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SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON IRAN FOR FAILURE TO HALT URANIUM ENRICHMENT, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1737 (2006)

United Nations - Security Council

23 December 2006
Security Council
SC/8928
Department of Public Information * News and Media Division * New York

    Security Council

    5612th Meeting (AM)

    SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON IRAN FOR FAILURE TO HALT

    URANIUM ENRICHMENT, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1737 (2006)

Measures Will Be Lifted if Iran Suspends Suspect Activities;

    Report Due from Atomic Energy Agency on Compliance within 60 Days

    Determined to give effect to its unmet 31 July demand that Iran
suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, the
Security Council today imposed sanctions on that country, blocking the
import or export of sensitive nuclear materiel and equipment and freezing
the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery
systems.

    Unanimously adopting resolution 1737 (2006) under Article 41 of the
Charter's Chapter VII, the Council decided that Iran should, without
further delay, suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities:  all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including
research and development; and work on all heavy-water related projects,
including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy
water.  The halt to those activities would be verified by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

    Specifically, the Council decided that all States should prevent the
supply, sale or transfer, for the use by or benefit of Iran, of related
equipment and technology, if the State determined that such items would
contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy-water related
activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.  The
Council decided it would terminate the measures if Iran fully complied with
its obligations, or adopt additional ones and possible further decisions if
the country did not.

    The Council requested a report within 60 days from the Director
General of IAEA on whether Iran had established full and sustained
suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution, as well as on the
process of Iranian compliance with all steps required by the IAEA Board, to
the Board of Governors and the Council for its consideration.  The Council
affirmed that it would review Iran's actions in light of that report and
suspend implementation of measures, if and for so long as Iran suspended
all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

    The Council also established a new committee, comprised of all Council
members, to monitor implementation of the present text and designate
further individuals or entities to which the sanctions should apply.  The
committee would be tasked with taking appropriate action on alleged
violations of the sanctions, consider requests for exemptions, designate
possible additional individuals and entities subjected to the measures, and
report at least every 90 days to the Council on the implementation of the
resolution.  All States were to report to the Committee within 60 days on
the steps they had taken with a view to implementing the relevant
provisions of the resolution.

    The representative of the United States stressed that adoption of the
resolution sent Iran an unambiguous message that there were serious
repercussions for its continuing disregard and defiance of the Security
Council.  He hoped the resolution would convince Iran that the best way to
ensure its security and end its isolation was to end its nuclear weapons
programme and take the steps outlined in today's text, and he looked
forward to Iran's unconditional and immediate reply.  The text provided an
important basis for action, and it was not open to interpretation,
compelling all Member States to deny Iran the equipment, technology,
technical assistance and financial assistance that could contribute to
nuclear sensitive activities.  In the face of non-compliance by Iran, the
United States would not hesitate to return to the Council for further action.

    The United Kingdom's representative recalled that, following adoption
of the first such Council resolution on 31 July mandating IAEA-required
suspension by Iran of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
that country had "simply thumbed its nose at the Security Council and
defied international law".  If Iran did not change course, the Council had
committed itself, in today's text, to further measures.  Iran, therefore,
faced a choice, and the vote today had indicated the gravity of that
choice.  He hoped Iran would heed the Council's decision and return to
negotiations to resolve the nuclear dossier.  That, in turn, would open the
way for the European Union and Iran to open a new and wider relationship to
their mutual benefit, and to the benefit of international peace and security.

    The main thrust of the resolution, the representative of the Russian
Federation said, was support of the Council for the activities of IAEA on
the issue at hand.  The long and difficult consultations had focused on
confirming the measures that Iran needed to take to ensure confidence in
its nuclear programme, as formulated by the IAEA Board.  It was crucial
that the restrictions introduced by the Council applied to the areas of
concern of the Agency.  Cooperation with Iran in areas not restricted by
the resolution should not be subjected to its terms.  Some of the wording
of the draft could have been made clearer.  He was convinced that a
solution could be found exclusively in the political and diplomatic
spheres.  In that context, the measures should be taken in line with
Article 41 of the Charter, and not permit the use of force.

