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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Elbaradei says Iran provided IAEA with new information

IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency

Vienna, Sept 3, IRNA
Iran-Nuclear-ElBaradei
The UN nuclear watchdog chief Mohammad ElBaradei has acknowledged to Iran's cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In a report to the IAEA Board of Governors, Elbaradei said that Iran had been cooperative in providing the IAEA with some new information with respect to the dates of the plutonium research activities that is at variance with some of the dates provided earlier.

ElBaradei said that as a vital part of its investigation into Iran's enrichment program, the Agency has conducted extensive environmental sampling at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components were manufactured, used and/or stored, with a view to assessing the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment activities.

He admitted that based on the information currently available to the Agency, the results of that analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination.

Elsewhere in the report, ElBaradei said the Agency still needs to understand what contacts took place during the period 1987 through 1993 between Iran and the intermediaries and why P-1 centrifuge design documents similar to those that had been provided in 1987 were delivered again in connection with the offer made around 1994.

He added, "This is important for establishing the chronology and sequence of events associated with the development of Iran's enrichment program, in particular with a view to ensuring that there has been no other development or acquisition of enrichment design, technology or components by Iran."
ElBaradei said Iran has been asked to provide more information, along with any supporting documentation, relevant to the P-2 program, in particular with regard to the scope of the original offer related to the P-2 design and Iran's acquisition of items in connection with that program.

ElBaradei reiterated Iran's cooperativeness with the IAEA, saying with the cooperation of Iran, the Agency was able, between 1 and 9 August 2005, to conduct detailed verification of the unprocessed irradiated UO2 targets stored in four containers.

He said a final assessment of Iran's plutonium research activities must await the results of the destructive analysis of the disks and targets.

ElBaradei said that Iran is in the process of constructing a heavy water research reactor (IR-40) at Arak (planned to go into operation in 2014) and a heavy water production plant ( HWPP) at Arak.

He said the Agency will monitor Iran's heavy water reactor program as a routine safeguards implementation matter.

ElBaradei also referred to Iran's cooperation with the IAEA in the Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

He said notwithstanding, as undertaken in its letter to the Agency of 10 November 2003, Iran has continued to act as if its Additional Protocol is in force.

The report added that as noted in the Director General's November 2004 report, since December 2003, Iran has facilitated, in a timely manner , Agency access under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to nuclear materials and facilities, as well as to other locations in the country, and has permitted the Agency to take environmental samples as requested by the Agency.

He said Iran has, since October 2003, provided the Agency upon its request and as a transparency measure, access to certain additional information and locations beyond that required under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

With regard to the razing of the Lavisan-Shian site, in August 2005, Iran provided further clarification and additional documentation in support of its statement that the site had been razed following the return of the site to the Municipality of Tehran in connection with a dispute between the Municipality and the Ministry of Defence, said ElBaradei.

The Agency is still awaiting additional information and clarifications from Iran regarding, and interviews with the individuals involved in efforts by the Physics Research Center, which had been located at Lavisan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment or conversion activities, he added.

He criticized Iran for not reporting to the IAEA its activities and experiments, particularly in the areas of uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium research, in accordance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement.

He accused Iran of following the policy of concealment continued until October 2003, and resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with that Agreement.

While Iran has provided further clarifications, and access to additional documentation, concerning the 1987 and mid-1990s offers related to the P-1 design, the Agency's investigation of the supply network indicates that Iran should have additional supporting information that could be useful in this regard, he added.

He said however that Iran has agreed to endeavour to provide further supporting information and documentation.

He added that Iran has also been asked to provide additional details on the process that led to Iran's decision in 1985 to pursue gas centrifuge enrichment and on the steps leading to its acquisition of centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987.

ElBaradei said that IAEA is assessing other aspects of Iran's nuclear program, including: statements made by it about plutonium research, in particular with respect to the dates they were carried out; Iran's activities at Gchine; and Iran's activities involving polonium.

He acknowledged that in view of the fact that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation, Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue.

He called on Iran to continued its transparency measures, saying that without the transparency measures, the Agency's ability to reconstruct, in particular, the chronology of enrichment research and development, which is essential for the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the statements made by Iran, will be restricted.

ElBaradei said the Secretariat will continue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear program, and the Director General will continue to report to the Board as appropriate.

He said the Agency has continued its monthly monitoring activities at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant PFEP (at Natanz, most recently from 30 to 31 August 2005) to ensure that the suspension of enrichment activities at PFEP is fully implemented.

He said the seals on the equipment and nuclear material have been replaced and verified.

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