Tracking Number: 236932
Title: "Perkins Reviews Iraqi Non-Compliance Record." Statement by US Ambassador to the UN Edward Perkins in testimony before two House Foreign Affairs subcommittees. (920729)
Date: 19920729
Text:
*NXE302
07/29/92 *
PERKINS REVIEWS IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE RECORD (Text: Amb. Perkins House testimony, 7/29/92) (4330) Washington -- Iraq continues to violate U.N. Security Council resolutions and to defy the international organization's authority, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Edward Perkins said in congressional testimony July 29.
Perkins testified to the House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs' sub-committees on Europe and the Middle East and Human Rights and International Organizations.
He reported to the committee that Iraq remains in violation of a broad range of United Nations resolutions "in an increasingly grave and provocative manner."
Iraq's actions "are nothing less than a clear and open challenge to the authority of the Security Council and the United Nations Charter," he said.
"Iraq should take care not to forget its status," Perkins warned. "It is subject, by virtue of its outlaw behavior, to mandatory obligations for which enforcement authority already exists. The international community cannot afford and does not intend to let Iraq repudiate those obligations," he stressed.
The following is the text of Perkins testimony, as prepared for delivery: (BEGIN TEXT) Chairman Hamilton, Chairman Yatron, Members of the Committee: I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Committee this morning. Since this is my first appearance before this body as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, let me take this time to thank you for your support and also to state my sincere belief in the critical role of Congress in the shaping of the strongest possible United States policy at the United Nations.
The purpose of my testimony today is to brief the Committee on our continuing efforts to ensure complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 687, establishing the terms for a cease-fire with Iraq.
This morning's hearing comes at a critical time. Over the course of the last two months, Saddam Hussein has openly violated the decisions of the Security Council, and, by word and deed, has defied the authority of the United Nations in an increasingly grave and provocative manner.
Let me be specific: -- Iraq has intentionally delayed a UN chemical and ballistic missile inspection team from examining a facility believed to contain materials associated with Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,
-- Iraq has permitted, and we suspect orchestrated, a general deterioration in the security of UN personnel, resulting in numerous attacks upon them, including the tragic shooting death of a UN humanitarian guard.
-- Iraq has denounced the findings and repudiated the authority of the UN commission established pursuant to Resolution 687 to demarcate its border with Kuwait and has refused to participate in the most recent session of that commission.
-- Disregarding its obligations under Resolution 688 to permit unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations, Iraq has failed to extend an agreement allowing the UN to bring humanitarian relief to millions of Iraqis who continue to be denied adequate food, medicine and other essential needs.
-- Likewise, Iraq has broken off negotiations to implement Resolutions 706 and 712, by which it would be permitted to sell oil in exchange for food to feed its population, a decision which ensures their continued suffering.
-- Finally, in another violation of Resolution 688, Iraq has continued and in fact intensified attacks against its Shia population in the south.
Mr. Chairman, these actions, viewed in their entirety, are nothing less than a clear and open challenge to the authority of the Security Council and the United Nations charter. In the case of the denial of access to the weapons inspection team and the attacks upon UN personnel, the implications are particularly grave. Iraq should take care not to forget its status, it is subject, by virtue of its outlaw behavior, to mandatory obligations for which enforcement authority already exists. The international community cannot afford and does not intend to let Iraq repudiate those obligations.
Let me now review UN efforts to ensure compliance with the main elements of the cease-fire resolution.
I. Weapons of mass destruction Resolution 687's provisions on weapons of mass destruction establish three overlapping U.N. functions and Iraqi obligations:
-- Disclosure of all weapons, weapons-related equipment, programs and associated production and research and development facilities and materials;
-- Destruction or rendering harmless of all existing weapons of mass destruction and related items identified for destruction by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and
-- Long-term and extensive monitoring of any Iraqi activities with a possible bearing on weapons of mass destruction.
As we have previously noted to this committee, Iraqi performance in each of these areas repeats a constant pattern: there is a period of non-cooperation and deceit; this is followed by defiance when confronted by U.N. officials; when defiance calls forth Security Council threats, it gives way to limited compliance; this is followed by new deceits and non-cooperation elsewhere.
