DATE=8/21/1999
TYPE=ON THE LINE
TITLE=ON THE LINE: THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISIS
NUMBER=1-00768
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
CONTENT=
Anncr: On the Line - a discussion of United
States policy and contemporary issues. This week,
"The India-Pakistan Crisis." Here is your host,
Robert Reilly.
Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line.
Sporadic fighting in Kashmir between Indian troops
and Muslim militants continues, but the danger of
a full-scale conflict between India and Pakistan
has receded. Earlier this year, India and Pakistan
seemed to be moving towards improved relations.
The prime ministers of both nations met in Lahore,
Pakistan in February, the first such visit by an
Indian leader in a decade. The dialogue was seen
as all the more important since both countries had
conducted successful nuclear tests last year. When
fighting in Kashmir broke out in May, it provoked
worldwide concern because, as Pakistan Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif said, "Kashmir is a nuclear
flashpoint."
Joining me today to discuss the crisis between
India and Pakistan are three experts. Stephen
Cohen is a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution. Zalmay Khalilzad is director of the
strategy and doctrine program at the RAND
Corporation and a former Assistant Under Secretary
of Defense. And Michael Krepon is president of the
Henry Stimson Center, a Washington-based think
tank. Welcome to the program.
Stephen Cohen, how is it that, in February, a
declaration is singed between the two prime
ministers in Lahore, committing them to the
peaceful resolution of all the outstanding issues
between Pakistan and India, and several months
later there is an armed conflagration in Kashmir?
What happened?
Cohen: We are still learning about what happened.
Apparently, Nawaz Sharif decided to give
permission for an incursion by the Pakistan
military or something supported by the Pakistan
military. And either it was larger than he thought
it would be or it got out of hand. It was more
successful than he thought it would be, and the
Indians suffered at least a tactical military
defeat. I think, though, that Lahore and Kargil,
these two extremes, do represent the way in which
the countries relate to each other -- in extremes.
They do find it hard to establish a normal working
relationship. And that's been with us for forty-
five years.
Host: And is the worst part of that bad
relationship constituted by the Kashmir issue?
Cohen: No, it could have been worse and it could
get worse. Kashmir has been a contentious issue
between the two countries for a long time, but I
think they have worked out a relationship where
they will not let Kashmir get out of hand.
Host: Zalmay Khalilzad, what was the purpose of
this action on the side of Pakistan? What did
they hope to achieve, and did they achieve it?
Khalilzad: The Pakistani calculation is that with
the nuclear weapons that they now posses - as
limited a capability as it might be - they are
somewhat safe in terms of a bigger war, that the
likelihood of a big war has decreased because of
the existence of nuclear weapons. And therefore
they feel freer to pursue insurgency operations
against India in order to get international
attention to the Kashmir issue and in order to get
the United States, in particular, to become
involved and seek a settlement of the Kashmir
issue on terms that would be more acceptable to
Pakistan. The problem is whether the Pakistani
Prime Minister miscalculated, that is, in thinking
that the war can remain limited, that they can
indulge in activities like Kargil. But things
might get out of hand and inadvertently lead to a
bigger war. I agree with Steve that neither wants
a big war but, out of miscalculation, war is an
unpredictable business. It is plausible that, as
Pakistanis pursue an insurgency strategy against
India, the Indian reactions and Pakistani counter-
reactions to that could, not that it necessarily
would, lead to a bigger war, including the use of
nuclear weapons.
Host: Mr. Krepon, wasn't the whole impetus of
the Lahore meeting driven by the fact that a small
conflict could lead to a nuclear confrontation?
So it was ironic to see that small conflagration
take place so soon after the concerns expressed
that we can't fight each other now because of the
dangers of nuclear escalation.
Krepon: I think there were a lot of elements
behind Lahore. There were a lot of reasons for
Lahore. And they were genuine reasons. There are
people in both India and Pakistan who do want to
turn the page after fifty years of enmity. There
are business interests in both countries that want
to have a normal trading relationship. These
countries are both stunted in terms of their
economic development and potential because of the
military drain and the drain of insurgency, which
by the way is a drain on Pakistani society, as
well as Indian society. There are lots of good
reasons to go to Lahore. It was a terrible
miscalculation on the part of some of the
Pakistani military leaders and on the part of the
Prime Minister of Pakistan to pursue a Kargil
strategy immediately after a Lahore strategy.
This speaks to the incoherence, the growing
incoherence of Pakistan's approach toward India
and also the difficulties that are growing within
Pakistan itself.