    China's representative said that sanctions were not the end, but a
means to urge Iran to return to negotiations.  The sanctions adopted today
were limited and reversible, and targeted at proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems.  There were also explicit provisions indicating that, if Iran
suspended its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and complied
with the relevant Council texts and IAEA requirements, the Council would
suspend and even terminate the sanctions.  Today's text had welcomed the
commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, United
Kingdom and United States to a negotiated solution, and had encouraged Iran
to engage with them, leading to the development of relations and
cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and establishment of
international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear
programme.  Those terms of the text could spur a new round of diplomatic
efforts.

    Iran's representative told the Council that it was a sad day for the
non-proliferation regime.  The Council was imposing sanctions on a member
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, unlike Israel, had never
attacked or threatened to use force against any United Nations
member.  Also unlike Israel, Iran had categorically rejected development,
stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on ideological and strategic
grounds, and it was prepared to provide guarantees that it would never
withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It had placed all its nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards, had fully implemented the Additional
Protocol for more than two years, and had stated its readiness to resume
its implementation.  Iran had also allowed more than 2,000 "person days of
IAEA scrutiny" of all of its related -- and even unrelated -- facilities,
resulting in reported statements by the Agency on the absence of any
evidence of diversion.

    He said that bringing Iran's peaceful nuclear programme to the Council
by a few permanent members, particularly the United States, was not aimed
at a solution, but at compelling Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT
to peaceful nuclear technology.  Suspension was not a solution, but a
temporary stop-gap measure to allow time to find a real
solution.  Moreover, such a suspension had been in place for two years, as
verified by IAEA.  He was here today because his country had not accepted
that "unlawful demand".  At the same time, his country was prepared to go
to any length to allay the so-called proliferation concerns.   Iran was
told it needed to build confidence, but confidence could only be built
through respect for and non-discriminatory application of international law
and international treaties.  Such treaties could not be the subject of
self-serving reinterpretations, even if imposed through resolutions.

    Other explanations of position were made by the representatives of
Qatar, France, Japan, United Republic of Tanzania and Argentina.

    The meeting began at 11:25 a.m. and adjourned at 12:41 p.m.

    Background

    The Security Council met today to act on a draft resolution (document
S/2006/1010) sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which
reads as follows:

    "The Security Council,

    "Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March
2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,

    "Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity
with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

    "Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA
Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to
Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General,
including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,

    "Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General's
report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding
issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which
could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to
conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

    "Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General's
report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that,
after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all
aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge
continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make
progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,

    "Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director
General's reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006
(GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established
full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its
cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the
other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied
with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) and which
are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran's refusal to take
these steps,

    "Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to
find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would
benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing
commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's
High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,

    "Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate
measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with
the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of
sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes,
until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of
this resolution have been met,

    "Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear
programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the
provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), mindful of its
primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security,

    "Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations,

    "1.   Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps
required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14,
which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose
of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;

    "2.   Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay
suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:

    (a)   all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including
research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and

    (b)   work on all heavy water-related projects, including the
construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be
verified by the IAEA;

    "3.   Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to
prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their
territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft
to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating
in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and
technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related,
reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:

    (a)   those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of
INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;

    (b)   those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part
1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:

    (i)   equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water
reactors;

    (ii)  low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in
assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;

    (c)   those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or
transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;

    (d)   any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and
technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the
Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein "the Committee"), which
could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy
water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems;

    "4.   Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to
prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their
territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft
to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating
in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods
and technology:

    (a)   those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814
if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related,
reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;

    (b)   any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815
if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related,
reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems;

    (c)   any further items if the State determines that they would
contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which
the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;

    "5.   Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items,
materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814
and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by
subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:

    (a)   the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out
in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and

    (b)   they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively
a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

    (c)   they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or
transfer; and

    (d)   in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days
of the supply, sale or transfer;

    "6.   Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures
to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training,
financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the
transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale,
transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;

    "7.   Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents
S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the
procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

    "8.   Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as
the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph
2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and
calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;

    "9.   Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above
shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a
case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such
items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of
Iran's technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including
where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other
humanitarian purposes, provided that:

    (a)   contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include
appropriate end-user guarantees; and

    (b)   Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems;

