Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=10/02/2004

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01574

TITLE=Confronting Iran Over Nuclear Weapons

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0038

CONTENT=This show broadcasts Saturday and Sunday.

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: Confronting Iran over nuclear weapons. Next, On the Line.

Host: Iranian officials say they have a right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. But the United States and others believe that Iran is secretly working to build nuclear weapons. U-S Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke out on this issue:

[Powell SOT]

It would be wise now for Iran to get with the I-A-E-A, to get with the European foreign ministers again and try and clear up these issues. We're not looking for a way to take it to the Security Council. We're looking for a way to make sure Iran is not developing a nuclear weapons program. That's in the interest of the region and the interest of the world for us to do that. And we will continue to pursue that approach.

Host: The International Atomic Energy Agency, or I-A-E-A, has urged Iran to stop its efforts to enrich uranium, but Iran has refused. Even more worrisome, observers say, is Iran's announcement that it successfully tested a new ballistic missile with a range up to thirteen-hundred kilometers. Such missiles could carry nuclear warheads and enable Iran to threaten much of the Middle East. Joining us to talk about the threat of a nuclear Iran are Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center; and Charles Ferguson, a fellow in Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome and thanks for joining us today. I appreciate it.

Host: Henry Sokolski, is it too late to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons?

Sokolski: I think it's too late to put behind us the concern that they could get weapons fairly quickly. What I mean by that is that they haven't gotten the bomb yet, but they've gotten all the things they need to know to make it and they have the means to make these things. Even if we bomb or destroy it, they can reconstitute it. So, from here on out, we've already passed that nuclear Rubicon. There's not something that we can prevent them from getting that will prevent them from covertly making a bomb at some time in the future.

Host: Charles Ferguson, is Iran already in a position where at any time they can make a nuclear bomb?

Ferguson: Basically I agree with what Henry said. Iran's been working on this for many decades and it's only two years ago that an Iranian dissident group revealed a lot of secret activities were going on. And then that put the spotlight on Iran. Then the I-A-E-A came in with inspectors. We're still trying to learn the full story, but what we've learned is that Iran has at least a rudimentary capability of enriching some uranium that could either be used for peaceful purposes or could be directed into a military weapons program.

Host: So what do we know exactly about the state and status of their program? What have they achieved to date?

Ferguson: Well they have a number of facilities spread throughout and so they're trying to put not all their eggs in one basket. And they've been looking at the whole nuclear fuel cycle, what's called front-end: trying to enrich uranium. That's one pathway to a bomb, to develop highly enriched uranium for a bomb. Another pathway is what's called the back-end of the fuel cycle: taking spent nuclear fuel, extracting plutonium, and forming that plutonium into a bomb. Iran's done some experiments on plutonium reprocessing. It's believed that they don't have a full-scale reprocessing facility yet. It seems they're much more advanced with the uranium enrichment technologies. They have both a pilot scale facility, might have upwards of a couple of hundred uranium centrifuges at that pilot scale facility. They have plans for a much bigger commercial scale facility, containing upwards of fifty-thousand centrifuges, enough to build fuel for the Bushehr reactor they hope to come on line within the next year or two.

Host: Henry Sokolski, what reason is there to believe that these efforts are not just designed for the Bushehr reactor and peaceful civilian nuclear purposes?

Sokolski: Well, first there's the economics of nuclear power itself. If you're sitting on oil and gas, you would really be out of your mind not to use that first. It's just so much cheaper. Now admittedly, they may need to pipe things to certain locations and they may not have the pipelines, but at the end of the day, building those pipelines and such would be far cheaper in the long run than building the power plant itself. Now, as uneconomical as the power plant is compared to oil and gas fired electrical generators, building the entire means to fuel and condition the fuel after it's been used in a reactor is way, way more cost ineffective. And so, it raises the question: Why would you spend all that money? It's kind of like going into a store and wanting a sandwich and then demanding that you have a slaughterhouse built for you. It's just way, way more than they need. They can buy the fuel to fuel this light-water reactor abroad for much less than they can make it themselves. And so, it raises first order questions.

