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THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION IN IRAQ

'What of Iraq? We must contain the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. We do that through sanctions and through support for UN efforts to end Saddam's programmes for Weapons of Mass Destruction. He must not be allowed to threaten the region again... These are not some kind of colonial dictate. They are obligations imposed on Iraq by the United Nations. Until Saddam fulfils them, sanctions must be maintained.'

British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind,:
in The Guardian, London, 28 June 1996

United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687, of 3 April 1991, fixed the terms of the ceasefire in the Gulf conflict, which followed the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, and his defeat by an international coalition of forces. It also established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). The purpose of this body is to oversee, in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the dismantling of Iraq's arsenal of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and to maintain a monitoring programme to ensure that it is never rebuilt. Both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement, despite the obstructive, and at times aggressive, conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them.

Peace terms of the Gulf conflict

The terms of the ceasefire were agreed to by Iraq. SCR 687 was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Threats to the Peace) and is legally binding on member States. Its provisions required Iraq to accept unconditionally the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the specified weapons and missiles; to submit full details of locations, amounts and types of her WMD and undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire WMD in the future; and to submit to immediate on-site inspections of weapon-making facilities.

UNSCOM's mandate and resources

UNSCOM was, therefore, required to:

• take possession of all biological and chemical weapons (BW and CW), stocks of agents, related sub-systems and components, and research, development, support and manufacturing facilities, so that they could be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless;
• supervise the destruction by Iraq of all her ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km, and related spare parts and repair and production facilities;
• monitor Iraq's compliance with her undertaking not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified; and
• help the IAEA to eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapon capabilities, and then to make sure that she was not involved in any proscribed nuclear activities.

Headed by a senior Swedish diplomat, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, UNSCOM is about 200 strong, with a headquarters in New York, a permanent Monitoring and Verification Centre in Baghdad, a Field Office in Bahrain, and an aerial surveillance capability. Staff at the Baghdad base are drawn from UN member States and the UN Secretariat, and include experts in various disciplines - nuclear, biological and chemical, missile technology, and aerial inspection.

Most of the experts are seconded for periods of two to three months, so that they do not have to work for too long in an environment which is always potentially, and sometimes actually, hostile. By the end of October 1996, more than 3,000 persons from some 60 countries had served with UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team in Iraq.

SCR 687 required the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with UNSCOM, to develop a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's military capabilities. As part of that plan, later approved in SCR 715, UNSCOM may inspect, with or without notice, any site or facility which the Iraqi Government could use in contravention of the Resolution, and may, if necessary, destroy any questionable materials.

Ambassador Ekeus reports directly to the UN Security Council, which meets every 60 days to consider whether there is a case for lifting the sanctions imposed on Iraq in August 1990, under SCR 661, shortly after her invasion of Kuwait. This Resolution requires UN member States to enforce a strict embargo on all exports to, and imports from, Iraq, with the exception of medical and humanitarian supplies and foodstuffs.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

For many years prior to the Gulf conflict, Western military observers believed that Iraq, despite her persistent denials, had been engaged in research into WMD. But it was not until UNSCOM's work began that the full extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons, BW and CW programmes began to emerge. As the knowledge came to light, the Security Council adopted SCR 707, requiring Iraq to provide UNSCOM and the IAEA with 'full, final and complete disclosures' (FFCDs) on all aspects of her research and development in these areas. The FFCDs have all been shown, by subsequent UNSCOM investigations, to be seriously deficient. It is thought that Iraq is continuing to conceal the full extent of her WMD programmes.

Nuclear

Particular concern was caused when the IAEA revealed just how close Iraq had come to constructing a workable nuclear device before the Gulf conflict. Iraq was thus contravening undertakings she gave on becoming one of the first signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in 1969. It is thought that if her previous nuclear weapons projects had not been halted by the Gulf conflict, and if a crash programme begun after her invasion of Kuwait, in 1990, using diverted fissile material supposedly safeguarded under IAEA agreements, had come to fruition, she might have been capable of building an implosion-type nuclear bomb by 1993. This kind of weapon can be constructed using either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, and needs a sophisticated trigger mechanism to detonate. The IAEA has uncovered clear documentary and physical evidence, and the Iraqi authorities have since admitted, that Iraq had pursued research programmes prior to 1990 into all five known methods of producing weapons-grade HEU, but with the major effort devoted to two:

• electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) - the slow process, involving the passage of uranium tetrachloride through a very strong magnetic field, produced by a device known as a calutron. Calutrons were discovered during an IAEA inspection of a facility near Baghdad.
• gas centrifuge enrichment - a more efficient method, using a series, or 'cascade', of ultra-high-speed centrifuges. By the outbreak of the Gulf conflict, Iraq had started testing centrifuge designs assembled from imported components, and had obtained sufficient additional centrifuge components for her research programme, although she still had much work to do to overcome the great technical problems of the method. The parallel weapons design programme had also made significant progress, but was similarly deficient in key areas. Many of the sophisticated materials, which Iraq is known to have obtained from other countries for the indigenous production of centrifuges, have now been surrendered to the IAEA; however, it remains possible that other centrifuges, or their components, continue to exist, undiscovered by the inspection regime. Weapons design work may also have continued on a small scale, but would have been limited in scope.

Biological

In summer 1995, Ambassador Ekeus documented for the UN Security Council the compelling evidence that Iraq had sought to build a biological warfare capability. During four years of Iraqi denials of any proscribed biological activities, UNSCOM had stated repeatedly that Iraq's claim was simply not credible. Finally, in July 1995, Iraq acknowledged an offensive BW programme, while continuing to deny any actual weaponisation of biological agent. Only after the departure to Jordan, the following month, of Gen Hussein Kamal Hassan, head of Iraq's military industrialisation programme, was the Iraqi Government forced to admit both to weaponisation and to much wider-ranging biological research.

The research programme involved five sites, for the production of human bacterial and viral pathogens and plant pathogens. In 1988 alone, Iraq imported 39 tonnes of growth medium for virulent agents, such as anthrax and botulinum, only 22 tonnes of which could satisfactorily be accounted for as consumed in production. UNSCOM destroyed 11 of the outstanding 17 tonnes during 1996, leaving six tonnes unaccounted for. This may imply that additional agent was produced and remains concealed.

Iraq eventually admitted having produced 20,000 litres of botulinum toxin. And, according to Madeleine Albright, US Permanent Representative at the UN, Iraq possessed, at one time, enough weaponised anthrax to kill the entire population of the world several times over.

In addition to anthrax spores and botulinum toxin, Iraq is known to have produced and weaponised aflatoxin (a fungal toxin), which causes liver and kidney failure in the short term and cancer and genetic disorders leading to birth defects in the long term, and ricin, a toxin causing lung damage when inhaled, as well as undertaking work on incapacitating agents.

Chemical

Iraq's possession of CW has long been public knowledge. It was highlighted in August 1988, when Iraqi forces made extensive use of both chemical and gas munitions against Kurdish civilians, in the area around Halabja, in Iraqi Kurdistan.

In the three FFCDs concerning CW programmes, which Iraq has made since 1992, she has acknowledged possession of more than 212,000 filled or unfilled CW munitions, 4,000 tonnes of bulk CW agent, and 17,000 tonnes of bulk precursor chemicals. The main facility for CW research and production was the Al-Muthanna State Establishment (which produced the nerve agents sarin, tabun and VX, and mustard agent); additional capacity for precursor chemical production was being developed, notably at three plants in the Fallujah area.

However, there is more to be discovered about Iraq's CW research and development. Iraq's CW programme spanned a long period of time; and, although UNSCOM has a good understanding of activities prior to August 1988, when Iraq's priority was to create a massive number of tactical CW, questions remain concerning two further broad, developmental, phases since. Iraq has admitted that these latter phases were aimed, respectively, at national self-sufficiency in CW capability and integration of the CW programme into her mainstream chemical industry; and production of strategic CW. Details of these later phases have not been disclosed in the FFCDs.

Ballistic missiles

UNSCOM has discovered that, during the 15 years preceding the Gulf conflict, Iraq imported from the then Soviet Union more than 800 Scud B missiles and 11 mobile launchers. Iraq claims to have indigenously produced a further eight mobile launchers and 28 fixed launch pads. An additional 32 fixed launch pads under construction were discovered by UNSCOM. In 1985, Iraq embarked, in cooperation with other countries, on a programme to develop a two-stage missile system, known as BADR 2000, designed for a range of around 1,000 km.

Iraq began, in 1987, a programme to extend the range of the Scud B and to 'reverse engineer' the design, so as to produce several new, more potent, indigenous missiles, known as the Al Hussein, Al Hijarah and Al Abbas. Development of a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead was also undertaken, and a warhead separation system successfully tested. By the time of the Gulf conflict, Iraq was engaged in designing further indigenous missile systems, some with planned ranges of up to 3,000 km.