    "10.  Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry
into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged
in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify
the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the
persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein "the Annex"), as
well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the
Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing
support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the
involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment,
materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs
3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related
to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;

    "11.  Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State
to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States
shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account
humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives
of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

    "12.  Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial
assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of
adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or
controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as
those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council
or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or
providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or
the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned
or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the
measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons
or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee
removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States shall
ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented
from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities
within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;

    "13.  Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not
apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been
determined by relevant States:

    (a)   to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for
foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes,
insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment
of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses
associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service
charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or
maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources,
after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention
to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial
assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by
the Committee within five working days of such notification;

    (b)   to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such
determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and
has been approved by the Committee;

    (c)   to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien
or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic
resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the
lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present
resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated
pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the
relevant States to the Committee;

    (d)   to be necessary for activities directly related to the items
specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the
relevant States to the Committee;

    "14.  Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts
frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or
other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts,
agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those
accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that
any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to
these provisions and are frozen;

    "15.  Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not
prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a
contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity,
provided that the relevant States have determined that:

    (a)   the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items,
materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial
assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3,
4 and 6 above;

    (b)   the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person
or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;

    and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the
intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where
appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic
resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

    "16.  Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA
or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety
or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects
directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii)
above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that
relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in
paragraph 2 above;

    "17.  Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent
specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their
territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to
Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems;

    "18.  Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its
provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council
consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

    (a)   to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and
those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions
taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further
information it may consider useful in this regard;

    (b)   to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding
the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed
by paragraph 17 of this resolution and whatever further information it may
consider useful in this regard;

    (c)   to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding
alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10
and 12 of this resolution;

    (d)   to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in
paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;

    (e)   to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of
paragraph 3 above;

    (f)   to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and
entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;

    (g)   to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in
such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where
possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set
out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;

    (h)   to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its
work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations
and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness
of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;

    "19.  Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60
days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a
view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17
above;

    "20.  Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in
paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is
for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the
international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages
Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the
international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such
engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

    "21.  Welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of
the European Union's High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this
issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals
(S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution
1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for
the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual
respect and the establishment of international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;

    "22.  Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the
IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends
and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for
their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining
outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the
necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues
relating to Iran's nuclear programme;

    "23.  Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of
the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of
all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of
Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with
the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and
in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

    "24.  Affirms that it shall review Iran's actions in the light of the
report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

    (a)   that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for
so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to
allow for negotiations;

    (b)   that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran
has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of
the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of
Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

    (c)   that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23
above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the
requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be
required should such additional measures be necessary;

    "25.  Decides to remain seized of the matter."

    Resolution Annex

    A.    Entities involved in the nuclear programme

    1.    Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran

    2.    Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor - Arak)

    3.    Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP - Natanz)

    4.    Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified
in IAEA reports)

    5.    Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified
in IAEA reports)

    6.    Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled
entity, some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge
programme making components, and in the missile programme)

    7.    7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being
directly involved in the nuclear programme)

    B.    Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme

    1.    Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)

    2.    Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)

    3.    Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant,
subordinate entity of AIO)

    C.    Persons involved in the nuclear programme

    1.    Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development

    2.    Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager ( Arak)

    3.    Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)

    4.    Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz

    5.    Jafar Mohammadi, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of
managing the production of valves for centrifuges)

    6.    Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company

    7.    Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar
University of Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has
conducted experiments on beryllium)

    D.    Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme

    1.    Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)

    2.    Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO

    3.    Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO

    4.    Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO

    E.    Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile
programmes

    1.    Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)

    Statements

    VITALY CHURKIN ( Russian Federation) said that his delegation would
vote in favour of the text, because the text -- a product of long and
difficult consultations -- focused on the confirmation of the measures that
Iran needed to take to ensure confidence in its nuclear programme, as
formulated by the IAEA Board.  In other words, the main thrust of the
resolution was support by the Council of the IAEA activities in that
area.  It was crucial that restrictions introduced by the Council applied
to the areas that caused the concern of the Agency.  Cooperation with Iran
in the areas that were not restricted by the resolution should not be
subject to its terms.

