DATE=3/4/2000
TYPE=ON THE LINE
TITLE=ON THE LINE: THE IRANIAN ELECTIONS
NUMBER=1-00827
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
CONTENT=
THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE
Anncr: On the Line - a discussion of United
States policy and contemporary issues. This week,
"The Iranian Elections." Here is your host, Robert
Reilly.
Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line. In
recent voting, Islamic reformists gained control
of Iran's parliament for the first time since the
1979 revolution brought an Islamic fundamentalist
regime to power. The reformists won one hundred
seventy seats out of a total of two hundred
ninety. Some observers say that President Mohammad
Khatami is now in a position to move forward with
reforms. But others warn that the key institutions
in Iran are still controlled by Iran's rigidly
fundamentalist supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.
Meanwhile, a senior U.S. military commander,
General Anthony Zinni, told the U.S. Congress that
Iran remains the greatest long-term threat to the
U.S. in the Middle East. General Zinni cited
Iran's support for terrorism and its programs to
develop weapons of mass destruction and the
missiles to deliver them.
Joining me today to discuss the Iranian elections
are three experts. Roscoe Suddarth is president of
the Middle East Institute and a former U.S.
ambassador to Jordan. Azar Nafisi is a visiting
professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced
International Studies. And Suzanne Maloney is a
research associate at the Brookings Institute.
Mr. Suddarth, this parliamentary election follows
upon municipal elections last year, in which the
reform group did stunningly well, which followed
the 1997 upset election of President Khatami. Does
all of this translate into an irreversible force
of reform in Iran?
Suddarth: It sure looks like a trend to me, Bob.
People have put great store by the fact that there
is a generational change. You have a greater and
greater proportion of the population that is very
young. And with the voting age now at sixteen, it
was fifteen before, you have youth who are voting.
You have the women who have voted very decisively
on liberal issues. From the U.S. point of view, I
think it is a very encouraging trend.
Host: Why from the U.S. point of view? What does
this promise to change?
Suddarth: Because it is an open society that they
are moving toward. It is a society under Mr.
Khatami that is calling for a dialogue and for
people-to-people ties, at least with the United
States. And I hope that, over time, the two
regimes will be able to signal one another
sufficiently that we will be able to compose some
of these differences. Iran is too important a
country to be left in isolation.
Host: Azar Nafisi, do you agree with that?
Nafisi: Yes, I do. I just wanted to add to what
Ambassador Suddarth was saying about this
generational change, apart from the very important
role the youth as a whole have played in these
elections and overall in the change toward more
pluralism. We also have the young revolutionaries
within the Islamic regime, who, at the time of the
revolution, were eighteen or twenty. Most of the
pro-democracy journalists, like Mr. [Akbar] Ganji,
they were about eighteen or twenty at the time of
the revolution. And over the years, two things
happened. They became more demoralized with the
ideological system of the Islamic regime, and they
became more and more open towards democratic
views. And I think that this sort of movement,
from both within the religious hierarchy and from
without, it is going to be very positive.
Host: Suzanne Maloney, can you have a theocratic
democracy?
Maloney: That is a very interesting question. But
I think what we are seeing in Iran is that the
democracy is moving much faster than the theocracy
is. The theocracy has not made a lot of progress
since 1979 in terms of establishing itself. Yet
each year, we are seeing more and more insistence
on political participation of Iranians,
particularly of young Iranians, and more and more
insistence on transparency and accountability from
the government. If that is not democracy, I am not
entirely sure what is. Iran is the most
pluralistic country in the region by far. And that
is a trend that has been going on for at least a
decade, and probably longer.
Host: Yet still, the institutions of the Iranian
regime are intact, with Ayatollah Khamenei
controlling the military, the media, and the
judiciary. And the Council of Guardians are a
brake, are they not, on anything this parliament
may do? How far can reform go before the clerical
regime says, you have overstepped yourselves?
Suddarth: Well, I guess that is the big question
now with a large majority in the Majlis
[parliament]. And if they start voting positive
legislation, it can be vetoed by the Council of
Guardians. But as an Iranian said to me, they can
only dare veto so many things; otherwise people
will be in the streets. And from the other
viewpoint, they will not be putting in bad
legislation, such as the press law. So everyone
has a lot of hope. On the other hand, there is
always the possibility that somebody in the
Revolutionary Guard feels things have gone too far
and moves in. Yet most people say that what
brought the Shah down was the spilling of blood.
So I think the clerical regime has been very
careful not to use too much force. And I think it
is under more pressure not to do that now. So I am
hopeful that there will not be a large counter-
revolution, but who's to say?
Host: What is the potential for that, Azar
Nafisi?
Nafisi: Also, I think that, right now, what is
happening in Iran is not so much polarization in
terms of the hard-liners and the reformists. There
is more division, clarification and exclusion. I
mean, who is the hard-liner, who was the real
opponent of the "reformist line" in this
revolution? Was it Ayatollah Khamenei or was it
the former president whom we did call reformist,
[Ali Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani?
