TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
In resolution 1172 (1998), adopted on 6 June 1998, the Security Council
condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by
Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998 and set out a number of steps to be taken by the
two countries. The Council requested me to report urgently on the
implementation of those steps by the two countries, while welcoming my own
efforts to encourage them to enter into a dialogue.
Ever since India's 11 May tests, I have been in frequent contact with
representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan at the highest levels,
as well as through other channels, including their Permanent Representatives to
the United Nations, by letter, telephone and personally. In these contacts, I
have expressed my acute concern at the alarming consequences of these tests and
have urged both Governments to enter into a dialogue in order to reduce the
increased tensions in the region. I have also appealed to both Governments to
adhere, without conditions and without delay, to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty and to consider freezing their nuclear weapons and missile
development programmes. Furthermore, I have advised India and Pakistan of my
readiness to support any efforts conducive to successful negotiations on nuclear
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
In the context of my ongoing efforts to encourage India and Pakistan to
enter into dialogue, which were welcomed by the Council in paragraph 6 of
resolution 1172 (1998), the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs,
Alvaro de Soto, travelled to the South Asian region on 24 June carrying letters
to Heads of Governments, in order to raise with them, on my behalf, the above-expressed concerns, as well as the possibility that I might visit the region, at
the appropriate time. He visited Bangladesh, where he met Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina, who had recently called on the Prime Ministers of India and
Pakistan in New Delhi and Islamabad, and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Abdus Samad Azad. He subsequently conferred with Prime Minister
Mohammed Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Gohar Ayub Khan. Finally, in Sri Lanka, host of the forthcoming summit of the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, he was received by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lakshman Kadirgamar. Regrettably, the Government
of India did not find it possible to receive Mr. de Soto during his mission,
which was concluded at the end of last week.
Mr. de Soto's contacts with regional leaders, while not as complete as
would have been desirable, nevertheless confirmed my concern that the new
situation which had emerged following the developments of May, compounding as it
does the long-standing causes of friction between India and Pakistan, may have
serious implications for peace and security in the region and beyond and
therefore needs to be addressed in earnest. It is my intention, therefore, to
continue my efforts with a view to encouraging the commencement of substantive
talks between the two Governments at the earliest possible date. In this
connection, I have been encouraged by indications from both sides of their
readiness to enter into a dialogue addressing peace and security matters and
causes of tension, including Kashmir.
In paragraph 15 of resolution 1172 (1998), the Security Council requested
me to report urgently on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement that
resolution. Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, in a press
statement issued by the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs
of India on 6 June 1998 and in a statement to the Security Council by the
Permanent Representative of Pakistan on the same date, both Governments
expressed reservations about different aspects of the resolution. However, in
subsequent communications and statements, both Governments have offered
suggestions relevant to various provisions of resolution 1172 (1998).
Specifically, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, addressed a
letter to me on 30 June 1998 drawing my attention to a "number of proposals"
made by India. On 2 July, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan wrote to me
setting out in an annex to his letter "Pakistan's position and proposals"
(S/1998/605). Similar proposals were conveyed by the Acting Foreign Secretary
of Pakistan to Mr. de Soto in Islamabad on 28 June. In addition, the following
documents and statements are also relevant to the subject matter:
Letter from the representative of the Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
dated 29 June
Letter from the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization dated 26 June
Letter from the Chairman of the Zangger Committee dated 26 June
Letter from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
dated 25 June
Pakistan's press statement of 11 June
Statement by India's Ministry of External Affairs of 5 June
Reply of the Prime Minister of India in discussion in Parliament on 29 May
Suo Moto statement by the Indian Prime Minister and paper presented to the
Indian Parliament on 27 May
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General dated 2 July
For the purpose of the report requested by the Council, the proposals and
positions expressed by the two Governments and other relevant information
emerging from the above-mentioned sources can be summarized as follows:
In paragraph 3 of resolution 1172 (1998) the Security Council demanded that
India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests. Since the adoption of
the resolution, both Governments have announced unilateral moratoriums. India
has also stated its willingness to convert this moratorium into a de jure
obligation. Pakistan, for its part, has indicated readiness to engage
constructively with India and other members of the international community with
the aim of formalizing the moratorium and reaching an agreement with India on a
bilateral nuclear test ban or on a wider regional ban involving other countries
in the region.
With reference to paragraph 4 of the resolution, frequent firing across the
Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has continued, as has the irregular warfare
in the area administered by India between militants and Indian security forces.
During his visit to Islamabad, Mr. de Soto was advised that in recent months
there had been a significant increase in the level of hostilities, reflected in
a growing number of civilian casualties. In this connection, it can also be
noted that in a letter which he addressed to me on 26 June 1998, the Permanent
Representative of Pakistan referred to "the deteriorating security situation in
South Asia, and particularly in Jammu and Kashmir".
In relation to paragraph 5 of the resolution, which calls on India and
Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, Prime
Minister Vajpayee advised me, in his letter of 30 June 1998, of his Government's
intention to pursue bilateral dialogue with Pakistan while rejecting any outside
involvement as counter-productive. As for Pakistan, its Permanent
Representative indicated to me in his letter, dated 2 July 1998, that his
Government would be ready to "engage with India and the international community
to promote a process, which in the first instance should accord priority to the
avoidance of conflict, the promotion of nuclear and conventional restraint and
stabilization between Pakistan and India, as well as the peaceful and just
resolution of the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir".
