U.S. Department of State
Off-camera
Daily Press Briefing
INDEX
Monday, November 17, 1997
Briefer: Lee McClenny
|
IRAQ |
|
|
2-3, 9-10 |
Composition of inspection teams; US position; potential new UNSCOM arrangements |
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3, 5, 8 |
Oil-for-food deal; US support of Butler pulling inspectors from Iraq |
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4-6, 12 |
Diplomatic initiatives, potential deadlines; Iraqi compliance; US response |
|
5-6, 8 |
Secretary's efforts; possible military action; US use of Gulf countries' facilities |
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6 |
Primakov's diplomatic activities; US expectations; US view of latest Iraqi statements |
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7-8 |
Supposed US change in approach, concessions, progress |
|
8-9 |
Potential anthrax use; meetings in Washington, DC |
|
9-12, 20 |
Timeline for inspectors jobs; expertise of team; US view of Iraqi complaints; suffering of Iraqi people; future removal of sanctions; Update on recent Kurdish dialogue |
|
TURKEY |
|
|
18 |
Potential use of Incerlik airport re attack on Iraq |
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFF-CAMERA PRESS BRIEFING
Briefer: Lee McClenny
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1997 1:15 P.M.
MR. MCCLENNY: It's 12:30 p.m. somewhere in the world, right? I apologize. That's a good place to start.
QUESTION: Just not here, right?
MR. MCCLENNY: Just not here. My apologies. I hope you'll bear with me. This is more difficult than it probably seems. There was a lot of stuff to go over. And goodness knows, I didn't want to come out unprepared. I have anyway; but I didn't want to.
................
QUESTION: The reports out of Iraq this morning are that the Iraqis are prepared to consider a composition of the inspection teams, based on Security Council membership. The US position, I believe, is that the team should go back as they are. Given that everybody wants a diplomatic solution, or says they do, is there any flexibility in the US position?
MR. MCCLENNY: It's the US position, and it's the position of all the members of the Security Council, to my understanding, that the first step is for Saddam Hussein to comply with the provisions of the various Security Council resolutions. That's step one.
It might be possible to talk about some new arrangements after that. But the first step is compliance with UNSCOM's requirements. Let's start with that, and we'll go from there.
QUESTION: New arrangements on the composition of UNSCOM?
MR. MCCLENNY: Conceivably. We've not ruled anything in or ruled anything out, quite frankly. It is not, however, for Iraq to dictate to the Security Council the membership of its team. The team was picked by the Security Council, and Iraq, the last time I looked, was not a member of the Security Council.
QUESTION: You're saying now that the US is open to compromise --
MR. MCCLENNY: No, what I said is that Iraq has to comply first, and we can talk about things later if they like. But compliance has to come first.
QUESTION: Well, word from the Secretary's aircraft is there's been some discussion of liberalizing the oil-for-food deal.
MR. MCCLENNY: I've seen a wire service story reporting that.
QUESTION: So now there's two incentives for Iraq to comply? You're willing to discuss changing the composition of the inspectors and to let them get more money to the oil-for-food deal. Sounds like a negotiation to me.
MR. MCCLENNY: Well, we've indicated for a long time - days and days - that we have actively been pursuing a peaceful and diplomatic solution to this. Without in any way accepting the premise of your question, which was attempting, I think, to put some words in my mouth that I didn't say in any case, we have pursued and wish to pursue a peaceful diplomatic resolution of this problem.
However, the first step has to be compliance with the UNSCOM regulations. The inspectors have to go back in, and we have to get going on that again. I don't want to - we're not drawing a line in the sand; we're not trying to create unreasonable expectations. But Iraq agreed to these conditions sometime ago. It's been their activity, their behavior over a long period of time which created this crisis. We're trying to resolve it without resorting to something other than diplomacy.
QUESTION: Lee, would you happen to know if UNSCOM were reshaped to be in line with the five permanent members of the Security Council, how will that change the current composition?
MR. MCCLENNY: I don't have a read-out. You'd have to ask UNSCOM to give you some sort of a read-out.
QUESTION: There are only six Americans now. I mean, how --
MR. MCCLENNY: I don't know what the numbers are, Carol, I'm sorry. I think it's not a subject that I have anything to deal with.
QUESTION: Does the United States Government either recommend or, more importantly, approve the pulling of all of the UNSCOM inspectors out of Iraq, question one. Second question, is that because of security reasons - they're being held as hostages or being around weapon sites that might be hit? Is that for their safety that they've been moved?