There is, furthermore, compelling evidence to suggest that, since the Gulf conflict, Iraq has sought to continue developing her proscribed ballistic missile capability. UNSCOM presented the Iraqi Government with firm evidence of the import of Scud gyroscope components up to autumn 1991. This was finally admitted by the Iraqi authorities in December 1994 - but their efforts to acquire proscribed equipment nevertheless continued. Part of a further shipment of advanced missile gyroscopes was intercepted en route to Iraq in 1995, and the procurement network and supplier were identified.

Iraq's declarations concerning her unilateral destruction of missiles remain unverified. Ambassador Ekeus has said that she may be hiding between six and 16 proscribed missiles.

The Iraqi Government's hand is forced

In August 1995, UNSCOM and the IAEA received some unexpected assistance, following the departure to Jordan of Gen Hussein Kamal Hassan, accompanied by an entourage that included his brother and their wives (both daughters of Saddam). Hussein Kamal Hassan imparted some new information to UNSCOM and to the IAEA. But of far greater significance was the reaction of the Iraqi authorities, who clearly became concerned that he would reveal substantial amounts of hitherto secret information about Iraq's WMD programmes. (Both men later returned to Iraq, on receiving a worthless promise from Saddam that they would not be harmed. They were murdered within days of their return and their wives remain in detention.) In an effort to pre-empt disclosures by the two men, and at the same time to gain credit at the UN, the Iraqi authorities began to admit considerably more than they had done until then. They told UNSCOM that the very biological warfare project which they had denied existed had reached the stage of filling bombs and Scud missile warheads with biological agents prior to the Gulf conflict. However, they maintained that the bombs and warheads had since been destroyed. They also revealed the existence of a crash programme, initiated in August 1990, to develop a nuclear device within 12 months, and made other admissions regarding their nuclear weapons programme and developments in the ballistic missile field.

While visiting Iraq at the Iraqi Government's request, in the wake of the departure of Gen Hussein Kamal Hassan, Ambassador Ekeus and his team were taken to a farm near Baghdad, where they were shown a huge quantity of documents and other material relating to Iraq's weapons programmes. The Iraqi authorities claimed that the farm had belonged to the General, and attempted to suggest that these items had been hidden there by him and had just been discovered. The documents, running to some 680,000 pages, computer disks, videotapes, microfilms and microfiches, were handed over to UNSCOM. They provided additional information on all of Iraq's WMD programmes.

Iraq's relations with UNSCOM

Despite her agreement to the UN peace terms, Iraq has repeatedly obstructed their implementation. From the early days of UNSCOM's mandate, she has given grudging cooperation at best, and has shown outright hostility during periods of heightened tension. The UN inspectors' unequivocal right of unannounced access to military and industrial sites has been regularly obstructed, challenged and delayed in a series of 'cheat and retreat' manoeuvres by the Iraqi authorities. Inspection teams have been harassed and, in at least one incident, have had live ammunition fired over their heads. Ambassador Ekeus and his deputy, Charles Duelfer, have been subjected to an officially-inspired campaign of denigration. Although its tactics have varied, the Iraqi Government has not wavered in its aim: to sap the will of UNSCOM to continue its work, and of the Security Council to maintain a vigil against Iraq's bid, apparently undiminished, to rearm and to threaten regional stability.

In September 1991, a 44-strong IAEA team was besieged in a car park for several days, after emerging from a suspected nuclear facility with documents. In July 1992, UNSCOM personnel attempted an inspection, without warning, of the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture in Baghdad, believing it contained documents relating to a long-range ballistic missile programme. They were denied entry. During a subsequent 18-day round-the-clock observation of the building, they were attacked by officially-inspired mobs and, following a series of increasingly violent demonstrations, were forced to leave the country.

Late in 1992, a series of particularly provocative activities coincided with illegal sorties by Iraqi aircraft into the air exclusion zone over northern Iraq. (The zone had been established by the international coalition to monitor Iraq's compliance with SCR 688, which seeks to stop her repression of her civilian population.) Britain and the US responded, in January 1993, by launching two attacks, which destroyed missile sites in the south and nuclear components factories in the suburbs of Baghdad.

