SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 986: WHY THE UNITED NATIONS HAD TO PROVIDE FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE

In the wake of the Gulf conflict, the international community has been obliged to impose sanctions on Iraq in order to prevent Saddam Hussein from rebuilding his offensive military capability. Now that Saddam has agreed to the conditions under which SCR 986 may be implemented, the UN should be able to reduce the suffering of the Iraqi people by getting greater amounts of humanitarian relief through to them. But no fundamental change seems likely in the underlying human rights situation.

Popularly known as the 'oil for food' agreement, UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986 was unanimously adopted in April 1995. The Resolution is only now coming into effect because of Iraq's earlier unwillingness to agree to the conditions for its implementation. Under the Resolution, Iraq is permitted to export a significant quantity of oil, most of the proceeds of which are to be used to pay for imports of food, medicine, health supplies and materials for essential civilian needs. The first consignments began arriving in Iraq during March 1997.

What the Resolution is

The suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of the policies of Saddam Hussein has been a cause for international concern ever since the end of the Gulf conflict. The measures designed to alleviate the situation, enshrined in SCR 986, have evolved from earlier humanitarian proposals which were put forward under SCRs 706 and 712 but which were rejected by Saddam. His reason was probably the mistaken belief that, in prolonging the suffering, he could mobilise popular opinion against the UN, and hasten the lifting of sanctions without having to satisfy the UN requirements which had led to their imposition.

Under the Resolution, Iraq is permitted to export up to $1,000 million worth of oil every 90 days, the larger part of it through the Kirkuk - Yumurtalik pipeline to Turkey, and the remainder via the Gulf. Thirty per cent of the proceeds is allocated to the UN Compensation Commission. The rest is paid into a UN escrow account and is available for the purchase of humanitarian relief supplies. The goods are to be distributed equitably throughout the country under strict UN monitoring. The international community insisted on such safeguards to ensure that the scheme would benefit the Iraqi people, not the regime, which has misused Iraq's scarce resources in the past.

How the Resolution will work

There is clear evidence that the regime is diverting existing resources, which could be spent on humanitarian aid, to military procurement, grandiose building projects and other purposes that are of no direct benefit to the people. Saddam's priorities appear to be to keep himself in power and to rebuild his armed forces for continued internal repression and for fresh foreign adventures, as indicated by the threatening military manoeuvres on which he embarks from time to time. Thus, because Saddam cannot be trusted, the conditions under which SCR 986 will be implemented are strict, in order to prevent the regime from misappropriating the benefits intended for the people. The main conditions are that:

oil revenues are to be paid into a UN escrow account, to be audited by external, independent public auditors;
the approval of the UN Sanctions Committee will be required for all payments from the escrow account, for all imports under the Resolution and for all contracts entered into for oil exports;
the UN will monitor both the arrival in Iraq of goods purchased under the Resolution and their equitable distribution;
distribution in areas of Iraq directly controlled by Baghdad will be undertaken by the Iraqi authorities, but equitable distribution must be 'effectively guaranteed' under a plan approved by the UN Secretary-General;
distribution in the three northern governorates will be undertaken by the UN;
and the agreement will be subject to review after 90 and 180 days.

What the Resolution is not

Throughout the negotiations leading to the conclusion of SCR 986, the Iraqi authorities have attempted to portray the Resolution as the first step in a general relaxation of sanctions. It is not. It is a purely humanitarian initiative designed to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people, which is due to Saddam's refusal to comply with Iraq's obligations under the relevant SCRs.

Continuing need for sanctions

SCR 687, of April 1991, imposed a number of obligations on Iraq, including:

that Iraq (and Kuwait) respect the inviolability of the international boundary agreed between them in 1963;
that Iraq accept unconditionally the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km;
that Iraq submit full details of locations, amounts and types of weaponry, and undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the future;
that Iraq submit to immediate on-site inspections of weapon-making facilities;
that Iraq return all Kuwaiti property seized during her illegal invasion of Kuwait;
that Iraq compensate those who suffered loss or injury as a result of the invasion;
that Iraq agree not to commit or support any act of international terrorism;
and that Iraq repatriate all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains to their country of origin.

SCR 688, also of April 1991, meanwhile reflects grave international concern at humanitarian abuse and repression within Iraq.

Saddam persists in avoiding implementing these requirements. The sanctions imposed by the international community are intended to exert the maximum pressure on Saddam's regime to do so, while minimising the impact on the country's people. The UN Sanctions Committee regularly reviews the need for sanctions to continue and has concluded that they must do so until Iraq complies fully with her obligations under the SCRs.

Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

In addition to imposing a requirement on Iraq concerning the destruction of her offensive weaponry, SCR 687 established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), whose remit is to oversee the dismantling of Iraq's WMD and, by means of a monitoring programme, to see that it is never rebuilt. From the early days of UNSCOM's mandate, Iraq has given grudging cooperation at best, and has shown outright hostility during periods of heightened tension. The UN inspectors' unequivocal right of unannounced access to military and industrial sites has been regularly obstructed, challenged and delayed in a series of 'cheat and retreat' measures by the Iraqi authorities. Inspectors have been harassed and threatened, and the head and deputy head of UNSCOM have been the subjects of an officially-inspired campaign of denigration.

