Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE= 06/08/2002

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01136

TITLE= THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISIS

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: The standoff between nuclear neighbors India and Pakistan. Next, On the Line.

Host: Fears continue that India and Pakistan may go to war over the disputed region of Kashmir. Terrorists operating out of Pakistan have repeatedly attacked Indian personnel and interests including the Parliament in New Delhi. Indian Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee demanded that Pakistan stop the cross border infiltration. Indian and Pakistani forces have been trading howitzer and light arms fire across the line of control that divides Kashmir. The crisis has raised the terrible possibility that either Pakistan or India might use nuclear weapons. The U-S State Department has warned Americans to leave India and Pakistan because of the growing danger. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Mr. Vajpayee both attended an Asian security conference in Kazakhstan this week, where both made statements about the crisis.

Musharraf: For the past several months tension along our borders with India and the line of control is high, stirring deep fears in South Asia and around the world over the real possibility of conflict. We do not want war. We will not initiate war, but if war is imposed on us, we will defend ourselves with the utmost resolution and determination.

Vajpayee: We are willing to discuss all issues with Pakistan including Jammu and Kashmir. But for that cross border terrorism has to end. Thank you.

Host: How serious is the crisis in South Asia and how can it be resolved? I'll ask my guests, Navnita Chadha Behera, a visiting fellow at The Brookings Insitute, and Pakistani Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan who is now fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for scholars in Washington. Welcome. Thanks both for joining me. I appreciate it.

During the Asian security conference in Kazakhstan Pakistani President [Pervez] Musharraf told a Russian television station: "A nuclear war cannot even be considered a possibility today. No sane person would discuss the prospect of nuclear war between the two countries." So at the risk of questioning my own sanity I will ask you, General Khan, whether it is a possibility and how serious is that possibility?

Khan: Nuclear war is unthinkable. This has been the word that has been getting currency lately in the context of the present crisis. But if you look back, the context of nuclear war being unthinkable has all along been the concept throughout the nuclear age. And if you wanted to really make comparisons it is pretty much available in history as to how the situation in Europe was. And there it was a similar situation where one side had a conventional preponderance and nuclear weapons were used essentially to make a conventional war unthinkable [because it would] turn into a nuclear war. That situation is very much in South Asia where two countries are in possession of nuclear weapons and now we are talking about a similar concept that it is unthinkable to even begin a conventional war that has the danger to precipitate into a nuclear war. Now that danger is actually something which is pretty much understood. But if the question is asked the [in this] context if there is deliberate thought process of using nuclear weapons, well I think [on] that issue the leaders of the nations are repeatedly assuring [us] that they do not think that they are interested in nuclear war or they perceive to be as such.

Host: Doctor Behera, does the deterrent affect of the nuclear weapons make it unthinkable that there would be a conventional war?

Behera: Actually, no. We have had a crisis in the region in 1999 when both the armies were engaged in a brief, short war over the Kargil Hills. That was a limited conventional war under the nuclear umbrella. So, it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out completely and especially bearing in mind that Pakistan has a first-use policy of nuclear weapons. And India has a declared no first-use policy, that we will not use it first, we will use it only to defend ourselves. But if one of the two adversaries has a first-use policy, and we have seen the threshold of that first-use shifting constantly.

Host: What did the threshold used to be?

Behera: It's only in the public domain. There is no official Pakistani nuclear document. Brigadier [Khan] can bail me out on that. But responsible government officials and officers have pointed out initially Admiral [Khalid] Kidwai had laid down four thresholds which were [1] in case of Pakistan's survival was at stake or [2] a big chunk of armory or armored aircraft, [3] if it's capability was destroyed in a conventional warfare with India. And the bottom line [4] was if Pakistan's survival was at stake, it would go ahead and use the weapon of the last resort. But Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations Mr. Munir Akram's statement that if you were to cross the line of control, we'd retain the option of using nuclear weapons as one among the sort of the toolbox of weapons that we have, that considerably lowers the threshold of usage of nuclear weapons in the region. And that does make the situation to my mind a very serious situation.

Host: General Khan, where do you think the threshold is right now?

Khan: I think from the statement that has now emerged from the president as well as the current thinking is that first of all, nobody is getting, I don't think so that anyone in Pakistan is really getting so "gung-ho" to use the nuclear weapons. We are trying to point out that once the line of control is crossed or the threshold of present as it is now is crossed, there is likely to be escalation which is not going to be in anyone's control. We are hearing from across the border [from India] that they have worked out everything -- that they know how to wage a limited war. She just mentioned about the Kargil War. [In the] Kargil War, the very limited kind of battle that happened in the north-most corner of the line of control. This is not the situation of the Kargil kind. These are two armies completely mobilized in the standoff situation. Now if anything precipitates now, one thing will lead on to another and there is a possibility that you may cross a certain threshold.

Host: And do you think that threshold is?