Host: What is the answer to that?
Nafisi: The answer to that question, as far as we
can see, is that Rafsanjani was really the main -
I hate to use these polarized words in themselves
- enemy. But he was the main antagonist in this
show. And people pointedly went to the polls not
just to vote for the pro-democratic forces, which
they did, but also to vote against Rafsanjani. It
was the same type of protest vote that they did
during Mr. Khatami's election. They were saying
"no" to a system. And there is another point. I
think that, not just for the hard-liners, but for
many people in the clerical hierarchy, reform is
equal to revolution. What is the reform? We don't
want a theocracy. Basically, that is what they are
saying. And that is why they are coming so
violently. But it is not just wishful thinking to
say that it is irreversible.
Host: You think it is?
Nafisi: I don't think that we can go back anymore.
Host: Tell me, Suzanne Maloney, President
Khatami, some people suggest, has had the longest
political honeymoon of any political leader. He
has been in there since 1997 as a reformer, as a
proponent of rule of law and, as Mr. Suddarth
mentioned, a dialogue of civilizations, and so
forth. However, he could always turn to the fact
that he is opposed by this parliament. Now he is
going to have seventy-percent support in the
parliament, or more. What is the next thing we
expect to see this parliament do? What is the
reform agenda?
Maloney: Khatami has a little bit of breathing
space now, but he also has a lot of pressure
because he will be facing a campaign for
reelection in about another year that will begin
to heat up. So there is a lot of pressure on him
to actually come through at this point.
Host: What does "coming through" mean?
Maloney: Looking closely at his record, you see he
is a very smart guy. Khatami is very savvy about
picking the battles. He is also very good at
appealing to the average Iranian on the street. He
has this kind of charisma that sends girls at
universities fainting and sobbing. It is unclear
exactly what the real agenda of this reformist
parliament will be. There are those who will argue
that economic reform is going to be on top of the
list. There are those who argue that they will be
looking to sort of feel-good measures, political
and social and cultural reforms, things like
repealing the ban on satellite dishes. I tend to
think that they are going to have to focus very
clearly and immediately on economic reform, but
that actually is the harder of the agendas that
they will have.
Host: In fact, Roscoe Suddarth, some people say
that the really difficult times are about to begin
because the so-called reformists really are not
bound together by anything other than their
antipathy to the clerical regime. And there is not
a common program for reform even in the economic
area. Some of them are for privatization of state
enterprises. Some of them oppose it.
Suddarth: Well, that is true. I think most people
agree that the primary movement will be toward
political reform and opening up the society,
perhaps political parties being allowed. The
Iranians seem to be interested in that for the
moment more than they are in the economy. I think
they realize that the entrenched interests of the
clerics, particularly in the foundations, the
bonyads which control eighty percent of the gross
national product of the country -- they are
enormous - will be very hard to take apart. They
are not even put in as part of the budget. They
are not transparent at all. So if he can start
moving in the direction of political reforms,
transparency and things like that, I think that
the Iranians will be patient with him.
Host: Do you agree?
Maloney: They have begun to do that with some
changes that were made even before these
elections. Last summer, you saw a new head
installed at the judiciary. So there you do not
have direct control by Khatami, but you have
someone who has come into that position willing to
make reforms, willing to work with the president.
The same is true at the largest of these
foundations. The Bonyad-e Mostazafan [Foundation
for the Oppressed] also received a new head last
July, someone who has pledged to work very closely
and has been criticized already by the previous
head for working so closely with the government
and being so cooperative. So you are already
starting to see this movement in favor of greater
control by the central government. And if he is
able to further that sort of thing over the next
six months, it will be a major accomplishment.
Suddarth: But you know you are right, I think,
that the people backing Khatami - that you have a
lot of statists, people from the [former Iranian
president] Bani Sadr [and former Iranian prime
minister Mir Hussein] Musavi tradition who believe
that the primary thing is equity, that you should
take care of the poor, that you should have the
state controlling things. They are not at all
interested in private enterprise, foreign
investment, all the sort of things that, I think,
are necessary for Iran to become prosperous.
Host: And to solve a twenty-percent unemployment
problem, right?
