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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing; today being Thursday. Let me start with a statement that we have with regard to the summary execution of Baha'i in Iran.

On July 21, Iranian authorities executed by hanging an Iranian Ba'hai, Mr. Rowhani, who had been charged with converting a Muslim to the Baha'i faith. There is no evidence that Mr. Rowhani was accorded due process of law.

The United States strongly condemns the execution of Mr. Rowhani for the exercise of his freedom of conscience. We call on the government of Iran to protect the lives of the 15 other imprisoned Baha'is, seven of whom are sentenced to death on charges of apostasy and so-called Zionist Baha'i activities. We understand that three of the condemned Baha'is are threatened with imminent execution and urge the Iranian authorities not to carry out the death sentence.

Since the Islamic republic came to power, more than 200 Baha'is have been executed because of their religious beliefs. Mr. Rowhani is the first Baha'i to be executed in Iran since 1992. We have repeatedly urged the government of Iran to ease restrictions on the practice of religion, and to recognize and uphold the fundamental human right to freedom of conscience and belief. We have also called for the release of all those serving sentences for the peaceful expression of their religious or political beliefs; we do so again today.

The President and Secretary Albright have made it clear that the issue of freedom of conscience and belief is a central component of our human rights policy in Iran and around the world. Our concerns about restrictions on the practice of religion will play an important role in any future dialogue with the government of Iran.

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QUESTION: A two-part question - what is your assessment of the significance of the missile test by the Iranians, in light of the Secretary's speech last month or so? The second part of that, we understand that the missile was detonated somewhere between 70 to 100 seconds after launch, but there's some uncertainty as to whether it was deliberate or accidental. a) have you heard that; and b) do you have an assessment of it?

MR. RUBIN: Let me tell you what I can say on this subject. Obviously, there are intelligence issues that make it difficult to be as specific as I know some of you may like. But I can say that the United States did detect yesterday the test launch of a No Dong type medium-range ballistic missile. The North Korean No Dong medium-range ballistic missile has a range in excess of 1,000 kilometers. The Iranian name for this missile is the Shahab-3.

This test is significant because it shows that Iran's aggressive effort to develop missiles more capable than its existing shorter-range Scud missiles is making progress. Additional time and flight tests normally are required to bring a missile into series production or so-called "operational status." Therefore, it would be premature to say this test suggests that Iran has an operational medium-range missile capability. However - and fairly obviously, once the Shahab-3 is made operational, Iran will have the ability to strike more distant targets, including Israel, portions of Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

This missile, I'm advised, is a No Dong type medium-range missile, indicating that it was largely derived from North Korean technology. This is also consistent with the fact that just as North Korea itself developed the No Dong, based on Scud technology, Iran for many years has been working with North Korea to put in place an indigenous Scud production capability.

That is what I can say about the significance of this and the status of the program as far as I can. With respect to whether it exploded and what the significance of that is, I am not in a position to comment.

QUESTION: Is it the first such test?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that. But clearly, this system is in a development phase, and during the development phase the missile is often tested. That is not a surprise; and therefore, one couldn't rule out additional tests. But it is not in the operational phase.

QUESTION: Given the test yesterday and --

MR. RUBIN: Oh, I didn't answer George's first question, and then I'll come over to you.

With respect to the Secretary's speech and the significance of this test, let me remind you that the Secretary made very clear in her speech that one of the key issues that we have profound concerns about is Iran's pursuit of programs in this area, including ballistic missile capabilities and weapons of mass destruction capabilities. That is one of our prime concerns with respect to Iran. It is one of the reasons why we think we need to do all we can to retard and deter other countries from providing assistance to this program. It is one of the basis for many aspects of our policy.

But it doesn't mean that we don't want to have an opportunity to express these concerns directly; and it doesn't mean that we don't see the election of President Khatemi and the steps that he's taken as significant enough to say what the Secretary said about what the future might hold.

The question is, will Iran pursue policies that don't threaten the interests of its neighbors and the world. We think one of the ways in which we can try to achieve that objective, in addition to retarding and deterring the assistance to Iran from other countries is to talk to the Iranians and express our concerns directly to them, at which time they would be in a position to express their concerns as well.

So Secretary Albright went into the speech on Iran with her eyes wide open about the problems in our relationship with Iran. It is precisely because of those problems that she identified what is the phenomenon in Iran politically, and what our road map might look like in the future if they are prepared to deal with the concerns that we have - especially with respect to ballistic missiles.

QUESTION: Does the test yesterday and the execution as well tell the Administration anything about what's going on between President Khatemi and the religious leaders who rule the country?

MR. RUBIN: It's not our practice to try to divine exactly what goes on between different groupings of interest groups and views that are obviously in existence in Iran. What we can do is identify phenomenon that we consider real, and that was the democratic basis of the election of President Khatemi. We can identify things that he said that have significance. We can identify things that Iran has done in the area of drugs, refugees, Afghanistan, statements about terrorism. And now we can identify, as we have always been, things that they've done that are bad news; and clearly, this kind of a test is bad news.