UNSCOM has nevertheless succeeded in destroying, removing or rendering harmless vast quantities of armaments, including chemical and biological weapons and, in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, facilities which, had they remained undiscovered, could have permitted Iraq to develop a nuclear weapons capability in the near future. It has also put in place a comprehensive monitoring system designed to detect any future attempt to divert industrial or technological facilities or resources into offensive weapons-related activity. But UNSCOM has warned that Iraq has not told the full story. The prospect of Saddam's retaining these horrific weapons does not bear thinking about.

Saddam's disregard for human rights

Under Saddam's regime, Iraq has long had one of the worst human rights records in the world. The concern of the international community about the situation in Iraq is focussed through the UN; but the Iraqi authorities deny entry to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and to human rights monitors. The regime is contravening SCR 688, which requires that Iraq should:

ensure that human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;
immediately end repression of her civilian population, especially in the Kurdish populated areas;
and allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance, and make available all necessary facilities for this assistance.

In his latest report to the UNCHR, the Special Rapporteur, Max van der Stoel, spoke of the 'virtual absence' of any assurance of civil and political rights in Iraq, whose authorities he describes as 'in simple terms … a dictatorial, totalitarian regime'.

Denials of these rights include:

summary executions;
arbitrary arrest, detention and punishment (including execution) without recourse to legal process;
gross mistreatment and systematic torture, both physical and mental;
cruel or unusual punishments such as amputations or other forms of bodily mutilation, and the diversion of medical personnel and resources for these purposes;
psychological coercion by means of threatened reprisals, against either the detainee or against a relative or friend;
mass discrimination regarding access to food supplies and health care;
and unreasonable restrictions on freedom of movement, thought, opinion and expression.

Continuing plight of the Kurds

After Iraq's defeat in the Gulf conflict, there were risings in the north and south of the country. The Iraqi Government's brutal suppression of the rising in the predominantly Kurdish northern governorates of Irbil, Dohuk and Suleimaniyah led to a major refugee crisis. Subsequent negotiations between the Kurds and Baghdad broke down, and Baghdad withdrew its administration from the north. The Kurds formed two rival regional administrations in 1992 - the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), strongest in the north and west, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), dominant in the south and east.

Taking advantage of a request for military assistance from the KDP leader, Massoud Barzani, Saddam moved substantial forces of his Republican Guard into the area and, on 31 August 1996, attacked the city of Irbil. Although the forces were subsequently withdrawn, the brutality of the operation was a clear violation of SCR 688.

Reports reaching Mr van der Stoel, and which he believes to be reliable, paint a grim picture of the suffering inflicted by Saddam's troops and by members of his security apparatus during the course of the operation. As Iraqi forces took temporary control of Irbil and the surrounding region, the security authorities rounded up people they knew to be opponents of the Baghdad regime and summarily executed many of them. Former members of the Iraqi armed forces, who had earlier fled to the north, were recaptured and suffered a similar fate. There were also many arbitrary arrests, those detained including children.

Destruction of the southern marshes

Like the Kurds in the north, the indigenous inhabitants of the marshes in south-eastern Iraq (Marsh Arabs) have faced sustained repression by Saddam. As well as mounting successive military campaigns against them, he has systematically destroyed their traditional way of life, amid the waters of the vast marshlands, which they have enjoyed for several thousand years. Displaced from their homes and livelihood, many have been resettled in collective villages.

The regime has been engaged in a massive project, now virtually complete, to drain the marshes by re-routing and damming natural water flows from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Plans for drainage were first drawn up in the 1950s, and their stated objectives are to reclaim arable land and improve water supplies to other areas of the country. But the way in which they have been implemented by Saddam, and the forced resettlement of, and armed attacks upon, many of the inhabitants of the marshes, suggest that Saddam's objective has gone beyond the simple reclamation of land for agriculture, and cast doubt on his motives for continuing them.

Implementation of SCR 986 - a test of Saddam's intentions

In belatedly agreeing to the implementation of SCR 986 and, only after further delay, to the conditions under which it could be put into effect, Saddam has once again demonstrated that he does not care about the Iraqi people. He refuses to comply fully with the requirements of SCRs 687 and 688, which would allow the relaxation of sanctions. He clearly prefers to retain his WMD capability, and harbours ambitions to dominate the region. He is also persisting with his policy of repressing Iraq's population, particularly her minorities, while leaving it to the international community to feel concern for the people's sufferings and to take steps to redress the situation. The way in which Saddam now allows the implementation of SCR 986 on the ground will be instructive. The world will be watching.

April 1997

This paper has been prepared for general briefing purposes. It is not and should not be construed or quoted as an expression of Government policy.

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