ACCESSION
ACCESSION NUMBER:251794 FILE ID:POL314 DATE:11/04/92 TITLE:ADD UNITED NATIONS REPORT, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4 (11/04/92) TEXT:*92110414.POL ADD UNITED NATIONS REPORT, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4 (Iraq/weapons) (560) IRAQ ADMITS TO SCUD FUEL PROGRAM The United Nations Special Commission overseeing the destruction of Iraq's weapons (UNSCOM) said November 4 that Baghdad has admitted to having a program since 1990 to produce fuel and import equipment for ballistic missiles. At a press conference, commission staff said that the inspection team collected an "enormous amount of data" during its just-concluded 14-day tour in Iraq; the team visited over 50 sites and held a series of seminars with Iraqi military officials. But Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, chairman of the special commission, acknowledged that the commission still does not "have the absolute evidence to say" with certainty that "we have accounted for all the Scuds" in Iraq's arsenal. Analysis of the new data, however, should help the commission determine if Scud launchers remain hidden and whether other statements made by Iraqi officials are true. For example, the firing pattern of the Scuds during the Persian Gulf war will help determine whether Iraq has hidden launchers. "We still have serious problem with the data," Ekeus said, adding that Iraq "very strongly refuses" to give any information on its foreign suppliers. UNSCOM has been "well received by the military, but that has been countered by harsh statements at the highest political levels," he said. "It was rather remarkable that they gave such military detail on how they moved the Scuds during the war," Ekeus said. "...but on the political area we have the opposite (of cooperation), we have the harassment and the very nasty statements. That is why we put such emphasis on the statements....We see the negative attitude from the political leadership." UNSCOM viewed its extensive 45th inspection as a "touchstone" in its relations with Iraq and of Iraq's compliance with the various Security Council resolutions, UNSCOM spokesman Tim Trevan said. The inspectors were searching for specific information on the ballistic missile program, especially on supplies of fuel and on Iraq's capability to produce the fuel, he added. Iraq finally admitted it had a program to produce additional fuel and 1mported equipment for the process. In late 1990 it was able launch a successful test flight using the fuel it produced, said Nikita Smidovich, leader of the inspection team. After meeting with the commanding general of the gulf war Scud operation, the team was shown launching sites, Smidovich added. He said that the inspectors also took samples from two launchers that they feel may have been destroyed by the allied forces during the gulf war instead of by Iraq or UNSCOM as part of the cease-fire agreement. UNSCOM "received some mixed signals" from Iraqi officials during the inspection, Trevan said. "On the positive side we have received new and detailed information on operational aspects of the weapons of mass destruction...especially ballistic missiles. Secondly the Iraqis did volunteer information on some aspects rather than just replying to our questions." But "On the negative side, we had the statements by the president, Saddam Hussein, and the deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz...saying fairly unpleasant things about the inspection," he said. "We also had continuing problems with the treatment of our inspectors in Baghdad and we still have not received from them an acknowledgement of their obligations under resolutions 707 and 715, particularly on on-going monitoring and verification." NNNN .
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