Host: Charles, is this evidence in and of itself that what's really going on here is a bomb program?

Ferguson: No. We don't have a so-called smoking gun, but just to tack on to something Henry said, you know, Iran has said for years they want a self-sufficient nuclear program. But in order to be truly self-sufficient, they also need a guaranteed indigenous supply of uranium. They've been trying to find uranium mines, but so far, Iran is very poor in uranium resources. They barely have enough proven resources of uranium to fuel even one Bushehr reactor. And they have plans for six or seven Bushehr type reactors over the next twenty years. So, there's really no proven capability for them to be truly self sufficient.

Host: Henry Sokolski?

Sokolski: I think there is some evidence. Even the I-A-E-A noticed that they were doing experiments with a material called polonium. And polonium only has two purposes. One is to perhaps power small engines on satellites, and they don't have those satellites. And the other is to help boost the ignition of a nuclear reaction in a bomb. And so, seeing that is worrisome. Then there were reports out of South Korea that they were visiting with the North Korean nuclear scientists on how to produce what's called a neutron generator or initiator, which has only got one purpose and that is to help you make an efficient small bomb that's missile-deliverable. But when you see these things, you've got to think that they've got more on their mind than electricity.

Ferguson: Actually there are other purposes for Polonium-210, and Iran hasn't actually declared its purposes. But there are two others. And I've learned this from my study about the dirty-bomb threat, that certain radioactive materials could be used for dirty bombs. But they could also be used for beneficial purposes. They could use Polonium-210 to reduce the static charge in textiles, and they do have a textile industry. And they could use Polonium-210 as a neutron source for oil well logging, to figure out what is the geological characteristics of their oil wells. And we certainly know they have an oil industry. So they could at least point to those two applications.

Sokolski: Yes, I imagine though, that unless they're taking notes, from what you've just laid out, we have not yet heard that from them. And more important: where they're doing this work is not related to those industries. It's in the wrong place.

Host: And would they need to be surreptitious about that research if these were the reasons they were using it?

Sokolski: Well, one of the things that's very disturbing about the Iranian program is it looks pretty clearly to have been a covert program that once found was then declared to be: Oh, oops, we forgot to declare it. But this really is all to be considered part of our declared program. That's what's known as getting a second chance. And while it may be a useful thing in dealing with people, with regard to nuclear programs that might be bomb programs, it's not a good idea to be lazy or casual about that kind of approach to declarations.

Host: Well, Charles Ferguson, on the issue of declarations, this all falls under the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So, what are the options on the table for other signatories to that treaty in dealing with Iran?

Ferguson: Yes, because Iran points to article four of the treaty and says: We have an inalienable right to obtain these nuclear technologies for peaceful use. But I think Henry and I are in basic agreement here that the real problem with that treaty is a matter of interpretation. You really need to go back to articles one and two of the treaty, that spell out that if a state signs that treaty saying they will not develop nuclear weapons, they're serious about it. And so if they acquire those nuclear technologies, they have to keep proving that they're not going to divert them into weapons programs. And so we need to take a hard look at how that treaty is, that those articles are interpreted within the treaty and I don't think we should just be handing over full scale nuclear fuel cycles to any state. We need to draw a line here, saying this has become way too dangerous. We don't want any more states getting even latent capabilities to develop nuclear weapons.

Host: Henry Sokolski?

Sokolski: I'll sort of amplify on that. There's a third article as well, not just one and two and four. This is like a lecture. Article three says those that don't have -- and we've already said, shouldn't get -- have to submit themselves to what are called nuclear safeguards, the purpose of which, is to prevent, or to verify, I should say, that they are not diverting their peaceful activities to make bombs. Now the problem, when you get to article four, is it says: We have an inalienable right to peaceful activity, but it says in conformity with these other prohibitions. That's quite a qualification. It could be argued, although we haven't yet, that certain activities are so close to bomb making, you can't verify whether or not they're going to be diverted to bomb-making, because it can happen so quickly [that], by the time you've detected it, it would be too late. That is what enrichment is like in a country like Iran. Something so close to bomb-making, you've got to wonder whether it can be peaceful.

