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Title:  "Iraq Must Meet UN Obligations, US Says." In remarks to the UN Security Council US Ambassador Thomas Pickering discussed the UN sanctions still in place against Iraq. (920311)

Date:  19920311

Text:
IRAQ MUST MEET U.N. OBLIGATIONS, U.S. SAYS

(Text: Pickering remarks to Security Council) (3080) United Nations -- U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering told Iraq March 11 that unless Baghdad fully and unconditionally complies with U.N. cease-fire demands, "the chances of lifting sanctions are nil."

Addressing the U.N. Security Council, Pickering said, "the council stands at a critical juncture in its consideration of restoring and maintaining international peace and security in the gulf region."

"My government and the council will be watching closely Iraqi actions in the future," he said. "By disdaining and failing to comply with the council's resolutions, Iraq risks making, as it has in the past, yet another tragic miscalculation, the full consequences of which the government of Iraq once again will have to bear."

The council met with a high-level Iraqi delegation March 11 to discuss Iraq's failure to comply with many cease-fire provisions. Pickering said that "from the first, Iraq has tried to obfuscate and evade its obligations."

He also said Iraq must not be allowed to convert its military plants into civilian manufacturing facilities and must immediately and completely destroy the al-Atheer nuclear weapons facility.

Following is the text of Pickering's remarks: (begin text) Mr. President, during the course of the past year no subject has preoccupied the council more than its efforts to restore international peace and security in the Gulf in the aftermath of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. We are here today because the requirements of the council have not been met. We are also here because Iraq has asked to send an authoritative senior official to answer "all the questions." I can assure him that there continue to be many questions which must be answered, preeminent among them is why Iraq will not comply fully and completely with the resolutions of this council.

Nearly one year ago, on April 3, 1991, the council adopted Resolution 687. This comprehensive and unprecedented resolution established a detailed framework for restoring and maintaining international peace and security in the Gulf region. Passage of this resolution was one of the most, important actions ever taken by the council, responding to the hope of mankind to make the United Nations an instrument of peace and stability.

Resolution 687 required Iraq to take precise steps on many issues. Iraq formally notified the secretary-general and the Security Council by letter on April 4, 1991, followed by an Iraqi letter of April 11, 1991 from its National Assembly, of its acceptance of the Resolution. Thus, a formal ceasefire to the Gulf conflict came into effect on April 11, 1991.

Resolution 687 led to a number of other resolutions to implement its specific parts including 689, 692, 699, 700, 705, 706, 707, 712 and 715.

This is a long list indeed of detailed resolutions spelling out Iraq's obligations. Unfortunately, from the first, Iraq has tried to obfuscate and evade its obligations.

The council agreed in Resolution 687 that if the Gulf region is to enjoy peace and security, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles must be permanently eliminated. This requires Iraq's cooperation, including the full and complete disclosure of its weapons programs. The record of Iraq's failure in this regard is unescapable, clear and serious.

An unfortunate pattern has developed: Iraq makes declarations of minimal content, declarations which are clearly meant to misinform, misdirect and to conceal. Iraq repeatedly divulges information related to its weapons programs only after being presented incontrovertible proof uncovered by the Special Commission and the IAEA in their inspections. This is not compliance, but hide and seek, cat and mouse, cheat and retreat.

For example, in the nuclear field Iraq concealed evidence of its electromagnetic isotope separation program for enriching uranium to the extent of pouring concrete over tell-tale structures and covering the concrete with rubble. In another instance, Iraq, in its declarations, consistently denied any nuclear "weaponization" programs until the sixth nuclear weapons inspection team in September 1991 found extensive and detailed documentation for such programs. Belatedly, Iraqi provided the seventh weapons inspection team formal, but still incomplete, written acknowledgement of nuclear weapons program. Still yet another damning example was Iraq's denial until August 6, 1991, when inspectors found evidence of it, that Iraq had produced unsafeguarded plutonium.

