Iran says it's ready to talk: But what about?
12:47 03/11/2010
November 3 (RIA Novosti) - For those who follow foreign policy, the Washington Post story of October 29th was astounding news, coming as it did, on the Friday, in apparent culmination to the week's events.
Iran offered to return to the negotiating table to discuss its controversial nuclear program with the six world powers (five permanent members of the UN Security Council - plus Germany).
Iranian leaders are this week in correspondence with Catherine Ashton, the European Union's new foreign policy chief, about the talks' venue and deadline. The sides will reportedly meet November 10-18 in Vienna, home to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
However this seems less sensational when one recalls that UN General Assembly sources said off the record in late September that Iran wanted to resume talks in November after its 12-month hiatus. The subject of such talks, rather than their resumption, is the most interesting issue.
Last month Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delighted his voters by listing four conditions for resuming talks with the West.
For example, the West must clarify the nature of its intentions in negotiating with Iran. Are they friendly or hostile? This is quite understandable. But then there's the final clause, stipulating that the six powers explicitly state their position on Israel's nuclear arsenal.
This point has been made so often, in similar Iranian propagandistic statements that Tehran's negotiating partners do what they can to ignore it. That is a mistake: it is an extremely difficult issue. Just consider the upcoming talks through the eyes of the parties concerned.
Europe's position is more or less clear. It always takes on the organization, because in reality its role is primarily passive: a less-than-enthusiastic U.S. assistant. The EU's feeling is that neither the problem of Iran's nuclear program, nor that of Israel's nuclear arsenal, are its battles to fight.
Russia and China are sick and tired of Tehran and its seemingly endless ability to get itself caught up in conflicts. Nevertheless, rumors circulated hinting that neither Moscow nor Beijing would approve any further anti-Iranian sanctions beyond June 2010.
Russia and China had warned the United States and the EU against adopting even tougher sanctions, making it clear that, after the UN sanctions, the measure would never again obtain both countries' support.
Although the West did exactly that, Russian sources remained optimistic, advising everyone to wait until talks resumed in November.
That leaves Washington. The United States is not keen to comment on the upcoming Vienna talks because the Democratic Party expects a crushing defeat in the fast-approaching midterm elections for the House of Representatives and Senate.
Unlike the other negotiators, the United States perceives both a nuclear Israel and a nuclear Iran as domestic policy issues. Any slip of the tongue regarding these issues risks depriving local politicians of much-needed votes.
But this is not to say that U.S. diplomats are bone idle in the run-up to the talks. They are trying to keep a low profile. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently held talks with Chinese leaders at the 17th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi and, with the same goal in mind, also paid a visit to the southern Chinese city of Sanya.
Clinton was keen to discover how ready Chinese companies were to replace Western companies on the Iranian market, should Western companies withdraw entirely.
The same talks are underway with Moscow, with each side clear on their "red lines." Everybody is trying to agree; everyone is waiting for the results of the upcoming U.S. election. Will conservative forces be able to exert any serious influence on U.S. foreign policy? Or will they fail to block the necessary changes?
The Republicans remain optimistic because the sanctions in place against Iran are yielding results. It is difficult to use credit cards in Tehran, the country is being starved of financial resources and Japanese and European companies are taking their leave (although Korean and Chinese businessmen are proving quick to step in).
There needs to be some meaningful traction on the Iranian issue. How this movement could be effected is outlined in a couple of articles in the leading U.S. periodical Foreign Affairs.
The September/October 2010 edition (of Foreign Affairs) boasts an article entitled Bringing Israel's Bomb Out of the Basement: Has Nuclear Ambiguity Outlived its Shelf Life? by Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller.
In it, the authors suggest that the United States should recognize Israel, officially, as a nuclear power, just as it recognized India. Why? The surprising benefits to be gained from such a course are detailed in another article in the same publication, entitled An Unlikely Trio: Can Iran, Turkey and the United States Become Allies? Here the author Mustafa Akyol explains that Turkey and Iran are the only two regional powers that are in a position to become Washington's main allies in the struggle against wild and aggressive fundamentalism across the Middle East.
The most logical conclusion is that although Iran can be portrayed as a rogue state for a long time, it is impossible to avoid serious dialogue with Tehran forever.
Of course nobody wants to see Mahmoud Ahmadinejad triumph after forcing the six world powers into a discussion of this extremely grave issue, rather than of how he is in the wrong to pursue his (clearly not civilian) nuclear development program. This is a discussion of the balance of power and vested interests in the greater Middle East. The Israeli nuclear arsenal, whose official existence is neither confirmed nor denied, comprising an estimated 80-500 warheads has a definite role to play here. It clearly influences Iran's behavior, behavior often called outrageous, scandalous and worse.
Sooner or later (and sooner would be better) the United States will have to reset its relations with Israel and the entire region. The greater Middle East is simply becoming too large for America to continue unequivocally supporting Israel and basing its entire regional policy on this fixed axis. As for talking to Iran about this: that remains an issue that will inevitably rear its head, whether under Obama or another reformist president.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
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