Tracking Number: 219255
Title: "Iraqi Weapons Programs Need Close Watching, UN Told." Rolf Ekeus and Hans Blix, the heads of the expert teams overseeing the destruction of Iraq's weapons programs, told
the UN Security Council that Iraq has consistently failed to cooperate with the Persian Gulf war cease-fire agreement and it needs constant monitoring to ensure the return of peace and stability to the region. (920312)
Translated
Title: Se informa a ONU que hay que vigilar de cerca programas de armas Iraquies.; Irak: l`ONU doit continuer sa surveillance. (920312)
Author: AITA, JUDY (USIA STAFF WRITER)
Date: 19920312
Text:
IRAQI WEAPONS PROGRAMS NEED CLOSE WATCHING, U.N. TOLD
(Experts cite Iraq's violations of cease-fire) (950) By Judy Aita USIA United Nations Correspondent United Nations -- The heads of the expert teams overseeing the destruction of Iraq's weapons programs told the U.N. Security Council March 11 that Iraq has consistently failed to cooperate with the Persian Gulf War cease-fire agreement and it needs constant monitoring to ensure the return of peace and stability to the region.
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, executive chairman of the special commission overseeing the destruction of Iraq's chemical, biological and ballistic weapons, and Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Iraq's claim that it has provided all the necessary information on the banned weapons programs is not true.
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Aziz, who contended that his government had "seriously endeavored" to meet the council's demands on its weapons programs, suggested that Iraqi experts, U.N. officials and the council discuss disarmament conditions for Iraq.
Ekeus said the information that Iraq has provided has been "neither complete nor systematized." The commission has evidence of "the continued existence and concealment of undeclared weapons and the means for their delivery," he said, referring to Scud missiles and launchers.
Blix noted that Iraq often has pursued a pattern of denial and clandestine activities until evidence of them becomes overwhelming.
While the agency's work would have been impossible without "a certain amount of cooperation by Iraq," he said, its mission could have been accomplished much faster and "with much less pain if Iraq had fully and spontaneously complied."
Iraq has "actively concealed" projects and deceived the inspectors, Blix said, noting that only the "firm and consistent support of the Security Council" enabled IAEA to survey Iraq's nuclear program.
Given Iraq's record, he said, international verification and monitoring are the only viable way to create confidence that Iraq is not reviving its nuclear weapons program.
Through its appearance before the council Iraq is trying to shift the blame for failing to compile the required weapons information from itself to the commission, Ekeus said.
He noted that Aziz said Iraq destroyed more than 270,000 items unilaterally, yet the commission has not received the list fully accounting for these items. In addition, he said, "the unilateral destruction by Iraq of these items is not in conformity with Resolution 687, which provided for disposal of prohibited items only under international supervision."
Iraq refused to allow the destruction of ballistic missile production materials and "is continuing to refuse to comply and seeks to confuse the issue," Ekeus said. "Iraq has sought to argue that nearly every building and every piece of equipment which has been devoted to its proscribed weapons programs should be kept and should be converted to what it has said would be civilian use.
"This argument does not stand up to even the most cursory examination," he said. "There is not a single structure or item which is or will be earmarked for destruction which has formed part of Iraq's civilian industrial base."
One of the council's major problems is Iraq's refusal to accept the long-term monitoring and verification plan drawn up the commission and the IAEA.
"Until Iraq agrees to accept and to cooperate in ongoing monitoring and verification, the commission has no alternative but to refuse requests to convert dual-use items to civilian programs, and, if the necessary acceptance and cooperation is not forthcoming, to insist on the destruction of those items," Ekeus said.
Ekeus reiterated the commission's complaints that Iraq continues to interfere with the landing rights of U.N. aircraft and other U.N. operations in the country.
Blix noted that after 10 months of inspections, intense questioning of Iraqi technicians, screening masses of documents, and assessing hundreds of samples taken in Iraq, the IAEA has been able to get a "fairly consistent and coherent picture" of the Iraqi nuclear program.
"Information supplied by Iraq, often after prior lack of cooperation, has been of great importance in several ways, but the picture that we draw is by no means a simple reflection of this information," he said, adding that direct observation and inspection of nuclear facilities, equipment and authentic documents, and information from other countries had been essential.
Nevertheless, there are still some gaps or "gray areas," Blix said. "In view of these gaps and Iraq's track record of non-revelation, inspections need to continue."
He said that if new information is revealed about sites having possible clandestine nuclear facilities, new inspections will be necessary even after long-term monitoring and verification procedures begin.
While Iraq's attitude has improved "somewhat" recently, Blix said, a "lack of cooperation and non-compliance still persist in the provision of information concerning sources of procurement of critical material and equipment."
A large part of Iraq's nuclear facilities, including those for research and development, either were destroyed or heavily damaged during the gulf war, but sites, facilities, equipment and materials which suffered little or no damage still remain and must be destroyed, Blix said.
As examples of sites where "little or no repairs or modification would be needed to resurrect the nuclear weapons program," Blix cited Al Atheer, a facility for designing weapons, as well as buildings at Tarmiya, an industrial complex for enriched uranium production, and Ash Sharqat, another site for industrial-scale activities.
Information on the large number of highly-trained scientists and engineers in the nuclear program "suggests that these people are currently engaged in the civilian reconstruction of the country," he said. "Needless to say, it is important that these highly-qualified cadres remain engaged in non-proscribed activities."
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File Identification: 03/12/92, PO-404; 03/12/92, AE-404; 03/12/92, AR-419; 03/12/92, EP-419; 03/12/92, EU-409; 03/12/92, NE-404; 03/12/92, NA-405; 03/13/92, AS-505; 03/16/92, AF-108
Product Name: Wireless
File
Product Code: WF
Languages: Arabic; Spanish; French
Keywords: UNITED NATIONS-SECURITY COUNCIL; INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY; INSPECTIONS; ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION; NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; IRAQ/Defense & Military; BLIX, HANS; EKEUS, ROLF; AZIZ, TARIQ
Thematic Codes: 1UN; 1NE; 1AC
Target Areas: AF; AR; EA; EU; NE
PDQ Text Link: 219255;
219396; 219693
USIA Notes: *92031204.POL
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