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IRAN SHOULD NOT BE DRIVEN INTO A CORNER

RIA Novosti

MOSCOW. (Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee, for RIA Novosti).

Russia's interest in the Iranian nuclear program is not only due to the fact that it is helping to build a nuclear plant at Bushehr. Iran is one of the most dynamically developing nations not only in the Middle East, but also anywhere in the world. The path chosen by Iran, including its nuclear ambitions, will be instrumental in determining both the situation in the region and future global mechanisms of controlling non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Rigid controls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over Iranian nuclear power have always been a sine qua non for Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Russia is one of Iran's closest neighbors, and the risk of nuclear technologies falling into extremists' hands is one Russia does not wish to take. For this reason, Russia scrutinizes every point of agreement with Iran - an approach that draws heavy criticism in Iran. In particular, Russia has always said that it will supply its nuclear fuel to Iran only if Tehran signs a protocol on returning spent fuel.

At present, Iran is ready and willing to cooperate with any party that does not see international controls as a way to wreck its nuclear program. Russia wants Iran's nuclear program to be carried out under international control, and full and complete information to be available at any time. It would be unfair to deny Iran the chance to exploit advanced technologies for its own development.

U.S. and Russian positions on the Iranian nuclear program are often said to be widely divergent. In fact, deep down, they are likely dictated by the same motives. Both the U.S. and Russia are first of all concerned with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Should extremists acquire a nuclear bomb and unleash "nuclear terrorism", it would be a global nightmare. So U.S. concerns about the security of America and its allies are quite understandable, as is its desire to play safe, especially in view of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. However, it should not be forgotten that it was the US campaign in Iraq that went some considerable way to sparking negative trends in the region.

But there are some aspects of the American position that clearly go beyond Iran-IAEA cooperation and clash with the Russian viewpoint. These are plans to overhaul the world order and, perhaps, the U.S.'s special attitude to Iran's oil resources and that country's growing say in regional affairs - a stance that, naturally, is not infused with pro-American sentiments. Russia is alarmed at the preparation by the United States of a "pre-war Iran dossier", as it did with Iraq. The American charges that Baghdad had weapons of mass destruction are now known to have been a myth. Time and again, international inspections failed to confirm American accusations. But still this did not stop the U.S. from unleashing a war against Iraq on the pretext that it could have used such weapons.

In addition, Russia has purely pragmatic interests in Iran. There is a very high likelihood that, were Russia to curtail its nuclear programs in Iran, American specialists would step in. And it is not inconceivable that, in a miraculous fashion and within a very short space of time, Iran might turn out to be a peaceful and transparent, as far as international control is concerned, state for the U.S. To my mind, the principal weakness of the U.S. arguments against Iran's nuclear program is this obvious commitment, as well as the negative experience of previous interference in Iraq's affairs on a similar pretext. Even if the U.S. is right in many things, these two circumstances cannot but undermine the credibility of what it says and does on Iran.

Only the IAEA can be a really competent and level-headed judge on such a complicated matter as Iran's national nuclear program. I think it would make sense for the U.S. to stop judging the organization's work exclusively through the prism of American aims and interests in the region. Incidentally, the issue of nuclear control in Iran may prove to be far from the last such issue that the world will face in the near future, and we should have ready some effective international mechanisms for such eventualities.

The European Union, which has its own ax to grind in Iran and the Middle East, is known to adhere to a relatively reasonable position, as it seeks to find real and non-discriminatory solutions to existing problems. As negotiators, the Europeans fit the bill: on the one hand, the Iranian leadership is willing to negotiate with EU representatives, while on the other the Europeans also bear in mind "Atlantic solidarity".

The negotiations slated to open in Geneva on April 10 will also deal, among other important matters, with the uranium-enrichment program announced by Iran. Russia has a vested interest in seeing the EU and Iran agree on this far-from-simple subject, and in particular to holding a nuts-and-bolts discussion of Tehran's "limited enrichment" proposals. The way these negotiations go may take a lot of the sting out of current passions surrounding Iran.

For the moment, these passions are running rather high. Some European commentators, for example, write that Bushehr may become a "stationary nuclear bomb", and, if detonated, could cover Middle East oil fields with a radioactive cloud. I believe it is up to an impartial IAEA mission to lay these fears to rest. Russian specialists, however, are convinced that safety at Bushehr meets next-generation international standards, and there is no cause for concern.

This is an apposite place to recall that the Middle East already has its own nuclear weapons, and they did not originate with Iran. It is certainly not right and proper, in my judgment, to consider weapons in the possession of one state in the region as posing a lesser risk than a peaceful energy program controlled by an international agency. The most dangerous and short-sighted thing to do in the present situation would be to let the situation get out of control, with Iran, disappointed and frustrated by its negotiating partners, "clamming up" against any external influence and drifting in a direction which it would be certain not to abandon. In this case, nuclear weapons, rather than peaceful programs, will be more probable.

Iran should not be driven into a corner, especially in a situation when it is itself seeking full-scale and constructive cooperation.