DATE=8/21/1999
TYPE=ON THE LINE
TITLE=ON THE LINE: THE INDIA-PAKISTAN DISPUTE
NUMBER=1-00770 MEDIUM-LENGTH VERSION
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
CONTENT=
ACTUALITIES AVAILABLE IN POLICY OFFICE
Anncr: On the Line - a discussion of United
States policy and contemporary issues. This week,
"The India-Pakistan Dispute." Here is your host,--
------.
Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line.
Fighting in Kashmir between Indian troops and
Muslim militants has ended, and the danger of a
full-scale conflict between India and Pakistan has
receded. Earlier this year, India and Pakistan
seemed to be moving towards improved relations.
The prime ministers of both nations met in Lahore,
Pakistan, in February, the first such visit by an
Indian leader in a decade. The dialogue was seen
as all the more important since both countries had
conducted successful nuclear weapons tests last
year. When fighting in Kargil broke out in May, it
provoked worldwide concern because, as Pakistan
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said, "Kashmir is a
nuclear flashpoint."
Joining me today to discuss the crisis between
India and Pakistan are three experts. Stephen
Cohen is a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution. Zalmay Khalilzad is director of the
strategy and doctrine program at the RAND
Corporation and a former Assistant Under Secretary
of Defense. And Michael Krepon is president of the
Henry Stimson Center, a Washington-based think
tank. Welcome to the program.
Stephen Cohen, how is it that, so soon after an
agreement between the two prime ministers in
Lahore to peacefully settle the outstanding issues
between Pakistan and India, there was an armed
conflagration in Kashmir?
Cohen: Apparently, Nawaz Sharif decided to give
permission for an incursion by the Pakistan
military or something supported by the Pakistan
military. And either it was larger than he thought
it would be or it got out of hand. It was more
successful than he thought it would be, and the
Indians suffered at least a tactical military
defeat. I think, though, that Lahore and Kargil,
these two extremes, do represent the way in which
the countries relate to each other. They do find
it hard to establish a normal working
relationship. And that's been with us for forty-
five years.
Host: Zalmay Khalilzad, could conflicts like the
one in Kashmir lead to a larger war?
Khalilzad: The problem is whether the Pakistani
Prime Minister miscalculated, that is, in thinking
that the war can remain limited, that they can
indulge in activities like Kargil. But things
might get out of hand and inadvertently lead to a
bigger war. Neither wants a big war but, out of
miscalculation, war is an unpredictable business.
It is plausible that, as Pakistanis pursue an
insurgency strategy against India, the Indian
reactions and Pakistani counter-reactions to that
could, not that it necessarily would, lead to a
bigger war, including the use of nuclear weapons.
Host: Mr. Krepon, wasn't the danger of nuclear
escalation supposed to prevent Pakistan and India
from fighting even conventional conflicts?
Krepon: It was a terrible miscalculation on the
part of some of the Pakistani military leaders and
on the part of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to
pursue a Kargil strategy immediately after a
Lahore strategy. This speaks to the growing
incoherence of Pakistan's approach toward India
and also the difficulties that are growing within
Pakistan itself.
Host: Stephen Cohen from the Brookings
Institution, to what extent does the incoherence
in Pakistan's Kashmir policy reflect political
incoherence inside Pakistan?
Cohen: Pakistan has been groping for a new
political order almost since the day it was born.
It has gone through several definitions of what it
means to be a Pakistani and what Pakistan stands
for, ranging from being "not Indian" to being
Islamic, and everything in between. The military
have played an inordinate role in Pakistani
politics. And in a sense, since they have been in
power for almost twenty-five years, half the
country's existence, they have not allowed
civilians to rise up and assume their own
political role. And therefore their security and
defense policy-making in Pakistan is somewhat
imbalanced. One of Pakistan's problems is that it
is strategically too far extended. It has really
overreached itself.
Host: Michael Krepon from the Stimson Center,
how do the two sides view the Kashmir problem?
Krepon: Pakistan's Kashmir problem is that
Pakistan's Kashmir policy is an insurgency policy.
And the more Pakistan resorts to the use of the
gun within Kashmir, the more the gun becomes
prevalent within Pakistan itself. And so
Pakistan's Kashmir policy threatens Pakistan. And
it does not help Kashmiris. India also has a
Kashmir problem. India's Kashmir problem is that
India's governance has not done real well in the
Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir. There is
widespread alienation. People do not like what the
Indian security forces are doing on the ground.
India's approach to Kashmir has had only one
track, which is fighting insurgency. And every
Indian scholar who has looked at Kashmir has come
to the same conclusion. A one-track policy for
Kashmir is not going to work.
Host: Zalmay Khalilzad from the RAND
Corporation, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with
President Bill Clinton on the 4th of July.
President Clinton stated that he would take a
personal interest in resolving the Kashmir
dispute. How can the United States do that?
Khalilzad: I think that for the immediate future I
don't see a real prospect for a settlement or a
compromise between India and Pakistan. The
options clearly could be acceptance of the current
line of control [that divides Kashmir into Indian-
and Pakistan-controlled sections], some
modification of the current line of control in
favor of Pakistan, and independence for Kashmir,
or a grand bargain across south Asia involving
China and India. I think that the problem is not
only India, but the problem is also Pakistan
because each of the alternatives, except one in
which the whole of Kashmir comes and joins
Pakistan, poses Pakistan with extreme dilemmas and
challenges. But I think what we need to do is to
become more engaged in preparing the grounds for a
settlement over the longer term. The near term is
to manage the crisis and prevent it from getting
out of control.
Host: Stephen Cohen from the Brooking
Institution, what should America's role be?
Cohen: I would be worried about a direct and
major American role. I do think that America has
interests in the region and has to get engaged,
but more gradually. America should engage other
countries, not simply China, because China and the
Saudis have some influence in Pakistan, but also
Japan and some of the European states, which are
concerned about both Kashmir and the nuclear
issue. There are really two separate issues, the
question of a nuclear war or nuclear proliferation
from the region, and as well as to the region, and
a conflict in Kashmir. I don't think that Kashmir
itself necessarily leads to a nuclear war. These
problems are tied together. They have to be
unraveled in some way. And a more careful,
extended diplomacy or diplomatic effort is
necessary to deal with them both, a sort of
parallel process. So I think a more holistic,
comprehensive American view is necessary.
Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have and
I would like to thank our guests, Stephen Cohen
from the Brookings Institute, Zalmay Khalilzad
from the RAND Corporation, and Michael Krepon from
the Henry Stimson Center, for joining me to
discuss the India-Pakistan dispute. This is ------
- for On the Line.
24-Aug-1999 13:30 PM EDT (24-Aug-1999 1730 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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