• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

23 June 2003

U.S. Urges IAEA to Expedite, Expand Iranian Nuclear Investigation

(Clandestine activities confirmed by IAEA visit) (2640)
The United States is deeply concerned about information the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified concerning
Iran's nuclear program, says Ambassador Kenneth Brill.
Responding on June 18 to the IAEA director general's report on Iran,
Brill noted that clandestine Iranian nuclear activities made public in
news reports last summer were confirmed as a result of the IAEA's
inspection visit to Iran in February. He also said that "Without the
outside revelations, Iran's extensive nuclear program would still be
proceeding on a largely clandestine basis" and the report "confirms
that Iran's nuclear program is cause for grave concern."
Brill, who is the U.S. Representative to United Nations organizations
in Vienna, noted that Iran told the IAEA that it had a policy of "full
cooperation" and "complete transparency" concerning its nuclear
program.
"Iran's 'complete transparency' proved not to extend, however, to the
import of nuclear material, or to the subsequent processing of that
material, or to the facilities where the material was stored and
processed," Brill said. "In fact, Iran's 'complete transparency' has
proven in crucial respects to be an empty promise, intended to
distract attention from its reluctant confirmation of the existence of
a whole series of clandestine activities and facilities," he
continued.
Brill took note of the fact that the IAEA report is not complete,
saying "The Director General's June 6 report indeed makes clear that
Iran has yet to answer questions the Agency put to it in February,
over three months ago. The breadth and depth of the unanswered
questions, together with the confirmed pattern of safeguards failures,
is the most compelling theme in the Director General's report," he
said.
Directly questioning the motivation of the Iranian government, Brill
asked, "If Iran's intentions are peaceful, why did it engage in a
long-term pattern of safeguards violations and evasions regarding a
number of its nuclear fuel cycle research and development activities?
Can anyone believe," he continued, "that all the different instances
of 'failure to comply' over many years, involving different quantities
of nuclear materials at different locations, could reflect anything
but a conscious effort by Iran to avoid monitoring of its fuel cycle
research and development activities by the IAEA?"
Following is the text of Brill's remarks:
(begin text)
Statement of the United States
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
Board Of Governors Meeting
Delivered by Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill, U.S. Representative,
U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna (UNVIE)
Vienna, Austria
June 18, 2003
Agenda Item 6(B): Director General's Report On Iran
Madame Chairwoman, the United States takes note of and welcomes the
Director General's June 6 report on the implementation of the NPT
[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] safeguards agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Although interim, the report clearly reflects the great thoroughness
and professionalism with which the Secretariat is pursuing the very
serious questions that have arisen about Iran's nuclear activities. My
government expresses appreciation to the Director General and to
Deputy Director General Goldschmidt and his staff for their continuing
efforts to clarify the nature, history, dimensions, and purposes of
the Iranian nuclear program. The United States strongly supports those
efforts, which are essential for maintaining the security and other
benefits that accrue to each country represented here today from a
strong and credible nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Agency's
efforts must continue until all the facts have been established and
evaluated.
Madame Chairwoman, the United States finds the substance of the
Director General's [DG's] report deeply troubling. Although the
investigations are continuing, the report already confirms that Iran's
nuclear program is cause for grave concern. Let me quote from the DG's
report: "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the
subsequent processing and use of that material, and the declaration of
facilities where the material was stored and processed. ... The number
of failures by Iran to report the nuclear material, facilities and
activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do
pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of concern." The
U.S., and I am sure most other Board members, fully share the concerns
the Director General expressed.
The report also notes that "the process of verifying the correctness
and completeness of the Iranian declarations is still ongoing." In
particular, the results of environmental sampling have not yet been
reported to the Board. We call on the Secretariat to expedite the
analysis of those samples and promptly report the results to the
Board. Likewise, we look forward to a report on the Secretariat's
continuing investigation of Iran's centrifuge and heavy water
programs. Additional information from the Secretariat on Iran's
experimentation in the production of uranium metal -- an activity
without apparent justification in Iran's fuel cycle -- and on its
isotope production experiments should also be presented to the Board
as soon as possible.