Disclosure Over the course of the last two months UNSCOM has significantly augmented its capacity to ensure Iraqi compliance with the weapons disclosure requirements of 687. This is due to an increase in the number of UNSCOM personnel permanently stationed in Baghdad and to the loan of a number of helicopters. The helicopters and the larger support base have facilitated more intensive aerial surveillance of suspected sites. Information developed from these flights has been used to tag additional 13 locations for inspection and also to build a baseline for long-term monitoring. I should add that notwithstanding the increased tempo of inspections the Iraqi government has generally not sought to impede these activities.
As required under Resolution 687 Iraq has also provided various written documents purporting to contain "full, final and complete" disclosures of its nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile weapons programs. One set of reports, received by the UN in March, is still being reviewed by UNSCOM and the IAEA, as is another set dealing with dual use items. While the review and verification process is a lengthy one, we do not now believe that either set of reports will meet the disclosure requirements of the relevant resolutions.
Further with respect to the full, final and complete declaration required by UNSCR 707, Iraq has continued to withhold information on procurement to support its WMD programs, including detailed year-by-year breakdowns of production and imports, and their (foreign) sources. The government of Iraq has lamely defended its refusal to provide this information by stating that disclosure of the name of foreign suppliers would place those companies and, particularly, their managements at risk of physical retaliation by the clandestine services of certain states.
As a general comment on the disclosure provisions of 687, let me say that the significant progress we have made towards locating prohibited materials and facilities and toward piecing together an in depth picture of Iraq's various weapons programs has come about despite Iraqi cooperation and not because of it. The most egregious example of non-cooperation was the refusal of Iraqi authorities to permit a weapons inspection team from the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), to examine what the UN believes to be prohibited materials relating to weapons of mass destruction housed in the so-called Agriculture Ministry in Baghdad.
Destruction Notwithstanding the handicaps imposed by Iraq's attempts to evade full disclosure, UNSCOM has proceeded with destruction of Iraq-declared, or U.N.-discovered, weapons and materials.
Destruction of chemical materials is the most advanced. Some 463 chemical munitions, most of which were either filled or partially filled with the chemical agent Sarin are now destroyed. Preparations continue for much larger scale destruction of chemical agents at Iraq's Muthanna plants, due to start this fall. No additional destruction has taken place in the biological area and any future destruction activities must await UNSCOM decisions about possible dual use facilities or discovery of suspect sites.
The UN continues to make headway in the area of ballistic missile destruction, in April the tenth inspection team oversaw destruction of some ten additional buildings and 45 items of production equipment associated with the ballistic missile program. In May, the eleventh inspection team continued this process. among other things, it inventoried equipment designed for the production of nozzles for the Badr-2000. The team also confirmed 89 Scud missiles unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. Combined with 62 previously confirmed, this brings the total number destroyed to 151 missiles.
In the nuclear area, the key technical installation of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, located at Al Atheer and Al Hatteen, was destroyed during the eleventh and twelfth IAEA inspection missions which occurred in April and May-June respectively. In addition, at the request of the twelfth IAEA inspection team, the Iraqi side has begun preparation for the destruction of selected buildings at the Tarmiya and Ash Shargat sites where the EMIS (electro-magnetic isotopic separation) process was in use.
The IAEA has observed that while the Iraqi side's cooperation in implementing destruction plans at Al-Atheer, Al-Hatten, Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat was very good, in the course of the twelfth IAEA mission, there was a definite deterioration in the Iraqi attitude to working with the inspection team. One manifestation of this was the often slow manner in which meetings, transportation and other activities were organized.
Monitoring As has been noted here previously, the whole point of the monitoring provisions contained in Resolutions 687 and 715 is to enable the UN to continuously assess a factual baseline against subsequent events and developments, after more than a year of field work and other investigations the IAEA and UNSCOM have now drawn reasonably accurate profiles of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.
Of course, important gaps remain in all areas. These include confirmation of Iraqi claims of unilateral destruction, verification of Iraqi disclosure reports, details on the budgetary, organizational, expenditure, import sources and prior use of weapons programs, particularly chemical weapons and so on. And of course there is also the continuing problem of Iraq's rejection of longterm monitoring, a self-defeating position since it will only prolong the period of intense scrutiny to which Iraq must be subjected in the meantime.
II. Return of property The UN-supervised return of Kuwaiti property stolen from Iraq continues to move slowly. Since my predecessor's testimony to the Committee in April, the focus has been on securing the return of remaining military equipment, including tanks, spare parts, salvageable parts of damaged aircraft, and I-Hawk missile systems. Kuwait has indicated to the UN that return of the I-Hawk missile systems is now its number one priority.