    He went on to say that some of the wording of the draft could have
been made clearer.  He was convinced that solutions could be found
exclusively in the political and diplomatic spheres.  In that context, it
was important that the measures would be taken in accordance with Article
41 of the Charter and not permit the use of force.  In strengthening the
global non-proliferation regime, it was necessary to seek solid regional
and international safety and security.  His Government saw the resolution
as a serious message to be sent to Iran to ensure a more active and open
cooperation with IAEA to resolve the remaining concerns.  The parameters
for cooperation had been set forth in the resolutions of the IAEA Board and
supported by the Security Council.

    Today's resolution clearly reaffirmed that, if Iran suspended all
activities related to enrichment or reprocessing of uranium, the sanctions
would be suspended, he said.  That would allow the international community
to launch a negotiations process.  Such proposals had been transmitted to
Iran's Government in the name of the six countries involved and remained
valid today.  He hoped Iran would perceive the context of the resolution
and take measures to resolve the issue.

    ALEJANDRO WOLFF ( United States) said the Security Council today was
sending Iran an unambiguous message that there were serious repercussions
for its continuing disregard and defiance of the Council.  Nearly four
months ago, the Council had sent a serious message to Iran to take the
steps required of it by IAEA.  That step had been taken to convince Iran to
relent from its confrontational posture and to consider the offer by the
United States, France, Germany, Russian Federation and China on 1 June, and
avoid Security Council action.  Regrettably, Iran had continued to defy the
international community by its continued enrichment activities and its
refusal to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and the request of IAEA.

    He said that today's Chapter VII text required Iran to suspend all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to stop work on all
heavy-water-related projects, including the construction of a research
reactor moderated by heavy water, all to be verified by IAEA, which would
report back to the Council within 60 days.  Iran was also required to
provide IAEA with the access it needed to resolve outstanding issues, as
well as to ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol.  To persuade Iran to take
those steps, today's resolution had taken the necessary measures, deciding
that there would be no trade with Iran in three key nuclear-related
areas.  The text also banned any technical or financial assistance by any
countries, and it had States freeze assets of any persons or entities
supporting Iran in its nuclear proliferation sensitive activities.

    That was the second such resolution that reflected the gravity of the
situation and the determination of the Security Council, he
said.  Hopefully, the resolution would convince Iran that the best way to
ensure its security and end its isolation was to end its nuclear weapons
programme and take the steps outlined in today's text.  The Council would
review its actions, based on IAEA's report, and adopt further measures if
Iran did not comply fully with its obligations.  He looked forward to
Iran's unconditional and immediate reply to the resolution, and he hoped
the Iranian leadership would come to understand that the pursuit of nuclear
capability made it less, and not more, secure.

    He said that the resolution provided an important basis for action,
compelling all Member States to deny Iran the equipment, technology,
technical assistance and financial assistance that could contribute to
nuclear sensitive activities.  The text was clear and not open to
interpretation, and the Council would insist on absolute
compliance.  However, the adoption was only a first step.  The Council
would work with the Sanctions Committee and, if necessary, it would not
hesitate to return to that body for further action if Iran failed to take
the necessary steps to comply.

    President of the Council, NASSIR ABDULAZIZ AL-NASSER ( Qatar),
speaking in his national capacity, said that his country was keen on
compliance by all states with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  That was a matter of principle to which Qatar
attached great importance.  For that reason, his country had never ceased
to appeal for the Middle East to become a region free of weapons of mass
destruction.  It had also called on Iran to submit to the inspection
regime, and on all States with stockpiles of nuclear weapons to dismantle
them.   Qatar supported all resolutions calling for such
measures.  Commitment to the NPT within the framework of IAEA might
encourage safe uses of nuclear technologies.  It would also build
confidence and promote understanding among nations.

    Emphasizing the essential role of IAEA, he said that Iran had the
right to undertake research of nuclear technologies and use nuclear
technologies for peaceful purposes, he continued.  However, today's
resolution sought to bar the country's access to the elements that could be
used for destructive purposes.  Today, the Council was to adopt a
resolution on a difficult question.  While his delegation had no doubt
about the sincerity of Iranian intentions, the international community
needed guarantees of nuclear safety from IAEA.  He appealed to Iran to
urgently respond to the text.  He knew it was difficult, but the horizons
for diplomatic cooperation were wide.  Among other things, the resolution
also confirmed that the measures to be enforced would be suspended, should
Iran comply with its provisions.  That would create an opportunity for
negotiations.