Host: That's an interesting point, and to what
extent does that incoherence that you just
referred to reflect political incoherence inside
Pakistan?
Cohen: I would say that Pakistan has been groping
for a new political order almost since that day it
was born. It has gone through several definitions
of what it means to be a Pakistani and what
Pakistan stands for, ranging from being "not
Indian" to being Islamic and everything in
between. The military have played an inordinate
role in Pakistani politics. And in a sense, since
they have been in power for almost twenty-five
years, half the country's existence, they have not
allowed civilians to rise up and assume their own
political role. And therefore their security and
defense policy-making in Pakistan is somewhat
imbalanced. The military, I think, are very
professional and, I think, are very competent for
the most part. But there is not balance to it.
And to make sound decisions, to make wise
decisions, to avoid making these kinds of
mistakes, you need to balance the officer's mess
with a responsible political party. Pakistan has
yet to develop that, even now after ten years of
democracy under [former Prime Minister] Benazir
[Bhutto] and Nawaz Sharif.
Host: To what extent does the fact that Pakistan
is more and more defining itself as an Islamic
state have an impact on its policy inside of
Kashmir? Because some say this was an area in
which the Hindus and Muslims lived very peacefully
for centuries, but because it was more of a Sufi
kind of Muslim practice, and now that's been
radicalized by the mujahadeen. What do you think?
Khalilzad: I think that the fact that Pakistan has
been unhappy with the situation in Kashmir has
been true whether it has had a government that has
been Islamic or more secular. I think the content
of the forces that are operating in Kashmir now,
and supported by Pakistan, has become more
Islamic.
Host: What are the Afghans doing there?
Khalilzad: Well, we talked earlier about the
incoherence of Pakistan's policy on Kashmir and
India. You can see the same thing in regard to
Afghanistan, where on the one hand you get many
Pakistanis in government and in the elite fearful
of Talebanism and the phenomenon we see in
Afghanistan spreading to Pakistan, and on the hand
in the government of Pakistan as a whole and the
I-S-I, the intelligence arm of the Pakistan
military and government supporting the Taleban.
And in those areas of Afghanistan that are under
the control of Taleban, there are facilities in
which Kashmiri militants, Kashmiri mujahadeen if
you like, get trained. And sometimes they are
mixed together with some of the Arabs and some
international terrorists networks that also
operate and train out of there.
Cohen: I would add that one of Pakistan's
problems is that it is strategically too far
extended. It has really overreached itself. It
has tried to conduct a major war, in a sense a
revolution in Afghanistan and also into central
Asia. It is the base for various Islamic
movements, some more violent and some more radical
than others are. And it is also trying to wage a
low level, low intensity war with India. That
would be possible because it is a large and
powerful state, if it were a coherent state. But
Pakistan has allowed its economy to deteriorate;
its social structure is unraveling in many ways.
There are sectarian disputes within Pakistan
between different varieties of Islam, and also
there is an inter-provincial conflict in Pakistan.
So I think Pakistan is really overreaching itself
and it has to cut its strategy to its
capabilities.
Host: Michael Krepon, you had mentioned that
there are substantial forces in both Pakistan and
India that want to turn a new page. To what
extent is their desire frustrated or aided by the
fact that both of these are now nuclear powers?
Krepon: With the advent of covert nuclear
capabilities in the early 1990s, Kashmir got
hotter. The situation in Kashmir got a lot worse.
And with the advent of overt nuclear capabilities
in both countries last year, Kashmir got a lot
worse. So there is a connection. But let me talk
a little bit about Pakistan's Kashmir problem and
also India's Kashmir problem. There are very,
very different. Pakistan's Kashmir problem, as
Steve Cohen has said, is that Pakistan's Kashmir
policy is an insurgency policy. And the more
Pakistan resorts to the use of the gun within
Kashmir, the more the gun becomes prevalent within
Pakistan itself. And so Pakistan's Kashmir policy
threatens Pakistan. And it does not help
Kashmiris. And that truth is not widely discussed
in Pakistan, certainly in the media. India also
has a Kashmir problem. India's Kashmir problem is
that India's governance has not done real well in
the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir. That is
being very polite. There is widespread alienation.
People do not like what the Indian security forces
are doing on the ground. India's approach to
Kashmir has had only one track, which is fighting
insurgency. And every Indian scholar who has
looked at Kashmir has come to the same conclusion.
A one-track policy for Kashmir is not going to
work.