Host: Well, Charles Ferguson, Hassan Rohani, who is one of the negotiators for Iran on nuclear issues, said recently that, well, as to this nuclear fuel cycle, the enriched uranium fuel cycle, that Iran could today have all the enriched uranium it needs, implying: Don't press to hard because if you do, we'll have that bomb right away. When you get to this point, what room is there for pressure under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty?

Ferguson: One reason he might be saying that is a matter of national pride and prestige, saying: Look, we've worked very hard, even though we've been under a sanctions regime for many years, especially from the United States. We found ways around that. You know, we've built up our technological structure. We've acquired the equipment, some would say, by hook or by crook. But, you know, we built this up, so that yes, once we give the go signal we can launch into a program. Of course, you know, he doesn't say a nuclear weapons program, but that kind of veiled threat, I think is clear.

Host: Henry Sokolski is there a threat veiled or otherwise from Iran?

Sokolski: We should start ringing our hands today. It's, as I say, the Rubicon's been passed. You can't get the kind of intelligence to make you sleep at ease given what they've got. And I don't even think, as I've argued before, you can really bomb your way with finality out of this problem, because they've got fifteen or more sights we know of, God only knows how many other places they've hidden it. I think, getting to your question on the N-P-T or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and what you can do, I think you can isolate this country as a violator and treat it as an unequal partner in the world's community of nations, which then puts it at odds on issues like trade, security assurances with regard to the Gulf and the Straight of Hormuz. You can put them in a place where they can't grow economically until they rethink what they're doing. Now, whether this group of people running this country would ever change their mind on these questions, is pretty doubtful, to be honest. Maybe that's the reason you put pressure on them, to hope that they will go away. We are probably locked in, if we're serious about this issue and worried about what a nuclear-ready Iran can do, into a long-term competition with this country, not unlike that in which we engaged no a much bigger scale during the Cold War. And so we have to start thinking not in ten weeks, or ten months about what we're going to do, but what we're going to do over the next ten years.

Host: Charles Ferguson, this question of imposing sanctions of one sort or another, how would those likely happen and are they likely to happen?

Ferguson: The most damaging set of sanctions would be on Iran's oil industry, but I just don't see it in the cards, because the European Union relies heavily on oil imports from Iran. Japan is very interested in keeping pipelines open to Iran. So those are our major allies and partners and if they're not going to back a tough sanctions regime, then sanctions just really aren't going to have much effect. As Iran has been saying: Look, the United States imposed sanctions on us for years and we found ways around that. So, sanctions are unilateral and are just not going to do much good.

Host: What about the kinds of sanctions that are specific to the N-P-T, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, things like saying that member states can't co-operate in any kind of nuclear way with Iran, and as you mentioned before, if there's a shortage of uranium in Iran, is there the possibility of some sort of embargo on raw uranium coming into the country?

Ferguson: Yes. I mean, I think that's worth exploring. But if we look at how Iran obtained most of its nuclear technology, it got it from Pakistan and Dr. A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market. Pakistan's not a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a black market by definition operates outside the bound of states. So, the N-P-T really is not structured to deal with that kind of problem. So, yes, I think it is worth looking at some kind of uranium embargo if Iran doesn't find its own sources.

Host: Henry Sokolski?

Sokolski: I'd be just a little more upbeat, but not much. I think one of the things that Iran's trying to do is make a legal argument based on peaceful nuclear energy. If you managed to get the Russians to actually say: Well, the U-N has said that we should back off nuclear cooperation, so we're not going to complete Bushehr, this makes a hash of the argument that Iran makes that it needs to enrich uranium. It doesn't have a reactor that needs enriched uranium. All of a sudden they're looking really foolish. And if they persist, it then draws even more attention to what their intentions might be. So there's some utility in playing this out and I think this administration is trying to do just that, and I wish them God speed, because I think the Europeans and the Russians need to think long and hard about what it means to have a member of the N-P-T argue that legally they can come within days of having a large number of bombs, because it won't stop at Iran. There are other neighbors of Iran that will follow in Iran's footsteps if it gets away with this legal precedent. And we shouldn't let it happen.