In the area of chemical weapons, Iraq offered contradictory statements regarding the making of chemical munitions. More importantly, Iraq has failed to respond satisfactorily to requests for information on Iraq's past chemical weapons programs, particularly as regards foreign suppliers of munitions, equipment and precursor chemicals. Instead, Iraq has insisted that its chemical weapons production did not start until 1986 and has claimed that all its chemical weapons were produced indigenously. However, the whole world knows, as attested by the U.N. itself, that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran as early as 1983.

Turning, to biological weapons programs, Iraq unquestionably violated its obligations to hand over to the Special Commission all its biological weapons-related items when contrary to Security Council Resolution 687 it destroyed buildings at its Salman Pak biological weapon research center immediately prior to the first commission inspection there. Moreover, after first maintaining it had no biological weapons and that it had carried out no related activities, Iraq then acknowledged to inspectors that it had undertaken research which could have had offensive military applications. Lastly, although Iraq then claimed that its biological weapons research program, which it said had begun in 1986, had ended in 1990, a Special Commission biological weapons inspection team found clear evidence at Salman Pak of the capability to produce what was characterized as "...vast quantities of biological agents."

In the area of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, Iraq initially declared 62 Scud missiles and Scud variants and five sites for production, maintenance, storage and deployment. Subsequent inspections revealed, however, that Iraq had misrepresented its inventory of ballistic missiles, components and facilities and attempted to deceive inspectors and conceal missiles and related components from inspection teams. As but one in a long list of examples I could give you today, Iraq's original declaration did not include five types of ballistic missiles covered by Resolution 687.

This pattern of concealment has continued, I am afraid to say, right down to the present day. For this I draw your attention to the report of Executive Chairman Ekeus on his special mission to Baghdad February 21-23 in which he notes that at the very moment he was being assured that Iraq had made all required declarations and fulfilled its obligations, a ballistic missile inspection team found at two sites prohibited items that had not previously been declared. Iraq continues to try to deceive and to evade.

In those February 1992 discussions with the Special Commission, Iraq stated it had already provided "all the necessary information" under Resolution 687. Iraq's previous actions to the contrary make it impossible to believe now that such is true. The Special Commission chairman could not but conclude that Iraq has given "no undertaking to provide such a full, final and complete disclosure."

Even in the face of its unsatisfactory disclosure of information on its weapons of mass destruction programs, destruction of some of these weapons has proceeded. Without full, final and complete disclosure, however, the inspectors will never know if all such weapons have been located and destroyed. More precisely in the absence of full disclosure we will all have to conclude that the destruction cannot categorically be proven to be complete.

U.N. resolutions also call for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's production facilities for these weapons of mass destruction. The clearest example of Iraq's nuclear facilities is the al-Atheer facility. U.N. inspection teams have found that al-Atheer is a state-of-the-art facility expressly designed for producing nuclear weapons. Iraq's own progress report on al-Atheer -- seized by a U.N. inspection team in September 1991 -- links al-Atheer directly with Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Al-Atheer can in no way be considered to have any other purpose than weapons making, and therefore should be immediately and completely destroyed.

Iraq has refused to destroy materiel and ballistic missile production and repair facilities designated by the Special Commission in February. Iraq has argued that these missile production items can be used for other purposes, including, interestingly enough, the production of missiles of ranges less than 150 kilometers.

Iraq has claimed that it can render these and similar facilities for producing weapons of mass destruction harmless by converting them to civilian use. Given Iraq's clear record of non-compliance with U.N. efforts to identify Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, however, Iraq must not be allowed the option to return these facilities to use for production of these awful weapons. Therefore, these facilities should be destroyed rather than merely converted.

The critical point here is not whether facilities are capable of producing material for civilian use but whether they are capable of being used for prohibited purposes. The council continues to support the proposition that the Special Commission -- and not Iraq -- must and will determine which facilities are required under Security Council resolutions to be destroyed. This is not a matter for negotiations or haggling, but of a final determination by the Special Commission which must be observed by Iraq.

Regarding Iraq's obligations under Resolutions 707 and 715 to agree unconditionally to implement the ongoing monitoring and verification plans, the Special Commission chairman reported in February that Iraq had not provided such agreement. The council insists on the necessity of assuring the international community that Iraq will not reacquire these destabilizing weapons. There is no alternative to Iraqi acceptance and implementation of Resolutions 707 and 715.

