NEW THINKING ON THE IRANIAN ISSUE
(Analysis by Reuven Pedhatzur, "Ha'aretz", July 28, 1998, p. B1.)
The test which Iran carried out last week on the Shihab-3 ballistic
missile was expected. To all those following the attempts to prevent the
transfer of missile technology to Iran, it was clear that they were bound
to fail. The joint war conducted by the United States and Israel had no
chance against the combined economic interests of Russia, China and North
Korea. It was clear that the aid of these countries, and the weak response
by the international community to the nuclear tests carried out by India
and Pakistan, would lead to the acceleration of the development of the
Iranian missile. The acceleration was certainly faster than western
intelligence bodies had anticipated, but how should this affect the
Israel's appropriate preparations against this development, which was
expected in any case?
The assumption that the Iranians, within a short time, will be equipped
with missiles capable of hitting Israel has been contained in every IDF
Intelligence Branch briefing that Israeli policy makers have received in
recent years. Therefore, the Iranian tests should have surprised nobody,
and thus the declaration that the launching of the missile requires a
large budgetary increase is not only out of place, but also attests to the
shallowness of the debate on the Iranian issue. For starters, the Iranian
threat is being unnecessarily magnified out of all proportion, and on the
basis of completely mistaken strategic thinking, it is being turned into
an existential threat. From here, it is a short step to the exploitation
of public fears in order to demand more resources. After all, who would
dare to oppose budgetary increases intended for defense against an
existential threat?
But how exactly would the security establishment use the additional budget
to prepare against the Iranian threat? The problem, of course, is that
nobody is asking this question, so senior security establishment figures
can suffice with the demand for a few extra billions, to be justified with
slogans and empty cliches devoid of all content. As in the past, as if by
a sort of conditioned reflex, the solution proposed by the security
establishment is always the same -- an addition to the budget.
The Iranian ballistic missile development program, like the Iranian
nuclear weapons project, cannot be destroyed by Israel. The idea that the
leaders of Iran are only waiting for the completion of the development of
the missiles in order to launch them at Israel completely avoids an
analysis of Iranian national interests. The acquiring of long-range
ballistic missiles is intended to turn Iran into a central player in the
Middle East. Last week's test launch was an additional Iranian signal in
the new strategic game developing in the region. The missiles, like
nuclear weapons, are devices for turning Iran into a regional power. The
ability to hit Israel is not the original intention, but rather derives
from Iranian preparations in the regional context. Of course, once such an
ability exists, Israel has no choice but to relate to it.
A professional analysis of the options available to Israel indicates that
a budgetary increase of the sort that the security establishment is
currently requesting will be ineffectual against the developing Iranian
ballistic missile threat. The attempt to base preparations on the
acquirement and development of weaponry able to deal with the missiles is
completely mistaken. It makes no difference how much money the IDF invests
in the development of weaponry and combat doctrines -- aggressive and
defensive -- against the Iranian missiles. In the end, the only answer to
the ballistic threat is deterrence.
From the moment that the Iranians possess missiles with non-conventional
warheads, only the assurance of a complete and hermetic defense against
them can act as a basis for preparations, since for Israel, the cost of
even a single nuclear missile hitting metropolitan Tel Aviv is
intolerable. Since even the most advanced measures cannot completely
ensure against the possibility of a single Iranian missile getting through
[our] defenses, policy makers will, in any case, have to abandon the
operational track and concentrate on deterrence.
Even if it is believed that the Iranian leadership intends to destroy
Israel, it must be understood that the only way to prevent the realization
of this threat is not investment in new and sophisticated weapons systems,
but rather through deterrence. Only when Iranian policy makers understand
that an attempted non-conventional strike at Israel will result in huge
damage to Iran, will they be deterred from the use of the missiles.
What is needed, therefore, is bold and original thinking, which does not
base preparations on the easy answer: the comfortable and mistaken
solution of budgetary increases. The real nature of the developing Iranian
threat should be explained to the public, and it should be made clear that
Iranian acquirement of nuclear weapons does not mean the end of the
Zionist dream. The problem is that those who are taking great trouble to
turn Iran into an existential threat will find it hard to calm the public
when it becomes clear that Iran has completed the development of nuclear
weapons. Increasing the budget is not the correct answer to the Iranian
nuclear tests; rather, there must be a basic revision in strategic
thinking on the Iranian issue.
.
=====================================================================
Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry - Jerusalem
Mail all Queries to ask@israel-info.gov.il
URL: http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il
gopher://israel-info.gov.il
=====================================================================
Note: The translations of articles from the Hebrew press
are prepared by the Government Press Office
as a service to foreign journalists in Israel.
They express the views of the authors.
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