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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

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QUESTION: On Iraq, Primakov was quoted in an interview today as sort of complaining that the United States has been on emotional overload on Iraq, and I wondered what you thought about that view.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I've not seen his comments, so I can't comment specifically on what he may or may not have said. But I don't think emotion is in any way an element governing US policy towards Iraq. This is a very serious matter that, after all, stems originally from Saddam Hussein's war of aggression on Kuwait. We have to go back to that.

We're focused very much on the issue of Saddam Hussein's continuing efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. This is a matter not only of interest to the national security of the United States, but we believe to the region, the Middle East region; and it's a global security concern that is shared by, we believe, all members of the international community -- including Russia -- sitting on the Security Council.

So emotions do not enter into a matter of this profound seriousness.

QUESTION: On the same issue, Iraq also struck back at some comments that you made yesterday about the food rationing issue, calling the United States a big liar, and other things. I wondered how you reacted to that.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'd like to step back not for the first time, but to set the record straight again on the whole background and history of the oil-for-food program, since Iraq continues to make this an element of propaganda in its efforts, I would remind you, not to deal with the humanitarian plight of their own people, but to divert attention from their failure to meet the requirements of dismantling their weapons of mass destruction programs.

So I'd like to make a number of points. First of all, the oil-for-food program itself was never intended to be the sole source of humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people. The program was intended to supplement, not substitute for, Iraq's other resources.

But there is strong evidence that Iraq has reduced its own purchases of essential goods in the spending of its own resources. I would point only to the proliferation of so-called "presidential palaces," which indicates that Iraq itself chooses to spend its own money and its own resources on items that have nothing to do with meeting the essential needs of its own people. And I think that's increasingly becoming aware to the Iraqi people themselves, given the very propaganda that Saddam Hussein has given to these palaces in his effort to thwart the work of the UN inspectors.

Secondly, the original program under Security Council Resolution 986 was carefully devised to meet the nutritional needs of the Iraqi people. This was the original program. The Secretary General specifically wanted to tailor this program to meet the needs of population groups that were most vulnerable in Iraq. But again, the Iraqi regime rejected this effort.

Thirdly, as has been pointed out on numerous occasions, nearly 95 percent of the more than 1,600 applications for humanitarian goods in the UN Sanctions Committee had been approved since the program began a year ago.

Fourth, I would point out that many of the delays in contract approvals are directly the result of Iraq's refusal to follow the procedures to which it agreed when the program began. Often applications have been submitted without necessary contract documentation or without evidence that the items would be used for humanitarian rather than, say, commercial or military purposes.

Finally, delays in purchasing humanitarian goods have also resulted from Iraq's refusal to sell oil for many weeks after the adoption of the program -- first in December of 1996, then in June of this year, and again this very month. So these interruptions in oil sales have forced the UN to hold contracts until there is money available to pay for them.

And lastly, there have been claims on the Iraqi side concerning a so-called blockage of delivery or purchase of baby milk powder for Iraqi children. I would like to clarify that we, the United States, in the Sanctions Committee, received a Tunisian contract for consideration on December 23 -- this, again, is for the baby milk powder -- and we responded positively to this contract within one day.

I would emphasize that we recommended approval of this contract even though it actually exceeded the amount that was allowable under the oil-for-food distribution list. We have confirmed, I believe, today with the Sanctions Committee Secretariat that the contract was approved without objection. So this is just another example of Iraq's attempt to simply fabricate stories and manipulate the sanctions regime for its own political purposes.

QUESTION: Two points on that - one, I mean, you sort of lay all of the blame at the feet of Iraq for any delays. And yet, when the Secretary was on her trip concerning the - when the crisis with Iraq was brewing, she agreed to look into ways in which to accelerate, expedite the processing of these applications; and in agreeing to do that, seemed to acknowledge that things could - not seemed to acknowledge, but she did acknowledge that things could be done better.

So it seems to me that even the US side has already acknowledged that there is something to be done procedurally to expedite this process.

MR. FOLEY: We have agreed with Secretary General Koffi Annan in this respect. We are really following his lead. We agreed with him when he noted that the program - the oil-for-food program itself - is unprecedented.

Any program that attempts to coordinate the use of nearly $4 billion a year in humanitarian aid is by definition unprecedented and exceptionally complex. We believe that the UN, through its various agencies and the Sanctions Committee, has done an extraordinary job under extremely difficult circumstances.

At our insistence, the Sanctions Committee has worked to streamline its procedures so that contract applications can be reviewed and approved as quickly as possible. In his own report on November 28, the Secretary General welcomed what he called the considerable improvements made in the approval process since the program was renewed in June.

That said, though, Carol, you're right that we're expecting a further report from the Secretary General in early 1998, making specific recommendations on how the oil-for-food program could be improved. We look forward to his recommendations and would be prepared to act immediately to improve delivery of food and medicine to the Iraqi people.

I understand your point. I would simply say that while we believe the blame is 100 percent on Saddam Hussein's shoulders for denying food and medicine and humanitarian assistance to his own people, that we are willing to redouble our efforts and to do everything possible to ensure, in spite of his own obstruction and exploitation of this issue, to make sure that the program is improved where it needs to be improved so that, indeed, food and medicine can reach needed recipients in Iraq; and also, frankly, so that this hypocritical argument can no longer be used by Saddam Hussein.

QUESTION: All right, and one other question. You accuse Iraq of reducing its normal expenditures on essential food items.

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: And all I heard you say was, well, look at the palaces, which is an argument the United States has often used. I mean, do you have any other evidence to prove your assertion that he, in fact, has reduced expenditures on essential food items? Besides the --

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'd have to refer you to the UN itself, which has people on the ground and is monitoring the food situation in Iraq. I think we have anecdotal evidence. The palaces are certainly the most obvious example since the Iraqi authorities have themselves given so much attention to it.

But I believe that it's clear that the food distribution itself, on the part of the Iraqi authorities, has been degraded, has been reduced over the years. Without getting into what we know and how we know it, it's clear that Saddam Hussein has continued to plow resources into areas that have nothing to do with meeting the humanitarian needs of his own people.