    In conclusion, he expressed hope that Iran could address the
resolution with the necessary rationality.  He also hoped that the text
would contribute to limiting nuclear proliferation in the region, in
particular in view of the fact that Israel had recently made statements on
its nuclear deterrence capability.  His delegation would vote in favour of
the draft.

    The draft resolution was then adopted unanimously as resolution 1737
(2006).

    Speaking after the vote, EMYR JONES PARRY (United Kingdom) said that,
on 31 July, the Council had adopted resolution 1696 (2006), which had
mandated the IAEA-required suspension by Iran of its enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities.  The Council had called on Iran without further
delay to take the steps required by the Agency and to implement all
necessary transparency measures and requests.  That resolution had also set
a deadline for such compliance by 31 August.  Iran's response had been to
step up those activities and to offer to export such technologies.  In
November, IAEA had reported insufficient transparency and an inability to
remove uncertainties about Iran's nuclear programme.

    He said Iran had "simply thumbed its nose at the Security Council and
defied international law".  Bearing in mind the Council's primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
taking with utmost seriousness the threat from the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, the Council had unequivocally expressed its intent in
resolution 1696 (2006) to adopt measures under Article 41 in the event of
Iranian non-compliance, and that was what it had done today.  In so doing,
it had reiterated and expanded its mandated suspension of Iran's
proliferation sensitive activities and established an embargo aimed at
preventing Iran from exporting and importing materials and equipment to
sustain proliferation sensitive activities.  The Council had also
introduced a set of measures intended to persuade Iran to stop pursuing
other activities of concern.  It had underlined the seriousness of the
situation, including the international community's lack of confidence about
the direction of Iran's policies.

    Importantly, however, the door was not closed for Iran, he said.  The
United Kingdom, France and Germany, with the European Union High
Representative, Javier Solana, had led negotiations with Iran and remained
committed to seeking a diplomatically negotiated solution based on
cooperation.  A new relationship between Europe and Iran was "on the
table", but that must be with an Iran that eschewed nuclear
ambition.  Suspension would permit negotiations to resume and intensify,
this time with Russian and United States engagement.  For that reason, in
the pursuit of a negotiated agreement, it was vital that all States
implemented the resolution as fully as possibly, including by adopting the
necessary legislation to pave the way for robust and necessary
implementation.  Without that, no one could expect the Council to meet its
objective.

    He said that, if Iran did not change course, the Council had committed
itself in today's text to further measures.  Iran, therefore, faced a
choice.  The vote today had indicated the gravity of that choice.  He hoped
Iran would heed the Council's decision and return to negotiations to
resolve the nuclear dossier.  That, in turn, would open the way for the
European Union and Iran to open a new and wider relationship to their
mutual benefit and to the benefit of international peace and security.

    JEAN-MARC DE LA SABLI�RE ( France) welcomed unanimous adoption of the
resolution today.  The text -- developed on the basis of a draft submitted
by France, Germany and United Kingdom -- confirmed the mandatory nature of
the suspension of proliferation sensitive activities in the nuclear
field.  The Council also sought to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of
nuclear materials, equipment and goods to and from Iran, and to ensure that
Iran would not avail itself of outside contributions to its sensitive
programmes.  It also addressed financial services surrounding sensitive
transactions, as well as the travel of those with operational
involvement.  Such travel would be restricted, and those individuals'
assets frozen.  Those measures would apply immediately to some 20 persons
and entities listed in the text.  The draft also reaffirmed the powers of IAEA.

    The aim of the measures adopted today was to invite Iran to conform to
its non-proliferation commitments and the guidelines of the IAEA, he
continued.  Iran should conform to the resolution and stop developing
technology capable of supporting nuclear and missile programmes.  It was
important that the measures were reversible.  Should Iran suspend all its
sensitive activities and conform to relevant resolutions of the Council and
IAEA, the measures just adopted would be suspended.  Should the country
persist, however, other measures would be taken under Article 41.  The
resolution sent a clear message to Iran, which was now facing a strategic
choice: cooperation with the international community or growing
isolation.  He hoped Teheran would choose dialogue.

