Tracking Number: 393922
Title: "Pelletreau Discusses Containing Iran Threat." Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau regarding US efforts to prevent Iran from contributing to
international terrorism or acquiring nuclear weapons. (950602)
Translated Title: L'Endiguement de la menace Iranienne. (950602)
Date: 19950602
Text:
*NEA504
06/02/95 PELLETREAU DISCUSSES CONTAINING IRAN THREAT (Text: U.S. officials' remarks during ON THE LINE show) (2810) WASHINGTON -- A State Department official declared June 3 that U.S. policy towards Iran "stems directly from the concerns we have about Iranian sponsorship of international terrorism and its desire and drive to acquire nuclear weapons."
In the Washington-based ON THE LINE, a USIA-sponsored television and radio program, Robert Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, made the case for President Clinton's recent imposition of a ban on U.S. trade with Iran. Asked about Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, Pelletreau said, "To raise the specter, within our lifetimes, within a decade perhaps, of having Iran able to mobilize a nuclear weapon in support of its aggressive policies in the region is hugely threatening."
William Quandt, a professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia who formerly served on the staff of the White House National Security Council, was also a guest on the program.
Although he agreed that Iran is a threat to world order, Quandt argued that the embargo will not work. "I think there's a real question of whether it's going to have any of the desired outcomes ... in terms of urging Iran to change its policies on acquiring nuclear weapons or support for groups that we define as terrorists," he said.
Following is a text of the show: (Begin text) ANNCR: ON THE LINE -- a discussion of United States policies and
contemporary issues.
This week, "Containing the Threat from Iran." Here is your host, U-S-l-A Deputy Director, Penn Kemble.
HOST: Hello and welcome to ON THE LINE. Iran is engaged in activities that threaten the peace and security of many nations. Iran is the principal state sponsor of international terrorism. Iran is trying to destroy the Middle East peace process. And Iran has intensified its eforts to develop nuclear weapons. In response, President Bill Clinton has banned U.S. trade with Iran and is urging America's allies to do the same.
Joining me today to discuss United States policy and Iran are two experts: Robert Pelletreau is Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and William Quandt is a professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia who formerly served on the staff of the White House National Security Council.
Gentlemen, welcome to the program. Assistant Secretary Pelletreau, let me begin with you, if I may. What is the U.S. strategy for dealing with Iran and how does the trade embargo fit into that plan?
PELLETREAU: U.S. policy stems directly from the concerns we have about Iranian sponsorship of international terrorism and its desire and drive to acquire nuclear weapons. We have had a dialogue with our principal allies since the beginning of this administration, trying to persuade Iran to leave these policies and become a less aggressive and more good neighbor in its region. The continuation of those policies by Iran required stronger measures and after a lengthy review, the President decided that we would impose a total embargo on U.S. dealings with Iran of
onomic nature. So we have now done that. We have incorporated that into our dialogue with our allies and we are increasing the economic cost that Iran has to pay if it is going to continue these unacceptable policies.
HOST: Mr. Quandt, does this make sense to you? Can an embargo really work? QUANDT: No. That doesn't necessarily mean that we haven't sometimes chosen to adopt embargo policies for symbolic reasons or to strengthen our bargaining position vis-a-vis our allies. There was a problem in trying to persuade our allies not to deal with Iran at a time when we were purchasing large amounts of Iranian oil. But if the question is, will this oblige Iran to change its behavior, the embargo itself, then no, it won't work. I think there's a real question of whether it's going to have any of the desired outcomes, that is in terms of urging Iran to change its policies on acquiring nuclear weapons or support for groups that we define as terrorists. But I don't think that's why the policy was adopted.
HOST: Before we talk about what besides the embargo might work, let me ask you, Secretary Pelletreau, how do our European allies respond to this call for an embargo?
PELLETREAU: It isn't that we have asked them to join in a total embargo. We have asked them to understand fully the reasons that we have imposed the embargo and to join in tightening the economic restrictions on Iran in ways that are suitable within their systems. First of all, we ask them not to fill in behind us in areas where American companies leave. Secondly, we ask them not to extend credits or guarantees to companies doing business in Iran that would provide a direct benefit to Iran or that would give Iran additional resources to continue its acquisition of nuclear weapons or high-tech weapons.
HOST: Are there any opponents to current Iranian policy within Iran? Any in particular we might associate with?