The UN return of property coordinator has gained the agreement of both sides to a land transfer point on the Iraq-Kuwait border at Safwan. Both the UN and Kuwait have now constructed facilities there (Kuwait on its side of the border) for the use of staff involved in the transfer. Once the final modalities are worked out by the UN, Safwan will be used for the transfer of heavy military equipment.
III. UNIKOM We remain very pleased with the performance of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and believe it should be maintained for the foreseeable future. Conditions in UNIKOM's area of operations have continued calm since my predecessor's testimony in April. UNIKOM investigates the occasional minor complaint from either side.
UNIKOM's chief military observer, General Greindl of Austria, who did an excellent job in establishing UNIKOM, was replaced in July by Major General Timothy K. Dibauma of Ghana.
In addition to its observer duties, UNIKOM, on a voluntary basis, has provided engineering support and logistical assistance to staff of the United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission physically demarcating the land portion of the Iraq/Kuwait boundary. UNIKOM plans to continue this assistance to the commission when it resumes its laying of markers in October/November.
Unfortunately, after final demarcation of the land boundary, as decided by the UN Boundary Demarcation Commission, an additional Iraqi Border Police Post will be on the Kuwaiti side of the boundary, bringing the total to six. Once the commission issues its final report to the Secretary-General and the report is officially endorsed by the Security Council, Iraq will have no alternative but to remove these posts.
IV. UN Iraq/Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission As mandated under UNSCR 687, the UN Iraq/Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission has met several times to take decisions on demarcating the border based on information from a 1963 agreement in which Iraq and Kuwait agreed to respect a common border described in a 1932 exchange of letters. The commission's mandate is to "demarcate" the border, that is, to physically locate the border based on their objective evaluations of the 1963 agreement and other evidence.
At the commission's April 8-16 session in New York, it reviewed the work of the joint New Zealand-Swedish survey team which provided the basis of the orthophoto mapping of the Iraq/Kuwait border area. The commission's independent experts had also reviewed the materials requested of Iraq and Kuwait on the land boundary. Adhering to the delimitation formula, and based on the findings of the independent experts and deliberations of the commission, the commission decided on the points demarcating the land portion of the Iraq/Kuwait boundary. Iraq did not participate in the vote on the land demarcation points.
The commission's interim report indicates that there will be some relocation of the de facto boundary in both directions. Iraq is unhappy about losing some territory in the Umm Qasr Port, especially some naval facilities, and the Rumaylah oil field areas.
After deciding on the land boundary at its April session, the commission physically placed some temporary border markers. The commission plans to resume placing border markers in October/November when there are more favorable weather conditions.
Iraqi officials have made numerous statements criticizing the commission's work and its demarcation of the land boundary which cast doubt about Iraq's ultimate acceptance of the demarcation.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmad Hussein sent a 43-page letter to the Secretary-General May 21 calling into question Iraq's previous formal acceptance of both UNSCR 687 and the Secretary-General's plan for implementing its border demarcation provisions, as well as the finality of the commission's decisions. It denounced the decisions adopted by the commission concerning the land boundary, as well as the mandate, composition and working methods of the commission. The Iraqi letter also suggested Iraq may dispute the very existence of Kuwait.
The Security Council responded to the Iraqi letter with a strong presidential statement adopted June 17 emphasizing the following:
"The inviolability of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait being demarcated by the commission and guaranteed by the Council pursuant to Resolution 687 (1991), and the grave consequences that would ensue from any breach thereof."
More recently, the Iraqi Foreign Minister informed the Secretary-General in a July 11 letter that Iraq would not participate in the Boundary Demarcation Commission's July 15-24 session in New York.
In spite of Iraq's decision to boycott the commission's July session, the commission met, finalized its report on the land boundary section and discussed the Khor Abdullah, the off-shore boundary. We expect the commission to submit its final report on demarcation of the land boundary to the Secretary-General very soon, who will then transmit to the Security Council for endorsement. The commission has scheduled another meeting in October to discuss the Khor Abdullah. The commission expects to finish demarcating the land boundary with physical markers by the end of 1992.
We note that the commission's July 24 press release at the conclusion of its July session rejected Iraqi charges of partiality, of not being afforded the opportunity to provide the commission with all relevant material and evidence, and of depriving Iraq of an outlet to the sea by its demarcation decisions.