Host: What is the United States supposed to do
about this, because when Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif came here and met with President Bill
Clinton on the 4th of July, he obtained from him a
statement that President Clinton would take a
personal interest in resolving the Kashmir
dispute? Now how can the United States do that?
Khalilzad: I think that for the immediate future I
don't see a real prospect for a settlement or a
compromise between India and Pakistan. The
options clearly could be acceptance of the current
line of control, some modification of the current
line of control in favor of Pakistan, and
independence for Kashmir, or a grand bargain
across south Asia involving China and India, as
well as resolving the Indo-Pakistan problem in the
name of nuclear stability because this has become
a nuclearized region. And there is a need of a
settlement of a grand kind.
Host: But first of all you would have to settle
the dispute over what would be the means by which
to have such a conversation, because India
maintains the they do not want to talk about this
in the U-N or even with the united States. It is a
bilateral issue, and Pakistan says the opposite.
Khalilzad: I think that maybe it will take time to
get the parties to move towards considering one of
these options. I would not rule out that India
would want to engage. Perhaps the formula would
have to be a creative one that doesn't really
indicate third party involvement de jure, while de
facto there could be some such third party
involvement. I think that the problem is not only
India, but the problem is also Pakistan because
each of the alternatives, except one in which the
whole of Kashmir comes and joins Pakistan, poses
Pakistan with extreme dilemmas and challenges.
But I think what we need to do is to become more
engaged in preparing the grounds for a settlement
over the longer term. The near term is to manage
the crisis and prevent it from getting out of
control.
Host: What about the role in the region of the
third nuclear power, China?
Krepon: Pakistan would welcome China's
involvement. India would consider it anathema.
Host: What is the Chinese interest?
Krepon: China has very good ties with Pakistan.
Host: Indeed, they would not have their nuclear
capability without China, would they?
Krepon: There are many reports of Chinese help to
Pakistan with respect to the missile program and
the nuclear program, which is another reason why
India would have great difficulty inviting China
to sit at the table where a solution was to be
formed. There is a real paradox here and a lot of
people have discovered it. And that is that
Pakistan, which has long called for
internationalization, might actually not benefit
if this were to occur. And that India, which has
long opposed internationalization, might find that
third parties would be supportive to Indian
equities in this dissipate. So the United States
has taken the position, and I think it is a good
position, that we are not going to go in there and
barge our way to the table. It is not going to
work. It would not be welcome on the part of the
Indian government. We are not going to do it. If
both sides can see the wisdom of inviting third
parties in to encourage, to suggest, to help in a
variety of ways, my sense is that third parties
would like to be helpful. We are worried about
where this relationship is going between India and
Pakistan. We are worried about Pakistan's future.
And the longer this thing goes on, the worse it is
likely to get.
Host: Stephen Cohen?
Cohen: I would be worried of a direct and major
American role. And I think we are in agreement on
that. I do think that America has interests in the
region and has to get engaged, but more gradually.
We don't have a process by which we can get
engaged. If there were an American proposal for
the settlement of Kashmir, for example, then
certainly that would be the target for both India
and Pakistan. That's certainly a way to shoot it
down. America should engage other countries, not
simply China, because China and the Saudis have
some influence in Pakistan, but also Japan and
some of the European states, which are concerned
about both Kashmir and the nuclear issue. There
are really two separate issues. The question of a
nuclear war or nuclear proliferation from the
region, and as well as to the region, and a
conflict in Kashmir. I don't think that Kashmir
itself necessarily leads to a nuclear war. These
problems are tied together. They have to be
unraveled in some way. And a more careful,
extended diplomacy or diplomatic effort is
necessary to deal with them both, a sort of
parallel process. You don't deal with one only;
you deal with both of them at the same time. And I
think we have lacked this kind of balanced policy
toward south Asia. Our primary emphasis for the
past six or eight years has been entirely on non-
proliferation. And we have ignored the disputes
between India and Pakistan and also the disputes
between India and China, where there is
considerable enmity, at least on the India side.
So I think a more holistic, comprehensive American
view is necessary. I am not sure if this
administration will get around to it, but
certainly they are being forced to think of
alternatives because the policy they have pursued
has not worked.
Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have and
I would like to thank our guests, Stephen Cohen
from the Brookings Institute, Zalmay Khalilzad
from the RAND Corporation, and Michael Krepon from
the Henry Stimson Center, for joining me to
discuss the India-Pakistan crisis. This is Robert
Reilly for On the Line.
19-Aug-1999 15:05 PM EDT (19-Aug-1999 1905 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
