IRAQ' S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM
By Terence Taylor
The scope and extent of
the offensive biological
weapons program
revealed by the Iraqis
following the defection
of General Hassan
Kamal in August 1995
surprised many. It was a startling
revelation, both in terms of its scope and the
nature of the likely battlefield use. In their
program it seems that the Iraqis had
examined and weaponized bacteria, viruses
and fungi, both in the form of living
organisms, as well as toxin derivatives. The
weapons effects sought ranged from lethal
agents and incapacitants to crop attack
agents. The delivery means included
surface to surface Al Hussein missiles and
field artillery. This blend of strategic and
tactical use of biological weapons was a
particular surprise.
Over four years of
inspection by the UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM), although suspicions were high,
had revealed little of substance about the
scale and nature of the program. However,
just enough evidence was found to convince
the Security Council that an offensive
biological weapons program of some sort
existed. This experience offers lessons for
those considering a verification protocol for
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
A reminder of UNSCOM's mission in
relation to Iraq's weapons of mass destruc-
tion is in order. Briefly, under Security
Council resolutions 687 and 715 of 1991,
UNSCOM is required to:
Find and destroy all of Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction and missiles with a range
of more than 150 kilometers.
Conduct monitoring of the undertaking by
Iraq not to use, develop or acquire these
weapons and missiles in the future.
As far as biological weapons are concerned,
the scope of the inspection and monitoring
system covers all stocks of agent, delivery
means and related sub-systems, all compo-
nents, research and development activities
and support and manufacturing facilities.
For their part the Iraqis were required to
make a full and final disclosure of all their
programs referred to in the Security Council
resolutions. As far as biological weapons
were concerned, Iraq claimed there were no
programs at all. After initial pressure they
said that they only had a limited defensive
program in which ten or so people were
involved and just two facilities. They
claimed that their defensive work involved
only botulinum toxin and anthrax. There-
fore, unlike the other weapons teams, the
biological weapons inspection teams and
planners at UNSCOM headquarters had
virtually a blank sheet of paper on which to
base their activities. There was sufficient
evidence from a number of sources that an
offensive program existed, but uncovering
the evidence to meet the Security Council
requirements of destruction and long term
monitoring was to prove a frustrating task.
In the end UNSCOM was compelled to
identify all the likely bio-technical dual-use
facilities in Iraq and visit them all. This
required visits to nearly eighty separate
facilities, exploiting the very intrusive
inspection provisions to the full. The types
of facilities visited ranged from pharmaceu-
tical production plants, university laborato-
ries, and medical stores to breweries and
dairy factories. During several years of
inspection activity only shreds of hard
evidence of a program were uncovered.
By
late 1994, even more convinced that a
substantial program existed, the biological
inspection activity was intensified even
further and a breakthrough was achieved
when it came to light that Iraq had pur-
chased substantial amounts of growth media
(used as a culture medium for growing
organisms) far in excess of that needed for
the claimed medical use. They tried to
cover up the true purpose with a trail of
documentation that was proved to be forged.
This evidence came to light at a time
(March 1995) when at least two members of
the Security Council began to press for the
trade sanctions on Iraq to be lifted. This
evidence was enough to convince them that
a major program was being hidden. The
many months of painstaking work by the
UNSCOM team were beginning to bear
fruit. The Iraqis persisted until the following July in denying an offensive program.
Finally, giving way under the pressure of the
evidence found by the Commission, and
driven by the desire to get sanctions lifted,
the Iraqis finally admitted to having an
offensive program, but only involving a
limited number of agents. They claimed
that although a certain amount of these
agents had been produced they had not been
weaponized.
Only a few weeks later, following the
defection of General Hassan Kamal,
Baghdad made available documents and
additional information on all their weapons
of mass destruction and missile programs.
There were surprises in store in all fields
which demonstrated the limitations of
inspection, even of the most intrusive
system ever conducted on a single country.
