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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

QUESTION: One more - referring to yesterday's Wall Street Journal article, titled "Fission for Cash," the reports are that at least two Russian nuclear agencies are in the shadow of Bushehr on the side, are quietly negotiating to sell Iran a 40 mega-watt heavy water research reactor and a uranium conversion facility that would allow fissionable materials to be produced by the Iranians. I would just ask, does this violate the non-proliferation policy of this government?

MR. RUBIN: We've repeatedly raised this kind of problem with Russian officials. We have discussed our concerns at the highest levels. Russia has declined to halt all nuclear cooperation with Iran. It has given us commitments that such cooperation will be limited to the Bushehr reactor project during the period of its construction.

Despite these commitments, we are aware that a number of Russian entities are engaged in cooperation with Iran that goes beyond the Bushehr reactor project. We are convinced that Iran is using the Bushehr reactor project as a cover for acquiring sensitive Russian nuclear technology. Because of our concerns, we have already substantially curtailed USG programs with key Russian nuclear entities. We are ready to take further steps against any entities that we believe may be involved in this type of nuclear cooperation with Iran.

We used the Administration's executive order last summer against seven Russian entities involved in assisting Iran's ballistic missile program. We are ready to take similar action against similar Russian nuclear entities. We have been engaged with the Russian Government in intensive and extensive discussions on this. We continue to underscore to the Russians that the true test of Russia's commitments is whether it takes decisive action to stop the flow of such technology.

The Russian Government has told us that it, too, is committed to ensuring that Russian entities do not transfer sensitive technologies to Iran, as that would affect Russian security interests.

Let me also say the US Government will not be able to approve expansion of the highly lucrative space launch market with Russia until Russian entities cease cooperation with Iran's ballistic missile program. So we are looking to see immediate concrete action from Russia to take decisive steps to prevent this kind of thing.

QUESTION: So there are no signs that the Russians are listening to us yet?

MR. RUBIN: Let me leave things just where I stated them.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - before that you won't be able to see expansion of the space program?

MR. RUBIN: I doubt when they read the transcript that they will be shocked.

[end of document]