    KENZO OSHIMA ( Japan) said that he regretted that the Council had had
to act again only five months later.  Its members had conducted intensive
discussions on the Iranian nuclear issue over the course of the year, in
order to seek a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the problem.  Those
efforts had failed to produce positive results. In defiance of resolution
1696 (2006), Iran had refused to take the steps required of it.  On the
contrary, the situation had worsened, with Iran's expansion of its
reprocessing and related activities.  Japan attached great importance to
the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,
along with their delivery means; that was a clear and present global
challenge posing a grave threat.  It must be dealt with firmly and with
determination.  In order to counter such threats, actual or potential, the
international community must act appropriately, timely and resolutely,
wherever those threats occurred, be it in the Middle East, Asia or elsewhere.

    He said that Iran's failure to comply with the requirements of IAEA
and the Council must be dealt with in a principled manner.  At the same
time, the country had a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, just
as any other country, and in exercising that right, he hoped that Iran
fully complied with its IAEA obligations.  Because of the importance of
non-proliferation, and taking into account the measured approach in the
resolution, he had supported it.  The text had not spelled the end of
negotiations with Iran.  Rather, it had kept the door open for talks and
had explicitly mentioned the reversibility of the measures taken
today.  Japan enjoyed the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy to
the fullest, and his country had traditionally enjoyed good relations with
Iran.  In adopting the resolution today, he appealed to Iran to seek the
resolution of the nuclear issue at the earliest possible time, through full
diplomatic talks.

    WANG GUANGYA ( China) said that, since the beginning of the year,
Iran's nuclear issue had attracted more and more attention.  The Iranian
side had not yet responded positively to the requirement of IAEA and the
Council.  After issuing a presidential statement in March and adopting
resolution 1696 in July, the Council had adopted another resolution today,
aiming to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism,
reinforcing IAEA's authority and promoting diplomatic efforts to seek a
peaceful solution to Iran's nuclear issue.  His delegation had voted in
favour of the draft.  Sanctions were not the end, but a means to urge Iran
to return to negotiations.  Sanction measures adopted this time were
limited and reversible, targeted at proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities and development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.  There were
also explicit provisions indicating that, if Iran suspended its
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, complied with the relevant
resolutions of the Council and met IAEA requirements, the Council would
suspend and even terminate the sanctions.

    The Council could not handle Iran's nuclear issue single-handedly, he
continued.  IAEA remained the main mechanism for dealing with that
issue.  Dialogue and negotiations was the only and fundamental way
out.  The solution required all-around diplomatic efforts and diplomatic
efforts outside the Council, in particular, should be strengthened.  The
resolution welcomed the commitment of China, France, Germany, Russian
Federation, United Kingdom and United States to a negotiated solution to
the issue and encouraged Iran to engage with the six countries' proposals
for a long-term comprehensive agreement, which would allow for the
development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect
and establishment of international confidence in the peaceful nature of
Iran's nuclear programme.  All that would be conducive to reactivating the
new round of diplomatic efforts.

    China had all along supported safeguarding the international nuclear
non-proliferation mechanism and opposed the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, he continued.  It did not wish to see turbulence in the Middle
East.  It was in favour of a peaceful solution through political and
diplomatic efforts and negotiations.  Under the current circumstances, he
called upon all the parties concerned to adopt a highly responsible and
constructive attitude, remain calm, practice restraint and refrain from any
steps that would harm diplomatic efforts and lead to the deterioration of
the situation.  At the same time, he hoped that the parties would seek to
resume negotiations in a creative and forward-looking manner, sparing no
efforts for enhancing the diplomatic efforts for a comprehensive and
peaceful solution.   China was ready to continue to make joint efforts with
all the parties concerned and contribute to maintaining international and
regional peace and stability, safeguarding and consolidating the
international non-proliferation mechanism and resolving Iran's nuclear
issue through political and diplomatic efforts.

    AUGUSTINE P. MAHIGA (United Republic of Tanzania) said he was opposed
to the development of nuclear weapons by anybody, including his traditional
friend, Iran.  He strongly supported the NPT and the non-proliferation
regime it established under IAEA, to which his country belonged.  He
expected all its members, including Iran, to uphold its treaty
obligations.  His country firmly believed in the right of the people of
Iran to civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  The current
resolution did not seek to constrain that right.  It should be made clear,
however, that any such programme had to be subjected to the IAEA
verification and safeguards regime.

