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20 November 1997

TRANSCRIPT: BERGER BRIEFING ON IRAQ/GENEVA TALKS NOVEMBER 20

(The proof will be in Iraq's actions on the inspectors) (3010)
Washington -- National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told White House
correspondents November 20 that although Iraq "has indicated that it
will allow UNSCOM to return" to Iraq, "from our perspective, the proof
of that will be in its actions.
"We will watch the situation very carefully," Berger said. "We hope
that that is in fact what is permitted to take place, but we will
judge it by what happens."
The NSC Advisor said that "We will continue to insist that UNSCOM
operate on an autonomous, professional basis, be permitted to do its
work in a professional way, and we will continue to retain all options
as we continue to move forward through this situation."
On the "bilateral understanding that is referred to in the communique
that was issued by Russia and by Iraq: That is an understanding
between Russia and Iraq; it is not binding on us or on the U.N. It is
not something that we are obligated to, in any respect, or is the U.N.
So, in short, we will continue in a very steady way over the days
ahead to pursue the strategy that the President outlined from the
beginning, which is to pursue diplomacy for the objective of full
compliance backed by strength."
Following is the White House transcript:
(begin transcript)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
November 20, 1997
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER
The Briefing Room
BERGER: Let me say a few things about where we seem to be this morning
with respect to the situation in Iraq. As you know, last evening in
Geneva, the P-5, which consists of China, Russia, the United States,
France, and Great Britain, reaffirmed very strongly the imperative
that UNSCOM must be permitted to return to Iraq with the previous
composition, pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1137, which
is the resolution which rejected Saddam Hussein's actions and demanded
that the UNSCOM be permitted to go back in unfettered.
The P-5 also reaffirmed that Saddam must comply with all U.N. Security
Council resolutions. This is a very strong expression of the
solidarity of the international community and its will with respect to
resolving this situation on the basis of full compliance.
Iraq since has indicated that it will allow UNSCOM to return. From our
perspective, the proof of that will be in its actions. We will watch
the situation very carefully. We hope that that is in fact what is
permitted to take place, but we will judge it by what happens.
We will continue to insist that UNSCOM operate on an autonomous,
professional basis, be permitted to do its work in a professional way,
and we will continue to retain all options as we continue to move
forward through this situation.
Let me say a word about the bilateral understanding that is referred
to in the communique that was issued by Russia and by Iraq. That is an
understanding between Russia and Iraq; it is not binding on us or on
the U.N. It is not something that we are obligated to, in any respect,
or is the U.N. So, in short, we will continue in a very steady way
over the days ahead to pursue the strategy that the President outlined
from the beginning, which is to pursue diplomacy for the objective of
full compliance backed by strength.
Let me end the statement there and take your questions.
Q:  Will the U2 flights be suspended, as Iraq says they will?
BERGER:  We have every expectation the U2 will continue to fly.
Q:  As previously arranged?
BERGER:  As Chairman Butler determines, on a periodic basis.
Q: Sandy, if the Russians do bring a proposal for easing the sanctions
to the Security Council, how would the United States react to that?
BERGER: Our position on easing the sanctions is unchanged. Let me say
-- put it in two respects: Number one, his decision, if that's what's
happened, to return -- to allow UNSCOM to return must be
unconditional. That's certainly what the statement of the 5 says and
it is our deep commitment. There are no conditions on his returning
those -
With respect to sanctions, our position is unchanged. It has been a
consistent position since the Bush administration, which is that we
need to see compliance with all relevant resolutions in order to
consider the question of sanctions relief.
Q: And if I could follow up on that, if the Russians propose something
short of that, would we veto it?
BERGER: We would not support anything short of that. If we had to veto
it, obviously we would.
Q: Sandy, appearances account for a lot here, and if tomorrow after
Butler makes his recommendations one of those recommendations is for
recomposition of the UNSCOM team and the U.S. supports that, the
appearance is going to be that this was part of an understanding that
Saddam, the Russians and the United States had going on.
BERGER: There is absolutely no understanding, there is no deal, there
are no concessions. UNSCOM will meet tomorrow and UNSCOM meets -- this
is the actual commission, not the inspectors -- about every six
months. These are professionals. They're largely sort of arms control
wonks -- and I don't mean that disrespectfully -- who come from around
the world. They're people who believe deeply in UNSCOM's mission. They
are not generally political or foreign ministry people. They're
technical people. And they periodically look at the effectiveness of
UNSCOM.
The most important thing that could be done to make UNSCOM more
effective would be for Saddam Hussein to be more cooperative with it.