PELLETREAU: Within Iran, you can see differences of view within the revolutionary regime. But as far as their principal policies towards the outside world, they are pretty unanimous. All major voices in Iran at this time, for example, support their opposition to the peace process and their support for Palestinian terrorist groups, for example, opposing or trying to undermine that peace process. There may be differentiations between them, but as the costs increase, we believe that the weight will increase on them to see that these are not policies that are truly in Iran's interests.
HOST: Professor Quandt, the U.S. government says that Iran supports terrorist groups. How extensive is this and how much of a threat do these terrorist groups constitute to U.S. security and economic interests?
QUANDT: In order to answer that question, one has to have access to information that I simply don't have. On the surface, it seems as if the Iranians make no bones about supporting certain groups, for example the Hizballah group in Lebanon and some of the Palestinian groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad have some kind of support from Iran. Now, if Iran were to go away tomorrow, there would still be some kind of Hizballah phenomenon in Lebanon. It is a Lebanese group and it is carrying out actions against Israelis, primarily inside of Lebanon. The Iranians will say quite bluntly that they see that as quite different from what we call international terrorism. I don't want to make excuses for the Iranians on this, but I think it is important to note that what we are most upset about, they acknowledge as legitimate support for political groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad that are basically fighting Israeli policies. I don't think there's a lot of evidence that the Iranians have been supporting, for example, Abu Nidal-type international terrorism or the I-R-A, the kind of things Gadhafi and Libya used to do, but I may not be well informed. I think they have been supporting groups who share their political view on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is a very anti-Israeli view, that's true.
HOST: There have been assassinations of Iranian opposition figures outside the country.
QUANDT: That's true. They have used violence against some of their own people. And again, they would put that, if they acknowledge it at all, more in the category of internal politics, settling accounts left over from the revolution. That's not a very nice business to be engaged in, and it's also not very uncommon in the Middle East for political dissidents to run into trouble with their adversaries in governments.
HOST: Islamic fundamentalism is something that Iran supports. I know we don't equate Islamic fundamentalism with terrorism. What distinctions do we make in our policy between people who are simply militantly religious and people who are willing to resort to violence in furthering their views?
PELLETREAU: That is exactly the principal difference. People who are good Muslims and practice Islam as a religion have our full respect as does the religion. But people who practice violence and terrorism, whether they are under a religious guise or a secular guise, have our full condemnation.
HOST: Now, what about the efforts by Iran to acquire nuclear weapons? How serious is this and how, for example, is Russia involved in this?
PELLETREAU: It's extremely serious given the policies that Iran is following in the region. To raise the specter, within our lifetimes, within a decade perhaps, of having Iran able to mobilize a nuclear weapon in support of its aggressive policies in the region is hugely threatening. So we're very concerned about that.
As you move to what you do about it, we have general agreement among nuclear supplier nations that we are not going to assist Iran in acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The difference with Russia comes in whether providing a light water reactor, for example, does support a nuclear weapons program or not. We have been in the process of sharing intelligence with the Russians about Iranian nuclear intentions and about the Iranian nuclear program. And I think as this intelligence sinks in and the Russians have a chance to think about it and have a chance to validate it, they will become more convinced themselves that an Iranian nuclear program is a real threat and is a threat to them as well as to the region.
HOST: Professor Quandt, ends and means are often related. What national interest would Iran have in mind in seeking nuclear weapons to advance them or in supporting terrorist groups? You're a historian and scholar of this region. What does Iran want?
QUANDT: First, let me say I think this is a serious issue, Iran getting nuclear weapons -- in a way that I don't think Iran's involvement with Hizballah and Hamas is nearly as important in the broad strategic equations of the Middle East. Now why would Iran possibly want them? First, it is worth recalling that when the Shah was governing Iran, we have every reason to believe he also was thinking of developing nuclear capabilities. First, Iran is in a region where other powers have nuclear weapons. Pakistan and India on one side of Iran have nuclear capabilities and Israel has nuclear capabilities. Iran, during the Iran-Iraq war, was subjected to massive use of chemical weapons to which it was not effectively able to respond. They probably lost hundreds of thousands of people in that war with Iraq which was not so very long ago. So let's assume if there were even a decent regime in Iran, it would probably think of wanting to have some kind of a deterrent against a resurgent Iraq, at a minimum. Now, this isn't such a decent regime but, as I said, even the Shah considered nuclear weapons. I think it is a serious prospect that an Iranian regime, as the Iraqis tried to do, will seek to have some kind of a capability. What will they do with it, is another matter. It's not such an easy capability to make use of, we've seen. India and Pakistan both crossed the nuclear threshold presumably and yet don't have much to show for it in terms of really advancing their national security. They seem to see it as some kind of deterrent. Would Iran really use a nuclear weapon? Would it use it in support of terrorism? I rather doubt it.
