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Draft resolution on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency

Vienna, Feb 1, IRNA
Iran-Nuclear-IAEA
A draft resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors was prepared in a London meeting by diplomats of the 5+1 on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The full text is as follows:
a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear program.

b) Also recalling the Director General's report of 6 June 2003 (GOV/2003/04), 26 August 2003 (GOV/2003,63), 10 November 2003 (GOV/2003/75), 24 February 2004 (GOV/2004/11), 1 June 2004 (GOV/2004/34) and Corr. I dated 18 June 2004, I September 2004 (GOV/2004/60), 15 November 2004 (GOV/2004/83), I August 2005 (INFCIRC/648), 8 August 2005 (GOV/2005/61), 10 August 2005 (GOV/2005/62), 2 September 2005 (GOV/2005/67) and 18 November 2005 (GOV/2005/87).

c) Recalling that article IV of the treaty on the Non- Proliferation of nuclear weapons stipulated that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the treaty.

d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension.

e) Recalling that in its resolution of 24 September 2005 the Board found that:
Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency Status;
The history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; and decided to address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C and the notification required under Article iii.B.4 of the Agency's Statute at a later date.

f) Noting that, as reported by the Director General, after nearly three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear program or to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.

g) Recalling that the Director General has stated that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/67).

h) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director General in GOV/2005/67),
i) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms.

j) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear program, and agreeing that an extensive period of confidence-building is required from Iran.

k) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the issues raised in this and previous resolutions.

1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's program by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for Iran to:
- Re-establish full and sustained suspension of all
enrichment-related activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
- Reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
- Ratify promptly and implement in full the additional protocol; - Pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the additional protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003,
- Implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the safeguards agreement and additional protocol, and include such access to individuals;
Documentation relating to procurement, dual-use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations.

2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these parts are required of Iran by the Board and to transmit to the Security Council copies of this and all previous resolutions as adopted on the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, as well as copies of all relevant reports to the Board;
3. Express serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear program, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and request Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;
4. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006;
5. Calls on Iran to understand that the Board lacks confidence in its intentions in seeking to develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous resolutions, and unresolved question that, inter alia, make the Agency unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran; and to reconsider its position both in relation to confidence-building measures and in relation to negotiations that can result in increased confidence; 6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify possible activities which could have a military nuclear dimension;
7. Requests the Director General to continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional Protocol to the Agreement pending its entry into force, with a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities;
8. Requests the Director General to report to the next regular session of the Board on the implementation of this and previous resolutions and convey to the Security Council that report together with any resolution from the March Board.

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

1430/2322/1416



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