They will make recommendations to Chairman Butler. Chairman Butler has
demonstrated himself to be, I think, a man of impeccable integrity who
is also deeply committed to the mission of UNSCOM, which is to detect
and prevent -- detect weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq and
prevent them from being reconstituted.
Now, he will make those judgments. If we felt those judgments were
being politicized, or we were being excluded in any way, these have to
be approved by the Security Council and that's the reason why that
sentence is in the communique of last night of the 5 so that we
obviously would veto anything that we thought was being done for
reasons other than the efficient, effective operation of UNSCOM. And I
believe, again, that through this crisis and before, UNSCOM and its
leadership have proven to be professionals.
Q: If anything happens tomorrow in the United Nations with Security
Council, and implicitly, U.S. approval, that favors Iraq, how is it
going to look like anything more than a coincidence?
BERGER: Well, if UNSCOM goes back in, it's got to be able to do its
work and it's got to be able to do it professionally. These teams, as
I've explained to you before, as I said before, are made up of experts
-- people who have expertise in nonproliferation, expertise in
chemical weapons, expertise in biological weapons. The United States
happens to have a good deal of that expertise. And we have every
expectation that the United States will continue to be a significant
contributor to the UNSCOM teams.
But there are certainly no concessions, no deals that have been made
here with respect to either the U.N. or the United States. And I might
note that Tariq Aziz has said that in the last few hours. He said that
the Security Council permanent members made no specific commitments to
Iraq in a Russia-brokered deal. Tariq Aziz, however, said Russia
promised to work for a just and fair solution. So even the Iraqis are
not claiming that these commitments are binding upon the Security
Council or its members.
Q: Over the previous 24 hours, numerous administration people were
making it very clear that they were very skeptical that anything would
come out of the Primakov mission and that they were at least somewhat
wary of what his motives were in this and somewhat suspicious of what
he might come back with. What changed?
BERGER: Well, first of all, I think skepticism is not a bad way to
proceed through a matter like this. I stand before you today, even
after last night, not saying that this is over, because it will not be
over, in our judgment, until these people are let back in and we see
that they're able to do their job.
I think that it's very difficult to speculate on why Saddam Hussein
may be doing something. One can speculate that the commitment by the
Russians to press in the U.N. for sanctions relief and for whatever
else provided him some face-saving mechanism here. But I think that
Mr. Primakov has been very clear that he spoke for no one else, sought
to commit no one else, and I think probably we'll see -- it may have
probably played a constructive role here.
Q: Will Saddam Hussein have to pay any price for defying the U.N. for
20 days?
BERGER: Yes, I would say the answer to that is that he does pay a
price that's probably unattractive. Number one, he's done a very good
job of reuniting the international community around the proposition
that we ought to continue vigorous effort to get at his weapons of
mass destruction. Number two, he has set back the date by which, in my
judgment, one can imagine UNSCOM completing its work, because to the
extent there has been disruption, I think Chairman Butler has
indicated that he's going to have to reestablish a continuity of
record here, and it may be that in some instances he has to go back
before he goes forward.
So I think -- and I would say, number three, that the international
community is far more focused today on the threat that Saddam Hussein
poses by his weapons of mass destruction program than they were two
weeks ago. We've been talking a lot in the last week about UNSCOM --
not exactly a household name around the world -- what they do, what
his capacities are, and to the extent that he may have lulled the
world into a false sense that he was less of a threat after -- six
years after the Gulf War, I think he's provided us an opportunity to
remind the world that he remains a threat. And the last thing I would
say is, the most pervasive sanctions regime in the history of mankind
which has been imposed on him since the Gulf War remains intact. I
have a hard time computing that as anything except a setback for him.
Q: How much potential damage over these past 20 days do you think
there was in the effort to destroy the weapons of mass destruction
capabilities? What would happen, in your assessment, over these past
three weeks, potentially that could have set back the process?
BERGER: It's really a technical question and I don't know exactly the
answer. First of all, let's -- I think all along here, we have been
and continue to be, as the President was this morning, quite cautious
about all of this. This is not over. We have to maintain the
two-pronged strategy we've been pursuing -- the diplomatic effort to
resolve this on a peaceful and principled basis, backed by a strong
military presence in the region to keep our options open. But I think
that's -- I'm sorry, Wolf, I lost the train of your question.
Q:  How much damage potentially -- what could he have done?
BERGER: I think that he clearly has -- we know that he has moved some
things. We know that he has obstructed some of the monitoring devices.