V. Detainees Unfortunately, there has been very little progress since my predecessor last testified on a grave and continuing humanitarian concern: the fate of the missing persons presumed to remain in Iraq.
A large number of prisoners of war, persons missing in action, and civilian detainees remain unaccounted for. Kuwait's list of 850, most recently revised in March, remains the best estimate of the number of Kuwaiti (723) and third country (127) persons presumed to remain in Iraq. Since March, 81 persons have been repatriated, including 20 persons on the Kuwaiti list of 850.
The other 61 persons were family reunification or special humanitarian cases. Kuwait is continuing its painstaking efforts to verify and update its list of missing. Thus, approximately 800 missing persons still remain in Iraq, according to Kuwait.
In recent months Kuwait has focused on individual case files, submitting to Iraq four batches of files totaling 70 persons, through the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), which requested Iraq to conduct a thorough search. Iraq has responded -- unacceptably -- to the first batch of 13 files, with the curt reply that offices were notified and no information found, without providing ICRC the details of what sort of search was conducted.
Iraq has also rejected ICRC requests to visit prisons and detention centers in Iraq, in accordance with ICRC's standard procedures for such visits, which are designed to facilitate ICRC's efforts to repatriate the missing and detained.
Most ominously, in a letter dated April 20 from the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General, Iraq in effect stated that by publishing the lists of the missing in several newspapers it had already done all it can to search for the missing, the Iraqi letter concludes that Iraq has "no further information to furnish in the future."
Iraq's uncooperative and dilatory behavior on this humanitarian issue continues to cause great mental and emotional anguish for the families of the missing. Iraq is obligated under the two cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council, 686 and 687, to facilitate ICRC's efforts to resolve this humanitarian issue.
VI. Multilateral Economic Sanctions The UN economic sanctions regime is a critical mechanism for maintaining pressure on Iraq to fulfill the terms of the cease-fire resolution, in view of Iraq's consistently uncooperative behavior on most aspects of Resolution 687 and related resolutions, I can report that the sanctions regime continues to have the solid support of the members of the council. This support continues despite aggressive Iraqi diplomatic and propaganda initiatives to persuade some members to argue for a partial or complete lifting of the sanctions. The Council's determination to maintain the sanctions was amply demonstrated yet again on Monday, when it decided to maintain the full force of the regime.
The maritime embargo continues to be vigorously applied through the efforts of our own and other cooperating naval forces in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aqaba, we have continued to encourage the government of Jordan to tighten up on movements of goods across its border with Iraq. Although we believe there are still shipments which move across that border without the approval of the UN Sanctions Committee, it is worth noting that the Jordanian authorities are now regular petitioners for committee approval. We will continue to be in contact with the Jordanians on this important issue.
While enforcing the sanctions regime, the Council and its Sanctions Committee have been continuously alert to the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. In the 16 months since the ceasefire, planned shipments to Iraq of 9.5 million tons of foodstuffs and approaching a billion dollars worth of other essential goods were notified to or approved by the Sanctions Committee under procedures established by Resolution 687. The committee routinely approves the sale or shipment to Iraq of such necessities as medical and hospital equipment and supplies, clothing and shoes, animal feeds and agricultural seeds, supplies for primary education, essential agricultural equipment and machinery, clothing and shoes, parts and materials for water treatment and sewage disposal, and grain storage and food packaging materials. It also approves building materials and other goods for use in the programs of the various humanitarian agencies working in Iraq.
By and large, all other items are prohibited, including all items which would serve as inputs to Iraqi industry. As an example, the committee routinely approves the export of civilian finished clothing, but opposes the export of fabric to be made into clothes in Iraqi factories. Any humanitarian good which might have a dual-use is also rejected unless the item will remain under the control of an appropriate humanitarian agency and will be re-exported from Iraq upon termination of the particular program.
As you know, a major effort in this area was the Security Council's adoption of Resolutions 706 and 712 -- the resolutions which permit the export of Iraqi oil in order to finance humanitarian imports to benefit all the people of that country and to fund UN programs mandated by the ceasefire resolution.
After several protracted rounds of face-to-face discussions on the implementation of these resolutions, I regret to say that the Iraqis continue to reject 706 and 712, most recently in statements last week. We regret the Iraqi rejection, because the resolutions provide the best way to ensure that Iraq meets its humanitarian obligations to its own people. The resolutions also provide the best means to ensure financing for the other UN functions mandated by the Council. These functions are critical, and now that Iraq says it has no intention of pursuing the resolutions further, we are, together with other concerned countries, developing other options for funding those activities. Iraq should understand that the alternatives to 706/712 will all be less attractive from the Iraqi perspective.