MR. MCCLENNY: The answer to both questions is really the same. That was a decision made by Chairman Butler of the UNSCOM, not by the United States.
QUESTION: But do we approve of what Chairman Butler did?
MR. MCCLENNY: We support Chairman Butler fully, just as all the other members of the Security Council did.
QUESTION: The United States over the weekend, and over the course of the last few days, has talked a lot about the diplomatic pressures that you're putting on Iraq to follow through with the sanctions. You want to try to work this out diplomatically; you want to exhaust these channels of diplomatic sort of pressure, if you will.
MR. MCCLENNY: We hope not to exhaust them, actually.
QUESTION: But nevertheless, is it - are we assuming that you're going to work the diplomatic chains indefinitely? I mean, is there any kind of time you're going to put on this, or are you just going to let this extend to another two weeks?
MR. MCCLENNY: No, there's no particular time deadline one way or the other. We're not allowing ourselves to be dictated artificially when we'll come to a solution of all of this. I think those of you who watched the weekend programs saw a number of Administration officials out there. They were all very clear about all of these questions. It's our much preferred course to resolve this matter quickly, peacefully and multilaterally.
We're working hard on the diplomatic track right now to do everything we possibly can to ensure that we follow up every possible lead, that we go all the right places. We want to do this as carefully as possible. We're serious; we're persistent in this regard. We would prefer not to resort to force, but we're not ruling anything out. If it becomes necessary, then that's something we'll have to deal with at that time.
QUESTION: Lee, just to clarify, you're saying, then, that if Iraq complies, then the US is willing to consider changing the composition of the inspectors --
MR. MCCLENNY: No, I didn't say that.
QUESTION: You didn't say that?
MR. MCCLENNY: I did not say that.
QUESTION: Okay, well you said anything - you said words to the effect that it might be possible to talk about some new arrangements after that.
MR. MCCLENNY: Might be possible - that's a double qualifier, I think. But we're pursuing a lot of diplomatic initiatives, and I'm not going to get into what the details might be. That's something that's being worked at a number of levels, and talking about it publicly is not going to help it at this point.
QUESTION: Okay, well, others are talking privately --
MR. MCCLENNY: Well, I'm not, not from this podium.
QUESTION: Others are talking on background. You're saying, then, that there are - things are possible if they comply. There's other --
MR. MCCLENNY: And as we've said from here before, the first step is to come into compliance with UNSCOM, and then we can talk about things. We're always willing to talk about things. Whether we will come to some sort of arrangement afterwards or not, I really don't know. That's something to be dealt with at that point in time.
We're willing to look at things if there are legitimate complaints of one sort or the other. But dictating to the Security Council is no good.
QUESTION: So then can you confirm this, as you call it, wire service report that the US is considering increasing the amount of - or tampering with the oil-for-food sale?
MR. MCCLENNY: Not from this podium, not on the record. I'm not comfortable talking about our diplomatic efforts in any detail at all; other than to assure you that we're working hard on all fronts with our friends and our allies, those who have special relations --
QUESTION: Do you --
MR. MCCLENNY: Let me finish, please. Those who have a special relationship with Iraq and those who don't. There is a wire service story, I've seen it. I can't confirm or deny its contents one way or the other.
QUESTION: You can't deny it, either?
MR. MCCLENNY: It has a certain ring of plausibility to it, yes, How's that?
QUESTION: It has a certain ring of plausibility?
QUESTION: -- the result of the opposition the Secretary faced with the Gulf allies over military action?
MR. MCCLENNY: You're asking me to get into areas that don't - that I really don't feel comfortable talking about; on top of which, there's a premise to your question which I don't accept. We're working the diplomatic track right now; we're not working the military track.
QUESTION: Which is the premise you don't accept?
MR. MCCLENNY: That we're working a military track before a diplomatic one, which I think was the premise of the question.
QUESTION: So the Secretary was not seeking approval from the Gulf allies for military action? She wasn't asking Saudi Arabia to let them use their base for military action?
MR. MCCLENNY: What we were asking for was trying to find a solution, a way to get out; trying to build a consensus among all the parties involved; and reminding some of the front-line nations in that region about the special threats that Iraq poses to them, and the threats that they face from Iraq.