Allow me to turn now to Iraq's other obligations under Resolution 687. On border issues, in August 1991, the Iraqi representative to the Boundary Commission stated that Iraq rejected the work of the commission. Iraq has, nevertheless, participated reluctantly in the work of the commission. Iraq is obligated to accept the work of the commission. Any statements by Iraq to the contrary are breaches of Iraq's obligations under Resolution 687.

Also related to the border is the issue of five Iraqi border police posts located on the Kuwaiti side of the boundary line on the map used by UNIKOM, which UNIKOM has repeatedly asked Iraq to remove to its side of the border and 1,000 meters away from the line on the UNIKOM map as previously agreed, but which Iraq still refuses to do.

On return of property, although progress has been made in returning Kuwaiti property, much remains to be done, including the return of aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems taken from Kuwait by Iraq.

On the repatriation of Kuwaiti, Saudi and other third country detainees, Iraq refuses to take action on investigating lists of missing detainees submitted by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At a meeting in Riyadh in March 1991, representatives of Iraq, Kuwait, France, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom and United States, all of the parties to that meeting including Iraq, agreed to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross all facilities necessary to enable the ICRC to gather information on the whereabouts of missing persons.

One full year later, Iraq has yet to agree to ICRC access to Iraqi prisons and places of detention. Nor has Iraq yet followed through on its agreement to publish in its media lists of the missing persons or to report effectively on what tracing steps it is taking on individual inquiry files.

Iraq's response has been a series of unfulfilled promises. The latest series of such promises was made in a February 1992 letter to the secretary-general which declares that Iraq is prepared to talk to the ICRC representative in Baghdad about ICRC access to prisons and publication of names of the missing. To add insult to injury, this Iraqi letter asserts that Iraq is now in compliance with paragraph 30 of Resolution 687 as a result of these promises. Once again Iraq has deliberately delayed any meaningful cooperation on this issue, displaying a totally callous and uncooperative attitude towards the plight of the missing and the suffering of their relatives.

Iraq has repeatedly criticized the council for causing shortages of food, medicines and other essential civilian needs in Iraq -- even though Resolutions 706 and 712 provide the means for Iraq to assure the provision and equitable distribution of such goods to all the Iraqi civilian population.

Paragraph 7 of Resolution 706 also required Iraq to submit monthly statements of its gold and foreign currency holdings. Iraq has yet to submit its first report.

Not only has Iraq not taken advantage of the 706/712 mechanism to improve the welfare of the Iraqi population, but Baghdad persists in actions repressing its civilian population, particularly in the predominantly Kurdish-inhabited areas of the north and in the predominantly Shi'a-inhabited areas of the south.

Grave international concern at Baghdad's brutal repression of its own civilian population led to passage of Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991. This resolution condemned the repression and demanded its immediate end. Members of the council will recall that indiscriminate Iraqi shelling of civilian populations and other military pressure on civilians had led to a massive exodus from northern Iraq to Turkey and Iran, threatening the international peace and security of the region. Resolution 688 also insisted that Iraq "allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations."

The Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur's February 18, 1992 report, the press and non-governmental organizations have all documented the economic embargo instituted by the Government of Iraq in October 1991 -- and, I am sorry to say, still continuing to this day -- on shipments of food, fuel and other essential humanitarian supplies to northern Iraq. This embargo, enforced by the Iraqi military, is both impeding U.N. relief operations and inflicting severe hardship on Iraqi civilians as well as impeding their right to enter and leave the area. In addition, Iraqi citizens formerly resident in the Kirkuk area are not allowed to return to their homes and businesses.

Elements of the embargo include cutting off salary and pension payments to Iraqi civil servants in the north, curtailing rations to approximately half what other Iraqi civilians receive, and reducing fuel deliveries to approximately 25 percent of the pre-October 1991 level. Checkpoint guards on the roads leading to northern Iraq are reported to confiscate the smallest quantities of privately purchased food carried by civilians arriving at the checkpoint from the south.