    He said his country had all along hoped that the concerned parties
would resolve the highly sensitive Iranian nuclear issue peacefully.  He
had placed faith in the parties to return to negotiations under mutually
acceptable terms.  Unfortunately, progress had been painfully slow, owing
to the uncompromising positions of both sides.  Despite the efforts to
overcome the differences, the situation had remained deadlocked, mainly
over the issue of enrichment and reprocessing activities as a condition for
further talks.  He believed the negotiators could overcome that issue, that
the impasse was reversible, as long as good political will
prevailed.  Today's resolution could be seen as a signal and a call to
revisit the issue at the earliest possible opportunity.

    CESAR MAYORAL ( Argentina) said that he had voted in favour of the
draft, because it reaffirmed an inalienable right of all States parties to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop and research the production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination.  At
the same time, his Government trusted that the Government of Iran would
continue its nuclear programme exclusively for peaceful purposes, following
the parameters established by IAEA and provided for in relevant Council
resolutions. He also expressed satisfaction that the resolution had been
adopted unanimously under Article 41 of the Charter.  Under the resolution,
there was no recourse to the use of force.  The main objective should be to
maintain international peace and security, and Argentina called on all
parties to resume dialogue to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian
nuclear issue.

    JAVAD ZARIF ( Iran) said that today was a sad day for the
non-proliferation regime.  Only a few days ago, Israel's Prime Minister had
boasted about the country's nuclear weapons, but, instead of raising an
eyebrow -- let alone addressing that serious threat to international peace
and security and the non-proliferation regime -- the Security Council was
imposing sanctions on a member of the NPT that, unlike Israel, had never
attacked nor threatened to use force against any United Nations
member.  Also unlike Israel, Iran had categorically rejected development,
stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on ideological and strategic
grounds, and it was prepared to provide guarantees that it would never
withdraw from the NPT.  It had placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards, and it had fully implemented the Additional Protocol for more
than two years and stated its readiness to resume its implementation.

    He said that Iran had allowed more than 2,000 "person days of IAEA
scrutiny" of all of its related -- and even unrelated -- facilities,
resulting in reported statements by the Agency on the absence of any
evidence of diversion.  His country had also voluntarily suspended its
lawful enrichment activities for more than two years, as verified by the
Agency, in order to build confidence and provide ample opportunity to find
a mutually acceptable solution, if that were ever the intention of its
negotiating partners.  It had presented various far-reaching proposals to
ensure permanent non-diversion, and it had consistently called for
time-bound and unconditional negotiations to find a mutually acceptable
solution, a call that had been repeated yesterday by Iran's Foreign Minister.

    The same Governments that had pushed the Council to take "groundless
punitive measures" against Iran's peaceful nuclear programme had
systematically prevented it from taking any action to nudge the Israeli
regime towards submitting itself to the rules governing the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, he said.  By so doing, they had provided it with
wide latitude, even encouragement, to indulge freely in the clandestine
development and unlawful possession of nuclear weapons and public boasting
about it, with impunity.  The Israeli regime had an unparalleled record of
non-compliance with Security Council resolutions -- if that was the
criteria today -- and a "long and dark" catalogue of crimes and atrocities,
such as occupation, aggression, militarism, State terrorism, crimes against
humanity and apartheid.  Nuclear weapons in such hands posed a uniquely
grave threat to regional and international peace and security.  The
reversal of the hypocritical policy of "strategic ambiguity" had removed
any excuse, if ever there had been one, for continued inaction by the Council.

    To put it into perspective, he said that today's resolution could only
remind the Iranian people of the historic injustices the Council had done
to them in the past six decades.  It was reminiscent of the attempt made by
the Council to punish the Iranian people for their nationalization of their
oil industry, described as a threat to peace.  It was also a reminder of
the Council's indifference in the face of a military coup, organized by two
permanent members, which had restored the dictatorship.  It refreshed the
memory of the time when the Council did not consider the massive invasion
of Iran by the former Iraqi regime as a threat to international peace and
security, and refused to even call on the invading army to withdraw from
Iranian territory.  It also brought back the horrors of the long years when
the Council had turned a blind eye to the extensive and brutal use of
chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and soldiers and, by so doing,
shouldered responsibility for tens of thousands of Iranians who continued
to suffer and perish as a result.