I don't think we'll know that until UNSCOM is allowed to go back in,
if they are, and make that technical judgment. But I think we also
said, and I've also said all along here, that he can't reconstitute in
a matter of a few weeks what UNSCOM has been successful in destroying
over the last six months. And I think we've -- six years -- and I
think we always understood that there was obviously some loss as each
day goes by.
Q: The United States has spent large amounts of money in the last two
years maintaining a military presence in the Persian Gulf. Right now,
with the new addition of planes, troops, equipment, ships, more money
will be spent. I imagine Great Britain is backing you. Are you getting
any promises of backing in the military sense if they were needed, and
are you getting all your clearances in the Arab countries which would
have to give you free passes to your planes, et cetera?
BERGER: Well, again, I don't want to speculate on military options,
certainly, the operational details of military options, that the
President has held open. I would say this -- that we are I think quite
confident that we not only have the capability in the region, but we
have the other capacity in the region to do what we might have to do
in any kind of more difficult situation. And I think the Pentagon
later today will have some statements about some further planes that
are being deployed.
Q: You seem to be suggesting that for whatever reason Saddam blinked.
Is the administration absolutely confident that he got nothing else
from the discussions with Primakov? And if the administration isn't
absolutely confident of that, have you sought those assurances from
the Russian government?
BERGER: Am I absolutely certain that he's gotten no commitments from
the United States, no commitments from the other Security Council
members? What Minister Primakov has indicated is that they will argue
on behalf of the Iraqis that sanctions should be lifted more quickly.
But Russia has taken that position for some time, so it's not a new
position. But there's nothing here that's self-executing in terms of a
Russia and Iraq arrangement or a Russia-Iraq understanding. It has to
be approved by the Security Council; we are a member of the Security
Council; we have a veto on the Security Council and we will not
support anything that violates our fundamental red lines that we've
talked about all along -- UNSCOM being permitted to do its work and to
do it in a professional, unfettered capacity.
Q: Just two quick questions, Sandy. First off, if Saddam succeeded in
getting the Russians to argue more for -- in the Security Council for
lifting the sanctions, why -- not immediately, but over the next few
months -- why isn't that a gain for him? Why doesn't that get -- cross
purposes?
BERGER: Because the Russians -- first of all, I wouldn't quite
characterize it the way you did, John. I think they've -- this is a
way in perhaps they've tried to help resolve this matter. They have
been -- they have taken this position in the past. It's not supported
by the United States, not supported by Great Britain, it's not
supported by the vast majority of Security Council members. And I
think as a result of the last two weeks, there is a far higher degree
of concern in the world, in the capitals, in the streets of these
countries about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction
capability than there was three weeks ago when people sort of forgot
Saddam Hussein and thought that he had taken a vacation.
Q: A second question. Do you anticipate an expansion in the oil for
food program if he comes into full compliance?
BERGER: Our position is the same as it has always been on this, which
is our dispute is not with the Iraqi people, it is with their
government. We do not seek through these very tight sanctions or very
strong sanctions to hurt the Iraqi people. We are the author of the
resolution which provided for the sale of some oil under U.N.
supervision to be distributed for U.N. supervision for food and
medicine.
There have been some indications that that is not happening at
adequate levels, and we would not be opposed at some point to seeing
that expanded. But that was our position before this, during this,
after this, and it's not at all -- let me say, that never even came up
last night in the meeting in Geneva.
MCCURRY:  This has got to be the last question.
Q: Sandy, are you concerned that Russia can now use its veto in the
Security Council as an advocate for Iraq, and does that complicate any
further pressure you might hope to bring on Iraq?
BERGER: It's hard to make something happen by veto. You can stop
something bad from happening by veto. You can't force something to
happen by veto. They've always had a veto in the Security Council;
they had a veto in the Security Council on Monday and they have a veto
in the Security Council on Thursday. And they -- in fairness here, the
Russians have signed on to the proposition that UNSCOM must go back in
its previous form without interference. And so I can't -- it will be
inconsistent with that for them to take a different position in the
Security Council. To the extent that they have a different view than
we do on sanctions, that has to pass by an affirmative vote, and if
any Security Council wanted to veto a change in the current sanctions,
i.e., us, we could do so.
Q: One last question. Do you applaud the Russian role in all this? The
French are praising the Russians for this triumphant return to the
diplomatic stage in the Middle East. Is that a view that the United
States shares?
BERGER: Again, I think we need to see how all of this -- I'd rather
read the last chapter of this book before I decide whether I like it
or not.
Q:  Good ending.
THE PRESS:  Thank you.
(end transcript)