Host: Well, Charles Ferguson, what about this question of Russia and it's role. It's been heavily involved in the nuclear reactor, the Bushehr construction in Iran, and we had recently a Russian official who's involved in that program saying that a crackdown on Iran wouldn't be in Russia's interest. Where is Russia's interest and how is it going to be expressed?

Ferguson: Well it's a balancing act, right now, in my view. I think Russia, and in some sense I agree with Henry, I think Russia doesn't want to be caught out there flapping in the wind, supporting a state that is in flagrant violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and I-A-E-A safeguards. Because Russia wants to look like it's a good member of the nuclear community. They want to be able to sell their nuclear goods to other states: India, China, other states where we're not going to have the kind of problems we're having with Iran. And so, if Russia finds itself isolated, it may see a lot of other nuclear deals unraveling. So it has to be supportive as much as it can, but on the other hand, it doesn't want to deal with the Bushehr plant being scuttled, because that's on the order of a billion dollars worth of sales or maybe more if another plant like Bushehr is ordered.

Host: Henry Sokolski, what are the politics in the U-N in enforcing the N-P-T and do those politics make the N-P-T viable any more?

Sokolski: I don't know. I think a spotlight's got to be placed on key nations including the U-S and it's allies. If we're serious about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, this probably is the test case even more so than North Korea, although North Korea plays a role. And the reason why is North Korea pulled out and said: Well, we're no longer a member. These folks say: We're compliant. And if Iran as compliant can get right up to the edge of nuclear capability to keep us wringing our hands, as I say, then the gigs up. The N-P-T becomes this gesture towards a sentiment rather than anything that's enforceable or worth the paper it's on. If on the other hand, we seize on this case to toughen our view about what's peaceful and what's permitted and we at least deprive these guys of a legal argument, then it means something. So, I think it's pretty important. We'd better pay attention.

Host: Charles Ferguson, let's switch really quick to this other technological issue which is the delivery devices issue and we have now Iran claiming that it's successfully tested missiles based on North Korean designs: a Shahab-3 missile. How big a threat is that and is it capable of carrying nuclear weapons?

Ferguson: Well, it's not an intercontinental ballistic missile, so it's not going to be able to be launched from Iran and actually be able to strike the United States. But obviously it's a regional security threat. It can strike a lot of targets within Israel and neighboring states. I don't think it quite has the range to hit Europe, but, you know, give Iran a year's more development and it might be able to target some European cities. So, this is very interesting in light of the Bush administration now unveiling a missile defense system, ostensibly focused on North Korea, but also looking down the road at having the system expanded to deal with an Iranian threat. But it's unclear whether -- these missiles could carry a crude nuclear weapon, sort of a first generation device, but who knows what kind of weaponization skills the Iranian engineers have? Apparently a design from China's been floating around the Khan network. We found out that Libya obtained designs for a nuclear warhead that's derived from a Chinese design. And so it wouldn't be a surprise if Iran also bought something similar from Dr. Khan's network.

Host: Henry Sokolski, we only have about forty-five seconds left.

Sokolski: I think in fact they're working on an intercontinental range, what do they call it? Space launch vehicle. And the numbers of these short range things are quite impressive. We're in for a world contender here. Don't kid yourself. They're not going to just play for the lake of the Persian Gulf. They want influence in general. And they certainly, even with a shorter range missile, they will hit the sick man of Europe called Turkey, which is a member of N-A-T-O.

Host: I'm afraid that's going to have to be the last word for today. We're out of time. I'd like to thank my guests: Henry Sokolski of the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center and Charles Ferguson of the Council on Foreign Relations. Before we go, I'd like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can reach us through our web site at w-w-w-dot-v-o-a-news-dot-com-slash-ontheline. For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.