    He said that bringing Iran's peaceful nuclear programme to the Council
by a few permanent members, particularly the United States, was not aimed
at a solution or negotiations.  Their stated objective had always been to
use the Council as an instrument of pressure and intimidation to compel
Iran to abandon its rights.  Reviewing the motivation behind the
presentation of the so-called package of incentives given to Iran, he said
that the United States and the "EU-3" had never even taken the trouble of
studying various Iranian proposals, as those negotiating partners were,
from the very beginning, bent on abusing the Council with the threat of
sanctions as an instrument to pressure and compel Iran to abandon the
exercise of its right under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.  It was
now an "open secret" that their objective from the negotiations had never
been to find a solution, but to impose and then prolong, perpetuate and
suspended Iran's rights.

    Suspension was not a solution, he stressed.  At best, it was a
temporary stop-gap measure to allow time to find a real solution.  Such a
suspension had been in place for two years, and IAEA had repeatedly
verified in each and every report, from November 2003 to February 2006,
that Iran had fully suspended what it had agreed to suspend.  So, Iran had
a suspension for two years, and on-and-off negotiations for
three.  Reviewing all of the proposals ignored by the United States and the
"EU-3" in the negotiations, he said that what they had wanted, despite what
they had told Iran, was -- "and still is" -- that Iran should undertake a
binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities.  He was here today
because his country had not accepted that "unlawful demand".  At the same
time, his country was prepared to "go to any length to allay their
so-called proliferation concerns, in spite of the fact that we all know
they are no more than unfounded and self-serving sheer excuses", he said.

    To the point that the sponsors said they did not trust Iran's
"intentions", he said the problem was that their "intention-o-meter" had a
rather abysmal record of chronic malfunction.  The former United States
Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, had claimed before Congress
in 1992 that Iran was trying to acquire a nuclear-weapon capability, and
had added that that goal was unlikely to be achieved before the year
2000.  Later, in November 1992, a draft national intelligence estimate by
the CIA had concluded that Iran was making progress on a nuclear-arms
programme and could develop a nuclear weapon by 2000.  Now, the same
intelligence establishment was saying not before 2015.  Accusing Iran of
having "the intention" to acquire nuclear weapons had, since the early
1980s, been a tool used to deprive Iran of any nuclear technology, even a
light water reactor or fuel for the United States-built research reactor.

    He said he wondered which "Iranian intention" or "proliferation
concern" had prompted the main proponents of today's resolution to prevent
Iran, over the past 27 years, from buying civilian aircraft or even their
spare parts, thereby jeopardizing the lives and safety of Iranian
civilians, whom they hypocritically tried to court now, to no avail.  He
told delegations to read "the dangerous divisive statement by the UK Prime
Minister" or the 23 August report by the Intelligence Committee of the
United States House of Representatives on Iran's nuclear programme, if they
wanted to understand the intention of the proponents of the resolution.

    Iran firmly believed that the days of weapons of mass murder had long
passed; that those inhumane instruments of indiscriminate slaughter had not
brought internal stability or external security for anyone, and that they
would not be able to do so in the future, he said.  Unlike some who
despised the Non-Proliferation Treaty and international law in general,
Iran had a high stake in preserving, fully implementing, strengthening and
universalizing the NPT.  Today's decision did exactly the opposite, because
it was championed by a non-member of the Treaty, coupled with its main
benefactor, which made no secret of its contempt for that and other
disarmament instruments.  No one had forgotten last year's World Summit, at
which even the word "disarmament" had been struck from the Outcome text by
the famous "red pen".  The days of bullying, pressure and intimidation by
some nuclear-weapon holders were gone.  Iran was told it needed to build
confidence, but confidence could only be built through respect for and
non-discriminatory application of law.  International law and international
treaties could not be the subject of arbitrary, fluctuating and
self-serving reinterpretations, even if they were imposed through
resolutions.  Such a precedent was dangerous for everyone.

    * *** *
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