Tracking Number: 239810
Title: "UN Inspections in Iraq Said Largely Successful." The UN Special Commission on Iraq, established after the Persian Gulf war to locate and oversee the destruction of all
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, has made significant progress despite the Baghdad government's efforts to impede its work. (920820)
Translated Title: Succes des inspections de l'ONU en Irak.; Consideran muy exitosas
inspecciones ONU en Irak. (920820)
Author: GOMEZ, BERTA (USIA STAFF WRITER)
Date: 19920820
Text:
U.N. INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ SAID LARGELY SUCCESSFUL
(Significant data unearthed on Iraqi weapons) (600) By Berta Gomez USIA Staff Writer Washington -- The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, established after the Persian Gulf war to locate and oversee the destruction of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, has made significant progress despite the Baghdad government's efforts to impede its work.
"It's been a long, painful process, but a lot has been done," said U.S. Army Major Karen Jansen, a chemical and biological weapons inspection officer who was detailed to the commission from June 1991 to last July.
Jansen was responsible for planning and implementing the chemical and biological inspections in Iraq. She also led four of the multinational inspection teams, including the group that was denied access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture for three weeks earlier this summer.
Despite the fact that the effort has been far more time-consuming than anticipated, Jansen told reporters at an August 19 press luncheon, the work so far has allowed experts to piece together a fairly accurate picture of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs.
"I am pretty confident" that all of the equipment and materials associated with Iraq's chemical weapons program have been identified and located, Jansen said. The equipment located is to be destroyed next month under supervision of the United Nations, she added.
Jansen acknowledged that important information about the weapons programs remains obscure -- particularly data on the various suppliers of weapons systems needed for the future compliance monitoring regimes.
"There are gaps -- not huge, but important" in the international community's knowledge of Iraq's pre-war weapons programs, she said.
Jansen said it is fairly certain that Iraq had the capacity to engage in chemical weapons warfare during the brief Gulf war. But even if it had, given the crudity of Iraq's missile delivery systems and various climactic factors, Jansen doubts it would have had "much impact at all."
She noted that the inspectors saw "no evidence" of biological "weaponization" in Iraq, although "it was very, very clear that they wanted a biological weapons program." While basic biological weapons research is fairly straightforward, the move to weaponization is extremely difficult, and Iraq had definitely not progressed that far, Jansen explained.
Yet it remains unclear how much progress had been achieved, she said. Due to the effectiveness of allied bombing and pre-war "cleansing" of suspected facilities, U.N. inspection teams have been unable to decipher the exact nature of Iraq's biological weapons research. Baghdad initially denied the existence of any such program, and later -- when confronted with evidence to the contrary -- insisted that it had only carried out research for defensive purposes, Jansen recounted.
In retrospect, Jansen said, the Iraqi government has made the task of the inspectors extremely difficult. Although the cease-fire agreement stipulates that Iraq must give the United Nations a complete inventory of all its weapons and weapons programs, information provided to date has been consistently incomplete -- if not inaccurate, Jansen said.
"They have no problem with telling you one story...and then altering it suddenly" when confronted with conflicting information. The Iraqi officials with whom she dealt, Jansen added, were "well-trusted and well-placed" and showed no signs of dissatisfaction with the regime.
In private conversations with ordinary Iraqis, however, the responses she received were quite different. They were often forthcoming with information and advice about the weapons programs; they also expressed deep unhappiness over the coalition's failure to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, Jansen said.
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File Identification: 08/20/92, PO-401; 08/20/92, AE-404; 08/20/92, AR-408; 08/20/92, EU-404; 08/26/92, AFF302; 08/20/92, ASI406
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Languages: French; Spanish
Keywords: UNITED NATIONS-SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ; INSPECTIONS; ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION; IRAQ/Defense & Military; MILITARY TECHNOLOGY; MILITARY CAPABILITIES; JANSEN, KAREN
Thematic Codes: 1UN; 1NE; 1AC
Target Areas: AF; AR; EU
PDQ Text Link: 239810; 240553; 240378
USIA Notes: *92082001.POL
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