So what we are focused on is the policies and practices of the government as well as the significant trend that was demonstrated by his election and things he's said and done since then.

QUESTION: One just follow-up on that. Does the Administration have any reason to think that there may be additional missile tests?

MR. RUBIN: I think in response to George's question I indicated - or in response to your question - that given that this is a missile in the development stage, that it would be imprudent to rule out the possibility of additional tests.

QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about whether or not you see this test at this moment in the Middle East peace process when things seem to be stalemated to say the least, whether this would --

MR. RUBIN: Although that depends on which newspaper you read, obviously.

QUESTION: You can comment on that, too.

QUESTION: Hopefully you'll talk about that as well. But since you're talking about Iran, I mean, do you see this as contributing to the jitters in the region? And in short term and long term, what affect does this have on the balance of power in the region? Maybe it has no affect at the moment, but in the long term, how significant is this?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I indicated, once the missile, the Shahab-3, is made operational, Iran will have the ability to strike more distant targets, including Israel, portions of Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia; and at that point, would therefore have an impact and a significance strategically. But at this point, this is a missile test in a development stage. There are many such tests that occur around the world. Our job and our effort and our objective is to try to work with the various countries around the world to try to retard and deter the acquisition of additional technology or capability that can add to what is obviously an indigenous capability that they now have.

QUESTION: Are you concerned that Israel might take a preemptive strike on this system? And have you talked with the Israelis about --

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're in regular touch with the Israelis. I do believe we've talked to them about the significance of this test, and we've had such discussions. But I'd rather keep those discussions private.

QUESTION: Follow-up, Jamie - you mentioned that this missile was based on North Korean technology. Do you all believe also that any of the transfers of technology from Russia could have aided in the test of this particular missile; or do you think that's more in helping in different areas?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say in general, we have been extremely concerned for some time about Iran's aggressive efforts to obtain missile technology from Russian firms. Some of those acquisition efforts have been successful; and therefore, one can't rule out that some technology contributed to this. But it is our understanding that this was largely derived from North Korean technology, and that is a key point.

We have been pursuing an intensive, high-level effort to impede Iranian efforts to obtain missile technology from Russian firms. We have produced real progress in this effort. Over the past year, the government in Russia has enacted sweeping new export controls, which is the basis by which you can change policies and practices and have a substantive impact on a subject like non-proliferation. They have shut down some activities, made arrests and announced last week that they are investigating nine Russian entities for cooperating with Iran.

So we have concerns in this area; we've been working very hard on those concerns. I can't rule out what you suggested, but the basic view is we regard this missile as based on and largely derived from North Korean technology.

QUESTION: I'd like to follow up Carol's question. Some months ago the Iranian resistance here in Washington developed some information based on their sources in Iran that the Iranian Government had one Shahab already operational. Could it not be very possibly that Iran now has the capability of reaching Israel with a medium-range rocket that's too fast for missile defenses that are not yet developed for this kind of medium-range rocket? Is it not possible that Israel is under that threat?

MR. RUBIN: I think I've made very clear what our view is, and that our view is there is not now an operational capability; that this program is in a development stage. You are quoting a particular source; you're welcome to continue to quote that source. If you're asking for our view - the government's view - I told you the government's view is that this is a missile in research and development, and it has not reached its operational phase. If it did, I've also told you our view that it would be possible for it to reach Israel.

QUESTION: But could it not have just a small number or even one missile ready to use against Israel; isn't that possible?

MR. RUBIN: I think I'm doing the best I can with your question. Your question is, what do we think of this missile. I've given you our judgment that I've been provided as to our judgment on a highly technical, very difficult judgment that we make with thousands and thousands of people working on this problem.

QUESTION: Not operational, that's the judgment?

MR. RUBIN: That's the word that I used, yes.

QUESTION: I know you're not the Vice President's spokesman, but would you expect this issue to come up during his meetings in Russia in the coming days?

MR. RUBIN: I would be surprised if, in one form or another, the Vice President - as the President has and the Secretary has - didn't have discussions about the issue of preventing and deterring and retarding assistance by certain Russian entities to Iran.

QUESTION: Natan Sharansky was here on Monday, did he raise any of these same concerns - possible presage the preparations for the test?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be able to get into details of Mr. Sharansky's discussions with us in any detail. I can say that we weren't surprised by this test, given the program that we know is in existence. Mr. Sharansky and US officials obviously did talk about our joint effort to try to deter and retard assistance to Iran's program, precisely because we share a view about the dangers inherent of such a program.

QUESTION: Can we move to the Middle East peace process?

QUESTION: Speaking of North Korea's missile technology, what is your understanding of the cooperation? Do you think Iranians used North Korean technology - (inaudible) - missile program; or Iranians used North Korea's missile body like No Dong missile body?

MR. RUBIN: Iran for many years has been working with North Korea to put in place an indigenous Scud production capability. That is something I indicated earlier, and that is the kind of cooperation between Iran and North Korea that we're so concerned about and we are working to deter and retard.

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(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)

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