The report that the Director General has put before us is one that no
country can afford to ignore or dismiss. It is an impartial and wholly
factual product of the international inspectorate entrusted by us all
to verify the obligations of every country that has brought into force
an NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)-required safeguards
agreement. The inspectors were invited by Iran itself to test its
stated policy of "full cooperation with the IAEA" and "complete
transparency." Iran's "complete transparency" proved not to extend,
however, to the import of nuclear material, or to the subsequent
processing of that material, or to the facilities where the material
was stored and processed. In fact, Iran's "complete transparency" has
proven in crucial respects to be an empty promise, intended to
distract attention from its reluctant confirmation of the existence of
a whole series of clandestine activities and facilities.
In his statement this morning, the Ambassador of Iran characterized
the quantity of nuclear material involved in the failures the DG's
report noted as small. The DG's report itself noted "the quantities of
nuclear material involved here have not been large." But the report
immediately added that the amount involved was "not insignificant in
terms of a State's ability to conduct nuclear research and development
activities." The question the Agency will need to resolve is indeed
whether Iran used that "not insignificant" quantity of nuclear
material for undeclared research and development activities.
When revelations about Iran's nuclear program were made last summer,
Iran did not demonstrate a willingness to move promptly to ensure the
IAEA was fully informed about developments relevant to its
responsibilities. The existence of undeclared nuclear facilities was
made public -- not by Iran -- in August 2002. In a meeting with the
IAEA the following month, Iran agreed to a visit to those facilities
by the Director General in October 2002. That visit, however, was
delayed by the Iranian side for months, and eventually took place only
in February of this year -- half a year after the revelations were
made.
We all need to reflect on the implications of the fact that the
sequence of events leading to the Director General's report was the
result not of reports by Iran to the IAEA, but largely of information
that came to the Agency through open sources. The IAEA deserves full
credit for following up on the press revelations and essentially
confirming them. But we must pause to consider what would have
happened if there had been no press disclosures? Would Iran have come
forward on its own to inform the IAEA of its undeclared activities and
its projects at Natanz, or Arak, or at the Kalaye Electric Company?
I believe the answer is clear. Without the outside revelations, Iran's
extensive nuclear program would still be proceeding on a largely
clandestine basis, with the existence of only the Bushehr power
reactor and a few other facilities acknowledged by Iranian
authorities. Can the IAEA or anyone else be confident under these
circumstances that there are no other clandestine facilities that have
yet to be revealed?
Madame Chairwoman, at the March Board the U.S. joined others in
raising questions and expressing concerns about Iran's nuclear
program. Those questions and concerns take on added weight in light of
the Director General's interim report, which raises further questions
about Iran's nuclear intentions. Such questions do not arise because
of "U.S. propaganda," as Iran would like the world to believe, but
instead flow from facts the Agency has revealed and confirmed.
The Director General's June 6 report indeed makes clear that Iran has
yet to answer questions the Agency put to it in February, over three
months ago. The breadth and depth of the unanswered questions,
together with the confirmed pattern of safeguards failures, is the
most compelling theme in the Director General's report.
I will mention here today only a few of the new questions to which the
DG's report gives rise:
-- If Iran's intentions are peaceful, why did it engage in a long-term
pattern of safeguards violations and evasions regarding a number of
its nuclear fuel cycle research and development activities? Can anyone
believe that all the different instances of "failure to comply" over
many years, involving different quantities of nuclear materials at
different locations, could reflect anything but a conscious effort by
Iran to avoid monitoring of its fuel cycle research and development
activities by the IAEA?
-- The DG reports that Iran obtained UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] from
abroad but failed to report it as it was obliged to do, and that some
of that UF6 is now missing. Iran says the missing material is due to a
"leak" it just discovered. In light of the pattern of evasions the
IAEA has now confirmed about Iran's use of undeclared imported uranium
compounds, as well as Iran's practical need to test centrifuges with
UF6 before committing to a huge facility like Natanz that must have
cost hundreds of millions of dollars, is it not incumbent on Iranian
authorities to cooperate fully with all IAEA efforts to establish what
the real facts are?
-- While Iranian officials publicly claim full cooperation with the
IAEA and say they are offering "complete transparency," the DG
reported that Iran initially denied inspectors access to parts of the
Kalaye Electric site, then only grudgingly granted some access, and
still continues to prevent inspectors from taking environmental
samples there. If Iran's claim that it never introduced nuclear
material into centrifuges is true, why will it not permit sampling at
the Kalaye Electric Company? Does it have something to hide there?
