13 March 1998
[EXCERPTS] TRANSCRIPT: STATE DEPT. NOON BRIEFING, MARCH 13
DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING INDEX Friday, March 13, 1998 Briefer: James P. Rubin ............ CHINA/NON-PROLIFERATION 1,6 Reports of nuclear deal with Iran inaccurate 2,6 "Sea-change" in Chinese non-proliferation policies, practices 4 Uses of chemical, AHF, anhydrous hydrogen fluoride 5 1-2-3 agreement could begin soon 5 No connection to President's travel plans IRAN 4-5 U.S. efforts to curtail nuclear capability efforts 7-8 Warm welcome for U.S. wrestling team encouraging 8 Court decision on terrorism being studied 9 Travel warning still in effect U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPB # 33 FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1998 12:30 P.M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. It's Friday; it seems there aren't many of you here, but we will brief nonetheless. ................... Q: Are you prepared to talk about the China-Iran nuclear deal? Does it seem to you that the Chinese tried to pull a fast one by attempting to go ahead with this deal just a couple of brief months after promising they would no longer engage in such transactions? MR. RUBIN: First let me say, with our usual disclaimer about not commenting on intelligence matters, I can discuss this incident. I think contrary to the suggestions that some have drawn from this event, this is a case that demonstrates how non-proliferation works, not how non-proliferation doesn't work. And there are always people who want to comment how there are a few drops less in the glass than there should be; and there are some who want to explain how full the glass really is. This is a case of the glass being well more than half full on non-proliferation. It's an indication of the progress we have made with China on nuclear non-proliferation. We raised with Chinese authorities a possible - and let me emphasize the word "possible" -- transaction between a Chinese entity and an Iranian organization involving a chemical that is not on any international nuclear control list, but could be used in the processing of nuclear materials. The Chinese authorities investigated the matter and promptly informed us that a transaction like that had not been agreed to, and that China had no intention of making such a transaction; nor do we have any evidence that a shipment of the chemical occurred, or that such a transaction is proceeding. So again, the fact that this was discussed and resolved to our satisfaction is an example of what happens when non-proliferation practices are working. The suggestion is that this was something that was going to happen is neither correct, as well. What we understand is there was a preliminary contact at a relatively low level, and that our response was to use the diplomatic process to stop this kind of transfer and ask them to look into it. And indeed, when we did, the Chinese conducted an investigation and responded promptly to our inquiry. It therefore is an indication that when you have these kind of commitments at the highest levels and you address a problem - not a problem that has happened, not a problem that you know will happen, but what we in this business call a concern that something might happen - that these problems can be resolved. And let me remind all of you that in thinking about this, the United States is firmly of the view that there has been a "sea change" in Chinese policies and practices on non-proliferation. Whether it is signing up to the unconditional extension of the NPT; whether it is stopping nuclear testing and signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; whether it's supporting a fissile material cut-off treaty; whether it's supporting a safeguard system for the International Atomic Energy Agency; or whether it is assisting us in our work to stop North Korea from developing a nuclear program, across the board the Chinese have - we've seen a sea change as a result of the work of the United States in recent years in bringing China into the fold, moving away from the practices in the past that were of such danger to us, and moving towards the kind of relationship that advances and protects the security of the United States, its interests and its allies. Q: I think I know the answer to this, given your strong words, but I'll ask it anyway. Are you confident - is the United States confident that this wasn't an attempt by the Chinese authorities to sort of test how vigilantly the United States was watching, having been caught trying to talk about a deal that we felt was problematic? Then they said, OK, we'll go and we'll make sure we stop it to -- MR. RUBIN: Well, unlike some commentators, we aren't capable of getting into the heads of the Chinese. And we don't have evidence that this was a deliberate attempt to bypass a national decision. The evidence, to the extent that we have it, is that this was a low-level contact that, once brought to the attention of those policy-makers who can influence the process - was looked into and was stopped. That's called non-proliferation. There's no question that China and Iran have a diplomatic relationship. What we've done here is moved the practice from a presumption of transferring dangerous systems to a presumption of denying the transfer of dangerous systems. That's called non-proliferation. Q: On their part? MR. RUBIN: On their part and our part, in working with them. Q: What was the timing? Can you discuss at all the timing of this? MR. RUBIN: I don't have any direct information on the timing. The words that I've been given to use are "recently." But let me see if after the briefing I can try to get you some more detail on particular dates, but that can often be difficult. Q: In relation to the summit. MR. RUBIN: Yes, yes. Q: Just following up on what Carol was asking you, is there any concern on the side of the US that had you not raised this with them or been there monitoring on some level, this deal, that the Chinese could have made a decision the other way? That seems to be a valid question. MR. RUBIN: We're always concerned. We're concerned about a lot of things. What I'm saying is that those who have speculated and psychoanalyzed the motivations, as far as we know, don't have evidence. The evidence that we have was that we don't have an indication that the transaction would have gone forward if we hadn't contacted the Chinese. We don't know the answer to questions like that. What we know is that this was a low-level contact, and that when it was raised, that it was not a signed, sealed and delivered project, but rather an inquiry. And when the inquiry was investigated, it was terminated. There's no reason, as far as we know, to presume, as so many commentators are wont to do, that it would have resulted in this. We have no illusions about the difficulties of pursuing non-proliferation, and the fact that in many countries in the world there are those who will transfer either equipment or technology or expertise even sometimes without the authority of their government. What we can do is when we find out about a potential problem, is raise it and resolve it; and that's what we did in this case. Q: And in this case was the low-level contact within or outside the government, the Chinese Government? Because you just made - you don't know -- MR. RUBIN: Right, I am going to have to be a little tricky - not tricky, but a little careful - (Laughter.) Q: Tricky works. MR. RUBIN: A little careful. I know that that word