As I've indicated now, at least a couple of times, Sid, I'm not going to talk about what the conversations were expressly about. We're working diplomacy first. If it comes to military stuff, we'll do that later.
QUESTION: Does the US have permission, standing or otherwise, to use facilities in Gulf countries for --
MR. MCCLENNY: I don't honestly know whether we have permission from the nations in the region for those kinds of things. But it's a hypothetical question, and we haven't come to that bridge yet.
QUESTION: Can you characterize Foreign Minister Primakov's diplomatic activity these days?
MR. MCCLENNY: I can't.
QUESTION: And say what your hopes and expectations might be for that particular initiative?
MR. MCCLENNY: I can't characterize it any way, one way or the other. We do think that those nations that have a special relationship or a special communications channel or special ties of one sort or the other with Iraq bear a special responsibility for impressing upon Iraq the seriousness with which the international community views this present crisis. But I don't know about his specific movements or what specifically he's working on. It would really fall to him to characterize his activities.
I'll repeat, I'm not going to get into details of diplomacy, one way or the other. I mean, it's a plant that flourishes not in bright light at this point. We can talk about it after the fact.
QUESTION: Would you characterize the latest statements from Iraq as a little bit more encouraging, perhaps, opening the door a little bit wider to possible diplomatic solution? And also, when you were saying Iraq has to be in full compliance, would they just have to agree to be in full compliance, or would they have to actually take steps to be in full compliance?
MR. MCCLENNY: No, I think they'd have to be in full compliance. But really the answer to your question is - the answer to both questions would be contained in the first question, the first answer, excuse me, which would be - it's flown out of my head. Repeat your first question for me; I had a good answer for you.
QUESTION: Do the latest statements from Iraq - is that at all slightly more encouraging?
MR. MCCLENNY: Yes, thank you. No, I don't think so, frankly. It's still a case of Iraq attempting to dictate to the Security Council. That's not encouraging at all. That's been the problem from the beginning.
QUESTION: Lee, why has the US changed its approach towards this?
MR. MCCLENNY: How have we changed our approach?
QUESTION: By offering concessions.
MR. MCCLENNY: That's your assessment. We've been down this path. I'm not going to talk about diplomacy and what's going on in diplomacy - whether we've offered or haven't offered. I'm just not going to go there, Sid.
QUESTION: Well, it falls to you today, as the only person around here speaking publicly, to explain what's going on --
MR. MCCLENNY: To the extent that I'm capable of so doing. And to the extent that it will advance our diplomatic efforts, I'm happy to do so.
QUESTION: Well, this government apparently has made a major change in its policy towards this crisis. There's loads of people talking on background, but now it falls to you to explain why the United States has changed - why the President of the United States has changed his approach, or is the Secretary sort of flying by the seat of her pants out there?
MR. MCCLENNY: Where do I begin, Sid?
QUESTION: Why is the US - where you begin is why the US has changed its approach towards this stand-off.
MR. MCCLENNY: Well, I don't know that we've changed our approach. I don't see it that way, frankly, Sid.
I have not confirmed for you in any way that there's been any change in our approaches. I don't think you know what our approach was a week ago or ten days ago, particularly. There may be people out there backgrounding, but from this podium, on the record, I don't have any new initiatives to announce for you. I don't have any new initiatives to confirm or to qualify or to categorize or describe in any way.
We are working hard - we've assured you many times from this podium and from other places on a diplomatic track - on a diplomatic track to find a peaceful resolution to this problem; one that will meet the basic requirements of everyone, which are putting Saddam Hussein and company back in compliance with UNSCOM regulations, and getting to work on dealing with the real problem, which is the destruction and dismantlement of his program of weapons of mass destruction.
In terms of details, in terms of inside baseball stories of diplomacy, I don't have anything for you.
QUESTION: Well, are you then saying that it was the United States' intention all along to change the oil-for-food deal and to consider --
MR. MCCLENNY: I'm saying it's been our intention all along to dismantle his weapons of mass destruction program. That's where we're going; that's what we're trying to get.
QUESTION: And this is --
MR. MCCLENNY: Beyond that, I'm not going to confirm details.
QUESTION: This was a tactic you all have had in your back pocket all along?
MR. MCCLENNY: Beyond that, I'm not going to confirm details, Sid.