VII. Humanitarian All available reports indicate that sufficient amounts of food and other essential civilian items are entering Iraq. The distribution of these essential items is far from equitable, however, and most items are somewhat more expensive compared to pre-1991 prices.
Since October of 1991, the Baghdad regime has imposed an internal embargo on shipments of essential goods to the predominantly Kurdish-held areas of northern Iraq. Although supplies reach Kurdish areas through major international humanitarian relief efforts and through traditional trade links with Turkey and Iran, the flow of rations to the area is considerably less than to provinces in the central Sunni heartland.
Reports from a variety of sources indicate that there are continuing problems in the predominantly Shia south. The Iraqi government has intensified military actions against the Arabs living in the marshes and has impeded distribution of clean water, and cut off sanitation services.
It is clear that through its continuing repression of ethnic and religious groups, its internal embargo, its denial of access by United Nations and other international relief agencies to many vulnerable groups, and its obstruction of relief, logistical and supply efforts, Iraq continues to violate Resolution 688.
Over the last several weeks, the United Nations has been unsuccessful in its efforts to gain an extension of the Memorandum of Understanding that provided a platform for the humanitarian relief operations mounted by the UN and many non-governmental relief organizations. When the MOU expired on June 30, the Secretary-General issued a statement which confirmed that the UN agencies would continue to carry out their programs in Iraq under "existing arrangements."
However, it has been increasingly difficult for them to do so, and the plight of the non-governmental agencies in some cases is even more troublesome. Although the Iraqi authorities have told the UN that there will be no problem with visas and internal travel permits, the expiry of most of these documents make movement in and around the country problematic, clearly hampering operations. Recent attacks on UN guards and other humanitarian personnel -- including the recent killing of one U.N. guard -- are cause for great concern, as are repeated acts of harassment committed against U.N. vehicles, property, and programs. The United Nations is maintaining its presence in the face of Iraqi harassment, but several NGOs have concluded they must leave.
Iraqi's failure to renew the MOU and to take adequate steps to ensure the safety of U.N. and NGO relief personnel violates Iraq's obligations under Resolution 688. Although discussions between the Iraqis and senior United Nations personnel continue, Iraq has not given the UN any real indication that it is prepared to renew the MOU or permit the UN guards' contingent -- on which the agencies depend for their security to remain. We will be watching this situation carefully in the days to come.
VIII. UN Compensation Commission To provide compensation for direct losses suffered as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council created a compensation commission to process and decide claims and a compensation fund to pay them.
The governing council of the compensation commission completed its sixth session in June and has now been in existence for one year. Its accomplishments to date have been impressive:
-- Adoption of the legal criteria for the filing of six categories of claims, including all claims of individuals, corporations, governments and international organizations;
-- Distribution of claims forms for all individual and corporate claims; -- Receipt of the first "urgent" claims of individuals who departed Kuwait or Iraq, suffered death or serious injury, or suffered losses up to $100,000;
-- Adoption of the rules of procedure for processing claims and of clarification on a number of key matters, for example, issues relating to business losses.
Despite these achievements, the commission suffers from a critical lack of resources for its operations and has no funds to pay claims. Its revenues are to come from a percentage of the value of Iraq oil exports. However, Iraq's behavior does not justify lifting the sanctions and it has refused to accept the terms of Security Council Resolutions 706/712 (which would have authorized $1.6 billion in oil sales for humanitarian purposes, with 30 percent of this amount for the compensation process). Unfortunately, for Saddam Hussein's victims, many of whom are people without financial reserves, justice delayed means, in important respects, justice denied.
(END TEXT) NNNN
File Identification: 07/29/92, NX-302
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: PERKINS, EDWARD/Speaker; CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY; HOUSE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS CMTE; IRAQ-US RELATIONS/Policy; IRAQ/Defense & Military; INSPECTIONS; ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION; UNITED NATIONS-SECURITY COUNCIL; ARMISTICE; HUMANITARIAN
Document Type: TXT
Thematic Codes: 1NE; 1UN; 1AC
Target Areas: NE
PDQ Text Link: 236932
USIA Notes: *92072902.NXE PERKINS/TEXT/IRAQI COMPLIANCE/UN/RM yb kf
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