09 May 2003
U.S. Disputes Stated Purposes of Iranian Nuclear Facilities
(Answer to question taken at May 9 State Department briefing) (420) Following is the official answer to a question taken at the May 9 regular State Department briefing; the answer was posted later in the day: (begin text) US DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman For Immediate Release May 9, 2003 2003/507 Taken Question from May 8, 2003 Daily Press Briefing Iranian Nuclear Facilities: Arak and Natanz Question: Did the Iranian government admit to having a heavy water reactor? If so, when? Have we confirmed reports of a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water reactor at Arak? Answer: Iran has acknowledged both the heavy water production plant at Arak and the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, but did so only after their existence was disclosed to the press in August 2002 by an Iranian opposition group. Aside from a small IAEA-safeguarded "zero-power" research reactor located at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, Iran has no known heavy water reactor and no need for an indigenous source of heavy water. Iran's only nuclear power reactor expected to become operational within the next decade is the light-water reactor under construction with Russian help at Bushehr. This raises serious questions about Iran's intentions in constructing an industrial-scale heavy water production plant at Arak. Heavy-water moderated reactors are better suited for plutonium production than are light water reactors. We believe Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant). Iran has also confirmed to the IAEA that it is constructing a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility near the town of Natanz. Although Iran initially delayed the visit, IAEA Director General ElBaradei visited the Natanz site in late February and found what appeared to be a "sophisticated" centrifuge uranium enrichment program. We are deeply concerned at Iran's efforts to build that facility clandestinely, and believe there is no logical reason for Iran to pursue uranium enrichment other than to support a weapons capability, especially in light of Russia's pledge to provide all the fuel for the lifetime of the Bushehr reactor. The IAEA is undertaking a rigorous examination of Iran's nuclear activities, and we look forward to hearing from Dr. ElBaradei at the June Board of Governors meeting as to the results to date of that examination. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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