Nafisi: Yes, that is one of the main problems, and
that is why I was saying, when we talk about
reformists, they are not a homogenous group. Both
in terms of politics as well as the economy and
culture, they do have a lot of things to solve and
to sort out. So I think you will see divisions
within all camps. Especially on the question of
the economy, there are many divergent views. As
Ambassador Suddarth said about Mir Hussein
Musavi's government, and also people like [former
Iranian editor of Salaam newspaper, Mohammad
Musavi] Khoeiniha, all these people who are to the
right of the current popular reformists would all
be very afraid of an open society, an open
economy. But I also wanted to say about President
Khatami that I always thought that President
Khatami's position was paradoxical. On the one
hand, he would like to keep the status quo and he
belongs to the prestigious revolutionary
tradition. He has been there from the start. On
the other hand, he has an agenda and he has come
with a platform that is very democratic in many
ways. So he has been vacillating at times between
these two, and it is a very precarious line to
tread. And you saw that in the student
demonstrations. I think that, with the student
demonstrations, President Khatami had to take
sides, or had at least to make public statements
which did alienate many groups within the
students. There are still unsolved problems, the
murders and the students, because now we have the
police on trial, but not their vigilantes who were
the real cause of the trouble. All the student
groups condemned this. So we have all these
problems to face. In order for Iran to move
forward, you need experts and you need to create a
trust for the Iranians to go back, for the West to
open up. And I think that those who are in favor
of a state economy do not have much place to go.
Host: How might the results of this election
translate into changes in foreign policy, Suzanne
Maloney?
Maloney: I think this parliament is not going to
have a great deal of control over the three main
issues that concern U.S. foreign policy in
particular, and that is terrorism, support of
groups that are rejectionist against the Arab-
Israeli peace process, and development of programs
for weapons of mass destruction. The parliament
does not have specific responsibilities over those
three areas. And so I don't think we are going to
see any immediate changes. But what we are seeing
is this culture of transparency and accountability
and the culture of criticizing and discussing
everything that is slowly going to move into those
three areas. There are problems at home that are
probably going to occupy most of the Majlis's
time, at least in its early sessions. But I would
also suspect that a parliament that is struggling
with some of the big issues of how do you enact
economic reform when you have major philosophical
differences about it, might look toward some easy
gains that might be made by reaching out on
foreign policy. And they have seen how successful
that has been over the past year or so.
Host: What did you think, Roscoe Suddarth, about
the reaction of the United States government to
the results of this election?
Suddarth: Well, I think they have been quite
positive. We are, however, at the end of an
administration. [President Bill] Clinton sees a
strategic opening in Iran, but I happen to be
somewhat pessimistic. I could see the
administration, for instance, doing a few small
gestures like allowing oil swaps or even perhaps
the importation of rugs from Iran, which would be
enormously positive. But as we move toward the
elction, [Vice President Al] Gore, I think, is
committed to not only a pro-Israeli stand, but for
similar reasons the East-West pipeline, which
denies Iran transit of oil and gas coming to
Turkey and the West. And what generally happens is
that the vice president, since this is a minor
foreign policy issue for America, even though
people in the Middle East think it is major --
there is China, there is Russia, there is the
World Trade Organization, there are a whole bunch
of things. I think he would prevail on Clinton to
go slow on Iran. Clinton has the whole peace
process that he has got to worry about. So I would
see limited gestures from the United States during
this period.
Host: There already have been a few limited
gestures from president Clinton on spare airline
parts and lifting sanctions against foreign
companies doing business in the oil industry in
Iran.
Maloney: The major change in the sanctions law was
one which assisted U.S. agriculture, because it
allowed our agricultural companies and medical
companies to export things to Iran. What the
Iranians are looking for is something that helps
their economy. And I agree with
Ambassador Suddarth. I do not think we will see
major gestures in the short term. There will be
this window of opportunity come November, when you
might see the administration more free to act, and
obviously they are interested in what is happening
in Iran as part of a larger process of dealing
with the Middle East.
Host: On the other hand, we saw president
Khatami in Damascus last summer meeting with the
heads of Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, expressing
his support. So how likely is it, even with him,
that there would be a breakthrough on any of these
issues that are so important to the United States
-- on terrorism, the Israeli-Arab peace process,
and weapons of mass destruction?
Nafisi: That is one of the problems that Iran
faces. It is a domestic problem that they have to
solve first because they also have to be able,
first of all, whatever they say in private, they
have to able to back it up with some public
action. And what happens is that many Iranian
politicians might want very good relations with
the U.S., but publicly their hands are tied.
Host: One Iranian candidate even said, why don't
we have a national referendum on reestablishing
relations with the U.S.?
Nafisi: You see, for example, Mr. [Kamal] Kharrazi
[Iranian foreign minister]. On one hand, he takes
steps toward more dialogue. On the other hand, I
think it was in an interview in Newsweek where he
says that we don't recognize Israel's existence.
Israel does not exist. Or on Salman Rushdie, he
now says we never took back what we said about
Salman Rushdie. The point is that they have to be
able to move domestically to a point where the
foreign minister can give assurances and be able
to back it up.
Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have
this week. I would like to thank our guests --
Roscoe Suddarth from the Middle East Institute;
Azar Nafisi from the Johns Hopkins School for
Advanced International Studies; and Suzanne
Maloney from the Brookings Institute-- for joining
me to discuss the Iranian elections. This is
Robert Reilly for On the Line.
Anncr: You've been listening to "On the Line" - a
discussion of United States policies and
contemporary issues. This is --------.
03-Mar-2000 11:14 AM EDT (03-Mar-2000 1614 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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