It is ironic -- truly tragic -- that the Government of Iraq should continue to issue distorted, fabricated and exaggerated claims about the alleged humanitarian impact of U.N. sanctions -- which in no way restrict the flow of medicines, food and other essential humanitarian goods -- while the Iraqi government itself imposes an internal embargo consciously designed to deprive some selected Iraqi civilians of food, fuel, medicine and other essential supplies.

The Iraqi government continues to repress its predominantly Shi'a population in the south as well. As recently as December 1991/January 1992 the Iraqi military launched attacks on the "marsh Arabs," killing hundreds.

The U.N. Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur's report and the press have also documented repressive Iraqi government practices against Shi'a religious and cultural institutions. The Government of Iraq apparently is waging a concerted attack against the Shi'a clergy by arresting them, "disappearing" them, imprisoning them and torturing them. Iraq has yet to reply to an inquiry from the Special Rapporteur about his November 1991 list of missing persons, including Shi'a clergy. The Iraqis continue to keep the ill and aged Imam Khoie under house arrest and to deny him medical attention from outside specialists. In March 1991 the shrine of Imam Hussain in Karbala was shelled, badly damaged, and desecrated. The official Iraqi explanation that Shi'a "rebels" defiled their holiest shrine defies credulity. Shi'a religious colleges and universities have been closed; Shi'a publications are prohibited or strictly censored; Shi'a religious leaders are prevented from traveling freely.

More generally, Iraq's human rights record is abysmal. The Special Rapporteur's February 1992 report, a document circulated to members of this council, as well as recent reports by private human rights organizations, catalog a compendium of horrors. Much of the new evidence derives from the files, videotapes and documents of the Iraqi secret police and security forces themselves, who in particular carefully recorded the regime's brutality against the Kurdish people.

Thus, the world is learning in detail of "Operation Anfal" -- the forced relocations of thousands of Kurdish villagers in a deliberate Iraqi policy to erase 4,000 Kurdish villages from the face of the earth. Already the Special Rapporteur has received more than 15,000 names of missing Kurds which led him to conclude that it would be difficult to dismiss the Kurdish claims of some 182,000 disappeared persons. Grave diggers are giving evidence of the burying indiscriminately of executed persons in mass graves. The list of horrors goes on and on.

Iraq's continuing repression of its civilian population led the Special Rapporteur to conclude that the threat to international peace and security in reference to Resolution 688 still continues.

In conclusion, the council has seen Iraqi promises of compliance over the past year. As the president of the council in his opening statement outlined, the council demands and expects Iraqi actions to comply with its resolutions. Without full and unconditional compliance, the chances of lifting sanctions are nil. The Iraqi delegation now has the opportunity to provide authoritative answers to our questions and authoritative declarations of unconditional acceptance of Resolutions 707 and 715, and indeed, of all the resolutions. Even more important Iraq now has the opportunity to show by its actions that it will carry out its obligations. We would welcome authoritative answers, declarations and even more, actions.

Once again the council stands at a critical juncture in its consideration of restoring and maintaining international peace and security in the Gulf region. My government and the council will be watching closely Iraqi actions in the future. By disdaining and failing to comply with the council's resolutions, Iraq risks making, as it has in the past, yet another tragic and fateful miscalculation, the full consequences of which the Government of Iraq will once again have to bear.

(end text) NNNN

File Identification:  03/11/92, TX-304; 03/11/92, EP-320; 03/11/92, EU-306; 03/11/92, NX-305; 03/12/92, AR-407; 03/12/92, NA-404
Product Name:  Wireless File
Product Code:  WF
Languages:  Arabic
Keywords:  UNITED NATIONS-SECURITY COUNCIL; PICKERING, THOMAS/Speaker; IRAQ-US RELATIONS/Policy; IRAQ/Defense & Military; INSPECTIONS/Policy; ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION/Policy; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION/Policy; ARMISTICE;
Document Type:  TXT
Thematic Codes:  1NE; 1AC; 1UN
Target Areas:  AR; EA; EU; NE
PDQ Text Link:  219106
USIA Notes:  *92031104.TXT