23 October 1997
TEXT: U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1134 ON IRAQ
(Security Council moves toward travel ban on Iraqi officials) (1560) United Nations -- The Security Council October 23 adopted a resolution stating its intention to impose travel restrictions on Iraqi officials if Baghdad continues to obstruct weapons inspections. The resolution, numbered 1134, was adopted by a vote of 10 to It condemned Iraq's refusal to allow U.N. weapons inspectors access to sites, endangering the safety of U.N. personnel, and removal and destruction of documents of interest to U.N. weapons experts. The council asked the U.N. Special Commission overseeing the destruction of Iraqi weapons (UNSCOM) to draw up lists of Iraqi officials and military who interfere with weapons inspections. Those officials will be placed under a travel ban in April if the problems continue. Following is the text of the council's resolution: (Begin text) Chile, Costa Rica, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: resolution #1134 The Security Council, Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, and in particular its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 1060 (1996) of 12 June 1996, and 1115 (1997) of 21 June 1997, Having considered the report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission dated 6 October 1997 (S/1997/774), Expressing grave concern at the report of additional incidents: since the adoption of resolution 1115 (1997) in which access by the Special Commission inspection teams to sites in Iraq designated for inspection by the "Commission was again denied by the Iraqi authorities, Stressing the unacceptability of any attempts by Iraq to deny access to such sites, Taking note of the progress nevertheless achieved by the Special Commission, as set out in the report of the Executive chairman, towards the elimination of Iraq's programme of weapons of mass destruction, Reaffirming its determination to ensure full compliance by Iraq with all its obligations under all previous relevant resolutions and reiterating its demand that Iraq allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission to any site which the Commission wishes to inspect, and in particular allow the Special Commission and its inspection teams to conduct both fixed wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics without interferences of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special Commission, and to make use of their own aircraft and such airfields In Iraq as they may determine are most appropriate for the work of the Commission, UNSCOM is right to insist that Iraq account for these and other components, and to clarify the status of Iraq's indigenous scud manufacturing capability. Until Iraq provides this information, there is no way to determine with any degree of confidence whether Iraq still has the capacity to construct and deploy prohibited missiles. Iraq also wants the Council to believe that it has "cooperated" with UNSCOM with regard to chemical weapons, however, as late as September, Iraq was still lying directly to UNSCOM about its production of vx. Only when presented with absolutely incontrovertible evidence did Iraq "cooperate" by admitting that it had lied in the past. Again, this is too little, too late. Biological weapons? The words of Chairman Butler speak for themselves: "this is an area that is unredeemed by progress or any approximation of the known facts of Iraq's program." Some of my colleagues have tried to draw attention to IAEA Chairman Blix's report on Iraq's nuclear program as an example of Iraqi cooperation. However, even in this area, it is clear that Iraq has not answered all the relevant questions necessary to have a full accounting of its programs -- the books cannot be "closed." Furthermore, we now know (thanks to the efforts of Chairman Blix and his staff) that Iraq lied and concealed an active weaponization program for years in direct defiance of its NPT and IAEA commitments. Iraq has lied about its programs for too long, and too recently, for us to settle for anything less than absolute certainty that Iraq's nuclear ambitions have been completely neutralized. When accounting for nuclear weapons, close is not good enough. If you fail to account for just one nuclear device, that could mean the destruction of an entire city. Baghdad has a clear and simple choice, it can comply with its obligations -- thus opening the way to lifting sanctions -- or it can continue along the path of non-compliance. It cannot do both. At this point, I would like to commend UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butler for the fine work he and his staff have done in the short time he has been in his position. Clearly, Chairman Butler has the courage, stamina, and dedication necessary to perform his extremely difficult job. The international community owes Mr. Butler and his staff their gratitude. UNSCOM and the Council have the right and obligation to hold Iraq strictly accountable for every aspect of all its WMD programs. Iraq cannot pick and choose which questions it wishes to answer. We on the Council must do everything we can to give Ambassador Butler the tools and the support he needs to do his job, as efficiently and thoroughly as possible. This resolution, we believe, helps to accomplish this objective. Recalling that resolution 1315 (1997) expresses the Council's firm intention, unless the Special Commission has advised the Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution, to impose additional measures on those categories of Iraqi officials responsible for the non-compliance, Reiterating the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities, as detailed in the report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, and especially Iraqi actions endangering the safety of Special Commission personnel, the removal and destruction of documents of interest to the Special Commission and interference with the freedom of movement of Special Commission personnel; 2. Decides that such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), ~715 ~(1991) and 1060 (1996), and notes that the Special Commission in the report of the Executive chairman was unable to advise that Iraq was in substantial compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997); 3. Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions, which Constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance; 4. Demands in particular that Iraq without delay allow the Special Commission inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of the Special Commission, as well as to officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom the Special Commission wishes to interview so that the Special Commission may fully discharge its mandate; 5. Requests the Chairman of the Special Commission to include in all future consolidated progress reports prepared under resolution 1051 (1996) an annex evaluating Iraq's compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997); 6. Expresses the firm intention -- if the Special Commission reports that Iraq is not in compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997) or if the Special Commission does not advise the Council in the report of the Executive Chairman due on 11 April 1998 that Iraq is in compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997) -- to adopt measures which would oblige all States to prevent without delay the entry into or transit through their territories of all Iraq~ officials and members of the Iraqi armed forces who are responsible for or participate in instances of non-compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997), provided that the entry of a person into a particular State on a specified date may be authorized by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its own territory to its own nationals or persons carry~ing out bona fide d~iplomatic assignments or missions; 7. Decides further, on the basis of all incidents related to the implementation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997), to begin to designate, in consultation w~ith the Special Commission, individuals whose entry or transit would be prevented upon implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 6 above; 8. Decides not to conduct the reviews provided for in paragraphs 21 and 28 of resolution 687 (1991) until after the next consolidated progress report of the special Commiss~ion, due on 11 April 1998, after which those reviews will resume in accordance wi~th resolution 687 (1991), beginning on 26 April 1998; 9. Reaffirms its full support for the authority of the Spec~ial Commission under its Executive Chairman to ensure the implementation of its mandate under the relevant resolutions of the Council; 10. Decides to remain seized of the matter. (End text)
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