QUESTION: Lee, have you - has the diplomatic --
QUESTION: Twice you've --
QUESTION: Has the diplomatic venue yielded any progress? I mean, can you --
MR. MCCLENNY: Well, I think the Secretary's comments from the Gulf suggested that she feels cautiously optimistic and heartened by her contact with our various allies.
We're having contacts obviously here in Washington and in some other capitals. In general, we're optimistic about getting where we want to get in the end.
There is a broad consensus that Iraq has behaved abysmally; that it's not in compliance; that it has to get back in compliance. And that's where we're starting to work from.
QUESTION: Is there a reality behind the fear that Saddam is taking advantage of the inspectors being gone to produce more anthrax or nerve gas or whatever? And is this driving this whole situation to a crisis that might require military intervention?
MR. MCCLENNY: Well, I'm not an expert in biochemical weapons or weapons production or whatever. I think it's safe to say - and indeed, I think some other spokesmen more senior than I, for the Administration, have made it clear that what's been destroyed or dismantled by UNSCOM over six-plus years can't be rebuilt immediately.
Now, I've seen some statements by people more knowledgeable than I that certain periods of time might be required to build certain kinds of capabilities. I don't' know what those deadlines honestly might be; don't know what the facts are one way or the other. We're aware, though, the competent experts in the Administration are aware of what kinds of parameters we're working within. Those are the sorts of real deadlines - not artificial deadlines - that we're working against. Beyond that, I really can't get into it.
QUESTION: Lee, you mentioned that things are going on here in Washington. Can you talk to us about that? Are they in this building? Who's involved?
MR. MCCLENNY: Certainly in this building and outside this building. There have been public references to the President's phone calls and conversations. I think there have been veiled references to various people inside this building. But I couldn't identify those people, and it wouldn't serve any particular purpose, frankly, to talk about it. We're working aggressively on it.
QUESTION: The spokesman is often asked the same question on various issues, and we're often - not always, but sometimes - told that the Secretary or whoever has been in touch with x, y and z. There's nobody - you can't --
MR. MCCLENNY: I had, unfortunately, a brief conversation with the traveling party - two, actually, earlier today; but both of them very brief. We didn't get into details of who she'd talked to one way or the other. There was a broad agreement that I wouldn't talk about - and indeed, I won't talk about the details of it.
I think if you look at some of the people who were on Sunday public affairs talk shows, you'll see some of the principal players here in Washington, certainly; with the exception of the President, below that level.
QUESTION: If what's been destroyed by the inspectors can be rebuilt immediately, then when will the inspectors' job ever be done? And two, is there enough expertise - can the number of Americans on the inspection team be reduced without getting rid of the expertise needed to carry out the inspection regime?
MR. MCCLENNY: Both are questions that are excellent and very interesting questions, but really need to be referred to someone who is technically and militarily, if you will, competent. I don't have answers for them. UNSCOM might be able to help you with them, though.
QUESTION: You said a moment ago that once Iraq is back in compliance with UNSCOM, you were willing to talk about things; we're willing to listen to legitimate complaints, I think, were your words. Do you consider Iraq's complaints about the composition of the inspection teams to be legitimate complaints?
MR. MCCLENNY: No.
QUESTION: So you're not willing to talk about that.
MR. MCCLENNY: We could discuss all sorts of things, and I don't know what we're going to talk about if and when Iraq gets back in compliance; and let's hope that they do get back in compliance.
I mean, I appreciate your desire to know more about what we would or wouldn't accept, but those are our diplomatic secrets that have to be kept secret until we're ready to deal with them one way or the other. I'm just not in a position to talk about it publicly.
QUESTION: A follow-up to my question is --
MR. MCCLENNY: Generically, we're ready to talk, broadly, about what might be done to make things more acceptable to Iraq or to other partners. If there's some room for compromise there, without any way compromising the basic mission - which is destroying the weapons of mass destruction - then why wouldn't we be willing to talk about it? Logic tells you that would be the situation.
QUESTION: So you're not ruling out discussions? Once they're back in compliance, you're not ruling out discussions?
MR. MCCLENNY: That's the first step - get back in compliance.
QUESTION: You're not ruling out discussions about --
MR. MCCLENNY: No.
QUESTION: Okay, thank you.
QUESTION: What are legitimate complaints?
MR. MCCLENNY: Legitimate complaints would be complaints that are legitimate, Sid. Beyond that, I don't think it's helpful to me as a diplomat to give you a legalistic definition.
