• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Analysis: Iran's Undeterred Nuclear Quest

Council on Foreign Relations

February 21, 2007
Prepared by: Robert McMahon

Indications are that Iran has responded to UN Security Council sanctions by expanding uranium enrichment efforts, rather than freezing them. The chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohammed ElBaradei, told the Financial Times ahead of his report to the Council this week that Iran appeared to be stepping up its nuclear enrichment program, including the installation of an additional 164-centrifuge cascade underground in Natanz. Other IAEA officials affirmed that the report would note Iranian defiance (AP). Iranian officials have announced their intention soon to complete a cascade of 3,000 centrifuges, the scale necessary to produce a nuclear bomb.

CFR Director of Studies Gary Samore, a former Clinton administration nuclear negotiator, says an optimistic explanation of Iran’s actions is that the country wants to have a 3,000-centrifuge facility in place at Natanz so it can claim a technical objective before returning seriously to talks and putting a suspension back in place. But Samore is doubtful whether Iran will move to give up its nuclear program. Rhetorically, at least, Tehran has used the sixty-day UN compliance deadline to reassert its right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad this week spoke out against international efforts to “bully” Iran (IRNA) and said nuclear energy is important (ISNA) for “the progress and honor of the country.” He also said the country was ready to halt enrichment if Western states did the same. This continues a pattern of defiance following Western-led efforts in the past year to offer carrots for Iranian cooperation, then threats, and finally the December 23 resolution banning the supply of materials and technology that could be used to build nuclear weapons.

Read the rest of this article on the cfr.org website.

Copyright 2007 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.