Khan: The problem here is that all along Pakistan's declared position has been that these nuclear weapons are meant to deter. When you they are meant to deter, the question is deter what? And deter who? Pakistan's policy has been very clear. They say that they want to deter an aggression. And deter aggression against who? India. They have made it very clear. To deter an aggression from India. That is what nuclear weapons are meant for. They have underplayed and never talked about use of nuclear weapons because we think it is unthinkable. The fact is that, she made a mention here about the use of India's declared policy of second-use, China also made the same point. India never took that seriously. The fact is that when there are nuclear weapons, then that is what causes deterrence, not for to make statements.

Host: Doctor Behera, if a conflict were to begin, would the greatest threat of nuclear escalation be from the threshold being crossed or perhaps some degradation of the chain of command or the ability of the Pakistani military to control the nuclear weapons -- which is to say, purposeful or accidental use of the weapons?

Behera: I think both possibilities cannot be ruled out. Brigadier Khan earlier sort of compared the situation to early years of Cold War in Europe. There's a big distinction. Unlike U-S and U-S-S-R of that time, both India and Pakistan do not have national means of their own intelligence. Warning time between two counties is barely three to five minutes whereas it was about twenty to twenty-five minutes between U-S and U-S-S-R. The technical means of control about misuse of nuclear weapons are also not as securely in place in the sub-continent as they were in the other situation. So I think technically it is difficult to kind of compare the two situations to my mind and rule out a use of accidental use of nuclear weapons. And the second problem is the threshold being crossed. As I said, if the threshold itself is not clear, if the red line itself is not clear -- what is your red line that we will cross and we will use the nuclear weapons -- then it brings it in very gray sort of an area. And here I wanted to bring one point onto the table was that there has been a lot of mention about the line of control being crossed and that being considered to be as crossing the threshold so to say. There's a very little awareness here that the line of control that divides the Kashmir region is only Azad Kashmir, as it is called often in Pakistan. But that's a very narrow strip, the width of which on average does not run more than fifty to seventy-five kilometers. The geographical depth of the Kashmir region which is under Pakistan's control is actually Northern Areas. And Northern Areas is an area which, as per Pakistan's constitution is not part of Pakistan. And as per Pakistan's Supreme Court Ruling, not part of Azad Kashmir. It is an area which has no constitutional law or autonomous status of its own. So, if that being the ground realities, the thresholds, I'm afraid, are in a very gray area and that raises the danger of a nuclear kind of confrontation taking place there.

Host: Do you agree?

Khan: Well, I possibly agree with some aspect she has mentioned. First of all, the distance of about U-S-S-R and U-S, that was between U-S-S-R and U-S mainland. I was talking about what existed between East Europe and West Europe. That was very close. Yes, she is right that we do not have those technical and other means. All the more reasons because of the evolving command and control systems in both the countries, there are dangers. And you alluded to the point that once a conventional war breaks out we do not know exactly how it's going to escalate. The possibility of accidents, accidental launches, false warnings, misperceptions are very much there. Particularly in the absence of good [intelligence] and surveillance measures that both counties do not have as sophisticated as she was mentioning and this is the real danger. Because of that, we do not know in which direction things can move. As of now I want you to know that things are not in a situation where there is inherent danger of safety. But, in the heat of the battle, you look to move the fuse closer towards battle effectiveness and the safety measures are lessened incrementally. Under due circumstances there is tremendous amount of strain on command and control that has never happened in any of our previous confrontations between India and Pakistan.

Host: Doctor Behera, in efforts to reduce the tension and step back from that risk, Prime Minster Vajpayee has said that there need to be certain conditions on the ground to set the stage for discussions, particularly that the infiltration be stopped. How will that take place in practice? How does President Musharraf make that happen and what would be evidence that he has effectively stopped infiltration? Is it merely a cessation for some period of time of any terrorist actions or is it something beyond that?

Behera: It is something beyond that because I think we have seen President Musharraf's assurances that were made originally in the January 12th speech that he would not allow jihad in the name of Kashmir. But on the ground reality we saw very little evidence that was being translated into policy priorities. What Prime Minister Vajpayee is trying to make the point here is, it's not purely and simply a question of cross-border infiltration. The infiltration can be temporarily stopped. It's a question of the camps, the terrorist training camps, which are there in Azad Kashmir, on which there is verifiable evidence that has been provided. The training, arms that are coming through the line of control. And those are the sort of indicators that will give us evidence whether the terrorist activity has indeed stopped on the ground. There needs to be verifiable evidence. That is, I think, the point that Prime Minister Vajpayee is trying to make. There needs to be verifiable and a durable evidence that this instrument of policy has indeed been abandoned. Violence has to end to give peace a chance. And I think that is the message that Mr. Vajpayee is trying to convey.

Host: General Khan, does President Pervez Musharraf have the ability at this point to stop the terrorist infiltration?

Khan: There are two aspects to the problem that is in the reason why violence is there. First of all, the violence is not necessarily because of infiltration alone. The violence is there because there is a problem in the Indian-occupied Kashmir as well. So you've got to see that both aspects of the problem are addressed. President Musharraf made it very, very clear on January 12th that his territory will not be used. And he made some action that was seen by the whole world. The Indian administration did not take that seriously -- did not cash in on that, immediately look for an [opportunity] and start a process so that a de-escalation process starts and there is no room for any further actions of this kind of vigilance that was taking place at that time. That did not happen. Which in turn started making Pakistanis believe that India is now truly trying to use infiltration or any other pretext of violence that may happen in that part of the world, that has been specifically for fifteen years as a pretext to go to war with Pakistan to settle some old scores. So now the problem is not necessarily infiltration of Kashmir alone. It's a problem of India's intentions as to what it wants vis-a-vis Pakistan. Which is really the scope of the intentions as far as their leaders are concerned is now creating a more cloud and more gray areas than we could really see through at this point.