In July 1993, an UNSCOM inspection team attempted to install monitoring cameras at two missile test stands at Al-Rafah and Yawm Al-Azim, about 60 km south and south-west of Baghdad. When the Iraqis refused to accept the camera systems, UNSCOM attempted temporarily to seal the sites while consultations were held. However, Iraq refused to allow the sites to be sealed. Backed by the threat of international military action to destroy the sites, Ambassador Ekeus successfully negotiated the installation of the cameras.

Major incidents occurred again in June 1996, when UNSCOM inspectors were denied access to a series of sites associated with the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard, and which were believed to be involved in the concealment of proscribed weapons. Iraq denied the inspectors access to four out of six sites, despite the Security Council's demand that she allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all.

Ambassador Ekeus visited Baghdad shortly afterwards at Security Council request. As a result of his visit, a Joint Statement and Joint Programme of Action were agreed with the Iraqi Government on 22 June, designed to promote verification efforts on all outstanding topics. However, the next UNSCOM inspection team was denied access, on 16 and 18 July, to a road leading to a site it wished to inspect, following an Iraqi claim that the road lay through 'presidential areas'.

On 23 August 1996, the Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement describing Iraq's behaviour as a gross violation of her obligations under SCRs 687, 707 and 715, as well as a contradiction of her commitments under the Joint Statement.

What has UNSCOM achieved so far?

UNSCOM has destroyed, removed or rendered harmless the following:

• an assembled 'supergun' - a huge static artillery piece with a range of up to 1,000 km;
• 151 Scud missiles, 19 mobile launchers, 76 chemical and 113 conventional warheads for Scuds, 9 conventional warheads for Al-Fahd missiles;
• a number of missile launch support vehicles; a substantial amount of rocket fuel and component chemicals; 28 operational fixed Al-Hussein missile launch pads, and a further 32 fixed launch pads at various stages of completion; 11 decoy missile and 9 Scud decoy vehicles, 2 SS-21 guidance and control sets and more than 200 imported guidance and control components;
• equipment for the production of missiles and components;
• more than 480,000 litres of chemical warfare agents (including mustard agent and the nerve agents sarin and tabun);
• more than 28,000 filled and nearly 12,000 empty CW (involving 8 types of munitions ranging from rockets to artillery shells, bombs and ballistic missile warheads;
• nearly 1,800,000 litres, more than 1,040,000 kilogrammes and 648 barrels of some 45 different precursor chemicals for the production of chemical warfare agents;
• equipment and facilities for CW production; and
• Al-Hakam, Iraq's main biological warfare agent production facility, together with equipment from subsidiary BW facilities at Al-Manal and Al-Safah.

UNSCOM has also made great efforts to verify Iraq's explanation as to how other prohibited capabilities have allegedly been unilaterally disposed of, eg through use or war damage.

Ongoing monitoring and verification

SCR 715 requires UNSCOM to monitor Iraq's continuing compliance with the WMD provisions of SCR 687. Teams of inspectors, accordingly, visit sites known to have been associated with past weapons activity, or which are judged to be capable of assisting the redevelopment of WMD. UNSCOM and the IAEA also observe facilities from the air, and by using fixed, remote camera systems, images from which can be viewed and recorded at the Baghdad Monitoring Centre.

The export/import regime

On 27 March 1996, SCR 1051 approved a mechanism to monitor certain of Iraq's imports. Iraq is required to inform the UN, in advance, of her intention to import items with dual-purpose capabilities (ie capable of being used for either legitimate or illicit purposes) and, subsequently, of any actual trade that takes place in them. These notifications will be checked against the records of the countries which exported the goods, against information available to UNSCOM and to the IAEA from other sources, and by inspections in Iraq, both at the border and at the declared site where the imports are being used. As long as UN sanctions remain in place, Iraq's imports are extremely limited; but once sanctions are relaxed, this mechanism will play a very important part in keeping a check on any rebuilding of WMD.

Continuing vigilance

UNSCOM and the IAEA are continuing their work to verify Iraq's FFCDs on all aspects of her WMD programmes. Ambassador Ekeus has repeatedly stated that if outstanding problems are to be resolved, the Iraqi regime must take a firm decision to comply fully with all the relevant Resolutions of the UN Security Council. No such decision has yet been taken.

Until it is, there cannot be progress towards easing the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the international community. Even when sanctions can be eased, the system of controls put in place by UNSCOM and the IAEA will need to remain for the forseeable future. These controls are a major step forward in preventing the proliferation of WMD.

January 1997

This paper has been prepared for general briefing purposes. It is not and should not be construed or quoted as an expression of Government policy.