didn't come out right. What I was trying to say is that what we're trying to do here is provide you with a lot more information than we normally do in a case like this. And in order for me to do that, there are certain lines that I have to draw. In China, in this area, it's fair to say that the entities involved are not completely independent; but it's also fair to say that there is a difference between the policy-maker level and the technical level. And so while this entity was clearly not a policy-making level operation, I think it's also fair to say that it didn't take the Chinese very long to ask them what was going on, unlike in the United States when we might ask our companies for information about what they're doing; they may seek to block the access and information. Q: And can you tell us whether the US had observed the contact, as you put it, the low-level contact, occurring over some duration of time, or was it a one-shot thing? I don't -- MR. RUBIN: Again, that's skirting on the edge of what I can say in this forum about this kind of thing. We were made aware of a contact at a low level, and this hadn't gotten very far along. When it was investigated, it was told to us that there was no agreement to transfer, nor was there an intention on the Chinese part to do so. Let me also give you a little information on this chemical, because I think there's a little bit of hyperbole in some of the descriptions of this chemical. This chemical, AHF, anhydrous hydrogen fluoride is not used to enrich uranium to weapons grade. AHF is used in the conversion process, which takes uranium from its basic form to a gaseous form suitable for beginning an entirely new process called uranium enrichment. Much work and an entirely separate process is then used to enrich uranium to weapons grade. AHF is also used to convert basic uranium to a form suitable for manufacture of reactor fuel. In addition, AHF has other uses. One of the reasons why it's not on any international nuclear control list is because it has many uses and is used in many different chemical processes, including, as some have indicated, as a precursor to the nerve agent Sarin. That's why it's on the Australia Group list. It is a highly caustic and difficult-to-manufacture-and-handle chemical. The point of all this is that we've moved to a point now in the recent years in non-proliferation, where rather than trying to stop countries from transferring nearly complete weaponization programs for either nuclear weapons or missiles, we're down to a very low level. We're down to the ingredients that can be used for processes that then can be used for possibly enriching uranium. So we're working way down in the weeds here to try to prevent non-proliferation dangers from sprouting. Therefore, it is easy for people to make more of what a particular agent or chemical or capability can do than it really can do. In other words, it's a long way from taking the uranium to a useable form for making uranium into enriched uranium that can be used for bombs. And it is not as simple or as dramatic as there's a tendency to make it. Q: Did the US inquire of the Chinese about this because the US feared it might have been used in connection with the Bushehr plant or some other aspect of Iranian nuclear -- MR. RUBIN: Again, with the usual caveat that I'm under in situations like this, let me just say that we spend an enormous amount of time and effort keeping track of, keeping tabs on, working on the process of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear capability. So whenever we see something that might in any way advance their knowledge or make it marginally easier, we raise our eyebrows, we ask questions and we try to stop it. But that's not the same as implying that Iran was on the verge of getting an ingredient that is so unique and so dangerous that it would put them on the fast track to a nuclear weapons capability; because this clearly was not the case in this incident. Q: Is it true that the ban on US civilian nuclear-related sales to China ends in ten days unless Congress blocks it? Is that -- MR. RUBIN: I don't know the number of days, but it is correct that the peaceful agreement - the 1,2,3 agreement, as it is called - would go into effect if Congress doesn't act negatively in a small number of days. Now, this issue obviously arises in the context of discussions of us trying to show what progress we've made. And in that regard, let me point out that we believe, as a result of our discussions with the Chinese, that the Chinese are taking very seriously their assurance that they are not going to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran. And our discussions with the Chinese and our independent judgments support the fact that the Chinese are taking very seriously this assurance. Q: Any effect on the President's travel plans to China, of this episode? I mean, does this episode play into that at all? MR. RUBIN: I don't think so. I think the President himself said that -- not surprisingly, the same thing that I said - which is that this is an indication of how the process can work well; that when you want to fight the fight against non-proliferation, that you need to work together rather than cutting off your ties. That's why he believes this is an area that you want to work with them on. I believe he was quite forward-leaning on the timing for his trip, in comments he made at the White House. Q: Jamie, can you help me procedurally? In a situation like this, where you have a "concern," is it normal, procedurally, to raise it in the form of a demarche? MR. RUBIN: Well, demarche is a broad-based term we use here in the Department. It could be as simple as a phone call; it could be as elaborate as a letter from the President of the United States. And there's a lot in between. But what that means is that there is contact with a government from another country about an issue of concern to us, and that did happen in this case. Q: I want to go to another subject, but are there more questions on this? Q: (Inaudible.) MR. RUBIN: On China, yes. Q: There's also a report in The Washington Times, that in addition to Iran, there's also transfer of something - they don't say what - to Palestine. Do you have anything on that? MR. RUBIN: Well, there's always a report like that in that paper. I've given up trying to comment on it. (Laughter.) Q: Sorry if you've taken this one up, Jamie, but there seems to be a good PRC element and a rogue PRC element involved here in these nuclear matters. Is the PRC government not aware of what its right hand is doing - the left to the right? MR. RUBIN: I think I tried to answer this in response to Ralph's question. We are now engaged at a level of non-proliferation that is very low down. We're talking about the kind of cooperation that isn't directly related to nuclear -- manufacture of nuclear weapons or even the precursor to that; but rather, a transfer of a chemical like this. As I said in response to an earlier question, I have no illusions that in China when an official is involved in a discussion like this, that at some point along the way, the Chinese Government can directly engage. But as far as we know, the policy-maker level, when apprised of this situation, inquired, discovered that there wasn't an intention to transfer, there wasn't an agreement to transfer and assured us there wouldn't be a transfer. That's called non-proliferation. ................. (end transcript)
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