Host: Doctor Behera, is India interested in just ending the terrorism or in solidifying its control over Kashmir?

Behera: I think the message has gone loud and clear. Our defense minister is on record having even said that we have no designs against territorial integrity of Pakistan. We have no quarrel with the people of Pakistan. The problem is essentially and only cross-border infiltration. And here I just wanted to bring to your attention the point that what was happening between the January 12th speech and the recent crisis that we've had. Yes, General Musharraf did announce that he would take certain measures but what is the ground reality that we see? Out of two-thousand people who were arrested as part of the original crackdown, eighteen-hundred people have been released. The chief of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed was released. The chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed, Moulana Masood Azhar is under house arrest and getting a government allowance of ten-thousand rupees per month. The bank accounts that were frozen, one account yielded a sum of, I think, three-hundred-thirty dollars, other ones yielded fifty dollars. It was very clear. It was a cosmetic measure. The groups really knew what was happening. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was operating under different name. Jaish-e-Mohammed started a new off-shoot. [name?] So there was really no difference on ground reality. Ground realities have not changed and that is what India took, basically, objection to. The world community had impressed upon Indian leadership, be patient, give diplomacy a chance, exercise restraint, General Musharraf has promised to do certain things. You need to exercise restraint. What Indian leadership now is saying is we did exercise restraint for six months. We have been penalized for our restraint. The Kaluchak massacre was thirty-four people including a two-month old baby who were killed in the massacre in the Jammu army camp. How long is going to be India's threshold of patience to tolerate the cross-border terrorism? That is the moot point.

Host: General Khan, how much more can the general do to stop terrorist actions?

Khan: In an earlier presentation Doctor Behera brought up a very interesting point, that was, verification. I think that's an issue right now. He is a man of his word -- when he says something he means it. The violence in that part of the world is going beyond certainty and not necessarily emanating from Pakistan. And he has also made it clear that if violence is going on inside India, that does not mean that Pakistan is always responsible for that. Pakistan took action against these two organizations -- in fact, two more organizations -- not only these, on its own, on request, on its own, even though India did not provide any cooperation in this regard. They questioned them to provide it -- they did not provide that. She mentioned about eighteen hundred people. As you know normally what happens when you hold people, when there is a crackdown and you hold people, you find out in the end that the majority of them, eighty-percent of them, were innocent simple workers. They were not involved in any of the activities. There was no case against them. You then determine that if there is a case against certain people, then you go about racketing and questioning them as to who are the main people -- who can be responsible.

Host: Well I think the question that comes up is it's been wildly reported that the I-S-I [Inter-Services Intelligence] intelligence service which was so closely tied to the Taliban in Afghanistan has also been very much involved in the Kashmiri militants' operations over a decade. How much control does President Musharraf have over the I-S-I at this point, and does he have the ability, the power to break whatever ties may remain between the I-S-I and militants in Kashmir?

Khan: Well, yes, I-S-I is a state organization. It is very much functioning on behalf of the state and it is not something that is independent. There is more propaganda about I-S-I. In India, everything happens because of I-S-I. Everything happens in there. If it doesn't rain, I-S-I is to be blamed, you know? Every time a person dies, he has something in his pocket that proves that he was from I-S-I. So we are not really getting involved into this propaganda antics. I-S-I is very much an organization that has played its role in the Afghan war and yes it is a national organization. It has to take direction from the state's operations. Then President Musharraf says something, well, I-S-I is very much in control. But the problem is it is beyond I-S-I, certain things that are happening in that part of the world that I-S-I can't do anything about.

Host: Doctor Behera?

Behera: Yes, this argument was often made that India blames I-S-I for events happening in Kashmir. I think one thing that the recent crisis has changed is that India's opinion has become the international community's opinion. And I think that is where Pakistan has to address the concerns of international community. The fact that cross-border infiltration is continuing, the fact that there are terrorists operating from across the line of control coming into Kashmir valley is not only argued by New Delhi anymore. It is being argued in Washington, in Paris, in London, in Tokyo, European Ambassador Chris Patten. I mean, everybody is coming around to accept the point that yes, there is a problem of cross-border terrorism. In fact, to my mind, what the recent crisis has done is change the defining parameters of the Kashmir dispute. The international community is no longer looking at the Kashmir dispute from the point of view of the question of self-determination. It has changed it to the problem of the terrorism and the possibility of nuclear war. That is where the international commentary is more concerned -- as to what the outcome of this crisis and this dispute is going to be.

Host: I'd like to thank my guests Navnita Chadha Behera of the Brookings Institution and Feroz Hassan Khan of the Woodrow Wilson Center. For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.