon to deal with targets in the area.
Q: You mentioned, for instance you mentioned that these cruisers were Tomahawk capable. Did you just do that in passing, or is there some suggestion here that the United States might use B-1s or cruise missiles to respond to violations of the no-fly zone, or would it be limited to try and shoot these planes down if they violate the no-fly zone? There's a suggestion here that this might go beyond just shooting at these planes.
A: There is a suggestion that, I think it's not a suggestion. It should be very clear. We have a powerful military force in the Gulf ready to protect our interests there. We have, in the past, used a variety of military assets including Tomahawk missiles and aircraft to protect our interests, and we will be able to do that in the future.
Q: I guess the question is, if the Iraqis are good enough, getting good enough at these minor incursions so they can do them in locations and at times where they don't get shot down but they continue, is there then an option with these other weapons to do something else in retaliation for violating the no-fly zone?
A: I think we've shown in the past that we are prepared to protect our interests and to enforce the no-fly zone. We've used a variety of military assets to do that. I'll leave it at that.
Q: Are there any pending requests from Central Command for any other assets in addition to the NIMITZ?
A: Not that I'm aware of.
Q: By sending U.S. planes deeper into the no-fly zone, closer to the 33rd Parallel, and therefore closer to some of the Iraqi air defenses, particularly those north of the 33rd, are U.S. pilots at any additional risk?
A: Any military mission involves some risk. But I can tell you that these missions are designed to hold risk to a minimum while still completing the mission. They are very meticulously designed.
Obviously when you go deeper, you incur some risk, but there are other ways to compensate for that risk, and we are trying to do that.
Q: Are you getting from other ways, other than strictly the violations of the no-fly zone, other indications of intent to stir up trouble by Saddam Hussein? Any intent to engage us in some fashion?
A: It is always difficult to measure intent, particularly Saddam Hussein's intent. But we don't see now other unusual activities.
Q: What about attacks on the U.N....
A: That remains extremely bothersome, their unwillingness to comply with UNSCOM and to help it do its job.
Q: (inaudible)
A: As I say, Saddam Hussein has not...is displaying hostility which is very bothersome.
Q: Are the two viewed as linked? The no-fly zone violations and the hostility toward the U.N.?
A: I think that we look at all his activity across the board, and our goal has been to get Saddam Hussein to comply with U.N. mandates and rules, which he has steadfastly refused to do. He has not cooperated with UNSCOM. In fact he's been hostile to it. He has not returned prisoners or lists of prisoners to Kuwait. He hasn't returned military equipment to Kuwait. There are a whole series of things that Saddam Hussein has refused to do -- all of which when added together, even before you get to things like surgical no-fly zone violations, suggest that he bears continued watching, and that's what we're doing. That's what we've been doing since the end of the Gulf War, and we'll continue to do that until his behavior changes.
Q: Is there a suspicion at all that he's attempting to lure U.S. planes into areas where there's a heavier air defense to attempt to shoot part of the planes down?
A: I don't think there's any reason to assume he's trying to do that more than he has sometimes in the past. It's always the risk to which we're attuned. Because we're aware that that's possible, we try to make adjustments to reduce the risk as much as possible.
Q: Secretary Cohen also said this morning that if Iraq continued to violate the zone they would "bear the consequences". Was he referring to anything other than them being shot down?
A: I think I'll just let the statement speak for itself.
Q: You mentioned that obviously Operation SOUTHERN WATCH has been going on for some time now. Does the Pentagon have any estimate as to how much the U.S. has spent on this since 1991?
A: I'm sure we can get some estimate. We will attempt to get some estimate.
Q: Do you have any reaction to this latest round of rather intensive Iranian exercises in the Gulf and how they impact on this tightening of the southern no-fly zone? Any concerns about deconfliction?
A: No. I'm not particularly worried about that at this stage.
Q: I take it you're declining, without getting into specifics, you're declining to rule out any response if they keep violating this no-fly zone. Is that what you're doing?
A: I want to be very clear about what I've said. We have shown in the past that we are willing and able to enforce the no-fly zone. We have a powerful military force in the area. That force is powerful all the time, 365 days a year. It's in the process of being augmented. I'll let the facts speak for themselves. Rather than speculate about the future, I'll just point to the fact that we have protected our interests there in the past.
Q: Without just air power.
Q: Do we already have pre-approval from the countries in which our aircraft are bed-down to enforce the no-fly zone?
A: Well, we're enforcing the no-fly zone. We're flying every day. We have rules of engagement which are understood by our pilots and certainly by the host countries.
Q: The northern no-fly zone, are there any adjustments being made there, and is the ongoing operation that Turkey is conducting against Kurds in the north hampering the enforcement of the no-fly zone now?
A: Two things. One, our Air Force in the north is much less robust than it is in the south -- first. Second, we do deconflict our operations over the northern no-fly zone with Turkey, and that does limit our flights to some extent.
Q: It was announced that the Iranians were intending to use their three submarines in this exercise in the Gulf. Would those submarines be permitted to get into the sea-space of the NIMITZ and other U.S. fleet components?
A: I don't think I'm going to get into operational detail like that.
Q: Do you have numbers on how much less robust the Air Force in the north is than in the south?
A: I don't have them right here with me, but it's... It varies a lot according to what we have in the Gulf, obviously. But it's considerably smaller. It's a powerful force in the north, but it's much smaller than the force in the south.
Q: Half?
A: Less than half.
Q: Are there indications that Iraq is flying more and does the U.S. have an estimate of how many of its aircraft are viable, how many can actually fly?
A: We do. Yeah. (Laughter)
Q: Can we take a vote as to whether or not you'd like to...
A: Any more questions on this?
Q: To get back to the submarine question...
Q: Will you answer those questions? Will you take those questions?
A: No. I don't think I'll answer them or take them.
Q: They're flying more?
A: I don't know the answer to that question about flying more. I'll try to find that out.
Q: We used to get numbers on operational Iraqi aircraft all the time. That doesn't sound like a very deep, dark secret.
A: There are about 184 operational Iraqi aircraft we estimate. Fighter aircraft.
Q: To get back to the submarines, has any message been sent to the Iranian government about our expectations of what they'll do around the NIMITZ and what might cause us to make some kind of response?
A: First of all, let me take that particular question. But on the NIMITZ itself, we have ships in the Gulf all the time. We operate with enormous attention to force protection at all times. The Iranians understand that. I don't anticipate that there will be any problems with this deployment by the NIMITZ in the Gulf.
Q: A follow-up to the operational Iraqi aircraft. You don't have a breakdown of what kind of aircraft they have?
A: I think I've probably said enough. I was talking about fighter aircraft. About 180 fighter aircraft.
Q: U.S. made, Russian made?
A: Iraqi aircraft? I'll just leave it at the gross figure.
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