-- Why did Iran test its capability to make uranium metal -- using a
secret stock of UF4 [uranium tetrafluoride] at an undeclared
laboratory -- when neither Bushehr nor its planned heavy water
research reactor requires uranium metal for fuel? The DG's report
noted that "neither [Iran's] light water reactors nor its planned
heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel." I don't need to
remind the Board that uranium metal is required to make fissile
components for HEU- [highly enriched uranium] type nuclear weapons.
Finally, Madame Chairwoman, in addition to those questions that Iran
should answer, I would like to pose some questions to the Secretariat:
-- The U.S. recognizes the IAEA's work in Iran is not yet complete and
that further analysis and evaluation will be needed before final
conclusions are drawn. It will be important for the Board to be
informed of the results of that work as soon as possible. But I would
like to ask today whether the Secretariat believes it is presently in
a position to provide the Board with assurances that there has been no
diversion of nuclear material in Iran to non-peaceful purposes?
-- Secondly, can the Secretariat tell us any results of the June 7-11
visit to Iran by its enrichment experts that was mentioned in
paragraphs 8 and 11 of the DG's June 6 report? Was the team able to
take environmental samples at any sites, and if so, are there results
that can be shared with the Board? Are there sites at which the team
was not allowed to take environmental samples? If so, is there
additional information about Iran's activities at those sites? And
finally, has Iran now satisfactorily addressed the questions that the
Agency forwarded on February 26 regarding its research and development
program on centrifuges?
In light of the importance my government attaches to answering
questions like the above in the most timely fashion possible, the U.S.
requests the Director General to advise this Board immediately if he
believes there are actions, pursuant to paragraph 18 of Iran's NPT
Safeguards Agreement, that the Secretariat views as "essential and
urgent" for Iran to take in order for the IAEA to verify that there
has been no diversion of nuclear material. If the DG believes a
Special Inspection is in order, my government would fully support that
and any other action the Director General believes is needed to answer
the outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear program.
The United States also requests the DG to inform the Board immediately
if the Secretariat detects in Iran actions that could be intended to
"sanitize" Iranian facilities of evidence of past violations of its
safeguards obligations.
The Board should in that regard urge Iran today to refrain from any
actions that would make it more difficult for the Agency to determine
the correctness and completeness of Iranian declarations.
Specifically, the DG's June 6 report indicates that Iran intends to
introduce nuclear material at the Natanz pilot centrifuge plant during
the present month of June. We look to the IAEA Secretariat to work
with Iran to ensure that no such step is taken while serious
outstanding questions remain about whether Iran may already have used
its centrifuges for undeclared operations -- evidence of which could
be masked by the introduction of new, declared nuclear material.
The United States also joins other Board members in calling on Iran to
sign, ratify, and implement the Strengthened Safeguards Additional
Protocol without delay and without conditions. If Iran's nuclear
program were limited only to peaceful purposes, Iran would see the
Additional Protocol as a way to show its commitment to the
non-proliferation regime and complete transparency. Instead, when
Iranian officials speak about signing the Additional Protocol, they
attach conditions no other country has sought or imposed. Like all
other NPT signatories, Iran has an obligation to safeguards compliance
that should be unqualified. Its adherence to the Additional Protocol
should not be conditioned.
In conclusion, Madame Chairwoman, I want to reiterate the gravity of
this issue. The Secretariat's work to date and the Director General's
forthright reporting on it have rendered an important service to the
nuclear non-proliferation regime and to global security. My government
now looks forward to further information from the DG as soon as
possible on the Secretariat's progress in determining the correctness
and completeness of Iranian declarations to date. The U.S. expects the
Agency's accumulation of further information will point to only one
conclusion: that Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons
program.
We propose that the Board be prepared to meet in special session to
consider further information and analysis from the Secretariat
whenever it becomes available, rather than waiting until the next
scheduled Board meeting in September. In the interim, Iran should take
all necessary steps to facilitate the work of the inspectors, so the
world can be reliably informed of the full truth about its nuclear
program.
Finally, Madame Chairwoman, the U.S. would like to join others in
supporting the release of the DG's June 6 report to the public. A
number of news media quickly acquired copies, and there have been
selective quotations from its text. Our publics would be better served
by the Board making the entire report available.
Thank you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)