QUESTION: No, I mean, you said it, Lee. You referred to legitimate complaints. What are legitimate complaints that Iraq has? I mean, you raised it.
MR. MCCLENNY: I didn't say Iraq had legitimate complaints. I said we would hypothetically be willing to listen to legitimate complaints. We're probably willing to listen to illegitimate complaints as well, but we're not going to do anything about them.
QUESTION: Does Iraq have legitimate complaints, in your --
MR. MCCLENNY: Not that I've seen so far, no. Composition of the team, if that's what you're referring to, no; allegations that we're somehow behaving specially towards them, no, clearly not. Our goal through UNSCOM, as a member of the Security Council, has been to dismantle their program of weapons of mass destruction, period.
This other stuff is fluff; it's chaff that's been thrown out there to distract people.
QUESTION: What about the impact on the Iraqi people? Is that a legitimate complaint of the sanctions?
MR. MCCLENNY: There are concerns. We are concerned as anybody else about the terrible suffering of the Iraqi people. I would note that we co-sponsored the oil-for-food program. We've helped administer it. It's unfortunately Iraq's Government's fault - Saddam Hussein's and his compatriots' fault that the Iraqi people are suffering as they had.
If they'd never invaded Kuwait to begin with; if they'd never engaged in this kind of bellicose dealing; if they had never backed out of oil-for-food for a period of time; if a lot of things, this situation would be much different. It's Iraq's fault that Iraq is in the situation it's in.
QUESTION: But you do concede the suffering of the Iraqi people would be one legitimate complaint that --
MR. MCCLENNY: I don't know that it's a complaint; it's a fact that the Iraqi people are suffering. It's Saddam Hussein's fault; that's another fact. Is there more that can be done? Perhaps, and we'd be willing to look at it. We have a wide and broad humanitarian impulse within our society, and I think it bothers us that people are suffering.
We've done a lot; we've done a whole bunch - I don't have the figures here in front of me - but a whole bunch to ensure that the suffering is kept as minimal as possible. Ultimately, though, the responsibility for that - the fault for that, if you will - lies with Saddam Hussein, not with the United States.
That's not why Saddam Hussein has tried to curtail the activities of UNSCOM. It has nothing to do with the suffering of the Iraqi people; he doesn't care. He obviously doesn't care. We do, but he doesn't.
Let's do over to this side a little bit. My neck's getting stiff looking that way.
QUESTION: Different subject.
MR. MCCLENNY: Do we have --
QUESTION: Can I just get one final - so does Iraq have any hope of sanctions being removed while Saddam Hussein is still in power?
MR. MCCLENNY: Sure, if they're in full compliance with UNSCOM. If we manage to dismantle their weapons of mass destruction. Absolutely.
The decision of who rules in Iraq is one that needs to be made by the Iraqi people. I'm not going to disingenuously suggest that we think there's democracy there and they have the full right to choose, but we have laws against the assassination or the removal of heads of state, and we're not going to go that route, as near as I can tell.
QUESTION: How do you define Iraq as getting back in compliance? I mean, what are the specific --
MR. MCCLENNY: Well, UNSCOM has to go back in, and they have to stop the oft repeated - again, I'm apologizing for not bringing my notes on this particular area - but their obstruction of, obfuscation of, resistance to UNSCOM inspectors' efforts to get to the bottom of whether they do or whether they don't have what kind of programs for developing weapons of mass destruction.
There are some people who believe that UNSCOM was getting close, and that's why we see the Iraqis precipitating a crisis. I don't, myself, know whether that's the case or not. But I know that we don't know yet the full scope of the effort that the Iraqis were mounting, and we want to get to the bottom of it.
Saddam Hussein with biological, chemical, nuclear or other sorts of weapons poses a serious threat not just to Iraq's neighbors, but to the United States and other peace-loving nations around the world.
......................QUESTION: No, this is Iraq.
MR. MCCLENNY: Okay.
QUESTION: Turkish - the defense ministry and the Turkish general staff, they announced that they don't want to give permission to use attack against Iraq, they decided.
MR. MCCLENNY: Are you talking about Incirlik airport?
QUESTION: Yeah.
MR. MCCLENNY: Sure. Actually, I think I do have something. We have not made a request to use Incirlik Air Base for any prospective military action against Iraq in the context of the current dispute over UNSCOM. Whether we would or would not is a hypothetical question, and I won't deal with a hypothetical at this point.
....................
[end of document]
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