HOST: It's been said that there's been a military buildup in the Straits of Hormuz. What's this all about? Are we really getting close to the edge?
PELLETREAU: There has been a military buildup. It is part of Iran's longstanding policy seeking to exercise dominance in theGulf region. It has not reached a point where it would seriously threaten the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. If it did, it would come directly into confrontation with a vital interest of the West. But it is something that is worth watching. It is combined with Iran seeking to rearm generally after the Iran-Iraq war and acquire more high-tech weapons and a larger conventional capability as well as a non-conventional capability.
HOST: As Iran amasses this military power, where's the counterweight to it? Is there any other counterweight besides a direct U.S. role?
PELLETREAU: The counterweight is really the close cooperative relations that we and other Western countries have with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. And working together, developing our collective security capability, we can pose a credible deterrent to either the threat from Iran or the threat from Iraq.
HOST: What's your view of that? Are we getting close to the edge in the Gulf?
QUANDT: No, I don't think so. I think actually the security situation in pure military terms is not so problematic. Iraq is in no situation to threaten its neighbors today nor really is Iran as long as we remain as engaged as we have been. I think we're stuck with a security role in the Gulf long into the next century. What really I think needs discussion is not just what the military ingredients of stability are in the Gulf but what what the political ingredients are. The missing element there is a political strategy toward Iran. We now have an economic strategy of trying to embargo them, a military strategy of trying to contain them. What's missing in all this is a political strategy designed to try to change their calculus of gains and losses.
HOST: Are you talking about an internal opposition? QUANDT: No. I think we have to accept that they have the regime they have for as long as this generation can remain in power. I don't think we are talking about toppling the regime. I think what we need to find is a way to begin to engage with it at some point. Maybe today it's still impossible. Maybe the scars from the past are not healed. But, as with every other major country with whom we have had conflicts -- the Soviet Union, China, even now Vietnam and North Korea and Cuba -- some form of political engagement at a certain point becomes an essential part of a strategy. That's the one piece of the puzzle that today is entirely missing. And, I think in the current atmosphere in Washington, nobody is going to argue for doing anything other than that, but it's short-sighted. In the long term, we want Iranians who will think politically about a relationship with us.
HOST: Assistant Secretary Pelletreau, at what point and under what conditions would the United States take steps towards opening relations?
PELLETREAU: I think there is already an engagement on the political level through the different political measures we have taken. We have seen an immediate reaction in Iran, for example, in the fall in the value of the rial. That is a very direct and very real impact in Iran from the measures we have taken. This does, in and of itself, have an impact on the Iranian calculus. Likewise, our engagement of our European allies, our dialogue with Russia at the highest levels about its nuclear cooperation with Iran, are having an impact on the Iranian calculus as they measure the pros and cons of adopting this policy versus that policy. I am assuming, we are assuming, that the Iranian regime has the capability to change some of its policies when it believes that the current policies are no longer fully serving its national interests and when the costs become higher than the benefits. That's part of what that engagement is all about.
HOST: Would the Clinton administration include human rights issues as part of its criteria in developing new relations with Iran?
PELLETREAU: We are concerned about the violations of human rights that are occurring in Iran. We're concerned about the continuation of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie and with the hundreds and hundreds of Iranians who are imprisoned without trial, without cause, sometimes just for their political or religious beliefs.
HOST: And, how has the peace between Israel and its neighbors, the developing peace, affected Iran?
PELLETREAU: The developing peace between Israel and its neighbors undercuts the appeal of radical Islamic fundamentalism.
HOST: I'm afraid that's all the time we have on this. I'd like to thank our guests -- Robert Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and William Quandt, from the University of Virginia -- for joining me this week to discuss U.S. policy and the threat from Iran. This is Penn Kemble for ON THE LINE.
(End text) NNNN
File Identification: 06/02/95, NEA504; 06/02/95, EUR513; 06/02/95, NAA502; 06/06/95, AFI201
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Languages: Arabic; French
Keywords: IRAN-US RELATIONS/Policy; PELLETREAU, ROBERT/Speaker; CONTAINMENT; IRAN/Defense & Military; TERRORISM; NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Document Type: TRA; INT
Thematic Codes: 1NE
Target
Areas: NE; EU
PDQ Text Link: 393922; 394290
USIA Notes: *95060201.GNE text:pelletreau/voa/on the line/iran/jln gc kf+
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