Analysis: Terms of Engagement
Council on Foreign Relations
Updated June 1, 2006
Prepared by: Lionel Beehner
The Bush administration now says the United States will engage directly in multilateral talks with Iran to try to resolve the nuclear crisis (LAT), provided that Tehran first suspends its uranium-enrichment activities. The U.S. offer to open dialogue was also contingent upon Russia and China agreeing to sanctions if Iran continued such activities. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters she hopes the Iranian government "will thoroughly consider this proposal." The announcement falls on the eve of six-party talks with the foreign ministers of the permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany. It is unclear whether a resolution will be reached that combines both sticks and carrots.
Iran's foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, says his country is willing to deal directly with the Americans, but not on condition Tehran first suspend its uranium-enrichment activities (ISN). Iran's response will be watched closely since, as this Backgrounder explains, it is not always clear who is setting foreign policy in Tehran.
The Iranians have backtracked on their earlier refusal to return to the table with the so-called EU-3— Germany, France, and Britain. Earlier this month, the trio offered Tehran a package of incentives that included assistance for building a light-water reactor and various security guarantees. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rebuffed the European offer (EUObserver), declaring "they can steal our gold and offer some nuts and chocolate in return." The EU-3's package was similar to one proposed last year, which Tehran also turned down.
The U.S. decision to engage Iran comes amid repeated calls by former U.S. officials, arms-control experts, and newspaper editorialists to engage directly with Tehran versus through proxies like the EU-3.
Read the rest of this article on the cfr.org website.
Copyright 2006 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.
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