This is not to say that on site inspection is of
no value; on the contrary it can be a very
powerful investigative tool. However, it is
essential to take a pragmatic view of its
potential, and the biological area, as is
widely recognized, is probably one of the
most difficult to deal with in this regard.
In the August 1995 revelations, the Iraqis
admitted to weaponizing, and testing for
weapons purposes, a wide range of agents.
They declared that they had weaponized
6,500 liters (1,716 gallons) of anthrax and
10,000 liters (2,600 gallons) of botulinum
toxin. In total quantity they had produced
more than this, but this was the amount that
they said filled in Al Hussein missile
warheads and R400 free fall bombs. The
total production quantities were reported as
at least 19,000 liters (4,490 gallons) of
botulinum toxin and 8,500 liters (2,210
gallons) of anthrax. In addition to these
lethal agents, they reported that they had
weaponized in the same delivery means the
incapacitant aflatoxin (derived from a
fungus) to a quantity of 1,580 liters
(410 gallons) out of a total of 2,200 liters
(572 gallons) produced. Among the range of
agents they admitted to testing for
weaponization are clostridium perfringens,
ricin, viruses (including hemorrahagic
conjunctivitis, rotavirus and camel pox).
They also carried out work, including field
trials, on a crop agent: wheat cover smut.
As far as delivery systems are concerned, in
addition to the systems already mentioned,
development work and field trials had been
conducted with aerial spray tanks (with both
manned and unmanned aircraft), 122 mm
rockets and 155 mm artillery rounds.
Although parts of the programs were
apparently unsuccessful, some of the work
was very advanced; in particular the aerial
spray tanks for the manned aircraft. By
chance, during Desert Storm, a coalition
bombing raid destroyed the prototype aerial
spray tanks. The genesis of the whole
program goes back to the early eighties and
was developed by the Iraqis in the context of
the war with Iran. The weaponization effort
did not come to fruition until after the war
had ended. In that context it is interesting to
note that not only strategic use was being
contemplated, but also tactical use with field
artillery.
After the invasion of Kuwait and prior to
Desert Storm, the production of anthrax and
botulinum toxin was accelerated. If the
Iraqi leadership is to be believed, this was
claimed to enable a second strike capability
against the Coalition forces in the event of a
massive strike on Baghdad. Ambassador
Rolf Ekeus, the Executive Chairman of
UNSCOM, reported to the Security Council
in his 11 October 1995 report (S/1195/864)
that he had been told that authority for such
use had been delegated to field commanders
with the weapons deployed in January 1991
to four separate sites.
Iraq claims to have destroyed all the filled munitions and bulk agent after the end of the
Gulf War. To date, this claim has yet to be
proved. Visits to reported destruction sites
are not likely to yield conclusive evidence
five years after the event in any case.
UNSCOM still faces a challenging verifica-
tion task despite its free ranging inspection
mandate. They also face delicate decisions
on destruction of the facilities which
participated in the offensive biological
weapons program. Their decisions must take
into account the need to preserve what
slender evidence exists of the program and
the added difficulty that some facilities are
used for peaceful purposes such as the
production of vaccines for veterinary use.
There is pause for thought in all this for the
proponents of a strong verification protocol
for the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. The technical and political
challenges to developing a protocol that
would be an effective deterrent to a would -
be cheater seem formidable. Indeed there
would seem to be a high risk of developing a
system that could be exploited by a deter-
mined state to claim full compliance. This
does not mean that some valuable confi-
dence-building measures could not be
strengthened - but their limitations must be
clear to participating governments. It was a
salutary experience, after nearly five years
of dedicated and thorough work by
UNSCOM, to hear Ambassador Ekeus
reporting to the U.S. Senate on 21 March
1996 that he believed that the Iraqis were
still concealing major parts of their illegal
weapons programs, including a number of
missiles which could include biological
warheads. It is time to rethink verification
for global weapons of mass destruction
treaties.
Dr. Terence Taylor is the Assistant Director
of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in the United Kingdom. Prior to his
present appointment he served on the
UNSCOM staff.
April 1996
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