Earlier, on 12 June 1998, the Government of India had extended an
invitation to Pakistan to resume talks at the level of Foreign Secretaries in
Delhi on 22 June 1998. On the same day, while rejecting India's offer on the
grounds that the proposed agenda was not acceptable, Pakistan made a counter-offer for talks to resume in Islamabad on 20 June 1998. This proposal was not
acceptable to India. Subsequently, on 23 June, the Prime Minister of Pakistan
addressed a letter to the Prime Minister of India affirming his readiness to
meet with him during the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation at Colombo, Sri Lanka, at the end of July. It is my understanding,
based on subsequent indications by representatives of both Governments, that
such a meeting is likely to materialize.
In paragraph 7 of resolution 1172 (1998), the Council called on India and
Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapons programmes and specified a
number of steps to that effect. In this regard, India indicated, in a statement
issued by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on 27 May 1998, that it would be
ready to enter into discussions with Pakistan and other countries on an
agreement on the "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons.
In document S/1998/605, Pakistan recalled its proposal for a non-aggression
agreement, on the basis of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
It suggested that, "perhaps, as a first step, the two countries could
(a) solemnly reaffirm their commitment to non-use of force as prescribed by the
Charter of the United Nations; (b) undertake to create transparency in military
preparations and (c) discuss further confidence-building measures, e.g. the
creation of a 'risk reduction centre'." While adding that it had not "declared
itself a 'Nuclear-Weapon State'", it indicated that it was prepared to enter
into a bilateral and/or multilateral dialogue to evolve an agreement for the
maintenance of strategic parity and stable deterrence between India and
Pakistan, at an agreed level. It underlined that it would not accept a position
of strategic inequality vis-à-vis India.
Pakistan also addressed the issue of a "conventional balance" between India
and Pakistan, which it considers "a necessary complement for nuclear
stabilization". It expressed interest in entering "into discussions bilaterally
with India and/or together with the major powers to establish new confidence-building measures, 'command and control' and monitoring of implementation of
confidence-building measures". It expected the international community,
particularly the five permanent members of the Security Council, to persuade
India to exercise restraint and to forego acquisition of sophisticated weapons
systems which will further destabilize the situation.
On the issue of weaponization, Pakistan assumed that some weaponization had
already occurred. It felt that the two countries should be encouraged to
restrain their build-up of warheads to the minimum and refrain from deployment
of missiles. It pointed out that it could "not accept a situation of
inferiority in missile capabilities", but that it was prepared to discuss the
issue of mutual restraint in the production and deployment of missiles.
Paragraph 7 of resolution 1172 (1998) also raised the issue of export
policies. In this context, India has confirmed, in a statement issued by the
Prime Minister on 27 May 1998, its commitment to continue to observe stringent
export controls on nuclear and missile related technologies, as well as those
relating to other weapons of mass destruction. For its part, Pakistan has
declared that it has never and will not transfer sensitive technologies to other
States or entities.
Regarding paragraph 13 of the resolution, India has reiterated its known
position regarding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It
stated that India's becoming a nuclear-weapon State had been inevitable because
the non-proliferation regime neither led to nuclear disarmament nor did it
prevent proliferation in the region. It pointed out that it could not accept a
flawed non-proliferation regime and appealed to the international community to
join in re-examining the present international security regime, which remained
committed to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. India also
stressed that the regime must be comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory
and expressed support for the recent eight-nation declaration, "Towards a
Nuclear-Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda".
Pakistan has stated that, under the circumstances, it would have to rely on
nuclear deterrence and stressed the importance of building comprehensive
arrangements for peace and security with India, including a conventional arms
balance and the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. It underlined, however, that
it was in favour of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
India has recalled that its decision not to subscribe to the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty had been approved by its Parliament in 1996. Its perception
then was that subscribing to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would severely
limit its nuclear potential to an unacceptably low level. Its reservations
deepened as the Treaty did not prove to carry forward the nuclear disarmament
process.
Pakistan has stressed that "its position on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty will be shaped by an assessment and analysis of its security requirements
in the context of the nuclear and conventional threat posed by India".
Concerning paragraph 14 of resolution 1172 (1998), both States have
reiterated their readiness to participate in negotiations on a convention
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
In the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, members of the Group of
Twenty-One, to which India and Pakistan belong, have proposed that negotiations
on the fissile material cut-off treaty should be one element of broader
negotiations on "nuclear disarmament", for example in an ad hoc committee
dealing with (a) a convention committing all States to the elimination of
nuclear weapons; (b) negotiations on the programme for nuclear disarmament; and
(c) a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other explosive devices.
India has also called for a global and comprehensive approach working
towards adopting a nuclear weapons convention in the shortest possible time.
Pakistan has stressed that a convention banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices should only be discussed
in the Conference on Disarmament and supports the approach of the Group of
Twenty-One. It has also sought clarification from the five permanent members of
the Security Council and those interested in the convention on whether India
would enter the talks as a nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon State, bearing in mind
that obligations for the two categories of States would differ.
It is noted that the Conference on Disarmament, which concluded the second
part of its 1998 session on 25 June 1998, has not been able to move forward on
the issue of a fissile material cut-off. Positions among States remain divided
over the issue. Most Western and Eastern European States wish to seen an
immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in
the Conference on Disarmament. Non-aligned countries maintain that the issue
could be dealt with within the framework of an ad hoc committee on nuclear
disarmament.
(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN
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